Posted on 08/06/2010 7:42:11 AM PDT by tlb
OPERATION DOWNFALL, to be complete within one year of the end of the war in Europe, had two major components.
* Olympic . November 1, 1945. Invasion of Southern Kyushu to provide a large base for naval and air forces within range of Tokyo.
* Coronet . March 1, 1946. Invasion of Central Honshu and Tokyo.
OLYMPIC
Olympic entailed landing three corps on southern Kyushu, the most southern of the four Japanese home islands. The center portion of Kyushu is almost impassible mountains which would be difficult to transit and was to be used to isolate southern Kyushu from counterattack by Japanese troops from northern Kyushu (Nagasaki). The landings were to be by troops already in the Pacific covered by 34 carriers and by land based aircraft from Okinawa. B-29's would interdict reinforcements. Southern Kyushu had a large bay, harbors, and many airfields. The intent was to base naval support craft and to establish 40 air groups, many redeployed from Europe.
From southern Kyushu, fighter air cover could open the Inland Sea to the US Navy and interdict transportation as far as north as Osaka ; fighter bombers could close shipping from Korea and China ; medium bombers and could destroy transportation, material, and installations around Tokyo and support the invasion troops ; large bombers (B-17 and B-24) could range over all of Japan. Meanwhile, B-29's from the Marianas could continue to wipe out industrial centers.
There were two naval groups.
The Strike Force, 3rd Fleet, had 21 carriers and 10 fast battleships to range up and down the length of Japan to suppress Japanese forces with priority to destroy aircraft and transportation.
The Assault Force, 5th Fleet, had 26 carriers, plus 8 detached from Strike force for the invasion period, 13 slow battleships, 20 cruisers, 139 DD, 167 DE, and support ships for a total of 800 warships. Troops and their equipment were to come from the Philippines and Marianas in 1,500 transports. All combat troops were from the Pacific theater ; none redeployed from Europe.
The plan called for a diversionary display by the floating reserve on Shikoku, the smallest of Japan's four islands, before their landing on Kyushu. Support troops including engineers to build airfields were to land starting on Y-Day + 2 ; some of these were to come from Europe.
The Japanese Defenses
At the time of the start to planning of Olympic, there were 1-1/2 divisions based on southern Kyushu; these with various service bases there amounted to about 45,000 men. Planners expected an additional three divisions to be moved into the area by the time of the landings.
The Japanese were able to predict the landing using the same logic as US planners and moved 9 more divisions into the area for 216,000 men by the time of the surrender in august. More men, material and defenses would have been assembled by the November date for the invasion.
Each side of the central bay had an army, each was divided into two functions - a static defense force on the beaches to fight to the death while allowing reinforcements to arrive, and the mobile reserve to push the American back into the sea. The three logical landing beaches were defended from the shore to the nearby mountains with new troops. The reserves located in the mountains were experienced troops from Manchuria with light tanks. Supporting the troops were the remnants of the navy and air force, lightly armed volunteers, and an array of "special" weapons.
The air forces contained 5,600 conventional combat planes and a similar number of older planes and trainers suitable as Kamikazes. The combat planes were withdrawn from Kyushu and the Kamikazes moved in. Japan was so short of aircraft and fuel that B-29's and carrier task forces were not routinely attacked so as to conserve combat aircraft for the final battle. Equal numbers were assigned to Kyushu and Tokyo areas. As the date for the first battle approached, more were moved to Kyushu with the Tokyo forces to be replaced with promised new production.
Kamikaze tactics were initiated in the Philippines and became a doctrine that inflicted terrible damage to US warships off Okinawa. The invasion of Kyushu would see the distance reduced, flying over familiar land instead of over-water navigation, and with targeting changed from warships to troopships ; the plan was to inflict intolerable damage to the invasion force before it hit the beach.
The following "special weapons" were established on southern Kyushu.
* Kamikazes -- 2,100 army planes and 2,700 navy planes. * Baku - suicide missile carried by a bomber. * Mini-subs, each with 2 torpedoes, 500 were building. * Fleet submarines -- rearm the 57 remaining that had been dedicated to resupply of outposts. * Kaiten - suicide torpedoes with a 20 mile range. * Shinyo - suicide motorboats. The army had 1-man, 17 foot motorboats. The navy had 2-man, 22 foot boats. * The largest surviving warships were destroyers that were prepared for suicidal attack on the invasion convoys. * On the land, human mines in which soldiers had explosives strapped to their bodies and were to crawl under a tank. Other explosives were packed with a suction cup to be attached to the side of a tank. And shaped charges on a long pole were to be detonated on the side of a tank. * Japanese paratroopers were to attack Okinawa to disrupt flight operations during the invasion period.
Alternatives to Olympic.
Rather than invade Japan, the country could have been blockaded with a ring around the Yellow Sea from Shanghai to Korea. This was not assured to cause the surrender of Japan. The direction of the war would have been towards reinforcing China and supplying the Soviet Union for their movement of troops into Manchuria, Korea, and mainland China.
A plan resurrected after the enemy buildup on Kyushu exceeded all expectations, was the occupation of the less well defended northern island of Hokkaido and northern part of Honshu. This would have been of equal distance from Tokyo, but further from American army, naval, and air force centers. Shipping was already a problem with large numbers unreleased from the Atlantic needed to supply Europe and return troops to the US ; to redeploy air and service forces from Europe to the Pacific, to supply the Pacific buildup and to move several corps to the invasion sites. Every tanker in the US fleet was required to provide the millions of gallons of fuel required by the ships involved in the Kyushu operation. More fuel and shipping would be required to move 1,100 miles further away to the north. That plan was dropped.
