A key to the map symbols is on my profile.
A key to the map symbols is on my profile.
interesting. the domestic issues that are being rolled along with neutrality have an amazingly familiar ring.
Instructions by Heydrich on Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied Territories, September 21, 1939
The Chief of the Security Police
Berlin, September 21, 1939
Schnellbrief
To Chiefs of all Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police
Subject: Jewish Question in Occupied Territory
I refer to the conference held in Berlin today, and again point out that the planned total measures (i.e., the final aim − Endziel) are to be kept strictly secret.
Distinction must be made between:
1. the final aim (which will require extended periods of time) and
2. the stages leading to the fulfillment of this final aim (which will be carried out in short periods).
The planned measures require the most thorough preparation with regard to technical as well as economic aspects.
It is obvious that the tasks ahead cannot be laid down from here in full detail. The instructions and directives below must serve also for the purpose of urging chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen to give practical consideration [to the problems involved].
For the time being, the first prerequisite for the final aim is the concentration of the Jews from the countryside into the larger cities.
This is to be carried out speedily.
In doing so, distinction must be made
1) between the zones of Danzig and West Prussia, Poznan, Eastern Upper Silesia, and
2) the other occupied zones.
As far as possible, the areas referred to under 1) are to be cleared of Jews; at least the aim should be to establish only few cities of concentration.
In the areas under 2), as few concentration centers as possible are to be set up, so as to facilitate subsequent measures. In this connection it should be borne in mind that only cities which are rail junctions, or are at least located on railroad lines, should be selected as concentration points.
On principle, Jewish communities of less than 500 persons are to be dissolved and transferred to the nearest concentration center.
This decree does not apply to the area of Einsatzgruppe 1, which is situated east of Cracow and is bounded roughly by Polanice, Jaroslaw, the new line of demarcation, and the former Slovak-Polish border. Within this area only an approximate census of Jews is to be carried out. Furthermore, Councils of Jewish Elders (Juedische AEltestenraete), as outlined below, are to be set up.
Councils of Jewish Elders
1) In each Jewish community a Council of Jewish Elders is to be set up which, as far as possible, is to be composed of the remaining authoritative personalities and rabbis. The Council is to be composed of up to 24 male Jews (depending on the size of the Jewish community).
The Council is to be made fully responsible, in the literal sense of the word, for the exact and prompt implementation of directives already issued or to be issued in the future.
2) In case of sabotage of such instructions, the Councils are to be warned that the most severe measures will be taken.
3) The Judenraete (Jewish Councils) are to carry out an approximate census of the Jews of their areas, broken down if possible according to sex (and age groups): a) up to 16 years, b) from 16-20 years, and c) above; and also according to the principal occupations. The results are to be reported in the shortest possible time.
4) The Councils of Elders are to be informed of the date and time of the evacuation, the means available for evacuation, and, finally, the departure routes. They are then to be made personally responsible for the evacuation of the Jews from the countryside.
The reason to be given for the concentration of the Jews in the cities is that the Jews have taken a decisive part in sniper attacks and plundering.
5) The Councils of Elders in the concentration centers are to be made responsible for the appropriate housing of the Jews arriving from the countryside.
For reasons of general police security, the concentration of the Jews in the cities will probably call for regulations in these cities which will forbid their entry to certain quarters completely and that − but with due regard to economic requirements − they may, for instance, not leave the ghetto, nor leave their homes after a certain hour in the evening, etc.
6) The Councils of Elders are also to be made responsible for the suitable provisioning of the Jews during the transport to the cities.
There is no objection to the evacuated Jews taking with them their movable possessions insofar as that is technically possible.
7) Jews who fail to comply with the order to move into cities are to be given a short additional period of grace where there was sufficient reason for the delay. They are to be warned of the most severe penalties if they fail to move by the later date set.
All necessary measures are, on principle, always to be taken in closest consultation and cooperation with the German civil administration and the competent local military authorities.
In the execution [of this plan], it must be taken into consideration that economic requirements in the occupied areas do not suffer.
