Posted on 03/16/2019 11:59:19 AM PDT by Allen In Texas Hill Country
As I tell friends, I worked on computers before the public knew computers existed. Can you say SOAPII? Anyway, I can't begin to imagine what the programmers that coded the MCAS boxes are going thru. I know, Boeing needed to more thoroughly train pilots on using or interacting with the MCAS box. But none the less, "in a manner of speaking", the programming of those boxes has indirectly killed over 300 people. But nobody will ever say that.
Carriers from Category 1 countries are permitted to operate into the U.S. and/or codeshare with U.S. air carriers in accordance with Department of Transportation (DOT) authorizations
IASA assessments determine compliance with these international standards by focusing on each critical element (CE) of an effective aviation safety oversight authority specified in ICAO Document 9734, Safety Oversight Manual. These eight critical elements include:
• (CE-1) Primary aviation legislation; • (CE-2) Specific operating regulations; • (CE-3) State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions; • (CE-4) Technical personnel qualification and training; • (CE-5) Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety critical information; • (CE-6) Licensing, certification, authorization, and approval obligations; • (CE-7) Surveillance obligations; and • (CE-8) Resolution of safety concerns.
An IASA does not evaluate the safety compliance of any particular air carrier, nor does it address aviation security, airports, or air traffic management.
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa/media/FAA_Initiatives_IASA.pdf
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This fact does not, apparently, take into account that Ethiopia allows 200-hour first officers to occupy the right seat in large commercial aircraft.
In the USA, all our first officers have at least 1,500 hours, by law.
Yes, there may be training issues with this crew, but using copilots with only 200 hours is at least as serious of an obstacle to safety, even with an experienced captain, as in this flight.
https://www.businessinsider.com/ethiopian-airlines-flight-302-co-pilot-200-flight-hours-2019-3
I would never deign to argue otherwise!
Dobutamine is better than both.
“MCAS makes the plane safer when there are competent pilots on board.”
I have only flown light planes. I am not sure why automatic horz trim is necessary. After a while trimming is almost instinct. Having an automatic system add trim to your own trim seems like an unnecessary thing but adds a little complexity. I would be interested in the opinion of someone that has used an MCAS.
My Theory after reading much on this:
The 737 Max does not fly like a 737. The larger engines and forward position create very unique attributes in flight.
When a plane flies so differently from others, it usually gets its own type-rating....meaning pilots must be trained specifically on that type of aircraft.
That costs a lot of money for both Boeing and for the airlines. Pilot training and recurring training is expensive.
Boeing needed to get the 737 Max to market quickly to counter the Airbus 320 Neo.
But if the 737 Max was given a different type rating, it would be cost-prohibitive for the airlines to add them to their fleet.
The ideal would be to have the 737 Max share the same type rating with the rest of the 737 series so pilots trained on one can fly the other.
But because the 737 Max did not perform like other 737s, Boeing created the MCAS system so the FAA would rate the Max as the same as any other 737.
Now, there have been problems with the MCAS reported by several pilots. There was a complaint that Boeing did not disclose the system fully enough.
As the flight ascends, the MCAS, which only uses the input from one Angle of Attack sensor, gets flakey. Most airlines use three sensors for automated systems. When two sensors agree, the computer uses that data. But when you only use one sensor and you get erroneous data....computers just do what the strange data tells it to do. In this case, it pushes the nose of the plane down.
The pilot tries to correct and ends up fighting the MCAS. Realizing this, the pilot disconnects the MCAS and tries to fly manually.
But remember, the 737 Max does not behave like most 737s. In a difficult situation, close to the ground, the pilot who has been flying 737s for a long time will fall back on their experience and make corrections as if it was a 737-800, for example.
That would be like making manual corrections on a 747 that you would make with a Piper Cub. It can make the situation worse.
Nice combinations of invention and willful ignorance there. How much does Boeing pay for social media folks these days?
“Southwest Airlines have some 80 737 aircraft with the MAX MCAS” - They actually have 34 MAX 8 planes in their fleet.
https://www.southwestaircommunity.com/t5/Southwest-Stories/Boeing-737-MAX-8-FAQs/ba-p/88171
“nor, as far as I am aware, have their pilots reported difficulties with managing the system.”
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/pilot-complaints-boeing-737-max/index.html
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/article227481979.html
https://thepointsguy.com/2017/10/first-sw-737-max-breaks-down/
Maybe it’s how they wrote the requirements. Can be dicey with all those H1B Visas.
E.g.
