The Iranian regime is attempting to use force and the threat of force to establish a strategic reality in which any Israeli or US attack on an Iranian proxy or partner would result in a large-scale conflict that would seek to impose significant economic and political costs on Israel and the United States. Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 following Israeli strikes on a Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drone headquarters in Beirut's southern suburbs, which Israel conducted in response to a Hezbollah attack on northern Israel.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) then struck targets in Iran (see below), after which Iranian forces again launched missiles at Israel. All of the Iranian missiles were intercepted or struck open areas.[2] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is Iran's top operational headquarters, subsequently announced the “cessation of [Iranian] armed forces operations” but warned that Iranian forces would inflict “much more severe and crushing measures” if the IDF continued to conduct operations against Hezbollah across Lebanon, including in southern Lebanon.[3] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters previously threatened on June 1 to attack Israel only if the IDF struck Beirut, which suggests that the regime has since lowered its threshold for attacking Israel.[4] The IDF stated that it will continue to target Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and warned that further attacks on northern Israel would trigger additional strikes on Beirut's suburbs.[5]
The recent exchange of fire comes as the Iranian regime appears to be placing renewed emphasis on the importance of the Axis of Resistance, and particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, as a central pillar of Iranian deterrence. A newspaper affiliated with the Supreme Leader's office argued on June 7 that Iran will “not hesitate to enter the field and defend the order that it is now seeking to achieve.”[6] The newspaper added that Iran's “new security equation” involves “an eye for an eye,” which suggests that Iran intends to respond to any threat to the Axis of Resistance.[7] Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Amoli Larijani similarly stated on X on June 8 that Iran's missile attack against Israel was not just a military response but a “formal declaration of a strategic doctrine…in which safeguarding regional power is pursued not in anticipation of threats, but through proactive initiative and offensive threat.”[8] These statements suggest that the regime seeks to deter future military action against its regional proxies and partners by increasing the costs of escalation.
The Iranian regime is almost certainly monitoring reports that US President Donald Trump would prefer a negotiated settlement over renewed conflict with Iran.[9] Iran's threats to inflict “much more severe and crushing measures” therefore likely seek to exploit the United States’ aversion to resuming the war and pressure the United States to convince Israel to halt attacks against Hezbollah.[10] This effort aligns with Iran and Hezbollah's broader objective of securing Israeli capitulation in Lebanon, particularly through a complete cessation of Israeli operations in Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.[11]
Hezbollah likely seeks to benefit from Iranian deterrence because Iran's threat to respond to any Israeli attack against Hezbollah injects uncertainty into Israel's decision-making process for military operations against Hezbollah.[12] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters’ warning implied that any Israeli kinetic activity in Lebanon, including responses to Hezbollah attacks, may elicit an Iranian attack on Israeli territory.[13] This warning is likely designed to force Israeli leaders at almost every echelon of command to have to consider whether an operation against Hezbollah would trigger an Iranian attack. The constant need to consider a possible Iranian attack would result in a more reactive and defensive Israeli posture.
Iran and Hezbollah may also calculate that the United States could blame Israel for any Israeli strike that triggered an Iranian response and thereby try to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel. Iranian leaders are almost certainly aware of Western media reporting that US President Donald Trump has criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for advancing Israeli operations against Hezbollah, and it likely seeks to exploit these reports to stoke further tensions between the two states.[14] Iranian officials and media have sought in recent days to frame Israel as undermining US diplomatic efforts with Iran as part of its effort to sow divisions between the two countries.[15]
The recent Iranian strikes on Israel and Iran's renewed emphasis on the Axis of Resistance reflect how the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) likely continues to dominate regime decision-making. ISW-CTP has repeatedly assessed that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle are driving regime decision-making.[16] Vahidi and his inner circle have consistently opposed compromise and prioritized securing maximalist objectives, such as recognized Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.[17] Vahidi served as the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force, which is the extraterritorial arm of the IRGC, between 1988 and 1997, and played a central role in establishing Lebanese Hezbollah and developing the broader Axis of Resistance.[18] The regime's renewed emphasis on Hezbollah and the broader Axis of Resistance, coupled with its lower threshold for direct military conflict, likely reflects Vahidi’s efforts to preserve and reinforce what he views as one of Iran's most valuable forms of deterrence.
