I don't agree that a regime under Mojtaba Khamenei is necessarily more dangerous than the one under Ali Khamenei. Mojtaba may be more reckless, which makes him dangerous. Ali, however, was more strategic, disciplined, and patient—which in many ways made him even more dangerous.
Ali was steadily moving Iran toward a lethal end state: a massive ballistic missile arsenal, an eventual ICBM capability, permanent coercive leverage over Hormuz, and ultimately a nuclear weapons capability protected by the growing costs and risks of military action against it given Iran's trajectory to a massive missile arsenal.
Mojtaba has inherited a much weaker position. He has lost much of Iran's missile production base, its ICBM program, enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, top weapons scientists, and other critical elements of the weaponization effort. He retains temporary leverage over Hormuz, but that can still be reversed if the Trump chooses to reopen the waterway by force.
What Mojtaba lacks in capability, however, he may make up for in grievance and a desire for revenge. He does not have his father's experience or patience, which may make him more reckless—and less willing to accept any agreement that meaningfully constrains the regime.
Thoughts?
https://x.com/mdubowitz/status/2064074764788945292
Ariel Oseran: Considering he is alive, I agree that Mojtaba is more dangerous in the short term than Ali, who was the greater strategic threat.
With the elimination of Ali, Iran not only lost its experienced commander-in-chief, but also its main source of strategic patience. Absent of a moderating factor, the Iranian regime is much more willing to embark on military adventures, regardless of the damage it suffers in response. What we are witnessing now is an emboldened, overly confident, risk-taking and radicalized Iranian regime, which is exhibiting a dramatic transformation in its deterrence doctrine.
In the past, any attack on Iran or its interests was met by strategic patience, with Iran taking its time to thoroughly calculate its response at a time and place of its choosing. Now, under its current hardline leadership, it is displaying a strong sense of self-confidence and willingness to engage its advisories directly, and swiftly.
In the short term, Iran has become a more immediate tactical threat to Israel, showing a willingness to engage it directly, contrary to decades of restraint and strategic patience. Recognizing this, Israelis need to prepare to a new dynamic of rounds of escalation with Iran moving forward. But strategically, Iran has no direct levers of pressure over Israel, short of attempting to pressure US President Trump into curbing Israeli military action. It tried to create one last night by imposing a ‘Lebanon for Israel’ equation, but didn't succeed. This was likely not the last word from Iran, but the more it engages Israel directly, the more it exposes its weakness in the long-run.
https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2064106753332031701
tbc
Danny Citrinowicz: A Brief Strategic Assessment
A. Without an agreement, maintaining the status quo between Iran and the United States will become increasingly difficult.
B. The main reason is the presence of multiple escalation triggers, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Lebanon. Recent events have demonstrated how quickly friction can spiral into confrontation.
C. As long as Hezbollah rejects the current ceasefire arrangements and Iran views any perceived challenge to its position in the Gulf as a violation of the existing balance, another round of escalation is not a matter of if, but when.
D. Regardless of what military action the United States takes against Iran, Tehran is likely to respond. Policymakers in Washington should assume that Iran will retaliate against any direct attack, whether through actions in the Gulf, against U.S. facilities and partners in countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, or the UAE.
E. If President Trump’s objective remains a negotiated agreement, the basic parameters are already well understood. The longer Washington delays a diplomatic resolution while simultaneously increasing pressure, the greater the risk that events on the ground will drive the United States toward a military confrontation it does not actually seek.
F. If the goal is a deal, continuously raising the level of escalation is unlikely to produce that outcome. Iran has consistently demonstrated that it responds to pressure with counter-pressure. Any strategy based primarily on coercion must take into account Tehran’s willingness and ability to retaliate, potentially creating a cycle of action and reaction that makes diplomacy even more difficult to achieve.
https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2064412081655365696
According to Trey Yingst, Trump said that Iran has today to sign the deal or the bombing will continue tonight.