Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update Special Report, April 9, 2026

Iran, the United States, and Israel have not exchanged fire since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 8. Gulf states continue to report drone attacks against them, however. Bahrain's Defense Ministry stated on April 9 that it has intercepted seven Iranian drones since April 8.[1] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces announced on April 9 that an unspecified number of drones entered Kuwaiti airspace and that one of these drones targeted a Kuwaiti National Guard site.[2]

Iran is taking several steps to try to exert control over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which have the net effect of keeping oil prices high. Iran likely aims to use high oil prices to exert economic pressure on the United States and extract concessions from the United States during negotiations. An unnamed senior Iranian source told Russian state media on April 9 that Iran will not allow more than 15 vessels per day to transit through the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire.[3] The Iranian Ports and Maritime Organization published a graphic on April 8 instructing ships to follow designated entry and exit routes in coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy to transit the strait.[4] These routes move international maritime traffic into Iranian-controlled waters. The graphic warns that ships risk hitting mines outside of these routes.[5] Unspecified US officials previously told Western media on March 23 that there are at least a dozen Iranian mines in the strait.[6] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei released a statement on April 9 in which he said that Iran will “take the management” of the Strait of Hormuz to a “new phase.”[7] This statement is consistent with other Iranian officials’ statements in recent weeks that Iran intends to use the strait as a point of leverage even after the war ends.[8] Commercial maritime tracking data showed that three cargo ships and one oil tanker entered the strait, while six cargo ships and four oil tankers exited the strait between 2:00 PM ET on April 8 and 2:00 PM ET on April 9.[9]

The US Government stated on April 8 that Iran submitted a “new” and “modified” proposal to the United States that will serve as the basis for the US-Iran talks.[10] US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that this proposal is a “workable basis on which to negotiate.”[11] Iranian media previously published a version of its 10-point proposal, which included long-standing and maximalist Iranian demands.[12] The proposal called for guarantees against future strikes on Iran, Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, recognition of Iran's right to uranium enrichment, and the lifting of all US primary and secondary sanctions.[13] It also demanded the termination of United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions against Iran, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, war reparations, and a ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon.[14] Unspecified mediators told the Wall Street Journal on April 8 that Iran has softened several of its demands, including its demands related to nuclear enrichment, the withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East, and war reparations.[15] The Wall Street Journal also highlighted disagreements over the scope of the ceasefire, noting that the United States does not consider Lebanon part of the agreement despite Iran including it in its proposal.[16] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on April 9 that Israeli strikes on Lebanon render negotiations “meaningless.”[17] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately insisted that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire framework.[18]

Israeli and Lebanese officials will reportedly begin direct negotiations under US auspices next week in Washington, DC.[53] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed Israeli officials on April 8 to conduct direct negotiations with the Lebanese government “as soon as possible.”[54] Netanyahu stated that the negotiations will focus on disarming Hezbollah and establishing “peaceful relations” between Israel and Lebanon.[55] Netanyahu's statement reportedly followed calls between Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.[56] Senior US officials told Axios that Witkoff asked Netanyahu to “calm down” Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon and open negotiations with the Lebanese government.[57] US Vice President JD Vance suggested on April 8 that Israel had expressed willingness to “check themselves a little bit in Lebanon.”[58] Israeli officials have stated that Israel will not observe a ceasefire in Lebanon and will continue to strike Hezbollah, however.[59]

The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to immediately enforce the Lebanese state's monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[60] Salam’s order is a more targeted order than his cabinet's March 2 decision to formally ban Hezbollah's military activities across Lebanon.[61] Salam’s order comes amid consistent pressure from Israel on the LAF to disarm Hezbollah, and ahead of the Lebanon-Israel talks next week.[62]

Other Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis, did not claim any attacks against US assets, Israel, or other countries in the region on April 9. Multiple Axis of Resistance group leaders warned that they would resume attacks if the IDF continues its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however. ISW-CTP has not observed any claimed or reported Iranian-backed Iraqi militia or Houthi attacks since April 8.[63]

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders called for Iraqi militias to resume attacks against US and Israeli targets in response to recent IDF strikes in Lebanon.[64] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al Walai called on April 8 for Axis of Resistance groups to attack Israel in response to its strikes in Lebanon, which the group framed as a ceasefire violation.[65] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi vowed on April 8 that the Axis of Resistance will “punish” Israel for its strikes in Lebanon.[66]

Houthi leaders also warned that the group may resume attacks against Israel if Israel continues its campaign in Lebanon. Houthi Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said in a speech on April 9 that the IDF’s campaign in Lebanon “may lead to the return of the entire battle.”[67] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti separately told Hezbollah media on April 9 that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is a “clear violation” that threatens to collapse the ceasefire and resume the conflict.[68] Bukhaiti warned that the Houthis could escalate their involvement in a resumed conflict, including by increasing their operations on “the Red Sea front.”[69] The threat is likely intended to coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its campaign against Hezbollah.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-9-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 10, 2026

