The Iranian regime is attempting to use calibrated force in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States without triggering a full-scale US response. Recent statements from senior Iranian officials and regime-affiliated media suggest that Iran believes that it is at war—not in a ceasefire—and views military action as a tactic to improve its negotiating position to serve the regime's strategic objectives. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that Iran must use military action and diplomacy in a complementary way, in which Iranian military action creates favorable conditions for the regime so that diplomacy can turn these conditions into ”legal, political, and economic achievements.“[1] Regime-affiliated outlet Nour News argued on June 9 that the recent round of strikes between Iran and Israel occurred because each side is attempting to use limited military action in order to strengthen its position in negotiations without triggering a full-scale war.[2] These statements and regime media opinions suggest that the regime views negotiations as a continuation of the war with the United States and perceives military action as a tool to secure the regime's objectives in negotiations.
Iranian officials appear to be calibrating their response to avoid triggering a major US response. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 9 that “foreign forces” are at constant risk due to their own errors and should leave the region because Iran will never be “hospitable” to their presence.[3] Araghchi‘s statement is likely a reference to the Iranian attack on the US Apache helicopter (see below) and notably stops short of explicitly naming or threatening US forces. The attack is consistent with Iran's broader effort to secure recognition of its control over the strait by deterring US intervention to protect maritime traffic, but the operation's limited scope suggests that Iran seeks to increase pressure on the United States through limited military action to secure greater concessions in negotiations while avoiding a return to full-blown war.
Iran has likely designed this new approach based on an assessment that the United States does not want to return to war.[4] Nour News, for example, highlighted that neither side wants to trigger a full-scale conflict, which implies that Nour News—a regime-affiliated outlet—believes that the United States does not want to return to war. US President Donald Trump has attempted to avoid a return to war. He has also said explicitly that he seeks to avoid war, which would increase Iran's confidence in its assessment.[5] Avoiding a return to large-scale operations is beneficial for Iran because it allows Iran to drag out the economic and political pressure on the United States and Israel. Iran faces its own economic pressure due to war damages and the US Navy blockade, but the Iranian regime only cares about economic damage insofar as it damages the regime's parochial interests and threatens regime security.
The recent escalation in Lebanon is also emblematic of this Iranian approach. ISW-CTP assessed on June 8 that the recent Iranian strikes and threats of future attacks are likely an attempt to deter US or Israeli military action against Iran's partners and proxies in the region (particularly Hezbollah), which are a central pillar of Iranian deterrence.[6] Iran has almost certainly observed discussions and leaks in Western media about the increasing tension between Trump and Netanyahu over Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Trump's fears that Israeli actions in Lebanon will cause US-Iran negotiations to collapse, for example.[7] Pressure from Trump on Netanyahu resulted in limited Israeli strikes that were carefully calibrated to avoid war, rather than restore deterrence vis-à-vis Iran. Such reports would increase Iranian confidence that Trump wants to avoid war. Trump's pressure on Israel increases the political risk of any strike in Beirut, thus limiting Israel's ability to degrade Hezbollah and threaten a key pillar of Iranian deterrence.
These strikes and Iranian efforts to link a complete ceasefire in Lebanon to a US-Iran ceasefire are part of an Iranian effort to secure a key objective, the survival of Hezbollah, and simultaneously distract the United States from discussions of Iran's nuclear program and Iranian efforts to control the strait and aim to reduce US leverage before negotiations on such issues.
Iran is using force against US forces near the Strait of Hormuz, likely in an effort to deter US forces from operating in the Strait of Hormuz for any reason. This use of force is designed to achieve the Iranian war aim of asserting its control over the strait. An Iranian drone downed a US Army AH-64 Apache gunship near the coast of Oman on June 8.[8] US President Donald Trump stated on June 9 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US Apache helicopter while the helicopter was patrolling in the Strait of Hormuz on June 8.[9] A US source told CNN on June 9 that an Iranian Shahed drone struck the US Apache helicopter.[10] Iran possesses a jet-powered interceptor variant of the Shahed, which may have downed the US Apache helicopter, according to a drone analyst.[11] Iran has not claimed responsibility for the Apache incident at the time of this writing, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi denied Iranian involvement to Al Jazeera on June 9.[12] CENTCOM spokesperson Captain Timothy Hawkins announced on June 9 that a US Navy Corsair unmanned surface vessel (USV) rescued the two crew members within two hours of the incident on June 8, marking the Navy's first USV search-and-rescue mission.[13] Both crew members are in stable condition.[14] Trump emphasized that the United States must respond to the Iranian attack.[15] ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of a ”proportional” US response as of 5:50 PM ET on June 9.[16] ISW-CTP will provide more details on the US response in its June 10 morning thread and evening update.
