Posted on 06/06/2012 9:14:02 AM PDT by Retain Mike
In late December 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FDR met and selected Chester Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet now mostly at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said, “Tell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there until the war is won”. Knox informed Nimitz by saying, “You’re going to take command of the Pacific Fleet, and I think you will be gone a long time”.
On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived by Catalina flying boat to take command. When the door opened he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned wiring, insulation and paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.
Nimitz decided some very good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders. He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. As head of officer personnel in the Pentagon, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignment they wanted. However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr. and Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton who had failed to provide warning of the Pearl Harbor attack, but provided the key intelligence prior to the Battle of Midway.
Midway began with the gracious, quiet leadership of Nimitz bringing the fight to the enemy at long odds. It finished with the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men on that day. To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering nearly every U.S. Navy ship left in the Pacific achieved the following order of battle.
Japan United States Heavy aircraft carriers 4 3 Light aircraft carriers 2 0 Battleships 11 0 Heavy cruisers 10 6 Light cruisers 6 1 Destroyers 53 17 -- -- Totals 86 27
This abbreviated narrative now leaves out the contribution of thousands, whose efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair and naval intelligence. The narrative also does not describe how making and/or paying the more bitter price for mistakes contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat.
The curtain rises on June 4 when PBY patrols by Lieutenant Howard Ady discovers the Japanese carriers and by Lieutenant William Chase reporting the Japanese planes heading towards Midway. The warnings enabled the 120 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air and launch attacks against the carriers except for 25 Marine Brewster Buffalos and Hellcat fighters dedicated to repel the attackers. In the ensuing Japanese attack, 14 of the 25 pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in a F2A-3 should consider the pilot lost before leaving the ground”.
Now began the attacks by land based planes on the Japanese carriers. First six TBF Devastator torpedo bombers lead by Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s. Next Army Captain James Collins lead four B-26 bombers rigged to carry torpedoes in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. Two of four planes were lost and no hits were obtained. Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney lead 15 long range B-17’s in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits. Major Benjamin Norris lead eleven Vindicator dive bombers considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy attacks and two were lost at sea because of low fuel.
Next into the battle came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet respectively. In all Lt. Commander Lance E. Massey, Lt. Commander Gene Lindsey, and Lt. Commander John Waldron lead 41 Devastator torpedo bombers. The squadrons became separated (Waldron deliberately so) from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. These 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 500 mph Zero fighters, and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire long enough to launch effectively 33 knot torpedoes against 30 knot aircraft carriers.
In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their three man crews were lost, except for Lieutenant George H. Gay who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers and was rescued by a PBY the next day. The only fighters about were six from Fighting 3 lead by Lt. Commander “Jimmy” Thach that tangled with a horde of Zero fighters and lost one aircraft. Those from Fighting 6 lead by Lieutenant Jim Gray lost track of the torpedo bombers and kept circling at 20,000 feet to protect the dive bombers they never found. Eventually these fighters returned to the Enterprise in total frustration.
The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Commander Stan Ring lead Bombing 8, Scouting 8, and Fighting 8 exactly as directed and then searched to the south until fuel was critical and each squadron proceeded independently. Lt. Commander Russ Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all had to ditch. That morning there were 29 empty seats in the Hornet ready room. Fifteen seats belonged to Torpedo 8 pilots slaughtered that morning by the Japanese. The 11 were for Bombing 8 that refueled at Midway and later returned to the Hornet.
The Japanese carrier task forces had withstood seven separate attacks without a single hit until Bombing 3 and Bombing 6 found the carriers. They arrived over the carriers while the Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the last of the American torpedo bombers. The 17 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6, Lieutenants Wade McClusky and Richard Best lead sections that obtained three hits on the Akagi and at least four hits on the Kaga. The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm for over three hours from 7AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes return safely, but Bombing 6 lost 8 of 18 two man crews.
There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 3PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 5 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers, but ordered Lieutenant Earl Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling, but there were too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day.
There were attacks before and after at Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these heavy four carriers achieved by the courage and sacrifice of these few men was lethal.
One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s, about 370 flyers attacked the Japanese in around 180 aircraft of which nearly 90 were lost resulting in about 190 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this an incredible, miraculous victory. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.
Another interesting thing about the A6M Zero is that it was almost a carbon copy of a Vought design that was sold to Japan in the late thirties and it was another Vought aircraft that was the primary fighter used by the US Marines to fight them. The F4U Corsair.
Good post. No apologies necessary.
I thought the movie gave a good sense of the timing of it.
Here is the letter I send out annually on the anniversary of D-Day.
General Dwight Eisenhower arrived in London to head Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) during the last five months of planning for D-Day. He achieved much more than the popular portrayal of managing a political/military alliance. Though he never led troops in combat, his leadership sustained many unprecedented initiatives for the successful Normandy landings. The air assault examples the frightful uncertainties plaguing critical hazards run on this “Day of Days”.