The IDF responded to the Iranian strikes on northern Israel by attacking Iranian air defense and ballistic missile sites in central and western Iran.[19] The IDF released footage of a strike targeting an Iranian air defense system.[20] The IDF also struck sites affiliated with ballistic missile production at the Bandar Imam Petrochemical Complex in Mahshahr, Khuzestan Province.[21] The IDF previously struck the same complex during the recent war as part of a broader Israeli and US effort to target Iran's petrochemical sector to impose economic costs on the regime and degrade its defense industrial capabilities.[22] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts on X and anti-regime media reported strikes against other Iranian military facilities, including drone storage and production facilities in Tehran and Esfahan provinces, respectively.[23] Iran responded to the Israeli strikes by launching additional missiles at Israel, all of which either struck open areas or were intercepted.[24]
Iran's “new security equation” also relies on threatening critical economic chokepoints to deter Israel and the United States from striking Iran or its partners. Iran continues to use coercive measures in and around the Strait of Hormuz to force vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iran's protection racket. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the regime increasingly views control over the strait as a key component of its future deterrence strategy.[25] Iranian leaders have repeatedly threatened to disrupt maritime commerce to impose economic costs on the United States and its allies to try to extract concessions during negotiations and discourage additional US or Israeli military action against Iran. The newspaper affiliated with the Supreme Leader's office stated that Iran intends to impose its new security equation “from [the Strait of] Hormuz to Beirut,” suggesting that control over the strait constitutes a core element of Tehran’s strategy.[26] Iranian officials have also repeatedly threatened to restrict shipping through the Bab al Mandeb (see below).[27] The regime likely calculates that threatening these economic chokepoints can generate sufficient economic pressure on the United States and its allies to secure concessions and strengthen Iran's long-term deterrence.
The Houthis announced on June 8 that they will target Israeli vessels in the Red Sea, but have not yet acted on this threat at the time of this writing.[28] Any Houthi attack on Israeli vessels in the Red Sea would likely seek to impose costs on Israel while remaining below the threshold that would trigger a US response. The Houthis announced on June 8 a complete ban on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, though it has not conducted any attacks on Israeli vessels at the time of writing.[29] A Houthi source told Reuters on June 8 that the Houthis’ ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea “was a first step” and added that “further escalation could lead [the Houthis] to stop the passage of any ships bound for Israel as well as other measures.”[30] A senior Houthi official also told the New York Times that the group would only target Israeli-linked vessels but warned that it would attack the vessels of any state, including Saudi Arabia, that intervenes.[31] Any Houthi campaign against Israeli shipping would likely seek to impose economic costs on Israel and complicate maritime trade in the Red Sea while seeking to avoid direct US military intervention. The Houthis have conducted limited ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting Israel during the current conflict, but have thus far not conducted attacks on international shipping.[32] Houthi attacks on Israeli vessels in the Red Sea would complement Iran's broader effort to pressure international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and increase costs on regional and global commerce. The Houthis previously began targeting Israeli-linked vessels after October 7, 2023, and later expanded their attacks to include vessels associated with companies that used Israeli ports, which forced major shipping firms to adopt costlier routes outside the Red Sea.[33] The Houthis’ recent implementation of maritime restrictions on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea also follows a previous report that Iran pressured the Houthis to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait in April 2026.[34] It is unclear whether the Houthis’ current restriction on Israeli-linked shipping reflects Iranian pressure or independent Houthi decision-making, however.
The Houthis launched at least two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel on June 8, which is consistent with the group's “limited” involvement in the current war. The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile salvo at Tel Aviv and other unspecified areas of central Israel on June 8.[35] The IDF stated that it intercepted one missile while a second missile landed near the Yemeni–Saudi border, according to the Saudi Defense Ministry.[36] The Houthis also published a video of the attack, which showed Houthi fighters launching several Palestine-2 medium-range ballistic missiles.[37] The Houthis previously conducted at least seven ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting Israel before the US-Iran ceasefire came into effect in early April.[38] These attacks included a drone attack on April 6 that the Houthis conducted in coordination with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.[39]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on June 8 that US forces disabled an unladen oil tanker that violated the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.[40] CENTCOM stated that the Palau-flagged M/T Marivex transited international waters in the Gulf of Oman and attempted to sail to an Iranian port.[41] US forces disabled the vessel by firing a precision munition at the vessel's engineering and steering spaces after its crew failed to comply with directions.[42] US forces have disabled seven non-compliant vessels and redirected 134 vessels since the United States began its blockade on Iranian ports on April 13.[43]
Two Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to strike US bases and interests in Iraq and the region if the United States strikes Iran.[44] Kataib Hezbollah said on June 8 that the group would target US bases and interests in Iraq and the region if the United States “intervenes.”[45] Likely Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada front group Saraya Awliya al Dam released a similar statement on June 8.[46] Neither group has acted on their threats at the time of this writing. These threats coincide with reports that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is leading efforts to prevent Iraqi armed factions from joining the Iran-Israel conflict, even if the United States reenters the war.[47]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-8-2026/
I don't agree that a regime under Mojtaba Khamenei is necessarily more dangerous than the one under Ali Khamenei. Mojtaba may be more reckless, which makes him dangerous. Ali, however, was more strategic, disciplined, and patient—which in many ways made him even more dangerous.