Casualties.
There are two sets of potential casualty figures; a low number used to gain approval to proceed with the operation ; and a high number used to plan reserve forces, medical needs and, as it turned out, to claim as lives saved by use of the atom bomb. These figures changed over time, starting low and going higher as the enemy build-up on Kyushu was discovered.
The low casualty figures were based on the landings at Okinawa, Lingayen Gulf, and Normandy. Okinawa and Lingayen Gulf were undefended on the beaches, the fighting took place in the mountains where each Japanese caused one US wounded of which 20% resulted in US deaths. Normandy had the same three-beach landing pattern, but two beaches were relatively easy, only the landing at "bloody" Omaha was vigorously defended.
All three Kyushu beaches were defended in depth. A shoreline defense such as Omaha beach and a mountain cave defense as on Okinawa ; all to the death. It would have been more realistic to triple the rate of Omaha beach rather than take the average of the three Normandy beaches as the planners did. There was also a difference in scale. Normandy landed 5 divisions plus 3 airborne divisions. Olympic was to land 14 divisions. Coronet was to have 23 divisions.
The defended beach at Tarawa was a shock to Marine landing with unexpected losses. The US invasion tactic was then changed from surprise to heavy bombardment. The Japanese had to change their defensive positions in the later Pacific actions from defense of the beach to the mountains. Kyushu was to have both forms of defense: well prepared installations near the beaches and well prepared caves in the mountains, with mobile tank forces.
The US planners expected that radar would detect Kamikazes coming through the mountains, carrier fighters would be vectored to intercept them, and proximity-fused ship's anti-aircraft fire would take out any that got through. However, 250 highly maneuverable warships were hit a few months earlier at Okinawa with these same defenses, in open water ; the prospects of loaded troop ships taking casualties was high and each hit could take half-a-thousand lives. Whereas two Messerschmitts were able to attack troops on the Normandy beaches, 5,000 Kamikaze were aimed at the approaching troop ships while still at sea. It would be reasonable to increase the hit rate of Kamikazes from nearby bases, yet the planners reduced it.
Japanese planners expected almost 500 ships would be sunk during the landing. US planners expected 15-20% losses, they had no experience with mass air attacks on merchant ships at sea.
Good weather was required for close air support on the cloudy islands of Japan. A typhoon had once saved Kyushu from invasion by Mongols in 1281. A storm that forced the carriers to withdraw or even to cause the 2,000 planes to remain on deck, would take away an important part of the invasion support. A storm would also hamper getting supplies over the beaches to the armies.
The original plan was for 9 divisions to attack 3 divisions of defenders. As enemy reinforcements were observed, the size of the invasion force was increased. The final plan had 18 U.S. divisions attacking 11 IJA divisions in defensive positions. Most sources give the advantage to defenders by 3:1, that is, attackers must outnumber defenders by three to be sure of victory.
Casualty figures were a guess that changed with time. There are sufficient numbers available to support any post-war position that any author chooses to take. Low numbers are quoted as reasons to do the invasion, 125,000 for Olympic and to end the war. High numbers, one million US casualties for Downfall, are quoted to justify the A-bomb and end the war. Typically, 25% of casualties are deaths. On average, 5 Japanese soldiers died for each American death.
Japanese casualties were not subjected to planning. If all troops resisted to the death, then the typical survival rate would have only included injured and unconscious soldiers. 216,627 troops were surrendered on Kyushu alone -- more than were expected -- and this was two months before the planned invasion so the number of defenders would have increased. Civilian casualties are a real unknown. 97,000 were killed in the bombing of Tokyo on March 9 ; the numbers from land warfare would also be high. Consider ratios of any proportion you desire. Civilian losses in some European cities were considerable ; certainly Japanese casualties would be in the multiple millions.
CORONET -- Spring 1945
Coronet was the attack across the Kanto plain to capture Tokyo. The broad plan was still going through refinement.
Naval bombardment by guns and air would begin at Y-15. There would be two simultaneous assaults on Y day.
First Army was to land on the southern half of Kujukuri Beach with 4 divisions to secure a beachhead. On Y+5, with two more divisions landed, they would move across the peninsula to clear the east side of Tokyo Bay and move north to take the port city of Choshi. Service troops would built land-based air bases under the cover of carrier aircraft. Thirty air groups were expected to be in place by Y+30.
Almost simultaneously, Eighth Army would land at Sagami Bay with four divisions to establish a beachhead, secure the Miura Peninsula and Yokosuka naval base. At Y+10, two armored divisions would land and move straight north, beind the industrial cities on Toyko Bay, to establish a blocking position north of Tokyo. Other elements were tasked to take the port cities of Yokohama and Kawasaki to provide supply points for the troops.
First Army was to attack across the Kanto plain to Tokyo about Y+30 with Eighth Army tanks ready to provide assistance. Tokyo had already been extensively destroyed by bombing.
Coronet was a larger operation than Olympic, but the landing on Kyushu, the southern island, was expected to be the more expensive because all of the homeland defensives would have been expended there and the promised replacements to ward off Coronet would have been made industrially impossible. Several thousand Air Force fighters and medium bombers would be flying from a hundred airfields on Kyushu. A 100 carriers could have been available including new construction and those coming from the Atlantic.
The Joint Chiefs expected the Japanese to surrender after exhausting themselves in Operation Olympic. Thus Coronet would not be required.
However, if necessary, follow up operations after Tokyo would have been initiated in the south, central, and north of Japan with US troops from Europe who had taken leave in the US -- only Air Force, air field construction, and service units had gone from Europe directly to the Pacific. And troops from Allied countries would be available.