The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11.[1] US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.[2] Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff are also part of the US negotiating team, which also reportedly includes officials from the Pentagon, National Security Council, and State Department.[3] CBS reported that the negotiating teams are expected to remain in Pakistan even if Vance departs.[4] A Pakistani source familiar with April 11 talks told Reuters that “everything is on track,” citing de‑escalation in Lebanon as a “good sign,” and confirmed that advance teams from both Iran and the United States are already in place in Islamabad.[5]

It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public. Iranian officials are using this ambiguity to frame the United States and its partners as aggressors who are attempting to collapse the ceasefire, which is far from clear. Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who are leading the Iranian negotiating delegation, insist that Lebanon must be included in the ceasefire and that Iran will be able to restrict shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as part of the ceasefire.[6] Ghalibaf wrote on X on April 10 that two ”mutually agreed“ measures — a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran's blocked assets — must be implemented before negotiations begin.[7] There is zero public evidence that any of these measures were ever included in the ceasefire by either party. It is additionally unclear whether the ceasefire extends to Iraq, for example, where Iranian-backed groups ambushed US diplomats on April 8. President Masoud Pezeshkian told Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan during a phone call on April 9 that the ceasefire depends on US commitments, while Araghchi separately stressed Lebanon's centrality to the ceasefire in a call with Iran's ambassador in Beirut.[8]

Iranian media reported on April 10 that Iranian parliamentarians are preparing to vote on a strategic Strait of Hormuz plan that would prohibit ”hostile” shipping (which would include US, Israel, and other vessels), require transit fees in rials, and mandate use of the term “Persian Gulf.”[9] This plan would force crews or countries to negotiate for safe passage through the international waterway, which would have economic impacts because it implies that Iran's conditions in these negotiations could change at any time and for any reason. An Iranian analyst close to the regime argued that the US-Iran War has reshaped Iran's security doctrine and deterrence posture, referring to Iran's control of the Strait.[10] An agreement that allows Iran to restrict shipping in the Strait, tax it, or otherwise threaten international shipping and keep energy prices high for the consumer.[11] Some shipping firms are calling on tankers not to pay Iran‘s toll, as it is a violation of freedom of navigation.[12] Even without a formal toll system, Iran is aware that it can coerce other powers in the future by threatening shipping through the strait.[13]

US President Trump warned on Truth Social on April 10 that Iran is engaging in “short‑term extortion” in the Strait of Hormuz and said that its leadership is negotiating only because it has “no cards.”[14] Fox News reporter Trey Yingst reported on April 10 that US intelligence agencies assessed that the IRGC is exploiting the two‑week ceasefire to solidify control over maritime traffic.[15] Vance stated that he and the negotiating team would not allow Iran to ”play them” before boarding his flight on April 10.[16]

Neither the US nor Iran has signaled any public shift on their stances on key issues in previous negotiations, which include nuclear enrichment limits, the highly enriched uranium stockpile, the missile program, sanctions, and access to frozen assets. Now these sticking points include the Strait of Hormuz as well. Trump continues to hold a firm red line against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, while Iranian officials such as Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi have reportedly refused to discuss the missile program, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[17] Mediators cited by the Wall Street Journal on April 8 said Iran has privately softened on several demands, including its previous positions on enrichment, US troop withdrawals from the region, and war reparations — though it remains unclear whether this reflects an official regime stance, however.[18] These mixed messages underscore the fragility of both the ceasefire framework and the diplomatic process now unfolding through indirect channels in Pakistan.

The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team. The United States is dealing with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions. These actors hold divergent views on the scope and purpose of the negotiations, and several are operating outside the formal responsibilities of their offices. The result is a fragmented team marked by internal rivalries, mixed signaling, and unclear lines of authority, especially between Iran's diplomatic institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi represents the diplomatic wing of the Iranian regime and has been supportive of using engagement as a tool to reduce pressure and stabilize the regional environment.[19] His position has been weakened by overt hostility from hardline elements. Social media users shared footage on April 9 of local IRGC affiliates and Basij supporters protesting outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry against Araghchi for negotiating with the United States.[20]

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the lead figure for the Iranian delegation for negotiations in Islamabad, a role more traditionally suited to the president or foreign minister.[21] President Masoud Pezeshkian has reportedly been sidelined in the regime's decision-making process.[22] Ghalibaf is a powerful political operator with strong ties to conservative networks, but he appears not to exercise command authority over the IRGC.[23] His leadership of the delegation creates a mismatch between responsibility and control, which may leave him exposed to criticism from hardliners and the IRGC while lacking the leverage to enforce consensus.[24]

IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi appears to wield outsized influence over Iran's diplomatic posture despite being a senior military officer and not a formal negotiator. Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member, serving as IRGC Quds Force Commander from 1988 to 1997 and now as the senior-most IRGC commander.[25] Iranian media reported that Vahidi was one of the five influential figures involved in the establishment of Hezbollah, which may make him more supportive of demanding a Lebanon ceasefire and reticent to cast aside Hezbollah in negotiations.[26] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are driving military decisionmaking, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[27] Vahidi is reportedly at odds with both Ghalibaf and Araghchi because Vahidi has pushed for SNSC Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr to be on the negotiating team, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[28] The SNSC Secretary does not normally take up these sorts of diplomatic responsibilities.[29] Ghalibaf and Araghchi’s negotiating team have pushed back on Vahidi’s request because Zolghadr lacks the necessary experience to be involved in these negotiations.[30] Vahidi notably pushed for Pezeshkian to select Zolghadr, whom he has worked with for decades, as SNSC secretary.[31] Vahidi’s influence highlights the continued dominance of security institutions over foreign policy when core defense capabilities are perceived to be at stake. His position effectively sets red lines that constrain negotiators who are ostensibly leading the delegation.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr oversees coordination among Iran's military, intelligence, and security bodies and plays a central role in shaping national security policy, including war planning and crisis management. Zolghadr is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran's security and judicial apparatuses, he commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran–Iraq War, rose through senior IRGC leadership roles in the 1990s and early 2000s, helped engineer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2005 election after opposing reformist President Mohammad Khatami, later oversaw internal security and Basij repression—including during the 2009 Green Movement—and was sanctioned by the UN in 2007 for involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.[32] Zolghadr appears not to be in the negotiating delegation, however.[33] It also remains unclear what role the SNSC plays at the moment, whether it is directing strategy, arbitrating disputes, or simply lending institutional cover to factional maneuvering.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is notably absent from the process. The Supreme Leader is often viewed as an informal but critical mediator among Iran's rival factions during periods of elite disagreement.[34] Mojtaba’s lack of visible involvement has deprived the negotiations of a potential internal arbiter capable of harmonizing positions between the IRGC, the government, and the parliamentary leadership. This absence of clear mediation and coordination leaves the Iranian negotiating posture internally divided and externally unpredictable, which may complicate US efforts to assess credibility and reach enforceable agreements.

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.[35] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry added that Iranian drone attacks targeted Kuwaiti National Guard facilities, injuring several personnel.[36] The ministry reported that explosive ordnance disposal teams handled 14 separate incidents during the same period.[37] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Public Relations office denied reports that Iran conducted drone or missile attacks in Gulf states.[38]

Iranian threats and restrictions regarding the Strait of Hormuz continue to limit the flow of maritime traffic through the strait. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that three cargo vessels, including one ship sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), have entered the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 9.[39] The ship sanctioned by OFAC is the Iranian-flagged Ganj, which is subject to secondary sanctions.[40] Commercially available maritime tracking data also shows that five vessels, including four cargo ships and one tanker, exited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[41] Three of the five vessels were Iranian-flagged, and two of the Iranian vessels, the Basht and the Negar, are sanctioned by OFAC.[42] The Basht and the Negar are both subject to secondary sanctions.[43]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. An unspecified US State Department official told a White House correspondent that Iraqi militias launched multiple drones at US embassy staff near the airport, causing no casualties.[44] The official did not specify the type of drone, but ordinary Iranian-made drones would lack the accuracy to ”ambush” moving personnel, especially individual personnel on foot or in a vehicle. This suggests that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia responsible for this attack utilized a FPV drone. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to use FPV drones.[45] FPV drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting, thus making this the most likely type of drone used in the attack.[46] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts have assessed that drone footage posted by multiple Iraqi militias during the war has appeared to be from fiber-optic FPV drones, making it likely that the militias already possess this technology.[47] US Deputy Secretary of State Christoper Landau summoned Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Nizar Khirullah on April 9 to condemn Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against US diplomatic personnel and facilities, including the attack on the Embassy personnel near the airport on April 8.[48]

The State Department noted on April 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted hundreds of attacks during the war against US citizens, diplomatic facilities, and commercial interests, as well as Iraqi institutions, civilians, and neighboring countries.[49] Landau emphasized the Iraqi government's failure to prevent these attacks.[50] Iraqi authorities conducted a few arrests during the war, but militia attacks continued. Iraqi authorities arrested four individuals on March 25 responsible for launching a drone attack at a former US military base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[51] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s office said on March 8 that Sudani told French President Emmanuel Macron that the Iraqi authorities had arrested the perpetrators of a drone attack on a French base in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 12 that killed one French soldier.[52]

Current economic challenges in Iran are causing Iranian officials to fear that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern. Iranian Parliament Budget Committee member Mehrdad Lahouti stated on April 10 that Iranian banks are in poor condition and warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy.[62] Lahouti added that production has ”practically” stalled and that exporters have halted activity.[63] Lahouti stated that producers cannot pay wages and that many hotels in Tehran have closed, noting that these businesses must pay workers.[64] Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran's “Achilles heel” and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern.[65] Unspecified insiders added that any comprehensive peace agreement would need to lift sanctions and release frozen funds because Iranian authorities would otherwise face severe difficulty meeting payroll obligations and repairing damaged infrastructure.[66] The internet blackout has also exacerbated economic strain. A recent NetBlocks report on April 10 indicates that Iran's nationwide internet blackout, exceeding 42 days, has severely disrupted financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations, compounding broader economic deterioration.[67] Netblocks previously estimated that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[68]

