A Duffer’s guide to researching Operation Downfall On-line
The following is a list of on-line resources for non-academics researching materials related to Operation Downfall with in some cases notes I pulled from the source documents.
This list is continually being updated as URL change/fail and not all materials listed have URL associated with them as they were books or resources that were pulled from those on-line documents for later research.
Feel free to use the list in your research.
The maps alone are very much worth that endorsement.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_downfall1.html
World War II in the Pacific
Operation Downfall : Olympic and Coronet
The Invasion of Japan
http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html
Operation Downfall, The Planned Invasion of Japan on November 1st. 1945
Ahoy - Mac’s Web Log
Naval, Maritime, Australian History and more
Mackenzie J Gregory
http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/OperationDownfallThePlann.html
Operation Downfall
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Triumph/index.html
Reports
of
General MacArthur
THE CAMPAIGNS OF
MACARTHUR IN THE PACIFIC
VOLUME I
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/index.htm#contents
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Japan’s Struggle to End the War
Chairman’s Office
1 July 1946
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/JapansStruggle/index.html
The Amphibians
Came to Conquer
THE STORY OF
ADMIRAL
RICHMOND KELLY TURNER
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/index.html
“Planning for Use of PT Boats at Okinawa
Before relating the story of the Okinawa assault, the reason for the absence of PT boats in the assault forces will be mentioned.
Vice Admiral Turner, and many other naval officers who had witnessed the PT boat operations in the Guadalcanal and New Georgia operations, thought that the PT boats were anywhere from somewhat to vastly overrated by the public and the press.
Admiral Hall tells the story that prior to the Okinawa operation the overall commander of the PT boats, who had participated in the South Pacific operations, reported to him in Leyte for duty in connection with training for the upcoming Okinawa landings. Admiral Hall asked Admiral Turner by despatch what part the PT boats would play in the operations so he could arrange appropriate training for them. Vice Admiral Turner informed Admiral Hall that the PT boats would not even be allowed to enter the Okinawa area until D plus 4 or later. Admiral Hall explained:
He evidently had no use for them, and I had no use for them. When I was doing my part of the Normandy landing, (OMAHA Beach) they were of no use whatsoever.32”
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/actc-24.html
At Close Quarters: PT Boats in the United States Navy
by
Captain Robert J. Bulkley, Jr.
USNR (Retired)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/CloseQuarters/index.html
Transport Doctrine
Amphibious Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet
September 1944
A16-3/P11
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Transport/index.html
Chapter XXX Use of Smoke in Amphibious Operations.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Transport/transport-30.html
Chapter XXVII Gunfire Support
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Transport/transport-27.html
Across the Reef: The Amphibious Tracked Vehicle at War By Victor J. Croizat
Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War By Peter G. Tsouras
Beans, Bullets and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II,
by Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter, USN (Retired)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/BBBO/index.html
Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1992, by Thomas Wildenberg
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/index.html
The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision
Reports of General MacArthur
CHAPTER XIV
JAPAN’S SURRENDER
PLATE NO. 130
Aerial Bombardment of Japan
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/Images/p_130.jpg
US Army in WW2
Campaign in the Marianas
Part Three
Tinian
CHAPTER XIII
American and Japanese Plans
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Marianas/USA-P-Marianas-13.html
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN: Marines in the Victory on Okinawa
by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)
http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extcontent/usmc/pcn-190-003135-00/sec1.htm
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume III:
Central Pacific Drive
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar////USMC/III/index.html#index
History of the USMC Operations in World War II
PART IV
Saipan: The Decisive Battle
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar////USMC/III/USMC-III-IV-1.html
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V:
Victory and Occupation
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/index.html#index
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V:
Victory and Occupation
Appendix J
Comparison of Equipment—Marine Division1
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-J.html
COMINCH P-009
Antiaircraft Action Summary
Suicide Attacks
April 1945
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary/index.html
SECRET INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 24
Battle Experience
Radar Pickets and Methods of Combating
Suicide Attacks Off Okinawa
March-May 1945
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/BatExp-Okinawa/index.html
“SMOKE, USE OF
CO USS Purdy comments:
This vessel used smoke only as ordered when at anchor in HAGUSHI BEACH area or at KERAMA RETTO. When in the HAGUSHI BEACH area, smoke coverage was excellent. In the KERAMA RETTO area the Purdy was stationed to windward where smoke coverage was relatively ineffective. It is believed that too few smoke boats are stationed to adequately cover ships in that direction.