The night before D-Day, 20,400 American and British paratroopers dropped behind the Normandy beaches from 1,250 C-47 aircraft plus gliders. This massive assault was attempted just 17 years after Charles Lindberg had flown the Atlantic solo for the first time.
To the last moment Ike’s air commander, British Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory, saw only tragic forebodings reinforced by memories of American problems in North Africa and Sicily, and the German catastrophe on Crete. The German losses were so severe that Hitler forbid any further massive air assaults. Leigh-Mallory anticipated hundreds of unarmed planes and gliders being destroyed with surviving paratroopers fighting isolated until killed or captured.
The planes would arrive over Normandy the night of June 5 in three streams with each 300 miles long, allowing the Germans up to two hours to reposition night fighters and anti-aircraft artillery for maximum slaughter of the transports. Most pilots were flying their first combat mission. Leigh-Mallory had specific intelligence the German 91st Air Landing Division, specialists in fighting paratroopers, and the 6th Parachute Regiment had inexplicably moved into the area around St. Mere-Eglise, where the American divisions were to land. Could these movements mean the deception plan for D-Day directing attention to Pas de Calais was breaking down?
Ike remained strategically committed to the airborne assault, but compassionately devoted to the men. The evening before D-Day, Eisenhower left SHAEF headquarters at 6 PM, traveling to Newbury where the 101st Airborne was boarding for its first combat mission. Ike arrived at 8 PM and did not leave until the last C-47 was airborne over three hours later.
In My Three Years with Eisenhower Captain Harry C. Butcher says, “We saw hundreds of paratroopers with blackened and grotesque faces, packing up for the big hop and jump. Ike wandered through them, stepping over, packs, guns, and a variety of equipment such as only paratroop people can devise, chinning with this and that one. All were put at ease. He was promised a job after the war by a Texan who said he roped, not dallied, his cows, and at least there was enough to eat in the work. Ike has developed or disclosed an informality and friendliness with troopers that almost amazed me”.
In Crusade in Europe General Dwight Eisenhower says, “I found the men in fine fettle, many of them joshingly admonishing me that I had no cause for worry, since the 101st was on the job, and everything would be taken care of in fine shape. I stayed with them until the last of them were in the air, somewhere about midnight. After a two hour trip back to my own camp, I had only a short time to wait until the first news should come in”.
One of the first D-Day reports was from Leigh-Mallory with news only 29 of 1,250 C-47’s were missing and only four gliders were unaccounted for. That morning Leigh-Mallory sent Ike a message frankly saying it is sometimes difficult to admit that one is wrong, but he had never had a greater pleasure than in doing so on this occasion. He congratulated Ike on the wisdom and courage of his command decision.
The above represents only one of many crushing anxieties Eisenhower persevered through. President Roosevelt understood the enormous risks, and asked the nation to pray for the coming invasion. Resting today in the luxury of historical certainty prevents us from imagining the dark specters hovering about nearly all invasion planning aspects.
“...Few if any ever met a mean ass Alabama Bubba...”
Or as Richard Pryor put it, “What were the Japanese thinking?...they only knew of California White People...they didn’t know about the kind of White people in Alabama that have to be kept chained-up in the basement...”
Thank you for posting!
Thanks for posting.
Now that is quite a point. In the four sources I read for the narrative I checked again and found no mention of that dilemma. I wonder now if that difficulty was even discussed? Maybe this was a case of Navy and Army speaking different languages?
And many of those were the grandsons of Confederate soldiers who fought so hard in the War between the States. I know, my Father was one of those at Midway.
No Hellcats...yet. Wildcats.
Don't confuse airspeed measured in knots vs mph. 330knots is about 380mph. Most aircraft airspeed is measured in knots.
Don't confuse airspeed measured in knots vs mph. 330knots is about 380mph. Most aircraft airspeed is measured in knots.
Right, they were Wildcats. As I said it was not quite ready for prime time.
I realize that Airspeed is usually measured in knots but ground speed specs are usually in MPH. I was thinking of a hopped up version of the A6M that was designed to compete with the Corsair which had set a new record of 405 MPH. I looked it up. THe A6M5 was fitted with a supercharger and was capable of speeds over 400 mph but only in a dive. there was a high speed version that was proposed (A6M8)that would probably have broken 400 MPH but it was never completed.
That'll teach me to rely on memory when the slow leak in my head starts acting up.
On a picture-perfect day, the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy wouldn’t speak to each other. They regarded each other as enemies second only to the Allies.
“...now mostly at the bottom of Pearl Harbor...”
No.
http://www.pearlharbor.org/ships-and-aircraft.asp
You are correct. That was overstated. The precious carriers and escorts had escaped.
“In late December” only four of the eight battleships were sunk. Only a few other smaller ships were sunk.
The Pacific fleet was in no way “at the bottom of Pearl Harbor.”
One area in which things could have turned out much worse...the alternate anchorage on the west/southwest side of Oahu was in deep water. If the fleet had been there on December 7th instead of in the harbor, all the ships sunk would have been permanently lost.
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