Iran likely targeted the Apache due to the role Apache gunships can play in air defense against Iranian drones over the strait or in intercepting Iranian fast attack craft. Lloyd's List, a maritime intelligence firm, told CNBC on June 4 that the US Navy has coordinated the transit of nearly 40 vessels via the Strait of Hormuz over the past three weeks.[17] Lloyd's List's chief editor told CNBC on June 4 that “the assumption is that the US Navy is providing limited assurances that it will intercept incoming threats against commercial ships.”[18] A US CENTCOM spokesperson denied to the Wall Street Journal that US forces escorted commercial vessels but confirmed that US forces continually communicate and coordinate with vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz on May 24.[19] US Apache gunships engaged Iranian fast attack craft during Project Freedom on May 4, and Emirati Apache gunships have intercepted incoming Iranian drones.[20]
The Iranian attack on the US Apache helicopter comes amid repeated Iranian efforts to use coercive measures, including force, in and around the Strait of Hormuz to force vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iran's protection racket.[21] Iran almost certainly perceives US efforts to facilitate the safe passage of vessels through the strait as a threat to this broader effort to assert control over the strait. Iran has previously used force to threaten US naval forces in the strait in order to try to increase the risk to US forces protecting vessels and deter such US efforts.[22]
The Iranian regime has continued to signal that it will not accept the United States’ latest nuclear demands. The New York Times, citing US officials and diplomats who have been briefed on the confidential talks, reported on June 8 that there are four major points of discussion between the United States and Iran, including a suspension of uranium enrichment for ten to 20 years, the dilution of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU), the dismantling of Iran's major nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan, and the ability of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to be able to conduct “snap” inspections.[23] Ebrahim Azizi reiterated on June 9 that the regime is not negotiating on any nuclear issues at this time and that the two sides are not close to reaching an agreement.[24]
The Houthis continue to threaten to restrict commercial shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, but they have not yet conducted attacks to realize these threats. Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammed al Bukhaiti told Russia Today India on June 9 that the Houthis have imposed a “blockade” against Israel and may target “any vessel heading to Israel.[25] Bukhaiti noted that the Houthis are using the Bab el Mandeb Strait as “leverage” to pressure Israel to stop operations against Hamas and Hezbollah.[26] Bukhaiti’s statement comes after the Houthis announced on June 8 that they will target Israeli vessels in the Red Sea.[27]
The Houthis launched a drone targeting Eilat Port in southern Israel on June 8, which Israel successfully intercepted.[28] The Houthis have yet to take responsibility for the drone attack at the time of this writing. The drone attack on Eilat comes after the Houthis launched two missiles reportedly targeting Tel Aviv in central Israel on June 8, one of which Israel intercepted. The other fell in Saudi territory.[29]
Hezbollah and Iran appear not to have effectively deterred Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is Iran's top operational headquarters, warned on June 8 that Iranian forces would inflict “much more severe and crushing measures” if the IDF continued to conduct operations against Hezbollah across Lebanon, including in southern Lebanon.[30] The Iranian warning occurred after Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 following Israeli strikes on a Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drone headquarters in Beirut's southern suburbs, which Israel conducted in response to a Hezbollah attack on northern Israel.[31] The Iranian warning implied that any Israeli kinetic activity in Lebanon, including responses to Hezbollah attacks, may elicit an Iranian attack on Israeli territory.[32] ISW-CTP assessed on June 8 that Hezbollah likely seeks to benefit from Iran's threat to respond to any Israeli attack against Hezbollah because such threats seek to inject uncertainty into Israel's decision-making process for military operations against Hezbollah.[33]
The IDF has continued strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon on June 8, however.[34] Senior Israeli officials stated on June 8 and 9 that Israel will not allow Hezbollah and Iran to deter Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and will respond to any Hezbollah or Iranian attacks on Israeli territory.[35] Senior Israeli cabinet officials said that any Hezbollah fire intended to cross the border into Israel will trigger strikes on Beirut, according to Israeli media on June 9.[36] Netanyahu said on June 8 that Hezbollah and Iran are attempting to limit IDF freedom of action, which is “intolerable and unacceptable.”[37] Netanyahu stated that if Iran attacks Israel again, Israel will “respond forcefully.”[38] Hezbollah and Iran have not conducted any attacks on Israeli territory since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on June 8 at the time of this writing, and the IDF has limited its strikes to southern Lebanon.