1) Above all, the needs of the army must be taken into consideration. For instance, for the time being, it will scarcely be possible to avoid, here and there, leaving behind some trade Jews who are absolutely essential for the provisioning of the troops, for lack of other possibilities. But in such cases the prompt Aryanization of these enterprises is to be planned and the move of the Jews to be completed in due course, in cooperation with the competent local German administrative authorities.
2) For the preservation of German economic interests in the occupied territories, it is obvious that Jewish-owned war and other essential industries, and also enterprises, industries and factories important to the Four-Year Plan, must be maintained for the time being.
In these cases also, prompt Aryanization must be aimed at, and the move of the Jews completed later.
3) Finally, the food situation in the occupied territories must be taken into consideration. For instance, as far as possible, land owned by Jewish settlers is to be handed over to the care of neighboring German or even Polish farmers to work on commission to ensure the harvesting of crops still standing in the fields, and replanting.
With regard to this important question, contact is to be made with the agricultural expert of the Chief of the Civil Administration.
4) In all cases in which it is not possible to coordinate the interests of the Security Police on the one hand, and the German civil administration on the other, I am to be informed by the fastest route and my decision awaited before the particular measures in question are carried out.
The Chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen are to report to me continuously on the following matters:
1) Numerical survey of the Jews present in their areas (according to the above classifications, if possible). The numbers of Jews evacuated from the countryside and of those already in the cities is to be listed separately.
2) Names of the cities which have been designated as concentration centers.
3) The dates set for the Jews to move to the cities.
4) Surveys of all the Jewish [owned] war and other essential industries and enterprises, or those important to the Four-Year Plan in their areas.
If possible, the following should be specified:
a) Type of enterprise (with a statement on possible conversion to really vital or war-important enterprises or ones of importance to the Four-Year Plan);
b) Which factories should be most urgently Aryanized (in order to forestall possible losses);
What kind of Aryanization is proposed? Germans or Poles? (the decision to depend on the importance of the enterprise);
c) The number of Jews working in these factories (specify those in leading positions).
Can operations at the enterprise be continued without difficulty after the removal of the Jews, or will it be necessary to allocate German or possibly Polish workers in their place? In what numbers?
If Polish workers have to be used care should be taken that they are drawn mainly from the former German provinces so as to begin to ease the problem there. These matters can be carried out only by means of coordination with the Labor Offices which have been set up.
In order to reach the planned aims, I expect the fullest cooperation of the whole manpower of the Security Policy and the SD.
The Chiefs of neighboring Einsatzgruppen are to establish contact with each other immediately in order to cover the areas in question completely.
The High Command of the Army; the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (attention: Secretary of State Neumann), the Reich Ministry for the Interior (attention: State Secretary Stuckart), for Food and the Economy (attention: State Secretary Landfried), as well as the Chiefs of Civil Administration of the Occupied Territories have received copies of this decree.
signed Heydrich
PS-3363.
Copyright ©2004 Yad Vashem The Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority
CBS - French Premier Daladier's Message to France - Don't worry, it is translated after he is done speaking.
The German Campaign in Poland: September 1 to October 5, 1939
Prepared under direction of the Chief of Staff
United States Government Printing Office Washington: 1942
e. Phase V: September 21-October 5--Occupation of East Poland.
It is not possible in this phase to describe the operations of individual armies. The only Polish troops still at large in German-occupied Poland on September 20 were the garrisons of Warsaw and Modlin, which had intercommunication until September 22; the naval garrison of the Hela Peninsula at the tip of the Corridor; a small mixed Polish force occupying Lemberg; and a considerable number of Polish units, mostly reserve formations, in the area of Deblin and Lublin.
In this phase the sieges of Warsaw and Modlin are the most important military operations. The operations against Warsaw were conducted by the Eighth Army on the west bank of the Vistula. The Third Army operated against the suburb of Praga on the ease bank. On September 22 the German divisions on both sides of the river launched local attacks that separated Modlin and Warsaw. The Germans suffered severe losses, but the siege lines drew tighter around both sides. An intensified artillery and air bombardment was hurled on the capital from the 24th to the 27th. It is estimated that 20 percent of all houses were destroyed and that about 60 percent received one or more hits.