ComPhibPac comments:
The determining factor of whether or not to use smoke as a protective measure against suicide attacks, as well as against orthodox enemy air attacks, is whether or not the concealment of ships from enemy planes is sufficient to warrant the reduced efficiency of our AA fire. If ships are only partially covered with smoke or if only some of the ships are covered, the use of smoke is not warranted. The following principles are based on the above:
Do not use smoke at sea, day or night.
Use smoke to cover an anchorage or transport area during low visibility, morning or evening twilight, should be governed by whether or not the ships can be effectively hidden from view of enemy planes. If planes can see the ships or make out their outlines through the smoke, smoke should not be used.
The decision to use smoke to cover an anchorage or transport area during low visibility, morning or evening twilight, should be governed by whether or not the ships can be effectively hidden from view of enemy planes. If planes can see the ships or make out their outlines through the smoke, smoke should not be used.”
and
“CHAPTER 81
RADAR PICKETS AND METHODS OF COMBATING SUICIDE ATTACKS OFF OKINAWA MARCH - MAY 1945
PREFACE
Radar Picket duty on isolated stations 350 miles from the coast
F. Use of Fog Oil Smoke by Small Craft Picket Supports: The fog oil smoke screen provided in the Hagushi transport area at night was most effective. In the event small craft are detailed to give close support to radar pickets, it is suggested that for use in night attacks the small craft be equipped with suitable supply of fog oil and necessary generators. A formation employing the small craft making smoke to windward might then provide considerable protection for the radar picket vessel unless, of course, wind conditions were too unfavorable. Since high speed and maneuverability are not attributes of these craft anyway (assuming the picket is also a small or medium type), nothing would be lost by slowing to speeds most suitable for taking advantage of the smoke by maneuvering beneath it.”
COMINCH P-0011
Anti-Suicide Action Summary
August 1945
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-0845/index.html
Information Bulletin · No. 29
Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-1045/index.html
Hyperwar US Navy in World War II
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/index.html
Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
by Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin, USN (Ret.)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Wallin/index.html
Naval Operations in the Pacific from March 1944 to October 1945
“Anchors Aweigh”
[Excerpted from Admiral Earnest J. King, Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Covering Combat Operations from 1 March 1944 to 1 March, 1945. March 1945, pp. 103-133 and Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Covering the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945. December 1945, pp. 173-204]
http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Compac45.html
Olympic vs. Ketsu-Go
Marine Corps Gazette, August 1965, Vol. 49, No. 8.
Dr. K. Jack Bauer describes the United States’ plans to assault Kyushu in the fall of 1945, a preliminary to the more massive invasion of Honshu.
http://www.warbirdforum.com/olympic.htm
American war plans, 1941-1945: the test of battle By Steven T. Ross
GUIDE TO JAPANESE MONOGRAPHS AND JAPANESE STUDIES ON MANCHURIA 1945-1960
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/guide.html
Hyperwar Japanese Monographs
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/index.html
Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger’s war in the Pacific, 1942-1945 By Robert L. Eichelberger, Emma Gudger Eichelberger, Jay Luvaas
General Kenney reports: a personal history of the Pacific War By George Churchill Kenney, United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force
http://books.google.com/books?id=tWdbngbCc84C&dq=general+kenney+reports&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=yDwNTOnTE4GC8gaF9cmUBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=ipo%20dam&f=false
Huber, Thomas M.
Japan’s battle of Okinawa, April to June 1945 / by Thomas M.
Huber.
p. em.- (Leavenworth papers 18, ISSN 01953451 ; no. IS)
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/Huber/Huber.asp#81
Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific
by
Major Chas. S. Nichols, Jr., USMC
Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1955
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Okinawa/index.html
History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V: Victory and Occupation
by
Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Saw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1968
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/index.html
Project SPHINX: The question of the use of gas in the planned invasion of Japan
Author: John Ellis van Courtland Moona
Affiliation: a Professor of history, Fitchburg State College,
DOI: 10.1080/01402398908437381
Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year
Published in: Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 12, Issue 3 September 1989 , pages 303 - 323
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=mass~content=a789934815
2nd Engineer Special Brigade
http://www.2esb.org/04_History/04_History.htm
3rd Engineer Special Brigade
http://ebsr.net/3rdESB2.htm
533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment
http://ebsr.net/Chronology.htm
Operation Zipper: The Invasion of Malaya, August 1945
v. 1.0 May 6, 2001
This historical order of battle is the work of Dr. Graham Watson.
http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/malaysia/operationzipper.html
HMS TRUMPETER
Escort Carrier
Ex USS Bastian ACV/AVG-47/CVE-37
Became USS Bastion 1946
Alblasserdijk 1948, Irene Valmas 1966.