Ali was steadily moving Iran toward a lethal end state: a massive ballistic missile arsenal, an eventual ICBM capability, permanent coercive leverage over Hormuz, and ultimately a nuclear weapons capability protected by the growing costs and risks of military action against it given Iran's trajectory to a massive missile arsenal.
Mojtaba has inherited a much weaker position. He has lost much of Iran's missile production base, its ICBM program, enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, top weapons scientists, and other critical elements of the weaponization effort. He retains temporary leverage over Hormuz, but that can still be reversed if the Trump chooses to reopen the waterway by force.
What Mojtaba lacks in capability, however, he may make up for in grievance and a desire for revenge. He does not have his father's experience or patience, which may make him more reckless—and less willing to accept any agreement that meaningfully constrains the regime.
Thoughts?
https://x.com/mdubowitz/status/2064074764788945292
Ariel Oseran: Considering he is alive, I agree that Mojtaba is more dangerous in the short term than Ali, who was the greater strategic threat.
With the elimination of Ali, Iran not only lost its experienced commander-in-chief, but also its main source of strategic patience. Absent of a moderating factor, the Iranian regime is much more willing to embark on military adventures, regardless of the damage it suffers in response. What we are witnessing now is an emboldened, overly confident, risk-taking and radicalized Iranian regime, which is exhibiting a dramatic transformation in its deterrence doctrine.
In the past, any attack on Iran or its interests was met by strategic patience, with Iran taking its time to thoroughly calculate its response at a time and place of its choosing. Now, under its current hardline leadership, it is displaying a strong sense of self-confidence and willingness to engage its advisories directly, and swiftly.
In the short term, Iran has become a more immediate tactical threat to Israel, showing a willingness to engage it directly, contrary to decades of restraint and strategic patience. Recognizing this, Israelis need to prepare to a new dynamic of rounds of escalation with Iran moving forward. But strategically, Iran has no direct levers of pressure over Israel, short of attempting to pressure US President Trump into curbing Israeli military action. It tried to create one last night by imposing a ‘Lebanon for Israel’ equation, but didn't succeed. This was likely not the last word from Iran, but the more it engages Israel directly, the more it exposes its weakness in the long-run.
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2064106753332031701
tbc
The Iranian regime is attempting to use calibrated force in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States without triggering a full-scale US response. Recent statements from senior Iranian officials and regime-affiliated media suggest that Iran believes that it is at war—not in a ceasefire—and views military action as a tactic to improve its negotiating position to serve the regime's strategic objectives. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that Iran must use military action and diplomacy in a complementary way, in which Iranian military action creates favorable conditions for the regime so that diplomacy can turn these conditions into ”legal, political, and economic achievements.“[1] Regime-affiliated outlet Nour News argued on June 9 that the recent round of strikes between Iran and Israel occurred because each side is attempting to use limited military action in order to strengthen its position in negotiations without triggering a full-scale war.[2] These statements and regime media opinions suggest that the regime views negotiations as a continuation of the war with the United States and perceives military action as a tool to secure the regime's objectives in negotiations.
Iranian officials appear to be calibrating their response to avoid triggering a major US response. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 9 that “foreign forces” are at constant risk due to their own errors and should leave the region because Iran will never be “hospitable” to their presence.[3] Araghchi‘s statement is likely a reference to the Iranian attack on the US Apache helicopter (see below) and notably stops short of explicitly naming or threatening US forces. The attack is consistent with Iran's broader effort to secure recognition of its control over the strait by deterring US intervention to protect maritime traffic, but the operation's limited scope suggests that Iran seeks to increase pressure on the United States through limited military action to secure greater concessions in negotiations while avoiding a return to full-blown war.
Iran has likely designed this new approach based on an assessment that the United States does not want to return to war.[4] Nour News, for example, highlighted that neither side wants to trigger a full-scale conflict, which implies that Nour News—a regime-affiliated outlet—believes that the United States does not want to return to war. US President Donald Trump has attempted to avoid a return to war. He has also said explicitly that he seeks to avoid war, which would increase Iran's confidence in its assessment.[5] Avoiding a return to large-scale operations is beneficial for Iran because it allows Iran to drag out the economic and political pressure on the United States and Israel. Iran faces its own economic pressure due to war damages and the US Navy blockade, but the Iranian regime only cares about economic damage insofar as it damages the regime's parochial interests and threatens regime security.