Warsaw surrendered unconditionally on September 27 with its garrison of 102,000 men, but German troops did not formally occupy it until October 5. Modlin gave up on the 28th, surrendering a garrison of 30,000 men.
Lemberg surrendered to the encircling German and Russian armies on September 21, and on the next day the German forces withdrew to the San River, which was the agreed line of demarcation between Germany and Russia. The garrison at Hela, besieged by land and naval forces, surrendered on October 1.
Few details are known of the final military operations east of Deblin, except that fighting was serious and the Germans suffered many casualties. The Polish 37th and 41st Divisions, reserve units, organized in garrisons east of the Vistula, participated in these engagements. These Polish forces, numbering about 8,000 men, surrendered on October 5 at Kock, a town 30 miles east of Deblin, thus ending the last vestige of resistance on the thirty-fifth day of the campaign. The cost in casualties to Germany was approximately 10,000 killed, 30,000 wounded, and 3,000 missing.
5. Lessons.--During years of peace the guiding purpose of the German High Command was to organize, train, and equip an Army that, by being able to retain the initiative and maintain sustained offensive power in the attacking echelon, could avoid the stalemates of the first World War. The principles enunciated in the following lessons will give some idea how this purpose was achieved in the Polish campaign.
a. General and strategic considerations.--(1) Superiority.-- The superiority, in all the potentialities of war, of the German Army of about 1,500,000 men must be reckoned as the principal reason for the swift victory over about 600,000 Poles actually engaged. But despite this superiority of the German Army, Poland's defeat was hastened and made inevitable by certain negative factors in the strategy of the Polish High Command:
(a) Failure to estimate accurately the gravity of the situation and the strength of the German Army, and the consequent failure to take adequate measures of security.
(b) Failure to complete mobilization in time, although the emergency had long been obvious.
(c) Failure to employ the military forces available to the best possible advantage. Geographically Poland was a ready-made salient because of the location of Slovakia and East Prussia on her southern and northern flanks, respectively. Instead of maintaining a well-organized and strongly-held interior defensive position, with adequate covering forces in front and adequate protective forces on the flanks and strong reserves in the rear, the Polish High Command chose to string out a major percentage of its Army in a thin cordon along the frontiers. Thus the Polish troops were far in advance of Poland's main defensive and traditional river-line positions. There was a semblance of disposition in depth of the divisions in the Lodz Group, but since its reserves had been placed too far in the rear for effective support, even this one group was unable to act cohesively.
(d) Failure to disperse the Polish Air Force and to construct emergency airfields.
(2) Double envelopment, intelligence operations.--The plan of the German High Command for both an inner and an outer double envelopment of the Polish armies was daring but strategically sound. This plan was greatly facilitated, of course, by Poland's geographical situation, which enabled the Germans to strike at the flanks at once, but it was not initiated and carried through without the effective use of intelligence operations both before and during the conflict. Long before the campaign began, the German High Command had obtained intimate knowledge of the intentions and dispositions of the Polish Army, and was therefore able to eliminate doubts and provide for contingencies in reaching decisions. The decision to attempt the envelopments could hardly have been risked, in spite of the superiority of the German Army, if the Polish Army and its leadership had not been accurately evaluated. As it happened, the inner envelopment was so successfully executed that the outer envelopment, though also effective, was rendered unnecessary.
(3) Fortifications, reserves.--The German High Command secured its center with fortifications in order both to economize on troops and to concentrate its maximum striking power on the wings of its Army, particularly on the southern wing. These fortifications were comparatively lightly manned with border troops and militia, but sufficient active and reserve divisions were available for their immediate reinforcement.
