Beyond Doolittle: The Navy Role in the Doolittle Raid [15:16]

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0:00 · on April 18th
0:02 · 1942 16 US Army Air Force medium bombers
0:05 · embarked on a dangerous mission the do
0:08 · little raid 30 Seconds over Tokyo is
0:11 · famous it is the subject of numerous
0:12 · books in at least six different motion
0:14 · pictures but those books and movies tend
0:17 · to focus on the pilots of those Army Air
0:18 · Force bombers but it wasn't just an Army
0:21 · Air Force mission the Navy was there too
0:23 · they had their own plans took their own
0:25 · risks and have their own story that
0:28 · deserves to be
0:32 · remembered the US Naval History and
0:34 · Heritage Command explains the idea of
0:36 · the raid conceived in January 1942 in
0:39 · the wake of the devastating Japanese
0:41 · surprise attack on Pearl Harbor the
0:43 · Joint Army Navy bombing project was to
0:45 · bomb Japanese industrial centers to
0:47 · inflict both material and psychological
0:49 · damage upon the enemy planners hoped
0:52 · that the former would include the
0:53 · destruction of specific targets with
0:55 · ensuing confusion and retardation of
0:57 · production those who planned the attacks
0:59 · on the Japanese homeland hope to induce
1:00 · the enemy to recall combat equipment
1:02 · from other theaters for home defense and
1:04 · incight a fear complex in Japan
1:07 · additionally it was hoped that the
1:08 · prosecution of the raid would improve
1:10 · the United States relationship with its
1:11 · allies receive a favorable reaction on
1:13 · the part of the American
1:15 · people these were lofty goals but the
1:18 · scenario was unlikely naval historian
1:20 · Jack Sweetman wrote in 1995 edition of
1:22 · the journal Naval History foreseeing the
1:25 · huge boost it would give us and allied
1:26 · morale the president had been urging his
1:29 · service chiefs since the closing weeks
1:30 · of 1941 to find a way to bomb the
1:33 · Japanese home islands but the website
1:35 · dittlerade.net writes "The idea of
1:37 · bombing Japan was met with skepticism
1:39 · from the military leadership it seemed
1:42 · an unfeasible idea while the US was
1:44 · rapidly building long-range bombers they
1:46 · had nothing in the arsenal that could
1:48 · carry on that sort of mission as
1:50 · Sweetman explains the enemy homeland was
1:52 · far out of range of the nearest known US
1:54 · base that suggested the attack be
1:57 · carried out by the Navy an alternative
1:58 · that was just as unlikely as the Navy
2:01 · History and Heritage Command writes the
2:03 · problem for the Navy in responding to
2:05 · Roosevelt's demands was that no one in
2:07 · their right mind wanted to take any of
2:08 · the Navy's precious fruit carriers and
2:10 · bring them within the necessary 200
2:12 · nautical miles to strike the Japanese
2:14 · homeland which would also be well within
2:16 · the range of hundreds of Japanese
2:18 · bombers bombers of the US Army Air
2:20 · Forces could not reach the Japanese home
2:22 · islands from any available base whereas
2:24 · using the shorter range single engine
2:25 · bombers of the Navy would be a virtual
2:27 · suicide mission for the Navy's
2:28 · indispensable aircraft carriers the
2:31 · solution using US Army Air Force bombers
2:33 · flown from Navy carriers came from a
2:36 · surprising source captain Francis Lowe
2:39 · was a 1915 graduate of the United States
2:41 · Naval Academy while his first
2:43 · assignments were aboard the battleship
2:44 · Connecticut in the cruiser Montana the
2:46 · Naval History and Heritage Command
2:48 · explains that in the early part of his
2:49 · illustrious career he was designated a
2:52 · submariner and commanded the submarines
2:54 · D3,09 L1 L2 S12 and served on the staffs
2:58 · of Commander Submarine Division 5 and
3:00 · Commander Control Force during and
3:02 · subsequent to World War I at the
3:04 · outbreak of war Low whose swimming
3:07 · ability had earned him the nickname frog
3:09 · was on the staff of Admiral King chief
3:11 · of naval operations his role was
3:13 · assistant chief of staff for
3:15 · anti-ubmarine
3:16 · warfare low was not an aviator in a
3:19 · career of assignments he had never
3:20 · served aboard an aircraft carrier but
3:22 · inspiration struck him as he was leaving
3:24 · Norfol Virginia on January 10th 1942 new
3:27 · little.net Net writes "While Francis
3:30 · Low's plane was getting prepared to
3:31 · leave for Washington Lo looked out the
3:33 · window at the outline of an aircraft
3:34 · carrier painted on the runway used for
3:36 · training fighter pilots in short carrier
3:38 · takeoff and landings he also saw US Army
3:41 · Air Force bomber planes practicing
3:42 · bombing targets from low altitude the
3:45 · thought flashed through Lowe's mind that
3:46 · if such bombers could take off from an
3:48 · aircraft carrier they could bomb Japan
3:51 · it was definitely an out-of-the-box
3:53 · solution air Force medium bombers had
3:55 · much better range than the single engine
3:56 · planes of the Navy if they could launch
3:58 · from an aircraft carrier that could
4:00 · reach Japan from a much longer and safer
4:02 · distance but the naval officer whose
4:04 · experience was much more tied to what
4:05 · was below the water than what was above
4:07 · it wasn't sure the idea could work do
4:10 · little raid.net writes "I think I have
4:12 · an idea," Lo said to his superior lo
4:15 · presented his plan to his chief of staff
4:17 · Admiral King lo wrote by hand and at the
4:19 · request of the admiral a 30-page
4:21 · scenario of how he saw things and how
4:23 · the attack was to be carried out the
4:25 · Naval History and Heritage Command
4:26 · writes "Admiral King broached the idea
4:28 · with Chief of the US Army Air Force
4:30 · General Hap Arnold who liked it arnold
4:32 · assigned Lieutenant Colonel James
4:34 · Doolittle who already had a reputation
4:36 · as a daredevil flyer to lead the mission
4:38 · doolittle determined that the new twin
