Posted on 02/25/2014 4:59:06 PM PST by Altariel
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that police may search a home without a warrant when two occupants disagree about allowing officers to enter, and the resident who refuses access is then arrested.
The justices declined to extend an earlier ruling denying entry to police when the occupants disagree and both are present.
Justice Samuel Alito wrote the court's 6-3 decision holding that an occupant may not object to a search when he is not at home.
(Excerpt) Read more at news.yahoo.com ...
Thanks for interjecting some COMMON sense amidst the madness.
“Once an arrest is made they can search anyway. That’s not new.”
That was the point of contention in the case that the Supremes decided to hear and made a finding on, isn’t it?:
“Justice Samuel Alito wrote the court’s 6-3 decision holding that an occupant may not object to a search when he is not at home.
“We therefore hold that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason,” Alito said.”
So, at the least, the ruling, from the Supreme Court, authorizing this is new, right?
Oh, I’m totally considering that case, I just read your previous post as if you weren’t accounting for the one I stated. If I was mistaken, I apologize.
“If the wife gives permission. Once permission is given to enter and search, it is given.”
Sure, and in a domestic dispute, it’s not unlikely that a wife will give that permission quite willingly if she sees a chance to maliciously harm her husband using the power of the state. Legalisms aside, in practice, the police can and probably will use this to their advantage to erode people’s liberty.
"Justice Samuel Alito wrote the court's 6-3 decision holding that an occupant may not object to a search when he is not at home."
Obviously the occupant who is still there can consent to a warrantless search. In this case, the guy had registered an objection, before being arrested. I think the police should have gotten a warrant given the prior SCOTUS ruling that one objection required a warrant.
It's the fact that he objected before being removed that makes this a bad ruling. Had he not been there in the first place to object, then the wife could have consented.
True, they would likely still come in, but hopefully “fruit of poisonous tree” would apply. But in the interim, it costs the plaintiff a ton of time and money. THAT’s what REALLY hacks me off. There needs to be equitable compensation for the cost in time and money for such egregious acts!
Case closed.
Well, I’ve been married 27 years. I guess I’m not too worried about my wife trying to put me in jail on false charges.
You keep attempting to compare this to your wife’s ability to have guests over without your permission.
Apples and pianos-—not even a close comparison.
You are lending support to that position, as you are arguing that one “occupant’s” say so overrides another’s to allow government employees to search the premises.
Such a position is completely antithetical to the anti-federalists, who sought to limit the power and authority of the federal government, and to the position espoused by James Otis, John Adams and others, that a man’s (or woman’s home is his castle, and that liberty is one to be appropriately defended and cherished.
It is a position to which our forefathers gave their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.
The problem wasn’t ultimately writs of assistance. The problem was a tyrannical government willing to deny the colonists the basic liberties held dearly even in English law in those days. James Otis fought against them in court because that was the form in which the danger materialized itself rather heinously in his day. Dismissing his arguments because we no longer have writs of assistance is intellectually dishonest.
Those same principles are at stake today, you are actively advocating against liberty. You are attempting to justify the loss of liberty via previous abuses. Your join date signifies only a join date, and is a refuge of one who cannot argue his position from the constitution or from the writings of the founders.
This will be abused.
Innocent people will be arrested over this.
Freepers’ lives will be affected.
It’s clear you’ve already chosen to whisper the soothing falsehood. “tis no danger, Sleep on, fellow patriots, only liberals need fear this.”
A wise man sees danger, does not deny its existence, and takes measures to prepare for the trouble ahead. He also warns others, that they may have the opportunity to prepare and not be off guard.
If one child will not cry himself to sleep because his father was arrested on false pretenses, if one wife will not mourn the loss of her husband, if one mother is able to embrace her family, none missing, imprisoned, wounded, or deceased, the warning is worth it.
Think long and hard about how much you value liberty.
It’s possible, but maliciously assumes they know how corrupt cops can be and are banking on that fact.
So much of the population still believes it can trust the government, and many conservatives are convinced the police are their friends.
The following information has just arrived via the LII's direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. A list of links for today's material is followed by the syllabus for any case which had one.
| Syllabus |
Opinion [Kagan] |
Dissent [Breyer ] |
|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KALEY et vir v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 12–464. Argued October 16, 2013 —Decided February 25, 2014
Title 21 U. S. C. §853(e)(1) empowers courts to enter pre-trial restraining orders to “preserve the availability of [forfeitable] property” while criminal proceedings are pending. Such pre-trial asset restraints are constitutionally permissible whenever probable cause exists to think that a defendant has committed an offense permitting forfeiture and that the assets in dispute are traceable or otherwise sufficiently related to the crime charged. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600 .