The recent escalation in Lebanon is also emblematic of this Iranian approach. ISW-CTP assessed on June 8 that the recent Iranian strikes and threats of future attacks are likely an attempt to deter US or Israeli military action against Iran's partners and proxies in the region (particularly Hezbollah), which are a central pillar of Iranian deterrence.[6] Iran has almost certainly observed discussions and leaks in Western media about the increasing tension between Trump and Netanyahu over Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Trump's fears that Israeli actions in Lebanon will cause US-Iran negotiations to collapse, for example.[7] Pressure from Trump on Netanyahu resulted in limited Israeli strikes that were carefully calibrated to avoid war, rather than restore deterrence vis-à-vis Iran. Such reports would increase Iranian confidence that Trump wants to avoid war. Trump's pressure on Israel increases the political risk of any strike in Beirut, thus limiting Israel's ability to degrade Hezbollah and threaten a key pillar of Iranian deterrence.
These strikes and Iranian efforts to link a complete ceasefire in Lebanon to a US-Iran ceasefire are part of an Iranian effort to secure a key objective, the survival of Hezbollah, and simultaneously distract the United States from discussions of Iran's nuclear program and Iranian efforts to control the strait and aim to reduce US leverage before negotiations on such issues.
Iran is using force against US forces near the Strait of Hormuz, likely in an effort to deter US forces from operating in the Strait of Hormuz for any reason. This use of force is designed to achieve the Iranian war aim of asserting its control over the strait. An Iranian drone downed a US Army AH-64 Apache gunship near the coast of Oman on June 8.[8] US President Donald Trump stated on June 9 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US Apache helicopter while the helicopter was patrolling in the Strait of Hormuz on June 8.[9] A US source told CNN on June 9 that an Iranian Shahed drone struck the US Apache helicopter.[10] Iran possesses a jet-powered interceptor variant of the Shahed, which may have downed the US Apache helicopter, according to a drone analyst.[11] Iran has not claimed responsibility for the Apache incident at the time of this writing, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi denied Iranian involvement to Al Jazeera on June 9.[12] CENTCOM spokesperson Captain Timothy Hawkins announced on June 9 that a US Navy Corsair unmanned surface vessel (USV) rescued the two crew members within two hours of the incident on June 8, marking the Navy's first USV search-and-rescue mission.[13] Both crew members are in stable condition.[14] Trump emphasized that the United States must respond to the Iranian attack.[15] ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of a ”proportional” US response as of 5:50 PM ET on June 9.[16] ISW-CTP will provide more details on the US response in its June 10 morning thread and evening update.
Iran likely targeted the Apache due to the role Apache gunships can play in air defense against Iranian drones over the strait or in intercepting Iranian fast attack craft. Lloyd's List, a maritime intelligence firm, told CNBC on June 4 that the US Navy has coordinated the transit of nearly 40 vessels via the Strait of Hormuz over the past three weeks.[17] Lloyd's List's chief editor told CNBC on June 4 that “the assumption is that the US Navy is providing limited assurances that it will intercept incoming threats against commercial ships.”[18] A US CENTCOM spokesperson denied to the Wall Street Journal that US forces escorted commercial vessels but confirmed that US forces continually communicate and coordinate with vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz on May 24.[19] US Apache gunships engaged Iranian fast attack craft during Project Freedom on May 4, and Emirati Apache gunships have intercepted incoming Iranian drones.[20]
The Iranian attack on the US Apache helicopter comes amid repeated Iranian efforts to use coercive measures, including force, in and around the Strait of Hormuz to force vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iran's protection racket.[21] Iran almost certainly perceives US efforts to facilitate the safe passage of vessels through the strait as a threat to this broader effort to assert control over the strait. Iran has previously used force to threaten US naval forces in the strait in order to try to increase the risk to US forces protecting vessels and deter such US efforts.[22]
The Iranian regime has continued to signal that it will not accept the United States’ latest nuclear demands. The New York Times, citing US officials and diplomats who have been briefed on the confidential talks, reported on June 8 that there are four major points of discussion between the United States and Iran, including a suspension of uranium enrichment for ten to 20 years, the dilution of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU), the dismantling of Iran's major nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan, and the ability of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to be able to conduct “snap” inspections.[23] Ebrahim Azizi reiterated on June 9 that the regime is not negotiating on any nuclear issues at this time and that the two sides are not close to reaching an agreement.[24]
The Houthis continue to threaten to restrict commercial shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, but they have not yet conducted attacks to realize these threats. Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammed al Bukhaiti told Russia Today India on June 9 that the Houthis have imposed a “blockade” against Israel and may target “any vessel heading to Israel.[25] Bukhaiti noted that the Houthis are using the Bab el Mandeb Strait as “leverage” to pressure Israel to stop operations against Hamas and Hezbollah.[26] Bukhaiti’s statement comes after the Houthis announced on June 8 that they will target Israeli vessels in the Red Sea.[27]
