So now, instead of pitching the plane down automatically, a light comes on.
Must’ve taken a real genius to figure that one out.
This is the problem with using H1 B Visas for this kind of work. In the US, even though it’s happening less and less, we are used being notified or informed of issues and having the freedom to make our own decisions. In other countries, they are used to being ruled not governed. The betters make the decision for you and establish controls to enforce that.
Instead of trusting the pilot to handle the situation, the H1 B figures the problem is too tough for the pilot to solve on their own and thinks it too risky that they have the freedom to make the wrong choice.
Commercial aircraft avionics manufacturers are going heavily into H1B use. Have been for a while.
> H1 B
All right. I am in the software development business. I have worked with MANY of these people. I do not doubt your characterization of this generation of H1Bs. (Their kids will be interesting — and make no mistake, they have STAYED and will not be going back).
But - do you have any data showing that H1Bs were on the project, or are working on any of these projects at Boeing or subcontractors?
The problem is that this aircraft, apparently, has inherent instability. Boeing did not add the MCAS system just because they thought it would be fun to have a system that would grab control from time to time and crash airplanes. They added MCAS because there are certain flight regimes that can lead to a stall unless the pilot, or the aircraft, takes immediate action.
So now you fix one problem by removing the fix that you put in to resolve an even bigger problem. If MCAS will no longer correct for impending stall, how does Boeing intend to deal with the inherent instability problem?
The next Boeing 737MAX accident will be a convention stall, but the passengers will be just as dead.
With all due respect, H1b visas are not in play here. While I do understand your comment and appreciate that perspective this is a case of Boeing Management wanting to deliver a 737 variant that required no additional training to use as a sales tool. Then they needed bigger engines to match the airbus competitor. The larger engines required a nacelle/wing change that change the characteristics of the plane. So in order to keep the “no additional training” point they developed MCAS which automagically made the MAX variant fly the same as the non MAX. Mistake number 1 was to let marketing needs override engineering (typical management mistake). Number 2 was single sensor input.
Man, can't even make this kind of stuff up.
I think a lot of aviation companies get paralysis through over-analysis. Just build a damn airplane.
Do I sense a sense of sarcasm? S/off
So how do you really feel about H1 B software programmers taking American jobs for half the cost to Boeing?
Do I sense a sense of sarcasm? S/off
So how do you really feel about H1 B software programmers taking American jobs for half the cost to Boeing?
Yeah, and how many were Chinese...