4:40 · engine B25 Mitchell bomber which had yet
4:43 · to see combat specifically modified to
4:45 · save weight and increase range was best
4:47 · suited for the mission it was a risky
4:50 · plan by any measure the fleet would
4:52 · require risking two of the Navy's
4:53 · precious aircraft carriers ships that
4:55 · were all the more valuable given the
4:56 · losses of capital ships at Pearl Harbor
4:59 · the Hornet having just been commissioned
5:00 · and finishing sea trials carried 16
5:02 · bombers would have to stow its own
5:04 · airarm below deck essentially rendering
5:06 · the carrier defenseless and blind a
5:09 · second carrier USS Enterprise would be
5:11 · there to provide air cover
5:13 · dittlerade.net Net writes "What was not
5:15 · disclosed with due little but was
5:17 · understood by all was the tremendous
5:19 · risk that the Navy was taking with this
5:20 · mission if marauding Japanese submarines
5:23 · discovered the 16 ship force steaming
5:25 · west it would gain unprecedented
5:27 · opportunity to what was left of
5:28 · the US Navy's strength in the Pacific
5:30 · coupled with Japanese attack by
5:32 · longrange bombers or heavy aircraft
5:34 · carrier force it would mean the end of
5:36 · American naval strength in the Pacific
5:38 · for months to come
5:40 · the B25 had never been tested in combat
5:42 · and the bombers would require extensive
5:44 · modification in a short period of time
5:45 · and under the strictest secrecy the
5:47 · bombers were modified with extra fuel
5:49 · tanks and had defensive weaponry removed
5:50 · to lower weight the guns at the rear of
5:53 · the plan were replaced with mock gun
5:55 · barrels made of broomsticks the planes
5:57 · would also not be carrying the secret
5:58 · Nordon bomb site as there was too much
6:00 · perceived risk that one might be
6:01 · captured one of the raiders devised a
6:04 · simple replacement called the Mark Twain
6:06 · materials for which reportedly cost
6:09 · 20 while initial tests from the deck of
6:11 · the Hornet in Norfolk demonstrated proof
6:13 · of concept that takeoff was possible
6:15 · there was a problem the bombers might be
6:17 · able to take off from one of the Navy's
6:18 · carriers but they couldn't land on one
6:20 · they would have to land elsewhere
6:22 · takeoff itself would be an adventure
6:24 · while the volunteer crews were given
6:25 · Navy training under Navy Lieutenant
6:27 · Henry L miller at Eglundfield Florida it
6:30 · was not under real conditions the first
6:32 · time that any of them would be taking
6:34 · off in a fully loaded bomber from the
6:35 · pitching deck of an aircraft carrier was
6:37 · when the mission launched for
6:39 · Tokyo despite the secrecy of the plans
6:42 · the Japanese were not completely in the
6:43 · dark the Naval History and Heritage
6:45 · Command writes that Japanese Admiral
6:47 · Isaruko Yamamoto commander-in-chief of
6:49 · the Combined Fleet was deeply concerned
6:51 · about the possibility of a US carrier
6:52 · raid on the Japanese homeland under the
6:55 · assumption that US carriers would have
6:56 · to approach within 200 miles of Japan to
6:58 · launch an attack with carrier aircraft
7:00 · Yamamoto directed the establishment of a
7:02 · fairly dense line of picket vessels at
7:04 · 600 to 700 miles from Japan which
7:06 · provides sufficient early warning for
7:08 · the Japanese to react and counter the US
7:10 · raid these vessels would be a danger
7:13 · william Holly in command of Task Force
7:15 · 16 was under orders not to risk his
7:17 · carriers while the plan was to carry
7:18 · Doolittle's planes to within 450 mi of
7:21 · the home islands if the task force was
7:23 · discovered they would have to launch
7:24 · immediately or if too far away abandoned
7:27 · the plan
7:28 · altogether us Navy commander John D
7:31 · alden writes of these picket vessels
7:33 · standard history of the World War II
7:35 · campaign against Japan have almost
7:36 · nothing to say about them they were
7:38 · judged too small and insignificant to be
7:40 · counted in the official record of
7:41 · Japanese ships sunk by our forces during
7:43 · the war so the usual tallies of ships
7:45 · credited to each of our submarines do
7:47 · not include them descriptions of the
7:49 · Imperial Japanese Navy provide little
7:51 · information about them and there was
7:52 · nothing like them in the US Navy what
7:55 · manner of opponents were these boats
7:57 · unlike the US Navy which preferred to
7:59 · build most of its smaller types of
8:00 · warships from the Keel up the Japanese
8:03 · Navy mobilized hundreds of fishing craft
8:04 · and other commercial types to serve as
8:06 · converted gunboats mind sweepers patrol
8:08 · boats submarine chasers and auxiliaries
8:10 · of various kinds alterations were held
8:13 · to a minimum the ships retained their
8:14 · commercial Maru names and many of the
8:16 · crews were simply enrolled as
8:17 · reserveists and retained on board the
8:20 · small vessels were lightly armed
8:21 · although each carried for depth charges
8:23 · something which would be a constant
8:24 · difficulty for US submarine crews but
8:26 · their most dangerous weapon was their
8:28 · powerful radio transmitters with
8:29 · antennas mounted high up on their masts
8:32 · as the Japanese Navy had significant air
8:34 · assets at their disposal these little
8:35 · ships posed a significant risk to the
8:37 · entire raid and those fears were
8:39 · realized on April 18th while the fleet
8:41 · was still some 650 mi from the home
8:44 · islands the first indication was a radar
8:47 · contact military historian Dwayne
8:48 · Schultz writes in his 1988 book The Do
8:51 · Little Raid that Hoy immediately turned
8:53 · the fleet but was not sure if the
8:54 · vessels had seen them in the poor
8:55 · weather schultz writes "They had lost 4
8:58 · hours and were more than 40 mi farther
8:59 · from the launch point than they should
9:01 · have been launch time was less than 11
9:03 · hours away and they had to cover more
9:04 · than 200 miles of open sea to reach it."