* South. The northern, more industrialized half of Kyushu would have been taken. * Central. The next largest industrial cities would have been taken with landings to take the peninsulas of Ise Bay, take Nagoya and then march overland to Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe. * North. A landing at Sapporo on Hokkaido followed by taking the anchorage at Mautsu.
Hindsight . Capture of the Marianas as B-29 bases turned out to be the key to the end-game. The campaign in the Philippines and Peleliu were not necessary except to force the final battle with the Japanese fleet and as a place to absorb Japanese army troops and air forces for destruction. Also, an alternative considered at the time, the invasion of Formosa to open access to China and as an alternate base for B-29's would have been equally unnecessary. These resources could have been applied sooner to capture and build air bases at Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which were instrumental in the rapid end of the war. But the secret weapon was a secret and it might not have worked or been ready in time.
Olympic - Southern Kyushu Troops . All were US from Pacific area Autumn of 1945 6th Army.
Sep 1 . Honshu, Kyushu, Strategic Air Force (B-29 Okinawa) ; continue strategic targets. Sep 1 . Shimonoseki Straight / ports, Strategic Air Force ; continue isolation mining. Sep 18. Hong Kong , British strikes. Sep 28. Canton , British strikes. Oct 1 . Ningpo , Chusan, China , Strategic Air Force ; isolation bombing. Oct 18. Honshu, Inland Sea , 3rd Fleet : TF-38 (US) , TF-37 (UK) ; strategic support Oct 21. Kyushu , Strategic Air Force ; N-S isolation and anti-buildup Oct 24. Kyushu , 5th Fleet ; preliminary bombardment, mine clearing, interdict highways. Oct 27. Outer Islands , 40th Inf Div Oct 28. Tanega Shima , 158th Reg Combat Team Oct 30. Shikoku , feint by 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions Nov 1 . West , 5th Amphibious Corp : 2nd , 3rd , 5th Marine Divisions Nov 1 . South , 11th Corp : 1st Cav , 43rd Inf , Americal Divisions. Nov 1 . East , 1st Corp : 25th , 33rd , 41st Infantry divisions Nov 22. Where needed : 11th Airborn Division. Nov 23. As needed or SW : 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions Dec - . Build air fields : support troops and air crews from European theator. Jan - . Attack all military and industrial areas of Japan by air and sea.
Planning Alternatives for Coronet -- Spring of 1946 Coronet was the attack across the Kanto plain to capture Tokyo. The broad plan was still going through refinement and only outline drafts had been completed by August 1.. The initial plan called for three landings using 25 divisions:
* a blocking force landing at Mito on the coast north of Toyko and move west to establish a position north of Tokyo. * the main force landing in Kashima Beach south of Choshi with a goal to clear Chiba province including the east side of Tokyo Bay and build airfields and land tank divisions before moving across the Kanto plain to attack Tokyo from the east. * a southern landing at Sagami Bay 30 days later would take Yokosuka naval base and move rapidly north to be west of Tokyo. * the three armies would then move on Tokyo.
A second plan, subject to further change, dispensed with the northern force and was reduced by 2 divisions. This acknowledged that redeployment from Europe was not going well -- two million experienced veterens were being released and units were in disarray.
* a landing was to be made on Kashima Beach east of Tokyo with 5 divisions to clear Chiba province, cross the Boso peninsula to Tokyo Bay, built land-based air bases under the cover of carrier aircraft, and built up 9 infantry and 2 tank divisions including some redeployed from the European theater. * The major landing was to be made ten days later at Sagami Bay, the outer part of Tokyo Bay, southwest of Tokyo with the goal to take the naval base at Yokosuka and open Toyko Bay and build up to 8 infantry and 3 tank divisions. * Then both armies were to move on Tokyo at D+30.
o The southern, Sagami force, was to move quickly north behind the cities on Tokyo Bay with elements tasked for the ports of Yokohama and Kawasaki, while the main force continued north to be northwest of Tokyo. o Meanwhile the Navy would move into Tokyo Bay to provide support from the south. o One corp is unaccounted for in the surviving drafts of the plan at the time of the surrender, which shows that the planning was still in progress.
A third plan retained the three landings of 25 divisions with 1 paratroop division in reserve. This was MacArthur's plan and assumed that more troops were available than the Joint Chiefs thought possible.
All I can say is, “Thank God for the atomic bomb and Harry Truman, Democrat though he was.”
The last History Channel show on this subject I watched claimed that planners has pretty much decided an invasion was impossible.
Dropping the bomb(s) saved 1mm US casualties, and about 10mm Japanese.
Dropping the bomb(s) saved 1mm US casualties, and about 10mm Japanese.
Here’s another account of what an invasion of Japan would likely have looked like:
http://www.webwizpro.com/1945InvasionofJapan.html
Would have made Verdun, the Somme and “The Russian Front”, combined, look like a mild dispute in a convent.
MEGA DITTOS to that!The man who was to become my father had finally been drafted(March,1945).He was(as were all others)”Infantry Replacement”.Had Truman not dropped the nukes,he was going to invade the islands of Japan.He hardly knew one end of an M1 from the other.He wnt on to become a very famous musician and I was born on May 8,1950(VE-Day +5-years0.
Here are some documents that the history minded might find interesting:
1. .pdf file containing a facsimilie copy of the Operation DOWNFALL Operations Order:
http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/wwii/marine1/1239.pdf
2. A transcription of a 1965 Marine Corps Gazette article comparing the Allied planning for Operation OLYMPIC, the invasion of Kyushu and the Japanese counterlanding plan, KETSU-GO:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/war.term/olympic.html
3. Two mid 1990’s articles on OLYMPIC and KETSU-GO by D.M. Giangreco. Mr. Giangreco is a member of the editorial staff of the Military Review and has written extensively on WWII subjects. These articles are included because he specifically addresses and rebutts the latter day revisionist historian arguments concerning casualty estimates for the invasion and their use in making the decision to use the atmic bomb:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/giangrec.htm and
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2109.pdf
Not to mention that probably half of Japan would have been occupied by the Soviets and ultimately the ChiComs.