US and Lebanese officials provided additional details on a US-Israeli-Lebanese framework to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[39] The United States, Israel, and Lebanon issued a joint statement on June 3 announcing that they would coordinate to establish zones south of the Litani River where the LAF would establish territorial control “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.”[40] The LAF will reportedly operate in these zones to confiscate weapons and protect civilians returning to evacuated areas.[41] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Western media on June 5 that these ”pilot zones” will be established once a complete ceasefire takes effect.[42] Aoun proposed that Israel and Lebanon first establish a “pilot zone” near Beaufort Castle and that the LAF replace the Israeli forces that seized the area on May 31.[43] US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa told Lebanese media on June 9 that Israeli forces will refrain from conducting kinetic activity in these zones.[44] Issa said that the LAF will move to new areas and conduct further disarmament operations after disarming the initial zones in an effort to eventually clear all of southern Lebanese territory of non-state weapons.[45]
Israeli forces exchanged fire with an unspecified militia fighter near the Israel-Lebanon border on June 9.[46] The IDF determined in an investigation that the gunman wore a “military uniform” and entered Israeli territory in the early afternoon of June 9, but failed to cross the Israeli border fence, which is several meters past the border within Israel.[47] Israeli soldiers in a community nearly one mile away responded to reports of gunfire near the border and killed the gunman, who acted alone and carried only a knife and a handgun.[48] The lone gunman's light armament, conspicuous military dress, and daytime movement suggest a very amateur and uncoordinated infiltration attempt rather than a well-coordinated military operation.
Iraqi political sources told Iraqi media on June 9 that they “anticipate” that only parties unaffiliated with Iraqi militias’ parties will fill the nine remaining Iraqi ministerial positions.[49] The Iraqi parliament approved 14 out of 23 ministers of incumbent Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s government on May 14 but multiple key ministries, including the defense and interior ministries, remain unfilled.[50] The United States opposes the allocation of any ministerial portfolio to political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, even if the militias announced their disarmament.[51] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib Imam al Ali may have signaled on June 2 their willingness to disarm to reduce US opposition to their political wings participating in the next Iraqi government in non-cabinet level roles.[52]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-9-2026/
Iran is using force, combined with the threat to suspend US-Iran negotiations, to try to deter the United States from conducting further attacks on Iran that would likely make it more difficult for Iran to achieve its strategic objectives, which include solidifying control over the Strait of Hormuz and preserving the Axis of Resistance. US forces struck around 20 targets in southern Iran, including air defenses, ground control stations, and surveillance radar sites, on June 9 in response to Iran's drone attack that downed a US Apache helicopter off the coast of Oman on June 8.[1] Iranian forces responded by conducting several drone and missile attacks targeting US bases in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain.[2] US forces intercepted all of the projectiles except for one that landed in the vicinity of the US Navy 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, with no reported casualties at the time of this writing.[3] The Iranian regime likely intended for these strikes to have an informational effect by signaling to the United States that Iranian forces would be prepared to resume the war with the United States if necessary. The Iranian regime likely calculated that the United States would not resume the war in response to these strikes given recent reports that US President Donald Trump would prefer a negotiated settlement over a resumption of conflict. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei separately stated on June 10 that Iran will “review” negotiations with the United States in light of the US self-defense strikes on Iran on June 9.[4] This comment is also part of the Iranian informational campaign aimed at deterring further US military action against Iran because Baghaei is implicitly threatening to suspend negotiations if the United States takes military action against Iran.[5] Iran is exploiting the current situation in which it has neither made concessions in negotiations nor faces continuous large-scale strikes from the United States and Israel to advance its objectives, such as normalizing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Iranian regime likely calculates that the status quo is favorable to achieving its objectives.