9:07 · At daybreak Holly launched three scout
9:09 · planes from the Enterprise the weather
9:11 · was Schultz Wright's rain squalls strong
9:13 · winds and 30-foot waves one of the
9:15 · planes might have been spotted but it
9:17 · was a moot point schultz writes that at
9:19 · 7:44 lookouts on the Hornet cited a
9:21 · fishing boat at 10,000 yards if lookouts
9:24 · could spot such a small craft surely the
9:26 · Japanese aboard her would have no
9:27 · difficulty seating the much larger ships
9:29 · of the task force while the task force
9:32 · had included eight destroyers vessels
9:33 · well equipped to deal with the small
9:35 · vessels of the Japanese picket Holly had
9:37 · sent them back with the fleet oilers the
9:38 · day before still the two carriers were
9:41 · escorted by three heavy cruisers and the
9:43 · light cruiser USS Nashville the Naval
9:45 · History and Heritage Command writes
9:47 · "Although presumed to be a fishing boat
9:48 · Hollyy wanted to take no chances and the
9:50 · light cruiser USS Nashville was ordered
9:52 · to sink the little vessel immediately."
9:55 · The war diary of the Nashville reads "At
9:58 · dawn the Nashville was steaming in
9:59 · company with aircraft carriers
10:00 · Enterprise and Hornet and cruisers
10:02 · Northampton Salt Lake City and Vincent
10:05 · at 0741 an enemy ship was cited bearing
10:08 · 350 relative at distance of about 10,000
10:10 · yards at 0752 received orders from
10:13 · Admiral Holly to attack vessel and sink
10:15 · aim open fire with main battery firing
10:17 · salvo at a range of 9,000 yards but the
10:21 · fight was more difficult than it would
10:22 · appear." Schultz quotes a sailor aboard
10:24 · Hornet this was real warfare the big
10:26 · guns were booming and it looked as if
10:27 · the whole side of the cruiser was on
10:29 · fire but the target was very small and
10:31 · the cruiser had difficulty getting in
10:33 · range schultz quotes an officer aboard
10:35 · Hornet there were heavy swells and the
10:37 · pickup boat was going up it would be on
10:38 · top of a swell and then it could be seen
10:40 · and then it would be down and you
10:41 · couldn't see a thing except perhaps the
10:42 · top of its mast the splashes were all
10:45 · around it but it was still there planes
10:47 · from Enterprise became involved the
10:49 · Naval History and Heritage Command
10:50 · writes in a series of actions often
10:52 · overlooked when compared to the B-25
10:54 · raids the vessel was the tiny number 23
10:57 · Nitto Maru the history and heritage
10:59 · command writes at 928 6-in rounds later
11:02 · and emptying the magazines of several
11:04 · F4F Wildcat fighters on strafing runs
11:07 · the Nitaru finally went down but not
11:09 · before hitting an SBD Dauntless with
11:11 · machine gun fire which forced the US
11:12 · plane to ditch the crew of the Dauntless
11:15 · was rescued by the Nashville but the
11:17 · mission was in trouble schultz writes
11:19 · "The bombardment had lasted 29 minutes
11:21 · during those 29 minutes the situation of
11:23 · the task force had grown increasingly
11:25 · tenuous." Sweetman writes "Security had
11:28 · been compromised in a discussion of what
11:29 · to do in such a situation Holly and
11:31 · Doolittle had decided that if their
11:33 · mission remained feasible they would
11:34 · launch at once." At 0820 Doolittle
11:37 · started the lead B25 down the 467
11:40 · available feet of the Hornet's deck on a
11:42 · 625 mile flight to Japan the last
11:45 · Mitchell clawed his way into the air
11:46 · exactly an hour
11:48 · later meanwhile the Japanese fleet was
11:50 · gathering they had plenty of assets
11:52 · available schultz writes "Rear Admiral
11:54 · Mati Ugaki Yamamoto's chief of staff
11:57 · responded at once to the American threat
11:58 · by issuing order number three a
12:00 · contingency plan to repel an American
12:02 · fleet off the coast." Ugi had ample
12:04 · resources to attack the advancing
12:06 · American ships including 35 planes
12:08 · recently returned from the Philippines
12:10 · 63 planes from the aircraft carrier Kaga
12:13 · 90 fighters 80 medium bombers 36 carrier
12:16 · bombers and two flying boats the
12:18 · Japanese second fleet consisting of 10
12:20 · destroyers and six heavy cruisers had
12:22 · just returned from the Indian Ocean a
12:24 · five carrier task force of the first
12:25 · airfleet was on the way back from the
12:27 · Indian Ocean and now south of Formosa
12:29 · nine submarines were within range of the
12:30 · American ships three of them only 200
12:32 · miles west of Hollyy's task force admir
12:35 · Ugaki ordered all ships to head towards
12:36 · the location reported by
12:38 · Nittoaru while Doolittle's planes were
12:41 · launching the Nashville and planes from
12:42 · Enterprise were attacking all the picket
12:44 · ships in the area sinking four including
12:46 · Nitubaru and damaging six others the
12:48 · Naval History and Heritage Command
12:50 · writes "The Dittle raid had temporarily
12:52 · put that portion of the Japanese Navy's
12:54 · offshore warning network out of
12:56 · commission."