Wow...And to think that right now I live in Kyushu ...
Of course, the latest revisionist crap from the left is that the Japanese didn’t surrender because of the bombs, but because the RUSSIANS declared war on August 8th. Nevermind that they didn’t have the manpower, aircraft, or naval forces available to significantly affect the battle for Japan...but when has that stopped the revisionist crap from the left?
This is the American military operation time line that American planners had for Operation Olympic as posted on :
http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html
Sep 1 . Honshu, Kyushu, Strategic Air Force (B-29 Okinawa) ; continue strategic targets.
Sep 1 . Shimonoseki Straight / ports, Strategic Air Force ; continue isolation mining.
Sep 18. Hong Kong , British strikes.
Sep 28. Canton , British strikes.
Oct 1 . Ningpo , Chusan, China , Strategic Air Force ; isolation bombing.
Oct 18. Honshu, Inland Sea , 3rd Fleet : TF-38 (US) , TF-37 (UK) ; strategic support
Oct 21. Kyushu , Strategic Air Force ; N-S isolation and anti-buildup
Oct 24. Kyushu , 5th Fleet ; preliminary bombardment, mine clearing, interdict highways.
Oct 27. Outer Islands , 40th Inf Div
Oct 28. Tanega Shima , 158th Reg Combat Team
Oct 30. Shikoku , feint by 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions
Nov 1 . West , 5th Amphibious Corp : 2nd , 3rd , 5th Marine Divisions
Nov 1 . South , 11th Corp : 1st Cav , 43rd Inf , Americal Divisions.
Nov 1 . East , 1st Corp : 25th , 33rd , 41st Infantry divisions
Nov 22. Where needed : 11th Airborn Division.
Nov 23. As needed or SW : 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions
Dec - . Build air fields : support troops and air crews from European theator.
Jan - . Attack all military and industrial areas of Japan by air and sea.
For those who are serious about researching Operation Downfall, the following is a good starting list of primary source documents:
Operation Olympic Documents
AFPAC Staff Study, ‘Olympic Operation in Southern Kyushu’, 28 May 1945, RG 165, NARA
AFPAC Operations Instructions No. 1/9, 3 August 1945, RG 338, Box 193,
Engineer Annex to USAFPAC Operations Instructions No. 1, 20 June 1945, RG 338, Box 193
CINCPAC Staff Study ‘OLYMPIC’, 18 June 1945, RG 218, NARA
CINCPAC Operations Plan, OLYMPIC, USMC Geographic File, Japan, Box 50, Folder B1-1, WNRC
Sixth Army Field Order No. 74, Troop List, 28 July 1945, Records of the Strategic Plans Division, Box 187, NHC
Memo, Colonel Elliott to General Krueger, 28 June 1945, Sub: Command Request for Construction Groups and Construction Battalions for Olympic, RG 338, Box 196
Sixth Army Engineer Section Plans and Operations, 1943 – 1945, WNRC
Troop List of Service Troops to Stage through Luzon, 19 July 1945, RG 338, Box 59, Sixth Army G-4 Decimal File, 1943 – 46, File 4, WNRC
Memo, Sixth Army Engineer to Chief of Staff, 3 June 1945, RG 338, Box 59, Sixth Army G-4 Decimal File, 1943 – 1946
Letters, Allied Air Forces to CINCAFPAC, 3 August 1945 and CINCAFPAC to CGFEAF, RG 338, Box 191, File No. 5
Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet Operations Plan No. A11 – 45, 10 August 1945, NHC
Amphibious Corps Operation Plan, No. 1 – 45, 6 August 1945, USMC Geographic File, Japan, Box 52, WNRC
V Marine Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, Appendix 3 to Annex C, 30 November 1945, Marine Historical Centre, Washington DC;
I Corps Field Order, 4 August 1945, RG 94, Box 3089, File 201-3.9, WNRC
IX Corps Field Order No. 1, Operation OLYMPIC, 12 August 1945, RG 94, Box 4105, File 209-3.9, WNRC
IX Corps Report of Reconnaissance and Survey of Japanese Dispositions, Southern Kyushu (Operation OLYMPIC-MAJESTIC), 15 December 1945, RG 94, Box 4104, File 209-2.0, WNRC
XI Corps Staff Conferences on OLYMPIC, 6-9 July 1945, RG 94, Box 4159, File 2.11-0.5, WNRC
XI Corps Tentative Plan for AAA Employment for Operation OLYMPIC, 8 July 1945, RG 338, Box 17, Operations Reports and Related Records, 1944 – 46, WNRC
Basic Logistic Plan, OLYMPIC, in Fifth Air Force Logistical Plan for Operation OLYMPIC, US Air Force Historical Center, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington DC
Operation Coronet Documents
Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan, JWPC 46/5, 9 July 1943, RG 218, NARA
Outline Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto Plain, RG 218, CCS Honshu (7-19-44), NARA
AFPAC Staff Study CORONET, 15 August 1945, RG 165, NARA
Eighth Army, CORONET Operation, G-3 Plans (Invasion of Japan), May-June 1945, RG 407, Box 2836, WNRC
AFPAC, DOWNFALL, Strategic Plans for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, 28 May 1945, RG 15, OPD 350.05, NARA
Staff Study of Cover and Deception Objectives for CORONET, JWPC 190/16, 26 July 1945, RG 218, NARA
Logistical Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto Plain, JLPC 47/10, 8 May 1945, RG 218, NARA
Memo, Marshall to Hull, 28 May 1945, Verifax 1193, Item 2288, Marshall Library;
Message, Hull to MacArthur, 29 May 1945, Verifax 1193, Item 2799, Marshall Library
Defensive Preparations in Japan, 2 August 1945, JIC 311, RG 218, NARA
Japanese Reaction to an Assault on the Kanto Plain (Tokyo) of Honshu, JIC 218/9, 10 July 1945, RG 218, NARA
Operations following Invasion of Kanto Plain (Broad Plans), JCS 1417, 10 July 1945, in CCS 381 POA (4-21-45), RG 218, NARA
‘Operations in Japan Following CORONET’, JWPC 333/1, 26 July 1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (microfilm edition)
This is a list of Secondary sources (both books and articles) that provide some very in-depth background on Japanese culture, industrial and military preparedness as applies to Operation Downfall:
Dennis Showalter, “Storm Over the Pacific,” in The Pacific War Companion (Oxford: Osprey Publications, 2005), 15.
Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1991), 44.
Iriye Akira, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941–45 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1981), 66–9.
Peter J. Wooley, Geography & Japan’s Strategic Choices (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 10–11.
John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Bantam Books, 1970),
EB Schumpeter, Ed., GC Allen, MS Gordon, The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 1930–1940: Population, Raw Materials and Industry (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1940), 676–79
Takekoshi Yosoburo, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan Volume 3 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), 277.
Takekoshi Yosoburo, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan Volume 1 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), 282.
Joseph D’Autremer, The Japanese Empire and Its Economic Conditions (New York: Charles Scribner’s & Sons, 1910), 135.
GE and Denzil Baring Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 2.
George Forty, Japanese Army Handbook 1939–45 (Sparkford, England: Sutton & Company, 2002), 95–103;
Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin Group, 1999) This is the single book to own on Operation Downfall.
Okumiya Matsake and Horkioshi Jiro with Martin Cadin, Zero! (New York: EP Dutton & Company, 1956). Zero! is an excellent chronology of the deterioration of the Japanese Air Forces that should be taken in toto.
Jim Rearden, “Koga’s Zero,” Invention & Technology 13 (Fall 1997): 61, 63.
David C. Isby, “CA: Tactical Naval Warfare in the Pacific, 1941–43,” Strategy and Tactics Magazine # 38, May 1973,
Robert B. Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sum: A History of the Japanese Military (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997),
Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1985),
Walter Boyne, The Influence of Air Power Upon History (New York: Pelican Publishing Company, 2003),
Suzuki Kanji, “A Kamikaze’s Story,” MHQ: Military History Quarterly 7, Number 3 (Spring 1995).
George Feifer, Tennozan (New York: Tichnor & Fields, 1992)
It saved us from having to fight in Japan.....twice.
The first time to get rid of Tojo and Company.
The second time to foil an invasion from “The People’s Democratic Republic of Japan” into South Japan.
A Duffer’s guide to researching Operation Downfall On-line
The following is a list of on-line resources for non-academics researching materials related to Operation Downfall with in some cases notes I pulled from the source documents.
This list is continually being updated as URL change/fail and not all materials listed have URL associated with them as they were books or resources that were pulled from those on-line documents for later research.
Feel free to use the list in your research.
The maps alone are very much worth that endorsement.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_downfall1.html
World War II in the Pacific
Operation Downfall : Olympic and Coronet
The Invasion of Japan
http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html
Operation Downfall, The Planned Invasion of Japan on November 1st. 1945
Ahoy - Mac’s Web Log
Naval, Maritime, Australian History and more
Mackenzie J Gregory
http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/OperationDownfallThePlann.html
Operation Downfall
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Triumph/index.html
Reports
of
General MacArthur
THE CAMPAIGNS OF
MACARTHUR IN THE PACIFIC
VOLUME I
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/index.htm#contents
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Japan’s Struggle to End the War
Chairman’s Office
1 July 1946
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/JapansStruggle/index.html
The Amphibians
Came to Conquer
THE STORY OF
ADMIRAL
RICHMOND KELLY TURNER
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/index.html
“Planning for Use of PT Boats at Okinawa
Before relating the story of the Okinawa assault, the reason for the absence of PT boats in the assault forces will be mentioned.
Vice Admiral Turner, and many other naval officers who had witnessed the PT boat operations in the Guadalcanal and New Georgia operations, thought that the PT boats were anywhere from somewhat to vastly overrated by the public and the press.
Admiral Hall tells the story that prior to the Okinawa operation the overall commander of the PT boats, who had participated in the South Pacific operations, reported to him in Leyte for duty in connection with training for the upcoming Okinawa landings. Admiral Hall asked Admiral Turner by despatch what part the PT boats would play in the operations so he could arrange appropriate training for them. Vice Admiral Turner informed Admiral Hall that the PT boats would not even be allowed to enter the Okinawa area until D plus 4 or later. Admiral Hall explained:
He evidently had no use for them, and I had no use for them. When I was doing my part of the Normandy landing, (OMAHA Beach) they were of no use whatsoever.32”
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/actc-24.html
At Close Quarters: PT Boats in the United States Navy
by
Captain Robert J. Bulkley, Jr.