(4) Aviation.--By employing its full striking power at the very beginning to destroy that of Poland, the German Air Force gained the necessary freedom of action to operate unmolested in all parts of the country, The Polish Air Force was inferior and severely limited, but the German High Command took no chances with its superiority in this respect. Both before and while its armies swept into battle, the Germans sent ahead more than two air fleets to destroy Polish airfields and aircraft. Once the Polish Air Force was neutralized, all important rail junctions were destroyed resulting in the disruption of Poland's main east-west and north-south communications. In consequence of this action, further mobilization was prevented and the service of supply impeded. Within 4 days Poland's industries, particularly her aviation plants, and her pilot training schools had felt the full fury of the German air assault. Poland had lost not only her aerial striking power but also the means of replenishing it, and thereafter was compelled to fight almost blind.
(5) Motorized and armored corps.--Corps consisting of motorized and armored divisions appeared for the first time in the Polish campaign and proved their strategic capabilities both in increased mobility and in added fire and striking power. For example, General Hoepner's panzer corps of von Reichenau's Tenth Army took advantage of a gap in the Polish Lodz Group at the juncture of two elements and plunged through it for a distance of 130 miles, a bold action that changed the strategic situation overnight. On the evening of the eighth day of the campaign General Hoepner's forces reached the suburbs of Warsaw, a distance of about 200 miles from the frontier.
b. Combined operations.--(1) Unity of command.--Unity of command was strictly adhered to in the Germany Army and the operations of the Polish campaign provide an everlasting example of what can be accomplished by the separate branches when they are placed under the control of a single, supreme head. The example of the application of this principle in the Polish operations was so successful that the German High Command accepted it as a pattern to be followed in future campaigns.
(2) Cooperation of arms.--The close cooperation achieved by the Germans in combined operations of the Infantry, Artillery, armored and motorized units, and the Air Force enabled them to perform seemingly impossible feats on the field of battle. The partnership, especially between air power and mechanized forces, made it possible for the offensive to sweep forward so rapidly that defensive reserves were of little value unless they were fully mobile or already occupied some strategic position. Thus the Infantry was able to close with the enemy while still in possession of adequate power to force a favorable decision. On many occasions the Infantry, upon reaching an objective, encountered a foe that was demoralized or already crushed.
(3) Intelligence cooperation.--The three-way cooperation maintained by the German Air Force, by combat intelligence and reconnaissance elements, and by the armored forces permitted the latter to operate effectively far ahead of the main forces.
(4) Cooperation of engineers.--The German engineers, who were specially trained as shock troops and who frequently had to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Infantry in carrying out their missions, facilitated the advance of the German armies by their speed and efficiency in solving engineering problems. Thoroughly trained, they sped up the advance by removing road blocks and constructing new bridges, or by repairing and maintaining hundreds of demolished bridges, over the Oder, San, Warthe, Vistula, Narew, and Bug Rivers and their tributaries.
(5) Cooperation in a special situation.--When the attack on the left flank of von Blaskowitz's Eighth Army by the Polish forces retreating from the Posen area threatened the whole German plan of campaign, the German High Command turned this threatened disaster into a decisive victory by the smooth coordination and cooperation of all arms. Air units were diverted from their strategic missions, and added the smashing and terrorizing effect of shock action to the other German counter measures. Hoepner's panzer corps, which became the left flank of von Reichenau's Tenth Army beyond the Pilica River, swung back from Warsaw and helped to encircle and annihilate the formidable Polish mass on the Bzura River. This Polish force might have won a victory if battlefield control of the German forces had been less flexible and unified. But within 3 days the Germans had checked the Polish threat and quickly resumed the general plan of the campaign.