12:57 · D Little's raid can only be called a
12:59 · success apparently the Japanese high
13:01 · command never even considered the
13:02 · possibility that twin engineed medium
13:04 · bombers would be taking off from an
13:05 · aircraft carrier amid confused reports
13:08 · and at least one incident of confusing
13:09 · the raiders as being Japanese all 16 of
13:12 · Dittle's raiders made it to their
13:13 · targets in Japan they then proceeded to
13:15 · landing areas in China and Soviet Russia
13:17 · and what happened to those planes and
13:19 · those crews is the subject of numerous
13:20 · books and movies but the role played by
13:23 · the Navy is relatively forgotten
13:26 · meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy
13:28 · sent a significant fleet chasing
13:30 · fruitlessly after Holly two cruiser
13:32 · divisions 11 submarines and four
13:34 · aircraft carriers all operating under
13:36 · the assumption that Holly would have to
13:38 · have assailed within 200 miles of the
13:39 · home island they never even got near him
13:42 · it's often been said that the do little
13:44 · raid which did relatively little damage
13:46 · but had a large effect on morale on both
13:48 · sides helped to convince the Japanese
13:51 · high command to approve a plan by
13:52 · Admiral Yamato to attack the American
13:54 · held island of Midway precipitating the
13:56 · Battle of Midway which is considered to
13:58 · be a turning point in the war but
14:00 · perhaps just as importantly the Dittle
14:02 · raid kept the Hornet and the Enterprise
14:04 · from participating in the May 1942
14:07 · Battle of the Coral Sea had two of the
14:10 · Navy's four aircraft carriers in the
14:11 · Pacific been present for the first major
14:14 · naval battle between aircraft carriers
14:16 · in which the carrier Lexington was sunk
14:18 · and the carrier Yorktown was damaged
14:20 · that battle might have turned out
14:22 · differently i hope you enjoyed watching
14:25 · this episode of the history guy and if
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14:46 · [Music]
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15:04 · [Music]
15:06 · [Applause]
15:12 · [Applause]
15:13 · [Music]

Just last week I learned something about Doolittle I found truly extraordinary.

Shell hired Doolittle away from the army to be their aviation fuel manager because he had a PhD in aeronautical engineering from MIT (one of the fist ever awarded in that discipline), he had a foot in both the civilian and military aviation worlds, and because he was the first to recognize how important high-octane avgas might soon become.

Doolittle won the coveted Bendix Trophy in 1931, so he knew how important it would be to have better avgas. At the time, Shell spent almost 100x as much to refine a gallon of 100/130 as it did 87 octane, which Doolittle realized was impractically expensive for the vast majority of military or civilian applications. Then in 1933, Sunoco hired Eugène Houdry, a French immigrant who had invented a primitive petroleum cracking tower he couldn't get fully funded back home. Sunoco petroleum engineer Tim Palucka saw the potential in Houdry's invention and between their ingenuity and Sunoco's money, they began mass-producing 100/130 avgas at a reasonable cost.

This was Doolittle's dream come true. By 1938, the US Army Air Corps made 100/130 avgas their standard fuel but details of this development were kept quiet.

On 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, the UK declared war on Germany, and WWII was off to the races.

The first aerial combats between the Luftwaffe and the RAF were in May of 1940. Both sides were running on 87-octane* and the Nodzis found the British fighters couldn't keep up. The RAF initially only sent Hurricanes to the continent, leaving the Spitfires back for home protection, but that rule went by the board when the Nodzis divided the Anglo-French forces and started pushing the British contingent toward Dunkirk. But even the Spitfire pilots found they were over-matched; the 109s were faster and could climb faster than they. Guarding the Dunkirk evacuation cost the RAF 229 planes, 70-80 of which were Spitfires. Worst of all, the Nodzis hadn't found them to be a particularly daunting foe.

* The Nodzis did have a 93/100 octane fuel called C3 (as opposed to their 80/87 B4) but early in the war it was in too limited production to make any difference.

That same month, the first shipment of Sunoco 100/130 arrived from the US. The British gave it a limited test run and found it so effective they began up-engine-ing the Spits from Rolls-Royce Merlin IIIs to Merlin XIIs, which had a higher compression ratio and a pore 'powerful' supercharger to take advantage of all that octane. Not only that, it made lead deposits more slowly, doubling the engine rebuild interval. This was not a minute too soon because the air war for dominance over the English Channel would begin two months later.