USNR (Retired)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/CloseQuarters/index.html
Transport Doctrine
Amphibious Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet
September 1944
A16-3/P11
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Transport/index.html
Chapter XXX Use of Smoke in Amphibious Operations.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Transport/transport-30.html
Chapter XXVII Gunfire Support
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Transport/transport-27.html
Across the Reef: The Amphibious Tracked Vehicle at War By Victor J. Croizat
Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War By Peter G. Tsouras
Beans, Bullets and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II,
by Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter, USN (Retired)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/BBBO/index.html
Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1992, by Thomas Wildenberg
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/index.html
The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision
Reports of General MacArthur
CHAPTER XIV
JAPAN’S SURRENDER
PLATE NO. 130
Aerial Bombardment of Japan
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/Images/p_130.jpg
US Army in WW2
Campaign in the Marianas
Part Three
Tinian
CHAPTER XIII
American and Japanese Plans
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Marianas/USA-P-Marianas-13.html
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN: Marines in the Victory on Okinawa
by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)
http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extcontent/usmc/pcn-190-003135-00/sec1.htm
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume III:
Central Pacific Drive
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar////USMC/III/index.html#index
History of the USMC Operations in World War II
PART IV
Saipan: The Decisive Battle
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar////USMC/III/USMC-III-IV-1.html
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V:
Victory and Occupation
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/index.html#index
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V:
Victory and Occupation
Appendix J
Comparison of Equipment—Marine Division1
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-J.html
COMINCH P-009
Antiaircraft Action Summary
Suicide Attacks
April 1945
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary/index.html
SECRET INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 24
Battle Experience
Radar Pickets and Methods of Combating
Suicide Attacks Off Okinawa
March-May 1945
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/BatExp-Okinawa/index.html
“SMOKE, USE OF
CO USS Purdy comments:
This vessel used smoke only as ordered when at anchor in HAGUSHI BEACH area or at KERAMA RETTO. When in the HAGUSHI BEACH area, smoke coverage was excellent. In the KERAMA RETTO area the Purdy was stationed to windward where smoke coverage was relatively ineffective. It is believed that too few smoke boats are stationed to adequately cover ships in that direction.
ComPhibPac comments:
The determining factor of whether or not to use smoke as a protective measure against suicide attacks, as well as against orthodox enemy air attacks, is whether or not the concealment of ships from enemy planes is sufficient to warrant the reduced efficiency of our AA fire. If ships are only partially covered with smoke or if only some of the ships are covered, the use of smoke is not warranted. The following principles are based on the above:
Do not use smoke at sea, day or night.
Use smoke to cover an anchorage or transport area during low visibility, morning or evening twilight, should be governed by whether or not the ships can be effectively hidden from view of enemy planes. If planes can see the ships or make out their outlines through the smoke, smoke should not be used.
The decision to use smoke to cover an anchorage or transport area during low visibility, morning or evening twilight, should be governed by whether or not the ships can be effectively hidden from view of enemy planes. If planes can see the ships or make out their outlines through the smoke, smoke should not be used.”
and
“CHAPTER 81
RADAR PICKETS AND METHODS OF COMBATING SUICIDE ATTACKS OFF OKINAWA MARCH - MAY 1945
PREFACE
Radar Picket duty on isolated stations 350 miles from the coast
F. Use of Fog Oil Smoke by Small Craft Picket Supports: The fog oil smoke screen provided in the Hagushi transport area at night was most effective. In the event small craft are detailed to give close support to radar pickets, it is suggested that for use in night attacks the small craft be equipped with suitable supply of fog oil and necessary generators. A formation employing the small craft making smoke to windward might then provide considerable protection for the radar picket vessel unless, of course, wind conditions were too unfavorable. Since high speed and maneuverability are not attributes of these craft anyway (assuming the picket is also a small or medium type), nothing would be lost by slowing to speeds most suitable for taking advantage of the smoke by maneuvering beneath it.”
COMINCH P-0011
Anti-Suicide Action Summary
August 1945
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-0845/index.html
Information Bulletin · No. 29
Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-1045/index.html
Hyperwar US Navy in World War II
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/index.html
Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
by Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin, USN (Ret.)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Wallin/index.html
Naval Operations in the Pacific from March 1944 to October 1945
“Anchors Aweigh”
[Excerpted from Admiral Earnest J. King, Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Covering Combat Operations from 1 March 1944 to 1 March, 1945. March 1945, pp. 103-133 and Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Covering the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945. December 1945, pp. 173-204]
http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Compac45.html
Olympic vs. Ketsu-Go
Marine Corps Gazette, August 1965, Vol. 49, No. 8.
Dr. K. Jack Bauer describes the United States’ plans to assault Kyushu in the fall of 1945, a preliminary to the more massive invasion of Honshu.
http://www.warbirdforum.com/olympic.htm
American war plans, 1941-1945: the test of battle By Steven T. Ross
GUIDE TO JAPANESE MONOGRAPHS AND JAPANESE STUDIES ON MANCHURIA 1945-1960
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/guide.html
Hyperwar Japanese Monographs
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/index.html
Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger’s war in the Pacific, 1942-1945 By Robert L. Eichelberger, Emma Gudger Eichelberger, Jay Luvaas
General Kenney reports: a personal history of the Pacific War By George Churchill Kenney, United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force
http://books.google.com/books?id=tWdbngbCc84C&dq=general+kenney+reports&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=yDwNTOnTE4GC8gaF9cmUBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=ipo%20dam&f=false
Huber, Thomas M.
Japan’s battle of Okinawa, April to June 1945 / by Thomas M.