The Houthis launched a drone targeting Eilat Port in southern Israel on June 8, which Israel successfully intercepted.[28] The Houthis have yet to take responsibility for the drone attack at the time of this writing. The drone attack on Eilat comes after the Houthis launched two missiles reportedly targeting Tel Aviv in central Israel on June 8, one of which Israel intercepted. The other fell in Saudi territory.[29]
Hezbollah and Iran appear not to have effectively deterred Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is Iran's top operational headquarters, warned on June 8 that Iranian forces would inflict “much more severe and crushing measures” if the IDF continued to conduct operations against Hezbollah across Lebanon, including in southern Lebanon.[30] The Iranian warning occurred after Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 following Israeli strikes on a Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drone headquarters in Beirut's southern suburbs, which Israel conducted in response to a Hezbollah attack on northern Israel.[31] The Iranian warning implied that any Israeli kinetic activity in Lebanon, including responses to Hezbollah attacks, may elicit an Iranian attack on Israeli territory.[32] ISW-CTP assessed on June 8 that Hezbollah likely seeks to benefit from Iran's threat to respond to any Israeli attack against Hezbollah because such threats seek to inject uncertainty into Israel's decision-making process for military operations against Hezbollah.[33]
The IDF has continued strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon on June 8, however.[34] Senior Israeli officials stated on June 8 and 9 that Israel will not allow Hezbollah and Iran to deter Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and will respond to any Hezbollah or Iranian attacks on Israeli territory.[35] Senior Israeli cabinet officials said that any Hezbollah fire intended to cross the border into Israel will trigger strikes on Beirut, according to Israeli media on June 9.[36] Netanyahu said on June 8 that Hezbollah and Iran are attempting to limit IDF freedom of action, which is “intolerable and unacceptable.”[37] Netanyahu stated that if Iran attacks Israel again, Israel will “respond forcefully.”[38] Hezbollah and Iran have not conducted any attacks on Israeli territory since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on June 8 at the time of this writing, and the IDF has limited its strikes to southern Lebanon.
US and Lebanese officials provided additional details on a US-Israeli-Lebanese framework to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[39] The United States, Israel, and Lebanon issued a joint statement on June 3 announcing that they would coordinate to establish zones south of the Litani River where the LAF would establish territorial control “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.”[40] The LAF will reportedly operate in these zones to confiscate weapons and protect civilians returning to evacuated areas.[41] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Western media on June 5 that these ”pilot zones” will be established once a complete ceasefire takes effect.[42] Aoun proposed that Israel and Lebanon first establish a “pilot zone” near Beaufort Castle and that the LAF replace the Israeli forces that seized the area on May 31.[43] US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa told Lebanese media on June 9 that Israeli forces will refrain from conducting kinetic activity in these zones.[44] Issa said that the LAF will move to new areas and conduct further disarmament operations after disarming the initial zones in an effort to eventually clear all of southern Lebanese territory of non-state weapons.[45]
Israeli forces exchanged fire with an unspecified militia fighter near the Israel-Lebanon border on June 9.[46] The IDF determined in an investigation that the gunman wore a “military uniform” and entered Israeli territory in the early afternoon of June 9, but failed to cross the Israeli border fence, which is several meters past the border within Israel.[47] Israeli soldiers in a community nearly one mile away responded to reports of gunfire near the border and killed the gunman, who acted alone and carried only a knife and a handgun.[48] The lone gunman's light armament, conspicuous military dress, and daytime movement suggest a very amateur and uncoordinated infiltration attempt rather than a well-coordinated military operation.
Iraqi political sources told Iraqi media on June 9 that they “anticipate” that only parties unaffiliated with Iraqi militias’ parties will fill the nine remaining Iraqi ministerial positions.[49] The Iraqi parliament approved 14 out of 23 ministers of incumbent Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s government on May 14 but multiple key ministries, including the defense and interior ministries, remain unfilled.[50] The United States opposes the allocation of any ministerial portfolio to political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, even if the militias announced their disarmament.[51] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib Imam al Ali may have signaled on June 2 their willingness to disarm to reduce US opposition to their political wings participating in the next Iraqi government in non-cabinet level roles.[52]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-9-2026/