The MkIIIs were only good for 6 psi boost. The MkXIIs could stand 12 psi for brief periods ("emergency power"). And when the Battle of Britain began, the Nodzis got a nasty surprise. They couldn't figure why their Messerschmidts could have got so much slower since Dunkirk. Depending on the source, the Spitfires were said to be 25 to 40 mph faster than the ME109s at 10,000 feet. The one thing a fighter pilot values more than hot women and cold beer is the ability to break contact when he's in over his head, and that's what Jimmy Doolittle's determination to make avgas better gave them. And it put the fear of Churchill into the Luftwaffe.

There were several critical nodes in WWII and none more critical than the Battle of Britain. Because it was a near-run thing, as the Brits say, and if they'd made it a best-of-three competition, it isn't certain the Brits could have prevailed more than the once. Which means Britain very nearly was eliminated from the war before the US was drawn in. Which means the US wouldn't have had the advantage of an unsinkable aircraft carrier permanently moored just 30 miles off the French coast to stage an invasion of Nodzi-occupied France from.

And if Jimmy Doolittle hadn't got a bee in his bonnet about figuring out how to cheaply manufacture a better avgas, there's a distinct possibility the other side might have won the Battle of Britain.

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--> YouTube-Generated Transcript <--
0:00	·	on April 18th
0:02	·	1942 16 US Army Air Force medium bombers
0:05	·	embarked on a dangerous mission the do
0:08	·	little raid 30 Seconds over Tokyo is
0:11	·	famous it is the subject of numerous
0:12	·	books in at least six different motion
0:14	·	pictures but those books and movies tend
0:17	·	to focus on the pilots of those Army Air
0:18	·	Force bombers but it wasn't just an Army
0:21	·	Air Force mission the Navy was there too
0:23	·	they had their own plans took their own
0:25	·	risks and have their own story that
0:28	·	deserves to be
0:32	·	remembered the US Naval History and
0:34	·	Heritage Command explains the idea of
0:36	·	the raid conceived in January 1942 in
0:39	·	the wake of the devastating Japanese
0:41	·	surprise attack on Pearl Harbor the
0:43	·	Joint Army Navy bombing project was to
0:45	·	bomb Japanese industrial centers to
0:47	·	inflict both material and psychological
0:49	·	damage upon the enemy planners hoped
0:52	·	that the former would include the
0:53	·	destruction of specific targets with
0:55	·	ensuing confusion and retardation of
0:57	·	production those who planned the attacks
0:59	·	on the Japanese homeland hope to induce
1:00	·	the enemy to recall combat equipment
1:02	·	from other theaters for home defense and
1:04	·	incight a fear complex in Japan
1:07	·	additionally it was hoped that the
1:08	·	prosecution of the raid would improve
1:10	·	the United States relationship with its
1:11	·	allies receive a favorable reaction on
1:13	·	the part of the American
1:15	·	people these were lofty goals but the
1:18	·	scenario was unlikely naval historian
1:20	·	Jack Sweetman wrote in 1995 edition of
1:22	·	the journal Naval History foreseeing the
1:25	·	huge boost it would give us and allied
1:26	·	morale the president had been urging his
1:29	·	service chiefs since the closing weeks
1:30	·	of 1941 to find a way to bomb the
1:33	·	Japanese home islands but the website
1:35	·	dittlerade.net writes "The idea of
1:37	·	bombing Japan was met with skepticism
1:39	·	from the military leadership it seemed
1:42	·	an unfeasible idea while the US was
1:44	·	rapidly building long-range bombers they
1:46	·	had nothing in the arsenal that could
1:48	·	carry on that sort of mission as
1:50	·	Sweetman explains the enemy homeland was
1:52	·	far out of range of the nearest known US
1:54	·	base that suggested the attack be
1:57	·	carried out by the Navy an alternative
1:58	·	that was just as unlikely as the Navy
2:01	·	History and Heritage Command writes the
2:03	·	problem for the Navy in responding to
2:05	·	Roosevelt's demands was that no one in
2:07	·	their right mind wanted to take any of
2:08	·	the Navy's precious fruit carriers and
2:10	·	bring them within the necessary 200
2:12	·	nautical miles to strike the Japanese
2:14	·	homeland which would also be well within
2:16	·	the range of hundreds of Japanese
2:18	·	bombers bombers of the US Army Air
2:20	·	Forces could not reach the Japanese home
2:22	·	islands from any available base whereas
2:24	·	using the shorter range single engine
2:25	·	bombers of the Navy would be a virtual
2:27	·	suicide mission for the Navy's
2:28	·	indispensable aircraft carriers the
2:31	·	solution using US Army Air Force bombers
2:33	·	flown from Navy carriers came from a
2:36	·	surprising source captain Francis Lowe
2:39	·	was a 1915 graduate of the United States
2:41	·	Naval Academy while his first