Huber.
p. em.- (Leavenworth papers 18, ISSN 01953451 ; no. IS)
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/Huber/Huber.asp#81
Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific
by
Major Chas. S. Nichols, Jr., USMC
Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1955
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Okinawa/index.html
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V: Victory and Occupation
by
Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Saw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1968
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/index.html
Project SPHINX: The question of the use of gas in the planned invasion of Japan
Author: John Ellis van Courtland Moona
Affiliation: a Professor of history, Fitchburg State College,
DOI: 10.1080/01402398908437381
Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year
Published in: Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 12, Issue 3 September 1989 , pages 303 - 323
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=mass~content=a789934815
2nd Engineer Special Brigade
http://www.2esb.org/04_History/04_History.htm
3rd Engineer Special Brigade
http://ebsr.net/3rdESB2.htm
533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment
http://ebsr.net/Chronology.htm
Operation Zipper: The Invasion of Malaya, August 1945
v. 1.0 May 6, 2001
This historical order of battle is the work of Dr. Graham Watson.
http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/malaysia/operationzipper.html
HMS TRUMPETER
Escort Carrier
Ex USS Bastian ACV/AVG-47/CVE-37
Became USS Bastion 1946
Alblasserdijk 1948, Irene Valmas 1966.
“Operation Zipper, the recapture of Malaya, was put into effect, but without a previously arranged air and sea bombardment. Over 100,000 troops landed at various points escorted by HMS Nelson, Richelieu, Nigeria, Cleopatra, Royalist and Ceylon, with the escort carriers Hunter, Stalker, Archer, Khedive, Emperor, Pursuer and Trumpeter with 15 destroyers.”
http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/TRUMPETER.html
Royal Navy: Fleet Air Army , August 1945
v.1.0 April 7, 2002
Graham Watson
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET
http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/uk/faa1945.html
ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTH EAST ASIA, September 1945
v.1.0 May 6, 2001
This historical orbat is the work of Dr. Graham Watson.
http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/usa/alliedlandforcessoutheastasia1945.html
AUSTRALIAN ARMY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC: 1942-45
THE MILITARY STRATEGY AND COMMAND ASPECTS OF THE
AUSTRALIAN ARMY’S AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
David Horner
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/Amphibious_Operations_Horner.pdf
Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army - Volume Vol7
Volume VII – The Final Campaigns (1st edition, 1963)
Author: Gavin Long
http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67909
Japanese Naval Ground Forces
CINCPAC Bulletin 11-45
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/KYE/CINCPAC-11-45/index.html
Reports Control Symbol
CSCAP (OT) 87
Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II
* * *
Final Report
7 December 1941 — 31 December 1946
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html
The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses
During World War II by All Causes
February 1947
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/index.html
Chapter IV-2
Kyushu Deployment to December 1945
KYUSHU OCCUPATION1
Original plans for the occupation of Japan
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-IV-2.html
27. In late November, in order to determine whether the VAC plan for OLYMPIC was valid and feasible, Brigadier General William W. Rogers, VAC chief of staff, called into Sasebo for a three-day war games session the commanders, chiefs of staff, and principal staff officers of the Japanese forces which were to have defended Kyushu. In the course of these sessions, the play of the games was based on the VAC plan and the defense orders and plans which the Japanese participants brought with them, after some initial reluctance to do so on their part. Questions were asked at random, capabilities and reaction times were measured, and all conceivable factors were taken into consideration. The Japanese were asked how long it would have taken them to move one division. Instead of the 36 hours that the Marines had expected, the answer was 9 days. The reason was that the former enemy commanders could only move their troops at night, and by foot, because of the complete American air superiority over the target by day. At the completion of the war games, it was decisively proven that U.S. air superiority had in fact guaranteed success to the VAC plan. In addition, although the strength of Japanese forces in the south of Kyushu was great, many soldiers were armed with spears only. The more than 2,000 aircraft on Kyushu posed a threat to the American landing, but these planes were held back to be employed in a mass Kamikaze attack which was never ordered. The entire three days of sessions were conducted on a thoroughly professional basis with attention paid to mutual courtesy and respect. In the end, General Rogers was satisfied that the VAC plan would have been valid, if OLYMPIC had been consummated. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Aug66.
CARDL search link with “Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare” as the search term:
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare, Volume I; general organization, policies and intentions, tactics.
Contains a comprehensive description and evaluation of the Japanese capacity to wage chemical warfare. Comparisons of knowledge, techniques, materiel and procedures to those of the United States on the...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=2071&CISOBOX=1&REC=18
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare.
Volume II
THE CHEMICAL WArFARE RESEARCH AND
Development WORK OF THE JAPANESE
1 March 1946
Office of the Chief Chemical Officer
General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific
Tokyo, Japan
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1568&REC=8
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare. Volume V, part G; Japanese chemical warfare equipment and materiel.
This report covers and describes the variety of Japanese chemical warfare items found in Japan and Korea by the intelligence teams assigned to collect this material. The information is generally non-technical...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1646&REC=15
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare. Volume V, part H; Japanese chemical warfare equipment and materiel.
This report covers and describes the variety of Japanese chemical warfare items found in Japan and Korea by the intelligence teams assigned to collect this material. The information is generally non-technical...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1838&REC=18
Kamikaze special attack force.
An explanation of the Kamikaze Special Attack Force written for the Japanese people. From a translation of an article in the Weekly Report of 8 November 1944 issued by the Cabinet Information Board.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1838&REC=18
Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command record, Mid-1941 - August 1945.
The basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers on duty in command and staff units within major units during periods of operations during World War...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=2409&REC=3
Defense installations on Iwo Jima.
Contains a photographic survey of the different Japanese defense installations on Iwo Jima as well as mapping of the mines, blockhouses, anti-aircraft, covered artillery, coastal defense, and enemy installations....
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=669&REC=7
Report of capture, occupation, and defense of Iwo Jima.