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 9 that Iran likely aims to restrict access to the tunnel complex and delay or complicate any ground operation to reach or seize the highly enriched uranium stored at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province. The Institute reported that Iran has constructed new makeshift roadblocks at all three tunnel entrances at the ENTC.[73] All three tunnel portals remain backfilled with dirt, and Iran has not made any effort to clear them or regain access.[74] The Institute added that Iran added additional barriers, including earthen berms, rubble piles, and possible fencing and a chicane at the northern entrance to restrict movement toward the tunnel complex.[75] French outlet Le Monde previously reported on March 28 that satellite imagery from June 9, 2025, showed a large convoy transporting sealed blue barrels, possibly containing nuclear-related material or highly enriched uranium, into the ENTC ahead of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[76]

The IDF reported on April 10 that the Israeli Air Force conducted more than 8,500 operational sorties and over 1,000 air missions in Iran since the beginning of the war.[81] The IDF added that it employed more than 18,000 munitions and executed over 10,800 strikes across more than 4,000 targets and 6,700 target components.[82]

more + maps and graphs: https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 11, 2026

Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.[1] The Iranian delegation is explicitly framing the talks as leverage for a broader reset in the US-Iran relationship.[2] Iranian demands include sovereignty claims over the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for war damages, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a region-wide ceasefire across the “Axis of Resistance,” which creates an imbalance in expectations that sets the talks up for deadlock.[3] Two people briefed on negotiations told the Financial Times that the April 11 negotiations have reached a ”stalemate” over the main sticking point — the status of the Strait of Hormuz.[4]

The composition of Iran's at least 70-person delegation, headed by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, underscores Iran's wide-ranging negotiating intentions.[5] The large and heavily securitized team blends diplomats, parliamentarians, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-adjacent figures, and high-level economic technocrats, indicating that Iran is pressing a long list of demands across a range of issue areas.[6] The inclusion of the Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and economic specialists points to a focus on sanctions architecture, frozen assets, and alternative financial mechanisms, suggesting preparation for prolonged economic and strategic bargaining rather than confidence-building compromise.[7]

The unusually large size of the Iranian delegation likely also reflects internal divisions and deep mutual distrust among regime power centers, rather than a unified negotiating strategy. There was reportedly infighting between the regime factions before the negotiations.[8] Ghalibaf and Araghchi reportedly clashed with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi over Vahidi’s effort to insert longtime IRGC affiliate and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr into the talks, despite Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations.[9] An IRGC-affiliated media outlet reported on their English language X account that Zolghadr was in the delegation in Islamabad, along with Defense Council Secretary IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, but Iranian Persian-language media did not disclose if Zolghadr was present.[10] The presence of overlapping political, security, and economic actors suggests a need for constant internal monitoring.[11]

Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy, which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States. Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a “hazardous area” that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait. Ships seeking to avoid the Iranian-declared hazardous area must transit Iranian territorial waters.[12] Iran then shakes down these merchant ships by extracting “protection fees.”[13] These “protection” fees protect ships from Iranian attacks. This protection racket is illegal under maritime law. No state bordering a strait is permitted to restrict traffic or extract fees under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[14] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times on April 11 that Iran laid its mines—of which there are reportedly fewer than a dozen, according to a previous March 23 report—” haphazardly,” which has prevented Iran from locating or removing them. These mines may or may not be in the 1,394 sq km “hazardous area.”

The threat of mines also enables Iran to keep the price of oil and shipping insurance as high as possible for as long as possible without conducting attacks that would cause the ceasefire to collapse. Iran may calculate that the high price of oil and shipping insurance would cause the United States to cave on some of Iran's demands.

The United States is attempting to undermine Iran's ability to use the threat of mines in the “hazardous area” by using US Navy destroyers to prove that the normal traffic separation scheme is safe and viable for traffic. Iran can only use the threat of mines to keep these costs high if the fear of mines persists. US President Donald Trump said on April 11 that the United States is “starting the process of clearing out” the strait.[15] Arleigh Burke-Class destroyers USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy transited the Strait to clear the Strait of naval mines.[16] US CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper said that the US Navy will share the route of safe passage with civilian shipping as soon as possible.[17] Such a move would undermine Iran's threats and badly damage its leverage in negotiations. The Qatari Transport Ministry announced later on April 11 that it will resume operations ”for all types of maritime vessels and ships” between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM local time on April 12.[18]

The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran's missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.[19] Such effects are temporary, however, and the ceasefire provides Iran with an opportunity to reorganize itself for more coordinated missile attacks. This is especially notable because Iran still retains roughly 1,000 of the 2,500 medium-range ballistic missiles it had before the war and well under 50% of its one-way attack drones.[20]

