Posted on 04/30/2019 9:33:26 AM PDT by WhoisAlanGreenspan?
Juan's latest update is well worth checking out. He attempts putting the unstable design theories to rest.
Also Boeing Shareholder Press Briefing
I would be proud to have you as my wingman, anywhere...anytime.
In all of my years at FreeRepublic.com, yours is the nicest comment I have read.
Here's a question for consideration that I haven't seen discussed in depth anywhere. Both the Indonesian and Ethiopian 737s fought and lost the battle with the MCAS systems, but both also had airspeed near or beyond the maximum allowed. In the Ethiopian case the air crew were criticized for not watching their speed and not turning the automatic throttle off.
The Indonesian report never mentions automatic throttle, and they were unable to sort out correct flight info between the right and left flight computers and the backup. So much so that they asked the terminal control about their altitude and airspeed, 322 knots 2,150 feet as they retracted the flaps and got the first nose down.
Kind of like Trump, I like the guys who don't crash!
Here's one for you. At Oshkosh, I was sitting drinking a coffee one morning and this older looking guy walks up and starts telling me his story.
He flys one of those short takeoff Piper Cubs with huge tires, and he tells me he's better at it than almost all the other pilots. Then he admits that he only learned to fly like 2-3 years ago! He was in his mid-eighties.
Pilots are pretty cool folks.
My neighbor went into so much detail that I actually had to leave before he finished telling me the finer points of what he had learned. I looked at the link that you included in your latest two points but there is a lot of information to go through there as well. I realize that with my experience being limited to general aviation aircraft that this is going over my head.
The primary point my neighbor made was that the behavior of the automatic trim system that Boeing has been using for nearly 60 years and the actual mechanics of how it works were altered. What happens when you use the two stab trim cutout switches near the stabilizer trim wheel also appears to have been altered. To completely disable MCAS it appears that you now need to turn off the breaker which is above your head and not that easy to find in an emergency if you haven’t been made aware of it previously. With proper training and notification the new system may still be perfectly safe but he felt that the lack of proper notification may be a big problem for Boeing.
My first powered aircraft was an ultralight taildragger called a Skypup. I took lessons in a Aeronca Champ and belonged to a club where everyone started out with ultralights, graduated to experimentals, and then went on to “classic aircraft” mostly Aeroncas, taildragging Pipers and Cessnas and a variety of fabric covered planes.
In my old age I just like a nice tame, simple tricycle gear airplane that once you plop it on the ground, can be taxied around like a car. I don’t need speed or challenges landing or taking off. I have had enough exciting aviation experiences. I just like predictable and safe these days.
All...Well worth reading. This preliminary report does not identify "cause". I believe that in section 2 of the final report, any finding that is "causal" will be listed as such. Also, note 14, at the bottom of page 22 explains what a "Finding" is.
...but both also had airspeed near or beyond the maximum allowed...
I believe this will be listed as a "causal" finding in both accidents.
And they didn't tell the airlines or the pilots.
With proper training and notification the new system may still be perfectly safe but he felt that the lack of proper notification may be a big problem for Boeing.
Bingo!
Here's the new Runaway Stabilizer procedure:
If this procedure had been in place, I believe both accidents would have been prevented...Sad.
The following link postulates Boeing's thought process WRT MCAS implementation:
I don't agree with everything postulated, however, I believe it is worth reading. If anyone has questions about terms used, let me know and I will try to answer.
Are you a real pilot?
An old Marine Pilot sat down at the Starbucks, still wearing his old USMC flight jacket and ordered a cup of coffee.
As he sat sipping his coffee, a young woman sat down next to him.
She turned to the pilot and asked, Are you a real pilot?
He replied, ‘Well, I’ve spent my whole life flying planes, first Stearmans, then the early Grummans...
flew a Wildcat and Corsair in WWII, and later in the Korean conflict, Banshees and Cougars.
I’ve taught more than 260 people to fly and given rides to hundreds,
so I guess I am a pilot, and you, what are you?
She said, ‘I’m a lesbian. I spend my whole day thinking about naked women.
As soon as I get up in the morning, I think about naked women.
When I shower, I think about naked women.
When I watch TV, I think about naked women.
It seems everything makes me think of naked women.’
The two sat sipping in silence.
A little while later, a young man sat down on the other side of the old pilot and asked: “Are you a real pilot?”
He replied, ‘I always thought I was, but I just found out I’m a lesbian.’
” To completely disable MCAS it appears that you now need to turn off the breaker which is above your head and not that easy to find in an emergency if you havent been made aware of it previously. “
The switches are about waist high on the throttle quandrant between the manual trim wheels.
To your previous post; Pretty interesting!
longitudinal stability augmentation system needed to comply with FAR MCAS out of the KC-767A / KC-46 design is an "off the shelf", proven solution, and is also compatible with 737 "legacy" air data architecture (2 AoA channels, not 3)
Good discussion at airliners.net
However I know some people disagree with Jollo's conjecture here; Note: switching only STAB TRIM CUTOFF AUTO-PILOT to CUTOFF while leaving STAB TRIM CUTOFF MAIN ELECT to NORMAL would have disabled all automations while leaving the electrical stab trim servo operative, to help pilots cope with aero loads on the stabilizer via thumb switches. Both Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes could easily have been avoided.
Somewhere I've seen the electrical schematic of those two switches and I'm pretty sure those saying they're redundant are correct. That it doesn't work the way Jollo wrote above is another monumentally unforgivable flaw.
No, this is what I thought also but it was just explained to me by an airline pilot familiar with the MAX. The switches that are knee high on the left hand side of the co-pilot's trim wheel, are the stabilizer trim cutout switches, but they do not function in quite the same as they did prior to MCAS. The stabilizer trim mechanism that pilots have been familiar with in the last 60 or so years of Boeing aircraft was redesigned in the 737 MAX. To turn off MCAS completely the breaker which is above the pilot's heads as they are seated needs to the switched to the off position.
The airplane is most likely perfectly safe when flown by competent pilots, but the decision was made at Boeing to not inform pilots of the changes in procedure in training, manuals and bulletins and is now the primary reason why they are probably in hot water.
“No, this is what I thought also but it was just explained to me by an airline pilot familiar with the MAX. “
You earlier mentioned he was relaying information he had just learned and you didn’t stay for the finer points.
yawn.
Get some context wise guy. Look around. We're just having a discussion, join in. Leave the attitude at the door please, this isn't democrat underwear, we love ya man, chill.
“Get some context wise guy. “
Context:
F changed his mind during this thread.
F hasn’t read the accounts and narratives of the FDR and CVR.
That wasn't one of the finer points... that was the major point.
What is your point?
“Perhaps, if the runaway trim checklist also called for setting engine thrust to 75%, the pilots could have saved the aircraft & all souls on board.”
Before the MCAS actuated, they were getting airspeed and autopilot warnings.
The airspeed checklist requires reducing power to 75%. It’s in the article you linked AND the preliminary report.
The AOA feeds the calculated airspeed which (along with the autopilot) were sounding alarms.
The faulty airspeed alarm checklist requires reducing power to 75%.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.