Posted on 08/18/2009 5:46:03 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
[On August 18], after [Schulenburg’s] report had been received, Ribbentrop did [press the matter of his trip to Moscow over the weekend.] Hitler, it is obvious, was now growing desperate. From his summer headquarters on the Obersalzberg there went out on the evening of August 18 a further “most urgent” telegram to Schulenburg signed by Ribbentrop. It arrived at the German Embassy in Moscow at 5:45 A.M. on the nineteenth and directed the ambassador to “arrange immediately another conversation with M. Molotov and do everything possible to see that it takes place without any delay.” There was no time to lose. “I ask you,” Ribbentrop wired, “to speak to M. Molotov as follows”:
. . . We, too, under normal circumstances, would naturally be ready to pursue a realignment of German-Russian relations through diplomatic channels, and to carry it out in the customary way. But the present unusual situation makes it necessary, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, to employ a different method which would lead to quick results.
German-Polish relations are becoming more acute from day to day. We have to take into account that incidents might occur any day that would make the outbreak of open conflict unavoidable . . . The Fuehrer considers it necessary that we be not taken by surprise by the outbreak of a German-Polish conflict while we are striving for a clarification of German-Russian relations. He therefore considers a previous clarification necessary, if only to be able to take into account Russian interest in case of such a conflict, which would, of course, be difficult without such a clarification.
The ambassador was to say that the “first stage” in the consultations mentioned by Molotov, the conclusion of the trade agreement, had been concluded in Berlin this very day (August 18) and that it was now time to “attack” the second stage. To do this the German Foreign Minister proposed his “immediate departure for Moscow,” to which he would come “with full powers from the Fuehrer, authorizing me to settle fully and conclusively the total complex of problems.” In Moscow, Ribbentrop added, he would “be in a position . . . to take Russian wishes into account.”
What wishes? The Germans now no longer beat around the bush.
I should also be in a position [Ribbentrop continued] to sign a special protocol regulating the interests of both parties in questions of foreign policy of one kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area. Such a settlement will only be possible, however, in an oral discussion.
This time the ambassador must not take a Russian “No.”
Please emphasize [Ribbentrop concluded] that German foreign policy has today reached a historic turning point . . . Please press for a rapid realization of my journey and oppose appropriately any fresh Russian objections. In this connection you must keep in mind the decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is possible and that we, therefore, have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
August 18. - A conversation with the Duce in the morning; his usual shifting feelings. He still thinks it possible that the democracies will not march and that Germany might do good business cheaply, from which business he does not want to be excluded. Then, too, he fears Hitler’s rage. He believes that a denunciation of the pact or something like it might induce Hitler to abandon the Polish question in order to square accounts with Italy. All this makes him nervous and disturbed.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
Developments in Europe – 1
Issue Held Grave – 1-3
Britain Rules Out a 4-Power Parley - 4
Germans Prepare in Czech Regions – 5-6
Talks of 3 Staffs in Russia Cordial – 6-7
The Same Old Tactics (Editorial) – 8*
*Having found the courage to contemplate Westminster in ruins and Notre Dame demolished, the British and the French seem to be ready to test out Hitler’s real intentions and await his answer to the question whether Danzig is worth a war.
Nazi-Soviet pact talks update at reply #2.
Ciano diary update at reply #3.
Stalin was playing Britain and France like a fiddle.
I don’t think Britain or France did them self any favors by sending minor ministers to Russia by slow boat to negotiate either. It really showed Stalin that they were not serious about eastern Europe which would mean that if war broke out the Soviets would pretty much be left standing alone. Stalin was far too shrewd for that so instead used the desperation of the Germans for a treaty to his advantage to absorb the Baltic states and buy time before he would have to face the Germans in combat.
Stalin was a one-man band; he was playing Hitler, too. Notice from the article about the banquet for the Anglo-French mission that Molotov didn’t attend; he sent a lackey instead. Even though Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov attended, they were strictly military men. Diplomatically, the Anglo-French mission was the second-rate game in town. Molotov was busy working with the Germans.
You can see from the articles that nobody in the West had an inkling of what the Germans and Soviets were up to, but the signs were there that the Germans and Soviets might cut a deal.
Nobody wanted a peace conference except Il Duce, and he didn’t really count. The Poles refused to talk with the Soviets and categorically refused to allow Soviet troops on Polish soil. That pretty much made moot the issue of an alliance with the USSR. And the USSR had some legitimate points about whether the western allies were really serious about fighting the Germans themselves.
It should have been apparent that the idea of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was a dead letter. The USSR was ripe for an approach by Hitler.
Yep, but I bet Stalin crapped in his pants when he saw how quickly France fell. In hindsight, it might have been a blessing in disguise, because the Soviets were counting on a long protracted war in the West, so that they could sweep in from the East and would only have to face the depleted armies of Germany and the Allies, then you would have been talking about Soviet domination of all of Europe.
The success of the Sickle Cut Plan made everyone crap their pants. Including Hitler and the high command German generals. It was basically the Schlieffen Plan turned on its head with a high risk armor movement through the Ardennes. The French and BEF played into it perfectly by rushing to the Dyle line which let Guderian cut off their escape. It scared Hitler so bad (he was not thinking beyond Sedan) that he ordered a halt right as the German armor was getting ready to go for the kill at Dunkirk.
You’re right though. If it had not been so successful and instead became a protracted war of attrition who knows where the boundaries of the Iron Curtain would have ended up.
My guess, the Atlantic Ocean.
I would say that it would be the French-German border. That would mean all of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Austria, and Italy would have been added to the Soviet Bloc. Look at the bright side. We could have avoided that whole Berlin Airlift thing.
It always seemed that the Russian army, post-Stalin purge, was totally incompetent to pour vodka out of a mukluk, much less defeat panzers, any time, anywhere.
So this editor really thought Hitler was bluffing? It certainly sounds like it.
It does at that. I wonder how he feels about that in light of today's (8/22/39) lead story.
I would think so...
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