The US-Israeli air campaign has nonetheless severely degraded elements of Iran's ballistic missile program, which is a system of systems that relies on many complicated and bespoke components to function. These components cannot be easily replaced. The air campaign targeted the critical capabilities of Iran's ballistic missile program to prevent the missile forces from executing their campaign design.[21] The US-Israeli campaign, for example, targeted Iranian missile fuel production, missile guidance systems, steel production that could be used for ballistic missiles, ball bearing factories (which are key for inertial guidance systems on Iranian missiles), and other key components.[22] Such assets are not easily replaced, and when and if Iran expends its remaining missiles, it will struggle to replace them rapidly. This will play into Iranian strike package decisions if the war resumes.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader's compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba’s face and injured one or both of his legs.[23] The sources added that Mojtaba remains “mentally sharp” and continues to participate in major decisions, including war and negotiations with the United States, through audio conferences with senior Iranian officials.[24] It is notable that the sources noted that the strikes disfigured his face–which implies at least some degree of head injuries–and felt it necessary to note he remains ”mentally sharp” in that context. Mojtaba has not appeared in public or in any new images or videos since his March 8 appointment as supreme leader.[25] The regime has circulated only older footage of him and has issued written statements.[26] Iranian state television described Mojtaba as a “janbaz,” which is a term for those wounded in war.[27] The reporting from individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle is consistent with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks on March 13 that Mojtaba is “wounded and likely disfigured.”[28]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.[29] Two of the sources told CNN that the PRC is attempting to route the shipments through third-party countries to obfuscate their route and origin.[30] The upcoming transfer may be the result of two-year-long negotiations between Iran and the PRC over Iran's acquisition of MANPADS and other weaponry, including anti-ship cruise missiles.[31] These negotiations ”accelerated sharply” after the 12-Day War, and Iran and the PRC were still discussing the issue as of February 24, according to Reuters.[32] The PRC Embassy in Washington denied that the PRC has provided weapons to any party in the conflict.[33] Tehran has similarly sought to acquire MANPADS from Russia in the lead-up to the recent conflict.[34]

Iran may be eager to use the current cessation of hostilities in preparation for possible renewed US or Israeli strikes should negotiations fail. The combined force has degraded Iranian air defenses and established air superiority over Iran, but new systems could present a threat to the combined force aircraft, particularly those flying at low altitudes. US aircraft have flown at low altitudes over several areas of southern Iran during the conflict, which suggests that the combined force severely suppressed or destroyed local Iranian anti-air capabilities, including MANPADS, in those areas.[35] Iran could use these systems to attempt to bolster defenses around Iranian naval assets along the Persian Gulf coast amid combined force efforts to limit the Iranian threat to international shipping. Iran reportedly deployed MANPADS to reinforce its defenses on Kharg Island in late March, for example.[36] MANPADS alone cannot replace the damage inflicted upon Iranian integrated air defense systems by US and Israeli strikes during this conflict and previous rounds of strikes in 2024, however.[37]

The PRC's reported preparations to send Iran MANPADS underscore the nature of the PRC's military partnership with Iran. The PRC has historically limited its support with Iran due to its close economic ties to the Gulf and has shown a willingness to bolster Iran's capabilities without risking direct entanglement in Iran's conflicts in the region.[38] The PRC is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears to be willing to sell military equipment to Iran; however, as also seen through the recent near-agreement to transfer PRC anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.[39] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran to reconstitute its missile program and has likely continued this support by sending missile fuel precursor even during the conflict.[40] Iranian officials may also seek the PRC to fulfill previous agreements that it has made with Iran, particularly regarding dual-use technologies to help Iran rebuild after the war. US officials recently accused the PRC's largest chipmaker, SMIC, of sending chipmaking technology to the Iranian military for nearly a year, for example.[41]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-11-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 12, 2026

The US Navy is attempting to prevent Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels from entering and exiting the Strait, while Iran prevents all other vessels from entering and exiting the Strait.[1] The only vessels moving through the Strait at this time are Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels. These Iranian-approved vessels are acceding to Iran's protection racket and using Iran's unilaterally imposed traffic separation scheme that forces vessels into Iranian territorial waters. Very few ships are transiting the Strait other than the ships moving through Iran's territorial waters. Only one ship transited the Strait on April 12 and did not use the Iranian-approved shipping lanes by skirting the southern edge of the Iran-declared hazardous area. US President Donald Trump said on April 12 that the US Navy will “interdict every vessel” that has paid Iran for passage and indicated that enforcement of the blockade will begin soon.[2] Iran has used threats of attacks and a limited number of mines to declare a “hazardous area” across the entire Strait of Hormuz except for Iranian territorial waters, where Iran then imposes fees.[3] The US Navy has deployed ships to clear the remaining naval mines and restore freedom of navigation.[4] Some Gulf countries are also supporting mine-clearing efforts, according to Trump.[5] Two US Navy destroyers transited the Strait on April 11 to set conditions for clearing mines in the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy threatened the destroyers but did not attack them.[6] The IRGC Navy has threatened that any military vessels in the Strait will be subject to a “decisive response.”[7]