(6) Relentlessness of pursuit.--The main objective of the German High Command was to destroy the Polish armies, and the accomplishment of this purpose was hastened by audacious and relentless pursuits that taxed the German troops almost to the limit of endurance. Intensive pressure on the Polish forces was constantly maintained. Their communications were continually disrupted. They were prevented from taking up delaying positions. German mechanized columns so rapidly encircled the Poles that they were never able to reach their final defensive river line.
c. Tactics and doctrine.--(1) Leadership, initiative.--The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish compaign. With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders. A good example of initiative by a higher commander is furnished by the important division of General Hoth, who commanded a panzer corps on the right flank of von Reichenau's Tenth Army. Southeast of Kielce, General Hoth, ignoring any dangers on his flanks, pushed his corps along the west banks of the Vistula, outflanked the thin Polish defense line in the Lysa Gora Hills, and, in short order, got behind the Polish positions. There, southeast of Radom, on September 9, with their backs to the Vistula, his men stood facing the retreating Poles. By this action General Hoth's armored forces were in position to play a leading role in the subsequent battle of Radom. As other German forces attacked frontally, his tank units plunged into the Polish rear, closing a trap in which they captured many more prisoners than their own strength.
(2) Intelligence, fifth column activities.--German intelligence and fifth column activities were carried on with extreme efficiency and effectiveness in facilitating the advance of ground forces and in spotting targets for the Air Force. Germany found it comparatively easy to conduct subversive activities among the large German minority in Poland on the borders of the Reich.
For obvious reasons, exact confirmed information on fifth column activities in Poland is lacking. However, the following instances have been reported in good faith by official American observers from testimony which they considered reliable:
Before the invasion began, rioting occurred among the German minority, and Polish officials were assassinated. This sort of activity was continued after the German advance, and the German fifth columnists aided the invaders in many other ways behind the Polish lines. The Germans were supplied with horses and with hidden stores of gasoline and food. Parachutists and troop transport airplanes were guided to landing grounds or warned of danger by signals. The locations of Polish troop headquarters, concentrations, batteries, and land mines were betrayed by secret wireless communications or signals from behind the Polish lines. Polish officers were assassinated. Polish troops and airplanes were fired on and billets burned. False orders and rumors were circulated, causing much confusion. Military communication lines were cut so frequently that it was impossible to use them German pilots reported that most of the landings of air-borne troops would have failed but for the system, of fifth column signals, such as flaming haystacks and huts; sheets and newspapers arranged in special patterns; corn and grass cut in telltale shapes; and torch signaling.
(3) Mobility, supporting fire.--A high degree of mobility and strong supporting fire exerted great influence in bringing about a speedy German victory. This combination made it possible to employ maximum striking power in the forward echelon and to concentrate it at the most critical point and time during combat. Thus the factors of power and speed were highly coordinated to serve the commander in a manner best suited to his purpose. The Infantry was equipped with organic artillery-75-mm and 150-mm howitzers-manned by infantrymen themselves on the front line. When the speed of advance elements of armored forces and motorized and foot Infantry carried them beyond the range of artillery support, such units received immediate cooperation from dive and other types of bombers.
(4) Combat groups.--In the attack of large units German infantry divisions were employed on broad fronts, and each division within the corps was assigned to a zone of action and an objective. Within a division zone of action the advance was conducted by reinforced regiments known in the German Army as "March Combat Groups" (combat teams), which operated almost independently. All important units, including lower combat teams, were made self-sufficient as far as supporting fire was concerned.
(5) Security.--The security of marching columns was assured by-
(a) Complete air support and superiority.
(b) The forward positions of mechanized forces.
(c) The great depth and breadth of air and ground reconnaissance, each corps including a strong and tactically complete motorized reconnaissance unit.
(d) The convergence of the main thrusts which drew units closer together as they reached their final objective.
(6) Reconnaissance.--The German High Command laid great stress upon reconnaissance. All units down to and including the infantry regiment were provided with the means of carrying out this vital combat function. Horse and cyclist units were employed for close reconnaissance, and motorized elements were used for distant reconnaissance.
(7) Infiltration, encirclement.--Tactics of deep infiltration and encirclement were employed to break down resistance. While engaged in such tactics, German units were intent on maintaining contact with the enemy rather than with friendly flanking troops. Frequently the main German forces, leaving weaker units to pin the enemy down, bypassed strong Polish positions in order to sever lines of communications and attack from the rear.