2:43	·	assignments were aboard the battleship
2:44	·	Connecticut in the cruiser Montana the
2:46	·	Naval History and Heritage Command
2:48	·	explains that in the early part of his
2:49	·	illustrious career he was designated a
2:52	·	submariner and commanded the submarines
2:54	·	D3,09 L1 L2 S12 and served on the staffs
2:58	·	of Commander Submarine Division 5 and
3:00	·	Commander Control Force during and
3:02	·	subsequent to World War I at the
3:04	·	outbreak of war Low whose swimming
3:07	·	ability had earned him the nickname frog
3:09	·	was on the staff of Admiral King chief
3:11	·	of naval operations his role was
3:13	·	assistant chief of staff for
3:15	·	anti-ubmarine
3:16	·	warfare low was not an aviator in a
3:19	·	career of assignments he had never
3:20	·	served aboard an aircraft carrier but
3:22	·	inspiration struck him as he was leaving
3:24	·	Norfol Virginia on January 10th 1942 new
3:27	·	little.net Net writes "While Francis
3:30	·	Low's plane was getting prepared to
3:31	·	leave for Washington Lo looked out the
3:33	·	window at the outline of an aircraft
3:34	·	carrier painted on the runway used for
3:36	·	training fighter pilots in short carrier
3:38	·	takeoff and landings he also saw US Army
3:41	·	Air Force bomber planes practicing
3:42	·	bombing targets from low altitude the
3:45	·	thought flashed through Lowe's mind that
3:46	·	if such bombers could take off from an
3:48	·	aircraft carrier they could bomb Japan
3:51	·	it was definitely an out-of-the-box
3:53	·	solution air Force medium bombers had
3:55	·	much better range than the single engine
3:56	·	planes of the Navy if they could launch
3:58	·	from an aircraft carrier that could
4:00	·	reach Japan from a much longer and safer
4:02	·	distance but the naval officer whose
4:04	·	experience was much more tied to what
4:05	·	was below the water than what was above
4:07	·	it wasn't sure the idea could work do
4:10	·	little raid.net writes "I think I have
4:12	·	an idea," Lo said to his superior lo
4:15	·	presented his plan to his chief of staff
4:17	·	Admiral King lo wrote by hand and at the
4:19	·	request of the admiral a 30-page
4:21	·	scenario of how he saw things and how
4:23	·	the attack was to be carried out the
4:25	·	Naval History and Heritage Command
4:26	·	writes "Admiral King broached the idea
4:28	·	with Chief of the US Army Air Force
4:30	·	General Hap Arnold who liked it arnold
4:32	·	assigned Lieutenant Colonel James
4:34	·	Doolittle who already had a reputation
4:36	·	as a daredevil flyer to lead the mission
4:38	·	doolittle determined that the new twin
4:40	·	engine B25 Mitchell bomber which had yet
4:43	·	to see combat specifically modified to
4:45	·	save weight and increase range was best
4:47	·	suited for the mission it was a risky
4:50	·	plan by any measure the fleet would
4:52	·	require risking two of the Navy's
4:53	·	precious aircraft carriers ships that
4:55	·	were all the more valuable given the
4:56	·	losses of capital ships at Pearl Harbor
4:59	·	the Hornet having just been commissioned
5:00	·	and finishing sea trials carried 16
5:02	·	bombers would have to stow its own
5:04	·	airarm below deck essentially rendering
5:06	·	the carrier defenseless and blind a
5:09	·	second carrier USS Enterprise would be
5:11	·	there to provide air cover
5:13	·	dittlerade.net Net writes "What was not
5:15	·	disclosed with due little but was
5:17	·	understood by all was the tremendous
5:19	·	risk that the Navy was taking with this
5:20	·	mission if marauding Japanese submarines
5:23	·	discovered the 16 ship force steaming
5:25	·	west it would gain unprecedented
5:27	·	opportunity to what was left of
5:28	·	the US Navy's strength in the Pacific
5:30	·	coupled with Japanese attack by
5:32	·	longrange bombers or heavy aircraft
5:34	·	carrier force it would mean the end of
5:36	·	American naval strength in the Pacific
5:38	·	for months to come
5:40	·	the B25 had never been tested in combat
5:42	·	and the bombers would require extensive
5:44	·	modification in a short period of time
5:45	·	and under the strictest secrecy the
5:47	·	bombers were modified with extra fuel
5:49	·	tanks and had defensive weaponry removed
5:50	·	to lower weight the guns at the rear of
5:53	·	the plan were replaced with mock gun
5:55	·	barrels made of broomsticks the planes
5:57	·	would also not be carrying the secret
5:58	·	Nordon bomb site as there was too much
6:00	·	perceived risk that one might be
6:01	·	captured one of the raiders devised a
6:04	·	simple replacement called the Mark Twain
6:06	·	materials for which reportedly cost
6:09	·	20 while initial tests from the deck of
6:11	·	the Hornet in Norfolk demonstrated proof
6:13	·	of concept that takeoff was possible
6:15	·	there was a problem the bombers might be
6:17	·	able to take off from one of the Navy's
6:18	·	carriers but they couldn't land on one
6:20	·	they would have to land elsewhere
6:22	·	takeoff itself would be an adventure