The United States and Iran did not reach an agreement during talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11 and 12.[8] Two Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on April 12 stated that US-Iran talks failed to reach an agreement over Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), Iran's “control” over the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran's demand that $27 billion in frozen revenues held abroad be released.[9] The two officials stated that the United States demanded that Iran immediately open the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic, but Iran countered that it would only allow unfettered traffic in the Strait after a final peace deal.[10] The lack of a public, mutually agreed-upon document establishing the ceasefire requirements makes adherence to the ceasefire difficult to establish, but US officials said after the two-week ceasefire agreement that the ceasefire required Iran to reopen the Strait. The officials added that the US delegation demanded that Iran “hand over or sell” its entire HEU stockpile, to which Iran made an unspecified counterproposal that the United States did not accept.[11] The officials stated that the US side refused Iran's requests for war reparations from frozen oil revenue in various countries.[12] US President Donald Trump emphasized on April 12 that Iran's delegation did not make compromises on its nuclear program, but that he believed Iran would return to negotiations.[13] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who was the head of the Iranian delegation and has accumulated substantial power within the Iranian system in the last year, blamed the US side for the failure of the negotiations and stated that the United States must “earn” Iran's trust, however.[14]

There were two principal issues that made reaching an agreement exceptionally difficult. First, as ISW-CTP noted on April 11, Iran sought an all-encompassing agreement that would have transformed US-Iran relations in fundamental ways, while the United States appeared focused on specific issues related to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear program.[15] This is best reflected by Iran's focus on the release of sanctioned funds, its hope that the United States would recognize Iran's “sovereignty” over the Strait of Hormuz, and a region-wide ceasefire.[16] Iran also remains unwilling to entertain limitations to its enrichment of nuclear material, which would presumably be needed to release sanctioned funds.[17] Any release of sanctioned funds without serious limitations to Iranian enrichment capabilities would be a massive change in stated Trump Administration policy.

Second, the multiple competing Iranian factions with divergent priorities and objectives in negotiations were part of the Iranian delegation, as ISW-CTP also noted on April 10 and April 11.[18] One faction, consisting of top IRGC officials and led by IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, was reportedly fighting with a second faction led by Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi—both far more pragmatic than their IRGC counterparts—about the aims of negotiations before the trip to Islamabad.[19]

Iran has not fired any munitions targeting the Gulf states since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on April 11. Iran has fired a decreasing number of missiles and drones targeting Gulf states since the ceasefire went into effect on April 8.[20] Iran fired a single drone targeting Bahrain on April 11.[21] The Gulf states did not detect or intercept any Iranian missiles or drones on April 12.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-12-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 13, 2026

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted seven “Iranian” drones on April 13.[1] Bahrain did not specify from where the drones were launched.[2] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias use some of the same types of drones as Iranian forces do because the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supplies drones to its Iraqi militia partners.[3] It is therefore possible that the Bahrain Defense Force's use of the term “Iranian” drones refers to Iranian drones used by Iraqi militias. Bahrain's Foreign Ministry also summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires on April 13 in response to “continued” Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council states.[4] Saudi Arabia similarly summoned the Iraqi ambassador to Saudi Arabia on April 12 for the same reason.[5] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups have claimed multiple drone attacks targeting US bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait since the start of the war.[6]

It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias answer to the IRGC, which provides guidance and support for their attacks.[7] The IRGC has previously demonstrated its ability to force Iraqi militias to halt their attacks, such as when IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to halt their attacks against US forces in January 2024.[8] The fact that Iraqi militias continue to attack the Gulf states, therefore, suggests that Iran has not directed the militias to halt these attacks.

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to attack regional states despite the Shia Coordination Framework's efforts to push the militias to agree to a “truce.”[9] An informed source told Iraqi media on April 5 that the framework authorized Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri to negotiate a “temporary truce” with the militias.[10] The source stated that Ameri’s negotiations focused on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are more loyal to Iran and are less responsive to domestic pressure than other Iraqi militias.[11] Framework member Amer al Fayez told Iraqi media on April 12 that Ameri’s committee successfully negotiated a “conditional truce” with the militias.[12] Fayez stated that the truce stipulated that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would halt attacks on US interests and diplomatic facilities in exchange for a commitment from the United States and Israel to stop striking Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and militia bases in Iraq.[13] It is unclear whether the truce required the militias to halt attacks against US interests across the region, or only in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control multiple brigades within the PMF.[14] It is unclear which militias agreed to this truce.

Iran rejected a US proposal to pause uranium enrichment for 20 years in exchange for the unfreezing of some Iranian assets and ending the current war during talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11 and 12. A US official and a source with knowledge told Axios on April 13 that the United States demanded a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, the removal of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, and unfettered freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz during the negotiations in Pakistan.[15] The US delegation offered to release a “certain portion” of frozen Iranian assets and end the current conflict in exchange for Iran meeting these demands.[16] Iran countered the 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a “single-digit” number of years and offered to downblend its HEU instead of handing over its HEU stockpile.[17] Iran's reported counterproposal to dilute its HEU is consistent with the position of some regime officials before the current conflict began, when Iran was in a relatively stronger position than it is now.[18] Iran presumably seeks to dilute rather than hand over its HEU stockpile so that it could re-enrich this stockpile at some point in the future.