(8) Field orders.--The German commanders avoided the use of lengthy written field orders. Elimination of lengthy written orders saved much time and played a large part in the successes gained by independent columns, which were often directed orally. Operation orders consisted mainly of intention, and the method of execution depended largely on the initiative of the officer concerned.
(9) Training.--During time of peace the German Army had been thoroughly conditioned physically, and in Poland the hardiness of the German soldier enabled him to perform feats of endurance. The Infantry marched an average of 18 miles a day during the greater part of the campaign. Many troops, such as parachutists and mountain units, were specially trained for specific missions. Three mountain divisions were employed to force the passes of the Carpathian Mountains.
Address Delivered by President Roosevelt to the Congress
September 21, 1939
U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, pp. 485-87
Since 1931 the use of force instead of the council table has constantly increased in the settlement of disputes between nations-except in the Western Hemisphere, where there has been only one war, now happily terminated.
During these years also the building up of vast armies, navies, and storehouses of war has proceeded abroad with growing speed and intensity. But, during these years, and extending back even to the days of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United States has constantly, consistently, and conscientiously done all in its power to encourage peaceful settlements, to bring about reduction of armaments, and to avert threatened wars. We have done this not only because any war anywhere necessarily hurts American security and American prosperity, but because of the more important fact that any war anywhere retards the progress of morality and religion and impairs the security of civilization itself.
For many years the primary purpose of our foreign policy has been that this Nation and this Government should strive to the utmost to aid in avoiding war among other nations. But if and when war unhappily comes, the Government and the Nation must exert every possible effort to avoid being drawn into the war.
The executive branch of the Government did its utmost, within our traditional policy of noninvolvement, to aid in averting the present appalling war. Having thus striven and failed, this Government must lose no time or effort to keep the Nation from being drawn into the war.
In my candid judgment we shall succeed in these efforts.
Beginning with the foundation of our constitutional government in the year 1789, the American policy in respect to belligerent nations, with one notable exception, has been based on international law. Be it remembered that what we call international law has had as its primary objectives the avoidance of causes of war and the prevention of the extension of war.
The single exception was the policy adopted by this Nation during the Napoleonic Wars, when, seeking to avoid involvement, we acted for some years under the so-called Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts. . . .
Our next deviation by statute from the sound principles of neutrality and peace through international law did not come for 130 years. It was the so-called Neutrality Act of 1935-only 4 years ago-an act continued in force by the joint resolution of May 1, 1937, despite grave doubts expressed as to its wisdom by many Senators and Representatives and by officials charged with the conduct of our foreign relations, including myself. I regret that the act. I regret equally that I signed that act.
On July fourteenth of this year I asked the Congress in the cause of peace and in the interest of real American neutrality and to take action to change that act.
I now ask again that such action be taken in respect to of the act which is wholly inconsistent with ancient precepts of the law of nations-the embargo provisions. I ask it because they are, in my opinion, most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security, and American peace.
I seek a greater consistency through the repeal of the embargo provisions and a return to international law. I seek reenactment of the historic and traditional American policy which, except for the disastrous interlude of the Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts, has served us well for nearly a century and a half.
It has been erroneously said that return to that policy might bring us nearer to war. I give to you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today I say this because with the repeal of the embargo this Government clearly and definitely will insist that American citizens and American ships keep away from the immediate perils of the actual zones of conflict.
Repeal of the embargo and a return to international law are the crux of this issue.
To those who say that this program would involve a step toward war on our part, I reply that it offers far greater safeguards than we now possess or have ever possessed to protect American lives and property from danger. It is a positive program for giving safety. This means less likelihood of incidents and controversies which tend to draw us into conflict, as they did in the last World War. There lies the road to peace!
I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world might swiftly pass. I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candor, that darker periods may lie ahead. The disaster is not of our making; no act of ours engendered the forces which assault the foundations of civilization. Yet we find ourselves affected to the core; our currents of commerce are changing, our minds are filled with new problems, our position in world affairs has already been altered.