After a grand jury indicted petitioners, Kerri and Brian Kaley, for reselling stolen medical devices and laundering the proceeds, the Government obtained a §853(e)(1) restraining order against their assets. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order, intending to use a portion of the disputed assets for their legal fees. The District Court allowed them to challenge the assets’ traceability to the offenses in question but not the facts supporting the underlying indictment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: When challenging the legality of a §853(e)(1) pre-trial asset seizure, a criminal defendant who has been indicted is not constitutionally entitled to contest a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes charged. Pp. 5–21.
(a) In Monsanto, this Court held that the Government may seize assets before trial that a defendant intends to use to pay an attorney, so long as probable cause exists “to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable.” 491 U. S., at 615. The question whether indicted defendants like the Kaleys are constitutionally entitled to a judicial re-determination of the grand jury’s probable cause conclusion in a hearing to lift an asset restraint has a ready answer in the fundamental and historic commitment of the criminal justice system to entrust probable cause findings to a grand jury. A probable cause finding sufficient to initiate a prosecution for a serious crime is “conclusive[e],” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 , and, as a general matter, “a challenge to the reliability or competence of the evidence” supporting that finding “will not be heard,” United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36 . A grand jury’s probable cause finding may, on its own, effect a pre-trial restraint on a person’s liberty. Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 117, n. 19. The same result follows when it works to restrain a defendant’s property.
The Kaleys’ alternative rule would have strange and destructive consequences. Allowing a judge to decide anew what the grand jury has already determined could result in two inconsistent findings governing different aspects of one criminal proceeding, with the same judge who found probable cause lacking presiding over a trial premised on its existence. That legal dissonance could not but undermine the criminal justice system’s integrity, especially the grand jury’s constitutional role. Pp. 5–12.
(b) The balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 —which requires a court to weigh (1) the burdens that a requested procedure would impose on the government against (2) the private interest at stake, as viewed alongside (3) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of that interest without the procedure and “the probable value, if any, of [the] additional . . . procedural safeguar[d],” id., at 335—if applicable here, tips against the Kaleys. Because the Government’s interest in freezing potentially forfeitable assets without an adversarial hearing about the probable cause underlying criminal charges and the Kaleys’ interest in retaining counsel of their own choosing are both substantial, the test’s third prong is critical. It boils down to the “probable value, if any,” of a judicial hearing in uncovering mistaken grand jury probable cause findings. But when the legal standard is merely probable cause and the grand jury has already made that finding, a full-dress hearing will provide little benefit. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. ___, ___. A finding of probable cause to think that a person committed a crime “can be [made] reliably without an adversary hearing,” Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 120, and the value of requiring additional “formalities and safeguards” would “[i]n most cases . . . be too slight,” id., at 121–122. The experience of several Circuits corroborates this view. Neither the Kaleys nor their amici point to a single case in two decades where courts, holding hearings of the kind they seek, have found the absence of probable cause to believe that an indicted defendant committed the crime charged. Pp. 12–20.
677 F. 3d 1316, affirmed and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., joined.
| Syllabus |
Opinion [Thomas] |
|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WALDEN v. FIORE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 12–574. Argued November 4, 2013—Decided February 25, 2014
Petitioner Walden, a Georgia police officer working as a deputized Drug Enforcement Administration agent at a Georgia airport, searched respondents and seized a large amount of cash. Respondents allege that after they returned to their Nevada residence, petitioner helped draft a false probable cause affidavit in support of the funds’ forfeiture and forwarded it to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia. In the end, no forfeiture complaint was filed, and respondents’ funds were returned. Respondents filed a tort suit against petitioner in Federal District Court in Nevada. The District Court dismissed the suit, finding that the Georgia search and seizure did not establish a basis to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court could properly exercise jurisdiction because petitioner had submitted the false probable cause affidavit with the knowledge that it would affect persons with significant Nevada connections.
Held: The District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner. Pp. 5–14.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process Clause constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 , and requires that the nonresident have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum State, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 . The inquiry into the “minimum contacts” necessary to create specific jurisdiction focuses “on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770 . For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, that relationship must arise out of contacts that the “defendant himself” creates with the forum, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 , and must be analyzed with regard to the defendant’s contacts with the forum itself, not with persons residing there, see, e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319. The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. These same principles apply when intentional torts are involved. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 –789. Pp. 5–10.
(b) Petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. No part of petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada, and he formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with that forum. The Ninth Circuit reached its contrary conclusion by improperly shifting the analytical focus from petitioner’s contacts with the forum to his contacts with respondents, obscuring the reality that none of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself. Respondents emphasize that they suffered the “injury” caused by the delayed return of their funds while residing in Nevada, but Calder made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. The proper question is whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way: Here, respondents’ claimed injury does not evince such a connection. The injury occurred in Nevada simply because that is where respondents chose to be when they desired to use the seized funds. Other possible contacts noted by the Ninth Circuit—that respondents’ Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, that cash seized in Georgia originated in Nevada, and that funds were returned to respondents in Nevada—are ultimately unavailing. Pp. 11–14.