Wife tells programmer husband “Pick up a loaf of bread on the way home from work and if they have eggs, get a dozen.”
The husband arrives at home with twelve loaves of bread.
Check out the date of the instructions you posted. Compare that to the date that the plane went into commercial service.
Yes, these instructions are post-Lion crash. But they are out there now and I expect every pilot flying a MAX knows about this now.
Besides, the STAB TRIM CUTOUT has been there forever and pilots area all trained on when to use it in runaway stabilizer conditions. This is nothing new.
So did they operate on relays. Or revolvers, resistors, capacitive tachometer potentiometers.
Thus my nightmare(s) about autonomous ground vehicles when the decision cycle deteriorates to what constitutes an acceptable choice of bad outcomes. Say vehicle is traveling at 45 mph when road ahead has tractor trailer jackknifing, and there is a school bus on the left and a group of bicyclists riding on a low-curb separated trail on right. What value-based selection comes into play at this 98% unlikely scenario?
>> That is a totally ignorant supposition.
And you, Sir, are the primary reason why competent aviators rarely comment to the general public.
Qualifications: Over 18,000 hours total time, of which ONE YEAR (365 x 24) of it was spent in the 737s. 34+ years flying large aircraft (now retired). Military aviator, 56+ years since first solo. Former Line Check Airman on the 737. I hold 5 Boeing type ratings. Current CFI. A&P, Dispatcher, Flight Engineer, etc. .
And for the other FReepers reading this, in the “old days”, Boeing training was the industry standard.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaA7kPfC5Hk
Boeing flushed Lockheed and the Douglas Bellcrank and Accumulator Co. down the toilet. The real fight began with the Gummn’t supported Airbooses....
I could go on, but suffice it to say that the U.S. Air Carriers are not world leaders in passenger revenue because of their superb cabin service.
>> Do the switches actually disconnect the circuit to the trim tabs or turn off an input into the controller?
The Stabilizer Trim system doesn’t use the trim tabs; it repositions the horizontal stabilizer. The cutoff switches depower the jackscrew motor that repositions the horizontal stabilizer.
One of the reasons I love FR is the diversity of thought on here, and the exposure in discussion to a wide range of experience in innumerable areas of expertise, many of which I have only a passing knowledge.
Let’s take advantage of it.
I welcome the input of someone who understands, in depth, multiple facets of aviation from design and support to operation.
I am inclined to accept at near face value that the concept of selling airplanes to countries with more available money than a cultural inclination to train pilots rigorously could indeed be a contributing cause.
You must all take into account that on certain foreign air carriers the local culture is different then what we practice in the USA. The two man USA crew is trained to perform under all flight circumstances with unified, effective, equal, communication between the Captain & First Officer. Of course the Captain retains final control direction...but the crew always operates as a “seamless” team.
In some Asian and African countries the Captain is supreme and the First Officer driven by their culture, will always follow his lead. This situation make for non seamless operations, as such that happened a few years when an Asiana Airlines aircraft crashed while landing in San Francisco, USA.
I am not saying these type actions were present during Indonesian & Ethiopia crashes...but it must be considered, because...the USA airmen have not had a similar incident. In other words, when an abnormal, threatening incident occurs, one crew member continues to fly and control the aircraft while the other crew member addresses the problem. When both crew members become totally immersed in handling the problem a crash is likely to occur.
I heard by the grapevine that Southwest, which have a number of these planes, have their pilots so well trained that THEY discovered the new anti-stall, became familiar with it, and have never had a problem with porpoising on climb-out. And if there’s ever the least question, the pilot TURNS IT OFF and flies the plane himself.
I remember when that crash happened, and the names of the cockpit crew became known. Never did learn each one’s position or rank. Their names were given as: Sum Ting Wong, Wi Tu Loh, and Ho Lee S**t.
Only if your problem is cardiogrnic shock rather then septic or hemorrhagic shock
Yes, there were likely both regulatory problems, and cultural problems.
KAL had to reinvent themselves after a string of crashes due to that type of CRM issue - the captain-as-despot cockpit culture factored into some of their crashes.
But having a 200 hour copilot pretty much guarantees a lopsided arrangement of judgment and proficiency between seat positions.
Having a 200 hour copilot is a regulatory shortfall in itself.
Maybe it’s time for the FAA to revise it’s IASA ratings criteria, to make the ratings system more accurate.
Oxygen
Bicarb
Epi
Calcium
Atropine
Lidocaine
Morphine
That's old school now but, it worked.
Norepi was, "leave 'em dead with levophed"
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