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So you continue to cite a historian who has been shown to be incomplete and inaccurate by numerous more recent revelations; you continue to reject LIVING historians who will tell you you are off base (me, for one); and you continue to let Kimmel and Short off the hook.

*You refuse to admit Short changed the "alert" status (and still have yet to admit you fully understand that. DO YOU???)

*You have yet to admit that Kimmel and Short did NOT have long-range recon out despite the fact they received what ALL historians call a "war" message days earlier;

*You refuse to acknowledge that cryptanalysts all confirm that NO Purple codes or other codes got through to Washington and/or were even decrypted, nor that the 14 part "war" message was not passed up the chain (this is undeniable).

So there is no talking to you. Please don't EVER quote Prange to me again unless it is to correct him with updated scholarship.

LS: "So you continue to cite a historian who has been shown to be incomplete and inaccurate by numerous more recent revelations..."

Pal, your problem is not me, it's Homer, and that's who you should take up your complaint with.

I quote Prange because it's Homer's "textbook" for this course.
If you don't like Prange, then suggest Homer use a different book, and I'll quote from it.

But in my opinion, Prange did a pretty good job, considering that he didn't know everything which has since come to light.
The result is, Prange -- "fair and balanced" -- spreads the blame around to almost everyone from Washington to Pearl Harbor.
That seems fair to me.

LS: "You refuse to admit Short changed the "alert" status (and still have yet to admit you fully understand that. DO YOU???)"

It's true, I've read nothing about Short's alert status codes, or how they may have somehow prevented top-brass in Washington from issuing adequate warnings against the coming Japanese air attack on Hawaii.

LS: "You have yet to admit that Kimmel and Short did NOT have long-range recon out despite the fact they received what ALL historians call a "war" message days earlier..."

Not true. I've explained the problem of long-range recon at least twice, but you don't remember what I said, do you?
Do you need me to repeat or expand on it?

As for "war warning" messages, there were some in November 1941, but they did not warn against air attacks, and indeed specifically directed General Short to defend against sabotage.

LS: "You refuse to acknowledge that cryptanalysts all confirm that NO Purple codes or other codes got through to Washington and/or were even decrypted, nor that the 14 part "war" message was not passed up the chain (this is undeniable)."

Pal, as I'm certain you well know, the subject of codes and code-breaking success is complicated and confusing in the extreme.
It is so tangled up in precise meanings of critical words that almost anyone who wades into the subject can expect to make some mistakes somewhere.

For example, in your statement above -- your reference to "Purple" is incorrect.
Words like "purple," "magic" and "J codes" all refer to Japanese diplomatic correspondence whose codes had been broken and read by US intelligence for many years.

Breaking and reading Japan's diplomatic codes produced a number of general warnings of the coming attack.

But specific fleet movement data could only come from Japan's Naval Codes -- Kaigun Ango -- of which there were four categories:

Code Book D, also known to US code-breakers as the 5-number code.
Radio call sign codes for Japanese officials, ships and shore stations.
Ship Movement (SM) code for reporting arrivals and departures of naval vessels.
Shin (S) code, used for contacting merchant vessels.

So debates over more specific Pearl Harbor warnings involve not Purple or J-code "Magic," which were quickly read, but rather Japan's naval codes -- long said to have not been broken and read until after December 7, 1941.

But Stinnett and others show evidence that some Japanese Naval Code messages were at least partially read.