688 F. 3d 558, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
| Syllabus |
Opinion [Alito] |
Concurrence [Scalia] |
Concurrence [Thomas] |
Dissent [Ginsburg] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FERNANDEZ v. CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the court of appeal of california, second appellate district
No. 12–7822. Argued November 13, 2013—Decided February 25, 2014
Police officers observed a suspect in a violent robbery run into an apartment building, and heard screams coming from one of the apartments. They knocked on the apartment door, which was answered by Roxanne Rojas, who appeared to be battered and bleeding. When the officers asked her to step out of the apartment so that they could conduct a protective sweep, petitioner came to the door and objected. Suspecting that he had assaulted Rojas, the officers removed petitioner from the apartment and placed him under arrest. He was then identified as the perpetrator in the earlier robbery and taken to the police station. An officer later returned to the apartment and, after obtaining Rojas’ oral and written consent, searched the premises, where he found several items linking petitioner to the robbery. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to suppress that evidence, and he was convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that because petitioner was not present when Rojas consented to the search, the exception to permissible warrantless consent searches of jointly occupied premises that arises when one of the occupants present objects to the search, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103 , did not apply, and therefore, petitioner’s suppression motion had been properly denied.
Held: Randolph does not extend to this situation, where Rojas’ consent was provided well after petitioner had been removed from their apartment. Pp. 5–15.
(a) Consent searches are permissible warrantless searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 –232, and are clearly reasonable when the consent comes from the sole occupant of the premises. When multiple occupants are involved, the rule extends to the search of the premises or effects of an absent, nonconsenting occupant so long as “the consent of one who possesses common authority over [the] premises or effects” is obtained. United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 . However, when “a physically present inhabitan[t]” refuses to consent, that refusal “is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” Randolph, 547 U. S., at 122–123. A controlling factor in Randolph was the objecting occupant’s physical presence. See, e.g., id., at 106, 108, 109, 114. Pp. 5–9.
(b) Petitioner contends that, though he was not present when Rojas consented, Randolph nevertheless controls, but neither of his arguments is sound. Pp. 9–14.
(1) He first argues that his absence should not matter since it occurred only because the police had taken him away. Dictum in Randolph suggesting that consent by one occupant might not be sufficient if “there is evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection,” 547 U. S., at 121, is best understood to refer to situations in which the removal of the potential objector is not objectively reasonable. Petitioner does not contest the fact that the police had reasonable grounds for his removal or the existence of probable cause for his arrest. He was thus in the same position as an occupant absent for any other reason. Pp. 9–10.
(2) Petitioner also argues that the objection he made while at the threshold remained effective until he changed his mind and withdrew it. This is inconsistent with Randolph in at least two important ways. It cannot be squared with the “widely shared social expectations” or “customary social usage” upon which Randolph’s holding was based. 547 U. S., at 111, 121. It also creates the sort of practical complications that Randolph sought to avoid by adopting a “formalis[tic]” rule, id., at 121, e.g., requiring that the scope of an objection’s duration and the procedures necessary to register a continuing objection be defined. Pp. 10–14.
(c) Petitioner claims that his expansive interpretation of Randolph would not hamper law enforcement because in most cases where officers have probable cause to arrest a physically present objector they also have probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the premises that the objector does not want them to enter. But he misunderstands the constitutional status of consent searches, which are permissible irrespective of the availability of a warrant. Requiring officers to obtain a warrant when a warrantless search is justified may interfere with law enforcement strategies and impose an unmerited burden on the person willing to consent to an immediate search. Pp. 14–15.
208 Cal. App. 4th 100, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, affirmed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed concurring opinions. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined.
Go back and reread Jamrs Otis again. You missed the thesis.
‘They cannot arrest someone just to get him out of the way. ‘
With all due respect, that is one of the most naive statements you’ve made on this thread.
You’ve been defending this decision to the hilt, and it seems you’ve been doing so due to your naive attitude towards police and other people. Both groups can screw you over royally, but you’re ignoring that.
Now, if you turn around and say you’re a cop, then I’d tell you that you’re just don’t belong in America.
Like another poster stated: yesterday, you had a specific freedom, today that freedom is gone.
That’s what you’re defending, a loss of freedom. That is the un-American part.
“It’s clear you’ve already chosen to whisper the soothing falsehood. “tis no danger, Sleep on, fellow patriots, only liberals need fear this.”
Blow it out your lying butt!
