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Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept:

"Here again that old serpent dichotomy raised its snaky head.
Marshall was aware of the danger to Hawaii and would do everything he could to provide protection to the outpost, yet deep down he did not believe the Japanese would attack..."

First of all, anyone who imagines that Gordon Prange blames everything on Kimmel & Short, while letting the top brass in Washington completely off the hook, has been smoking something illegal, instead of actually reading Prange's book.

Second, Prange wrote before 1980, when less information about "what Washington knew" was available, so Prange doesn't go nearly far enough.

In the end, Marshall, Stark & others at the top ignored numerous specific warnings, misinterpreted important clues, and refused to pass along vital data to Hawaii, despite the advise of such capable middle level Washington officers as Navy Commander Arthur McCollum and Army Colonel Rufus Bratton.

So you continue to cite a historian who has been shown to be incomplete and inaccurate by numerous more recent revelations; you continue to reject LIVING historians who will tell you you are off base (me, for one); and you continue to let Kimmel and Short off the hook.

*You refuse to admit Short changed the "alert" status (and still have yet to admit you fully understand that. DO YOU???)

*You have yet to admit that Kimmel and Short did NOT have long-range recon out despite the fact they received what ALL historians call a "war" message days earlier;

*You refuse to acknowledge that cryptanalysts all confirm that NO Purple codes or other codes got through to Washington and/or were even decrypted, nor that the 14 part "war" message was not passed up the chain (this is undeniable).

So there is no talking to you. Please don't EVER quote Prange to me again unless it is to correct him with updated scholarship.

First I should point out that I'm not aware of anyone stating that Prange only blamed Kimmel and Short exclusively, so I don't know where that statement came from.

If we go back to Marshall's letter of the 7th we can see an example of what Prange is referring too as far as that "old serpent dichotomy".

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

So we see that Marshall understands and has let General Short know (this is who this letter was to) that surprise attack by air or submarine constitute the most immediate danger. But in the same vein he states that if Hawaii survives the first 6 hours of hostilities without being attacked then the defenses in place should discourage the Japanese from attacking in the first place. This at least implies a belief that Hawaii would not be the first place struck.

It is important to understand that right now Pearl Harbor is the best defended U.S. base in the Pacific. It is even better defended than most of the bases on the Pacific Coast. San Diego, which Admiral Richardson had wanted to move the fleet to has about a third of the defenses that Pearl has right now.

In this same letter to Short from Marshall, he goes over the effort and difficulties to continue to improve these defenses at Pearl Harbor. Here is an example of some of what Marshall is currently facing.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobstrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.
I have not mentioned Panama, but the naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

This letter also covers the number of pursuit planes at or headed to Pearl, the concerns with how they stack up against the latest Japanese models, the desire to get P40s there by March, and also putting B-17s at Hawaii instead of the B18's currently based there. Finally, there is also discussion on barrage balloons and the complete lack of production of them (Only 3 are available with only 80 in production)

I don't see any evidence here that signs are being intentionally ignored or vital data not being passed, in fact just the opposite. There is an effort to beef up Pearl Harbor against a potential attack, there are comparisons and concerns over the equipment that the Japanese may employ against Hawaii, but at the same time there is a degree of doubt that Japan would strike this far out. Guess we will have to wait and see what the next entry brings us.