In such circumstances our policy must be to appreciate in the deepest sense the true American interest. Rightly considered, this interest is not selfish. Destiny first made us, with our sister nations on this hemisphere, joint heirs of European culture. Fate seems now to compel us to assume the task of helping to maintain in the western world a citadel wherein that civilization may be kept alive. The peace, the integrity, and the safety of the Americas-these must be kept firm and serene. In a period when it is sometimes said that free discussion is no longer compatible with national safety, may you by your deeds show the world that we of the United States are one people, of one mind, one spirit, one clear resolution, walking before God in the light of the living.
Broadcast Schedule WJSV Washington, D.C. Thursday, September 21st, 1939 From: 05:59-06:30 -- Sign On and Sundial - Recorded Music From: 06:30-07:00 -- Sundial - Arthur Godfrey From: 07:00-07:30 -- Sundial - Arthur Godfrey From: 07:30-08:00 -- Sundial - Arthur Godfrey From: 08:00-08:05 -- Arrow News From: 08:05-08:30 -- Sundial - Arthur Godfrey From: 08:30-08:45 -- Certified Magic Carpet From: 08:45-09:00 -- Bachelor's Children From: 09:00-09:15 -- Pretty Kitty Kelly From: 09:15-09:30 -- Myrt And Marge From: 09:30-09:45 -- Hilltop House From: 09:45-10:00 -- Kay Fairchild, Stepmother From: 10:00-10:15 -- CBS News and Mary Lee Taylor Program From: 10:15-10:30 -- Brenda Curtis From: 10:30-10:45 -- Big Sister From: 10:45-11:00 -- Aunt Jenny's Real Life Stories From: 11:00-11:15 -- Jean Abbey From: 11:15-11:30 -- When A Girl Marries From: 11:30-11:45 -- The Romance Of Helen Trent From: 11:45-12:00 -- Our Gal Sunday From: 12:00-12:15 -- The Goldbergs From: 12:15-12:30 -- Life Can Be Beautiful From: 12:30-12:45 -- Road Of Life From: 12:45-13:00 -- This Day Is Ours From: 13:00-13:15 -- Sunshine Report From: 13:15-13:30 -- The Life And Love Of Dr. Susan From: 13:30-13:45 -- Your Family And Mine From: 13:45-14:00 -- News Followed By Albert Warner From: 14:00-15:00 -- President's Address followed by Premier Daladier From: 15:00-15:10 -- Commentary & Analysis On The President's Address From: 15:10-15:25 -- The Career Of Alice Blair From: 15:25-15:30 -- Arrow News From: 15:30-15:45 -- Rhythm & Romance From: 15:45-16:00 -- Scattergood Baines From: 16:00-17:17 -- Baseball - Cleveland at Washington From: 17:17-17:30 -- The World Dances From: 17:30-17:45 -- Arrow News followed by Time Out From: 17:45-18:00 -- Sports With Harry McTigue From: 18:00-18:15 -- Amos 'n' Andy From: 18:15-18:30 -- The Parker Family From: 18:30-19:00 -- Joe E. Brown From: 19:00-19:30 -- Ask-It Basket From: 19:30-19:55 -- Strange As It Seems From: 19:55-20:00 -- Elmer Davis And The News From: 20:00-21:00 -- Major Bowes and his Original Amateur Hour From: 21:00-21:30 -- The Columbia Workshop From: 21:30-22:00 -- Americans At Work From: 22:00-22:15 -- Arrow News & Edwin C. Hill Commentary From: 22:15-22:30 -- Streamline Interlude From: 22:30-22:45 -- The Midweek Review With Albert Warner From: 22:45-23:21 -- Repeat of FDR Speech From: 23:21-23:30 -- Jerry Livingstone & His Orchestra From: 23:30-24:00 -- Teddy Powell Orchestra From: 00:00-00:30 -- Louis Prima Orchestra From: 00:30-01:02 -- Bob Chester Orchestra, News & SignoffThis one day made me a fan of OTR for life. May it be as joyful for all of you, my FRiends. http://www.archive.org/details/OTRR_WJSV_Complete_Day_Singles