Show me where the Founding Fathers rejected the right of a legal owner to invite ANYONE on to their property, government or not.
A warrant is used when permission has been denied or is not available. When permission is given, no warrant is required.
Again - if you are a passenger in a car, and the driver gives the cops permission to search the car, you cannot complain if the cops find you hiding drugs. Your home is no different, in the sense that someone with a legal right to invite another onto your property also has the legal right to allow cops on the property.
Align yourself with Kagan and Ginsberg if you want. I’d find them repulsive company. If my sin is agreeing with Thomas and Scalia, I’ll take my chances.
“The problem wasn’t ultimately writs of assistance.”
Ummm...yes it was. An unending warrant covering an entire colony WAS the problem.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said police should be required to honor Fernandez’s objection. The dissent, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, added that it would not have hindered the police investigation because police already had probable cause to justify a search warrant to a judge.
She warned that the high court decision might send a dangerous message to law enforcement officials. “Instead of adhering to the warrant requirement, today’s decision tells the police they may dodge it, never mind [that there was] ample time to secure the approval of a neutral magistrate,” Justice Ginsburg wrote.
She said the decision amounted to a “drastic reduction” of Fourth Amendment protections.
“Although the police have probable cause and could obtain a warrant with dispatch, if they can gain the consent of someone other than the suspect, why should the law insist on the formality of a warrant,” Ginsburg asked. She answered her own question: “Because the Framers saw the neutral magistrate as an essential part of the criminal process shielding all of us, good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked police activity.”
“That’s what you’re defending, a loss of freedom.”
No. You never had that ‘freedom’.
I repeat: IF - can anyone on this thread read a two letter word - IF someone with authority to allow others on the property gives the cops permission to enter the property...what IS your concern?
If your spouse or parent who lives with you and who has the right to invite others on gives the cops permission, THEN they can enter without yours. If they do not get permission, then they would need a warrant.
Don’t like it? Don’t live with anyone.
My wife could empty my savings account - because it is OUR savings account. If I don’t trust her, I shouldn’t have her name on the account. She could also invite cops into our house if I’m not there. What makes you think that has not always been the case?
Clipping quotes to use them out of context is intellectually dishonest.
Go back and reread James Otis. You’re desperately trying to distract from his point.
Consider this: you are a suspect in an investigation. Your wife gives the police the okay. You say “no.” on the grounds of no warrant.
You are handcuffed and held in back of a car while the search is conducted. Your wife is told to sit down and is watched by an officer while his partner goes to search. Officer safety must be assured after all.
Shockingly, evidence is “found” which demonstrates your “ clear” “guilt.” Your shocked and dismayed wife can’t believe this is happening to you. She protests your innocence. The police point to this case, informing your wife all has transpired legally.
It may be planted evidence, it may be “evidence” of a “crime” committed daily, unknowingly, due to the plethora of laws on the books.
But the damage is done.
Instead of protecting the family castle, the king is treated like a common criminal, and the queen realizes, too late, that the system she trusted has worked against them both.
It turns out, the royal pair *did* have good reason to decline the government rogues entry to their castle,
In all seriousness, if I were in your shoes, I would sit down with my wife and encourage her to make give a default answer “no”, should any such situation present itself.
If ever there is a time for husband and wife to work together in unity, this is it.
While you are considering the real and practical ramifications of what you are defending, show me where any of the Founders ever said that government employees could enter a free oerson’s house despite the refusal of an occupant.
A conservative justice who opens the door for more government overreach and abuse is worse than his liberal counterpart, and should not be defended on the grounds that he made a statist ruling.
Telling people not to be alarmed when a conservative makes a statist ruling is dishonest and cheapens the meaning of “conservative.”
You de facto have liberty. The State cannot grant it, only do everything in its power to take it away.
Bingo. And this makes it ridiculously easy for a cop to plant evidence or come up with a “crime” to charge anyone with.
Alito made the wrong call here.
If they can use this to get around a warrant, why would they go through the trouble of getting warrants?
You could certainly complain if the cops searched your pockets and found the drugs. That is because you have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to what is in your pockets.
Similarly, there can hardly be a case where a person lives with others but has no expectation of privacy within the home. I might go into my wife's purse to retrieve some particular item, but I would not SEARCH her purse. I would not find myself looking in her closet or in her dresser.
Similarly, my wife does not know the combination to my gun safe. She's not interested and never has a need for anything in the safe unless I am present to retrieve it.
I have seen plenty of situations where people have a roommate in order to live in a nicer apartment. This ruling would seem to put the tenant roommate in the position of being able to grant a search of an entire home.
At least in the case where the man arrested has explicitly denied permission for the search, that should trigger the requirement for a warrant. Does a man's home cease to be his home simply because he is absent?
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