6:24	·	while the volunteer crews were given
6:25	·	Navy training under Navy Lieutenant
6:27	·	Henry L miller at Eglundfield Florida it
6:30	·	was not under real conditions the first
6:32	·	time that any of them would be taking
6:34	·	off in a fully loaded bomber from the
6:35	·	pitching deck of an aircraft carrier was
6:37	·	when the mission launched for
6:39	·	Tokyo despite the secrecy of the plans
6:42	·	the Japanese were not completely in the
6:43	·	dark the Naval History and Heritage
6:45	·	Command writes that Japanese Admiral
6:47	·	Isaruko Yamamoto commander-in-chief of
6:49	·	the Combined Fleet was deeply concerned
6:51	·	about the possibility of a US carrier
6:52	·	raid on the Japanese homeland under the
6:55	·	assumption that US carriers would have
6:56	·	to approach within 200 miles of Japan to
6:58	·	launch an attack with carrier aircraft
7:00	·	Yamamoto directed the establishment of a
7:02	·	fairly dense line of picket vessels at
7:04	·	600 to 700 miles from Japan which
7:06	·	provides sufficient early warning for
7:08	·	the Japanese to react and counter the US
7:10	·	raid these vessels would be a danger
7:13	·	william Holly in command of Task Force
7:15	·	16 was under orders not to risk his
7:17	·	carriers while the plan was to carry
7:18	·	Doolittle's planes to within 450 mi of
7:21	·	the home islands if the task force was
7:23	·	discovered they would have to launch
7:24	·	immediately or if too far away abandoned
7:27	·	the plan
7:28	·	altogether us Navy commander John D
7:31	·	alden writes of these picket vessels
7:33	·	standard history of the World War II
7:35	·	campaign against Japan have almost
7:36	·	nothing to say about them they were
7:38	·	judged too small and insignificant to be
7:40	·	counted in the official record of
7:41	·	Japanese ships sunk by our forces during
7:43	·	the war so the usual tallies of ships
7:45	·	credited to each of our submarines do
7:47	·	not include them descriptions of the
7:49	·	Imperial Japanese Navy provide little
7:51	·	information about them and there was
7:52	·	nothing like them in the US Navy what
7:55	·	manner of opponents were these boats
7:57	·	unlike the US Navy which preferred to
7:59	·	build most of its smaller types of
8:00	·	warships from the Keel up the Japanese
8:03	·	Navy mobilized hundreds of fishing craft
8:04	·	and other commercial types to serve as
8:06	·	converted gunboats mind sweepers patrol
8:08	·	boats submarine chasers and auxiliaries
8:10	·	of various kinds alterations were held
8:13	·	to a minimum the ships retained their
8:14	·	commercial Maru names and many of the
8:16	·	crews were simply enrolled as
8:17	·	reserveists and retained on board the
8:20	·	small vessels were lightly armed
8:21	·	although each carried for depth charges
8:23	·	something which would be a constant
8:24	·	difficulty for US submarine crews but
8:26	·	their most dangerous weapon was their
8:28	·	powerful radio transmitters with
8:29	·	antennas mounted high up on their masts
8:32	·	as the Japanese Navy had significant air
8:34	·	assets at their disposal these little
8:35	·	ships posed a significant risk to the
8:37	·	entire raid and those fears were
8:39	·	realized on April 18th while the fleet
8:41	·	was still some 650 mi from the home
8:44	·	islands the first indication was a radar
8:47	·	contact military historian Dwayne
8:48	·	Schultz writes in his 1988 book The Do
8:51	·	Little Raid that Hoy immediately turned
8:53	·	the fleet but was not sure if the
8:54	·	vessels had seen them in the poor
8:55	·	weather schultz writes "They had lost 4
8:58	·	hours and were more than 40 mi farther
8:59	·	from the launch point than they should
9:01	·	have been launch time was less than 11
9:03	·	hours away and they had to cover more
9:04	·	than 200 miles of open sea to reach it."
9:07	·	At daybreak Holly launched three scout
9:09	·	planes from the Enterprise the weather
9:11	·	was Schultz Wright's rain squalls strong
9:13	·	winds and 30-foot waves one of the
9:15	·	planes might have been spotted but it
9:17	·	was a moot point schultz writes that at
9:19	·	7:44 lookouts on the Hornet cited a
9:21	·	fishing boat at 10,000 yards if lookouts
9:24	·	could spot such a small craft surely the
9:26	·	Japanese aboard her would have no
9:27	·	difficulty seating the much larger ships
9:29	·	of the task force while the task force
9:32	·	had included eight destroyers vessels
9:33	·	well equipped to deal with the small
9:35	·	vessels of the Japanese picket Holly had
9:37	·	sent them back with the fleet oilers the
9:38	·	day before still the two carriers were
9:41	·	escorted by three heavy cruisers and the
9:43	·	light cruiser USS Nashville the Naval
9:45	·	History and Heritage Command writes
9:47	·	"Although presumed to be a fishing boat
9:48	·	Hollyy wanted to take no chances and the
9:50	·	light cruiser USS Nashville was ordered
9:52	·	to sink the little vessel immediately."