Iran has repeatedly used calibrated force in recent weeks as part of a series of campaigns to try to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 to pressure US President Donald Trump to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[6] These attacks were part of a broader Iranian effort to preserve Hezbollah, which it views as a key pillar of its deterrence strategy vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.[7] Iran has also used force, including attacks on US forces in the Gulf and the drone attack on the Apache helicopter, to try to deter the United States from enforcing its naval blockade and interfering with Iranian efforts to control the strait.[8] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly emphasized that Iran will not concede on control of the strait, its proxy and partner network, and its nuclear program because it views these things as central pillars to its national security strategy to deter future attacks by the United States and Israel.[9]
ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of additional US strikes in Iran as of 5:36 PM ET on June 10. CTP-ISW will provide more details on the US strikes in its June 11 morning thread and evening update. President Trump threatened earlier on June 10 to strike Iranian power plants and bridges if Iran did not make progress in negotiations.[10]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is continuing to strike Hezbollah targets and conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon, despite Hezbollah and Iranian efforts to deter Israel from continuing its campaign in Lebanon. ISW-CTP assessed on June 8 that Hezbollah likely seeks to benefit from Iran's threat to respond to any Israeli attack against Hezbollah because such threats seek to inject uncertainty into Israel's decision-making process for military operations against Hezbollah.[11] Senior Israeli officials stated on June 8 and 9 that Israel will not allow Hezbollah and Iran to deter Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and will respond to any Hezbollah or Iranian attacks on Israeli territory.[12] The IDF continued to strike Hezbollah targets, including rocket and drone launch sites, in southern Lebanon on June 9 and 10.[13] IDF units, including the 869th Brigade Reconnaissance Unit (91st Division) and the 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Division), have continued to seize and destroy Hezbollah weapons caches and infrastructure and kill the group's fighters in southern Lebanon in recent days.[14] Lebanese security sources told Saudi media on June 10 that the IDF is attempting to advance along the Beaufort Castle axis toward Kfar Tebnit and Ali Taher Hill in southeastern Lebanon and along the Biyyadah axis toward Majdal Zoun and Mazraat Buyut al Sayad in southwestern Lebanon.[15] Kfar Tebnit and Ali al Taher are both located on high ground, which is favorable for observing Hezbollah ground force movements.[16] The IDF and Hezbollah launched strikes against each other along both axes on June 10.[17]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Imam Ali submitted files and data related to its members, weapons, and vehicles to the Iraqi federal government's disarmament committee.[18] The Iraqi federal government began trying to restrict arms to the state on June 4 through the disarmament and integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters into the Iraqi security establishment, including the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[19] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iraqi militias, such as Kataib al Imam Ali, that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[20] Kataib al Imam Ali controls the 40th PMF Brigade.[21] Kataib al Imam Ali announced on June 2 that it would begin to “disengage” from the PMF and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state, possibly to overcome US opposition to the group's involvement in the next Iraqi government.[22] Kataib al Imam Ali could also seek to fill a portion of the 35,000 jobs in Iraqi security institutions that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly proposed to be allocated to militia members who disarm.[23]
It will be difficult for the Iraqi federal government to confirm the degree of Kataib al Imam Ali's transparency and honesty given the extent to which Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have routinely obscured their operations from the Iraqi state. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias operate covertly due to their very nature as “resistance” organizations.[24] The PMF, which the militias are supposed to integrate into, also operates with limited Iraqi government oversight.[25] The Iraqi federal government, under former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, tried and failed multiple times to audit the PMF.[26] PMF officials have deliberately hidden information such as the size of the PMF from the Iraqi federal government, for example.[27] Militias that control PMF brigades also manage illicit financial networks that Iran uses to evade US sanctions.[28] ISW-CTP continues to assess that any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-10-2026/