An Israeli journalist reported on April 13 that the Iranian delegation in Islamabad, led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, discussed Iran's nuclear program “contrary to instructions from Tehran.”[19] The only Iranian officials who could presumably give such instructions are IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi or Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. This report is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that there appear to be internal divisions among regime power centers and that the regime appears to lack a unified negotiating strategy.[20]

It is unclear whether the above three US demands and Iranian counterproposal represent the full scope of each side's demands. Regime-affiliated media reported on April 11 that Iranian demands included sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for war damages, and a region-wide ceasefire across the “Axis of Resistance.”[21] It is unclear whether the Iranian delegation raised these demands during the April 11-12 negotiations, however. It is also unclear whether recent reports capture the entirety of US demands during the talks in Islamabad. US demands have previously included limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and funding for its regional proxies and partners.[22] It is possible that the negotiations in Islamabad concluded before these issues were raised because it was clear that the gap between the delegations’ positions on core demands was too wide to resolve. US President Donald Trump stated on April 13 that Iran contacted US officials about conducting a second round of negotiations.[23] A US official and a regional source told Axios on April 13 that regional mediators, including Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt, will speak to US and Iranian officials in the coming days to “bridge the remaining gaps” between the two sides and seek to facilitate a second round of discussions before the two-week ceasefire ends on April 21.[24]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is simultaneously imposing a blockade on Iranian ports and vessels while taking steps to open the official transit route through the Strait of Hormuz for vessels transiting to or from non-Iranian ports. CENTCOM implemented its blockade on Iranian ports and vessels at 10:00 AM ET on April 13.[25] CENTCOM announced on April 13 that it will enforce a blockade on vessels from all nations that enter or depart Iranian ports and coastal areas, including ports in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.[26] CENTCOM noted that it will not impede freedom of navigation for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to or from non-Iranian ports.[27] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 13 that US forces are enforcing “maritime access restrictions” on Iranian ports and coastal areas in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Arabian Sea.[28] UKMTO reported that CENTCOM granted “neutral vessels” currently docked at Iranian ports a limited grace period to depart.[29] UKMTO did not specify the length of the “limited grace period,” however. UKMTO added that CENTCOM’s blockade will not impede traffic to or from non-Iranian ports, but that vessels may encounter US “military presence, directed communications, or right-of-visit procedures” while transiting the strait.[30] A senior US official told the Wall Street Journal on April 13 that over 15 US naval vessels are supporting the blockade.[31] The official did not specify which vessels are implementing the blockade, but CENTCOM currently has an aircraft carrier, multiple guided-missile destroyers, an amphibious assault ship, and several other warships deployed near the strait.[32] Two US missile destroyers also deployed to the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz on April 11.[33] CENTCOM did not specify what procedures it intends to use to enforce the blockade, but US forces have previously interdicted Venezuelan and Russian oil tankers using small boarding teams transported by helicopters deployed from naval vessels.[34] US President Donald Trump said on April 13 that he expects unspecified countries to assist CENTCOM with the blockade of Iranian ports and vessels.[35] Trump previously said on April 12 that some Gulf countries are supporting US naval mine-clearing efforts, but it is unclear whether they would help enforce the blockade.[36] The United Kingdom and France said that they will not take part in the blockade.[37]

At least two oil tankers destined for China via the Iranian-approved transit route turned around after CENTCOM began blockading Iranian and Iranian-approved shipping.[42] CBS reported that two falsely flagged oil tankers, the Rich Starry and the Ostria, changed course less than an hour before CENTCOM began enforcing the blockade.[43] A successful US blockade of Iranian and Iranian-approved shipping would cut off Iran's main source of revenue by disrupting its nearly 2 million barrel-per-day oil export trade.[44] A sanctions-focused US analyst estimated on April 13 that a successful blockade on Iranian ports and shipping would cost the regime around $435 million USD per day, leaving Iran with few alternatives to export and import goods.[45] The analyst added that Iran's onshore oil storage capacity is 13 days, after which Iran would have to shut down its oil fields, potentially causing long-term damage to the oil fields.[46]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across Lebanon. The IDF struck approximately 150 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon in the past 24 hours.[66] The IDF stated that it struck rocket and drone launchers, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launch sites, Hezbollah command centers, unspecified military buildings, and Hezbollah fighters.[67] The IDF confirmed that it killed over 250 Hezbollah fighters and commanders in its April 8 strikes on Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon.[68] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that the IDF’s April 8 strikes killed 357 individuals.[69] The IDF confirmed that it killed the following Hezbollah commanders:

Hassan Mustafa Nasser.[70] Nasser was Hezbollah's Logistics Support Staff Commander. The IDF stated that Nasser was a veteran commander responsible for acquiring and storing Hezbollah's military equipment. The IDF added that Nasser was a central figure in Hezbollah's reconstitution efforts.
Ali Qassem (“Abu Ali Abbas”).[71] Qassem was a senior commander in Hezbollah's Intelligence Unit. The IDF stated that Qassem was one of the commanders responsible for collecting intelligence on Israel and identifying Israeli targets.

Ali Hijazi.[72] Hijazi was a senior commander in Hezbollah's Intelligence Unit. The IDF stated that Hijazi was also responsible for collecting intelligence on Israel and identifying Israeli targets.