9:55	·	The war diary of the Nashville reads "At
9:58	·	dawn the Nashville was steaming in
9:59	·	company with aircraft carriers
10:00	·	Enterprise and Hornet and cruisers
10:02	·	Northampton Salt Lake City and Vincent
10:05	·	at 0741 an enemy ship was cited bearing
10:08	·	350 relative at distance of about 10,000
10:10	·	yards at 0752 received orders from
10:13	·	Admiral Holly to attack vessel and sink
10:15	·	aim open fire with main battery firing
10:17	·	salvo at a range of 9,000 yards but the
10:21	·	fight was more difficult than it would
10:22	·	appear." Schultz quotes a sailor aboard
10:24	·	Hornet this was real warfare the big
10:26	·	guns were booming and it looked as if
10:27	·	the whole side of the cruiser was on
10:29	·	fire but the target was very small and
10:31	·	the cruiser had difficulty getting in
10:33	·	range schultz quotes an officer aboard
10:35	·	Hornet there were heavy swells and the
10:37	·	pickup boat was going up it would be on
10:38	·	top of a swell and then it could be seen
10:40	·	and then it would be down and you
10:41	·	couldn't see a thing except perhaps the
10:42	·	top of its mast the splashes were all
10:45	·	around it but it was still there planes
10:47	·	from Enterprise became involved the
10:49	·	Naval History and Heritage Command
10:50	·	writes in a series of actions often
10:52	·	overlooked when compared to the B-25
10:54	·	raids the vessel was the tiny number 23
10:57	·	Nitto Maru the history and heritage
10:59	·	command writes at 928 6-in rounds later
11:02	·	and emptying the magazines of several
11:04	·	F4F Wildcat fighters on strafing runs
11:07	·	the Nitaru finally went down but not
11:09	·	before hitting an SBD Dauntless with
11:11	·	machine gun fire which forced the US
11:12	·	plane to ditch the crew of the Dauntless
11:15	·	was rescued by the Nashville but the
11:17	·	mission was in trouble schultz writes
11:19	·	"The bombardment had lasted 29 minutes
11:21	·	during those 29 minutes the situation of
11:23	·	the task force had grown increasingly
11:25	·	tenuous." Sweetman writes "Security had
11:28	·	been compromised in a discussion of what
11:29	·	to do in such a situation Holly and
11:31	·	Doolittle had decided that if their
11:33	·	mission remained feasible they would
11:34	·	launch at once." At 0820 Doolittle
11:37	·	started the lead B25 down the 467
11:40	·	available feet of the Hornet's deck on a
11:42	·	625 mile flight to Japan the last
11:45	·	Mitchell clawed his way into the air
11:46	·	exactly an hour
11:48	·	later meanwhile the Japanese fleet was
11:50	·	gathering they had plenty of assets
11:52	·	available schultz writes "Rear Admiral
11:54	·	Mati Ugaki Yamamoto's chief of staff
11:57	·	responded at once to the American threat
11:58	·	by issuing order number three a
12:00	·	contingency plan to repel an American
12:02	·	fleet off the coast." Ugi had ample
12:04	·	resources to attack the advancing
12:06	·	American ships including 35 planes
12:08	·	recently returned from the Philippines
12:10	·	63 planes from the aircraft carrier Kaga
12:13	·	90 fighters 80 medium bombers 36 carrier
12:16	·	bombers and two flying boats the
12:18	·	Japanese second fleet consisting of 10
12:20	·	destroyers and six heavy cruisers had
12:22	·	just returned from the Indian Ocean a
12:24	·	five carrier task force of the first
12:25	·	airfleet was on the way back from the
12:27	·	Indian Ocean and now south of Formosa
12:29	·	nine submarines were within range of the
12:30	·	American ships three of them only 200
12:32	·	miles west of Hollyy's task force admir
12:35	·	Ugaki ordered all ships to head towards
12:36	·	the location reported by
12:38	·	Nittoaru while Doolittle's planes were
12:41	·	launching the Nashville and planes from
12:42	·	Enterprise were attacking all the picket
12:44	·	ships in the area sinking four including
12:46	·	Nitubaru and damaging six others the
12:48	·	Naval History and Heritage Command
12:50	·	writes "The Dittle raid had temporarily
12:52	·	put that portion of the Japanese Navy's
12:54	·	offshore warning network out of
12:56	·	commission."
12:57	·	D Little's raid can only be called a
12:59	·	success apparently the Japanese high
13:01	·	command never even considered the
13:02	·	possibility that twin engineed medium
13:04	·	bombers would be taking off from an
13:05	·	aircraft carrier amid confused reports
13:08	·	and at least one incident of confusing
13:09	·	the raiders as being Japanese all 16 of
13:12	·	Dittle's raiders made it to their
13:13	·	targets in Japan they then proceeded to
13:15	·	landing areas in China and Soviet Russia
13:17	·	and what happened to those planes and
13:19	·	those crews is the subject of numerous
13:20	·	books and movies but the role played by
13:23	·	the Navy is relatively forgotten
13:26	·	meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy
13:28	·	sent a significant fleet chasing
13:30	·	fruitlessly after Holly two cruiser
13:32	·	divisions 11 submarines and four
13:34	·	aircraft carriers all operating under
13:36	·	the assumption that Holly would have to
13:38	·	have assailed within 200 miles of the
13:39	·	home island they never even got near him
13:42	·	it's often been said that the do little
13:44	·	raid which did relatively little damage
13:46	·	but had a large effect on morale on both
13:48	·	sides helped to convince the Japanese
13:51	·	high command to approve a plan by
13:52	·	Admiral Yamato to attack the American
13:54	·	held island of Midway precipitating the
13:56	·	Battle of Midway which is considered to
13:58	·	be a turning point in the war but
14:00	·	perhaps just as importantly the Dittle
14:02	·	raid kept the Hornet and the Enterprise
14:04	·	from participating in the May 1942
14:07	·	Battle of the Coral Sea had two of the
14:10	·	Navy's four aircraft carriers in the
14:11	·	Pacific been present for the first major
14:14	·	naval battle between aircraft carriers
14:16	·	in which the carrier Lexington was sunk
14:18	·	and the carrier Yorktown was damaged
14:20	·	that battle might have turned out
14:22	·	differently i hope you enjoyed watching
14:25	·	this episode of the history guy and if
14:26	·	you did please feel free to like and
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