This is the commanding general’s report of the capture, occupation, development, and defense of Iwo Jima, representing an important step in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The enclosures for...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1150&CISOBOX=1&REC=20
Participation in the Okinawa Operation, volume I.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=439&REC=7
Participation in the Okinawa Operation, volume II.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=430&REC=20
U.S. Army transportation in the Southwest Pacific area, 1941-1947.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=903&REC=1
Tenth Army: Action report: Ryukyus: 26 March to 30 June 1945. Volume I.
Vol. I of II. Volume I begins with roster of officers HQ, Tenth Army. Report of the Tenth Army mission in the Okinawa and Ryukyus campaign. Includes task force organization, planning, training, embarkation,...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=599&REC=2
Tenth Army: Action report: Ryukyus: 26 March to 30 June 1945. Volume II.
Vol. II of II. Report of the Tenth Army mission in the Okinawa and Ryukyus campaign. Includes task force organization, planning, training, embarkation, movement, military operations summary, enemy tactics,...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=610&REC=3
Antiaircraft artillery activities in the Pacific war.
This report is a summary of the operations of antiaircraft artillery from December 1941 until August 1945 against the enemy in the Pacific theater. Engagements with aircraft, protection to airfields, supply...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1997&REC=16
Collection World War II Operational Documents
Title Occupation of Japan.
Abstract Report of the part played by the 98th Infantry Division in the Occupation of Japan. It covers the transition of the Division from preparation for combat to planning for occupation; the rapid planning and execution of an overseas movement and amphibious land; and finally, the establishment of control over the Osaka Area of Honshu, Japan.
Keyword World War, 1939-1945; World War Two; WWII; Post-World War II; Japanese occupation; Allied occupation; Japanese constitution; Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO); Japan; Japanese history; Japanese culture; Pacific Theater of Operations
Publisher Osaka, Japan : Headquarters 98th Infantry Division,
Date, Original 1945
Date, Digital 2008-07-21
Resource Type Textual; Maps
Format PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 76 p.; 7.41 MB.
Call number N12834-A
Language eng
Release statement Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Repository Combined Arms Research Library
Library Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created 2009-06-02
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=2616&CISOBOX=1&REC=20
Basic outline plan for Blacklist operations to occupy Japan proper and Korea after surrender or collapse: Annexes.
Plans for how the allies were going to occupy Japan and Korea after their defeat.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=230&REC=14
Basic outline plan for Blacklist operations to occupy Japan proper and Korea after surrender or collapse.
The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy Japan Proper and Korea after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=150&CISOBOX=1&REC=3
Tentative troop list by type units for Blacklist operations.
The attached troop list by type unit, “BLACKLIST” Operations, contains an allocation of type units, adjusted to availability in the Western Pacific for the months of August and September 1945 for use as...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... OX=1&REC=3
Japanese plans for the defense of Kyushu.
This report discusses the defensive plans of Kyushu, Japan, based on Sixth Army’s estimates and intelligence. The information was compiled for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Japan. The report is dated...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=150&CISOBOX=1&REC=3
This is a really great on-line document on American military preperations for the Invasion of Japan:
Report of Joint Air Ground Tests Sgainst Japanese Type Field Fortifications (Sphinx Project) Camp Hood, Texas. Period: 6-24 July 1945.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3354&CISOBOX=1&REC=1
This document runs 20(+) MB. The things in it that stood out:
1) The US Military had a host of active and passive infrared night viewing devices that were coming on-line for Operation Downfall. The Alamo Scouts coming ashore on Kyushu would have “Owned the night.”
2) There were a lot of tactics from the US 6th Army’s Luzon campaign in the manuevers including mass Napalm strikes, AA search lights for night combat, and the use of AA guns for cave position destruction.
3) Early mortar tracking radars and sound spotting devices were going to fielded at large scale in infantry regiments.
4) The 250mm (9.75-inch) self propelled mortar made a huge impression on the evaluators in it’s effects on Japanese reverse slope defense. It was going to be fielded at a rate of 2-to-4 per infantry regiment cannon company at some point during the invasion of Japan.
Ah, but don’t foget Europe!
As soon as the US and British armies, supplies, and supply ships and supply dumps were “transferred” from the European front lines (essentially where they were already “opposing” Soviet armies far larger then the US local forces) back across the Atlantic, back across the US continent and then back across the Pacific -
Stalin would have been able to “stabilize” a war-torn and disarmed Germany immediately all the way to the French border. And the French socialist unions and strikers and Vichy government wold have turned France into a Yugoslav or Polish client state.
There are two sets of potential casualty figures; a low number used to gain approval to proceed with the operation ; and a high number used to plan reserve forces, medical needs and, as it turned out, to claim as lives saved by use of the atom bomb. These figures changed over time, starting low and going higher as the enemy build-up on Kyushu was discovered.The invasion of Japan would obviously have been bloodier for the US (which would have been fighting alone) than Okinawa had been. Transfer of additional Japanese troops from occupied China, probably via Korea, would have to have been interdicted, but even with those reinforcements dropping to near-zero, the invasion would have resulted in the deaths of pretty much everyone in Japan just to bring it to a victorious conclusion. We all remember the nutty Rising Sun types who continued to fight for decades after the war ended, because they'd never been told that it was over, and they were only fighting on little ratholes the empire had overrun at some point. An invasion of Japan might have seen primary combat over in perhaps a year, but there would have been thousands (at least) who would only succumb to death in combat or old age.
The Last Mission: The Secret History of World War II’s Final Battle
Jim Smith, Malcolm McConnell
http://www.amazon.com/The-Last-Mission-Secret-History/dp/0767907795
https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/jim-smith/the-last-mission/
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