“Operation Zipper, the recapture of Malaya, was put into effect, but without a previously arranged air and sea bombardment. Over 100,000 troops landed at various points escorted by HMS Nelson, Richelieu, Nigeria, Cleopatra, Royalist and Ceylon, with the escort carriers Hunter, Stalker, Archer, Khedive, Emperor, Pursuer and Trumpeter with 15 destroyers.”
http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/TRUMPETER.html
Royal Navy: Fleet Air Army , August 1945
v.1.0 April 7, 2002
Graham Watson
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET
http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/uk/faa1945.html
ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTH EAST ASIA, September 1945
v.1.0 May 6, 2001
This historical orbat is the work of Dr. Graham Watson.
http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/usa/alliedlandforcessoutheastasia1945.html
AUSTRALIAN ARMY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC: 1942-45
THE MILITARY STRATEGY AND COMMAND ASPECTS OF THE
AUSTRALIAN ARMY’S AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
David Horner
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs/Amphibious_Operations_Horner.pdf
Australia in the War of 19391945. Series 1 Army - Volume Vol7
Volume VII The Final Campaigns (1st edition, 1963)
Author: Gavin Long
http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67909
Japanese Naval Ground Forces
CINCPAC Bulletin 11-45
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/KYE/CINCPAC-11-45/index.html
Reports Control Symbol
CSCAP (OT) 87
Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II
* * *
Final Report
7 December 1941 — 31 December 1946
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html
The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses
During World War II by All Causes
February 1947
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/index.html
Chapter IV-2
Kyushu Deployment to December 1945
KYUSHU OCCUPATION1
Original plans for the occupation of Japan
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-IV-2.html
27. In late November, in order to determine whether the VAC plan for OLYMPIC was valid and feasible, Brigadier General William W. Rogers, VAC chief of staff, called into Sasebo for a three-day war games session the commanders, chiefs of staff, and principal staff officers of the Japanese forces which were to have defended Kyushu. In the course of these sessions, the play of the games was based on the VAC plan and the defense orders and plans which the Japanese participants brought with them, after some initial reluctance to do so on their part. Questions were asked at random, capabilities and reaction times were measured, and all conceivable factors were taken into consideration. The Japanese were asked how long it would have taken them to move one division. Instead of the 36 hours that the Marines had expected, the answer was 9 days. The reason was that the former enemy commanders could only move their troops at night, and by foot, because of the complete American air superiority over the target by day. At the completion of the war games, it was decisively proven that U.S. air superiority had in fact guaranteed success to the VAC plan. In addition, although the strength of Japanese forces in the south of Kyushu was great, many soldiers were armed with spears only. The more than 2,000 aircraft on Kyushu posed a threat to the American landing, but these planes were held back to be employed in a mass Kamikaze attack which was never ordered. The entire three days of sessions were conducted on a thoroughly professional basis with attention paid to mutual courtesy and respect. In the end, General Rogers was satisfied that the VAC plan would have been valid, if OLYMPIC had been consummated. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Aug66.
CARDL search link with “Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare” as the search term:
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare, Volume I; general organization, policies and intentions, tactics.
Contains a comprehensive description and evaluation of the Japanese capacity to wage chemical warfare. Comparisons of knowledge, techniques, materiel and procedures to those of the United States on the...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=2071&CISOBOX=1&REC=18
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare.
Volume II
THE CHEMICAL WArFARE RESEARCH AND
Development WORK OF THE JAPANESE
1 March 1946
Office of the Chief Chemical Officer
General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific
Tokyo, Japan
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1568&REC=8
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare. Volume V, part G; Japanese chemical warfare equipment and materiel.
This report covers and describes the variety of Japanese chemical warfare items found in Japan and Korea by the intelligence teams assigned to collect this material. The information is generally non-technical...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1646&REC=15
Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare. Volume V, part H; Japanese chemical warfare equipment and materiel.
This report covers and describes the variety of Japanese chemical warfare items found in Japan and Korea by the intelligence teams assigned to collect this material. The information is generally non-technical...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1838&REC=18
Kamikaze special attack force.
An explanation of the Kamikaze Special Attack Force written for the Japanese people. From a translation of an article in the Weekly Report of 8 November 1944 issued by the Cabinet Information Board.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1838&REC=18
Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command record, Mid-1941 - August 1945.
The basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers on duty in command and staff units within major units during periods of operations during World War...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=2409&REC=3
Defense installations on Iwo Jima.
Contains a photographic survey of the different Japanese defense installations on Iwo Jima as well as mapping of the mines, blockhouses, anti-aircraft, covered artillery, coastal defense, and enemy installations....
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=669&REC=7
Report of capture, occupation, and defense of Iwo Jima.
This is the commanding general’s report of the capture, occupation, development, and defense of Iwo Jima, representing an important step in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The enclosures for...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1150&CISOBOX=1&REC=20
Participation in the Okinawa Operation, volume I.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=439&REC=7
Participation in the Okinawa Operation, volume II.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=430&REC=20
U.S. Army transportation in the Southwest Pacific area, 1941-1947.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=903&REC=1
Tenth Army: Action report: Ryukyus: 26 March to 30 June 1945. Volume I.
Vol. I of II. Volume I begins with roster of officers HQ, Tenth Army. Report of the Tenth Army mission in the Okinawa and Ryukyus campaign. Includes task force organization, planning, training, embarkation,...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=599&REC=2
Tenth Army: Action report: Ryukyus: 26 March to 30 June 1945. Volume II.
Vol. II of II. Report of the Tenth Army mission in the Okinawa and Ryukyus campaign. Includes task force organization, planning, training, embarkation, movement, military operations summary, enemy tactics,...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=610&REC=3
Antiaircraft artillery activities in the Pacific war.
This report is a summary of the operations of antiaircraft artillery from December 1941 until August 1945 against the enemy in the Pacific theater. Engagements with aircraft, protection to airfields, supply...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1997&REC=16
Collection World War II Operational Documents
Title Occupation of Japan.
Abstract Report of the part played by the 98th Infantry Division in the Occupation of Japan. It covers the transition of the Division from preparation for combat to planning for occupation; the rapid planning and execution of an overseas movement and amphibious land; and finally, the establishment of control over the Osaka Area of Honshu, Japan.
Keyword World War, 1939-1945; World War Two; WWII; Post-World War II; Japanese occupation; Allied occupation; Japanese constitution; Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO); Japan; Japanese history; Japanese culture; Pacific Theater of Operations
Publisher Osaka, Japan : Headquarters 98th Infantry Division,
Date, Original 1945
Date, Digital 2008-07-21
Resource Type Textual; Maps
Format PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 76 p.; 7.41 MB.
Call number N12834-A
Language eng
Release statement Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Repository Combined Arms Research Library
Library Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created 2009-06-02
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=2616&CISOBOX=1&REC=20
Basic outline plan for Blacklist operations to occupy Japan proper and Korea after surrender or collapse: Annexes.
Plans for how the allies were going to occupy Japan and Korea after their defeat.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=230&REC=14
Basic outline plan for Blacklist operations to occupy Japan proper and Korea after surrender or collapse.
The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy Japan Proper and Korea after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=150&CISOBOX=1&REC=3
Tentative troop list by type units for Blacklist operations.
The attached troop list by type unit, “BLACKLIST” Operations, contains an allocation of type units, adjusted to availability in the Western Pacific for the months of August and September 1945 for use as...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... OX=1&REC=3
Japanese plans for the defense of Kyushu.
This report discusses the defensive plans of Kyushu, Japan, based on Sixth Army’s estimates and intelligence. The information was compiled for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Japan. The report is dated...
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=150&CISOBOX=1&REC=3
This is a really great on-line document on American military preperations for the Invasion of Japan:
Report of Joint Air Ground Tests Sgainst Japanese Type Field Fortifications (Sphinx Project) Camp Hood, Texas. Period: 6-24 July 1945.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3354&CISOBOX=1&REC=1
This document runs 20(+) MB. The things in it that stood out:
1) The US Military had a host of active and passive infrared night viewing devices that were coming on-line for Operation Downfall. The Alamo Scouts coming ashore on Kyushu would have “Owned the night.”
2) There were a lot of tactics from the US 6th Army’s Luzon campaign in the manuevers including mass Napalm strikes, AA search lights for night combat, and the use of AA guns for cave position destruction.
3) Early mortar tracking radars and sound spotting devices were going to fielded at large scale in infantry regiments.
4) The 250mm (9.75-inch) self propelled mortar made a huge impression on the evaluators in it’s effects on Japanese reverse slope defense. It was going to be fielded at a rate of 2-to-4 per infantry regiment cannon company at some point during the invasion of Japan.