“Abu Muhammad Habib.”[73] Habib was the deputy commander of Hezbollah's Missile Unit. This unit launched missiles targeting Israel during the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict and in the current war. The IDF added that Habib recently led operations to bolster the unit's capabilities.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-13-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 14, 2026

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that no vessels have breached the US blockade on Iranian ports since CENTCOM implemented the blockade on April 13.[1] CENTCOM implemented a blockade on April 13 against all vessels transiting to or from Iranian ports. The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port. US forces have previously demonstrated their ability to interdict vessels in international waters.[2] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that US forces will likely attempt to intercept or “quarantine” any vessels that violate the blockade in the Arabian Sea to limit the threat of attacks from the Iranian coast.[3] Vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are therefore not automatically breaching the US blockade. Commercially available maritime data indicates that at least eight vessels departed the Strait of Hormuz, including six Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels, on April 14. One of the vessels, the US-sanctioned Rich Starry oil tanker, departed from Amjan Port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on April 13.[4] Other Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels, including the Elpis and Christianna, also left the strait after departing Iranian ports.[5] Commercially available maritime data also indicates that at least nine vessels entered the Strait of Hormuz, including three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships. One of the entering vessels was the Ocean Energy cargo ship, which docked at Iran's Bandar Abbas Port on April 13.[6] It is unclear whether this vessel was exempted from the blockade. Reuters reported that a US military notice sent to mariners exempts humanitarian shipments to Iran from the US blockade.[7] CENTCOM also announced that six merchant vessels complied with the US direction to return to an Iranian port in the Gulf of Oman.[8] CENTCOM has not interdicted any vessels at the time of this writing.

It is also unclear whether any of the vessels that left Iranian ports on April 14 were authorized to do so under CENTCOM’s “limited grade period.” United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on April 13 that CENTCOM granted “neutral vessels” currently docked at Iranian ports an unspecified grace period to depart. The complexity and variety of factors involved in the blockade, including determining vessels’ origin and destination and whether vessels are considered “neutral”, make it premature to try to assess whether some vessels have gotten through the US blockade.

The United States’ decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, which is set to expire on April 19, will further constrain Iran's ability to export oil in addition to the US blockade on Iranian ports.[9] Two US officials told Reuters on April 14 that the US Treasury Department will enforce sanctions on Iranian oil after April 19.[10] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also told reporters on April 14 that the US blockade on Iranian ports will ensure that no vessels from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are “able to get their [Iranian] oil.”[11] The PRC purchases more than 90 percent of Iran's oil exports.[12] A sanctions-focused US analyst estimated on April 13 that a successful blockade on Iranian ports would cost the regime around $435 million USD per day, leaving Iran with few alternatives to export and import goods.[13]

Iran is reportedly considering temporarily pausing shipments to avoid testing the US blockade on Iranian ports and raising tensions ahead of possible talks, according to a person familiar with Iranian decision-making on the Strait of Hormuz speaking to Bloomberg on April 14.[14] Iran would only be able to pause shipments for a limited period of time before it would start to run out of room to store oil. A sanctions-focused analyst reported on April 13 that Iran's onshore oil storage capacity is 13 days, after which Iran would have to shut down its oil fields, potentially causing long-term damage to the oil fields.[15] Iran's limited storage capacity highlights the difficult position the US blockade has put Iran in. Iran appears to have three other courses of action that it could take to respond to the US blockade on Iranian ports. It is unclear which course of action Iran will pursue at this time. The courses of action include:

Iran could agree to a deal acceptable to the United States, which would likely require Iran to make concessions on its nuclear program and other issues.

Iran could attempt to run the blockade, a move that would almost certainly result in a US response and possibly the seizure of Iranian vessels central to Iran's oil trade.
Iran could restart or widen the conflict, although it is unclear whether a resumption of the conflict would necessarily end the US blockade on Iranian ports.

Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber warned that Iran will “open new fronts” and “increase economic pressures” on US allies and regional countries in response to the US blockade on Iranian ports, likely to try to coerce the United States to end its blockade. Mokhber may have been referring to the Houthis, which have not conducted attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea during the war thus far. Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that Iran is pressuring the Houthis to “close” the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[16] Saudi Arabia has urged the United States to end its blockade on Iranian ports and return to negotiations due to concerns that the blockade could cause the Houthis to resume attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait, according to the Arab officials.[17] Saudi energy officials told the Wall Street Journal that the Houthis have sent guarantees that their fighters will not attack Saudi Arabia or its ships passing through the Bab el Mandeb, however.[18] Previous Houthi attacks on shipping between 2023 and 2025 sharply increased shipping costs and contributed to global inflation.[19]

US President Donald Trump stated on April 14 that the United States and Iran may hold another round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, “over [the] next two days.”[20] A senior Iranian source told Western media on April 14 that the United States and Iran are keeping April 17 through 19 open for possible talks, but that no date has been confirmed.[21] Trump did not specify who would lead the US delegation in a potential second round of negotiations. US Vice President JD Vance, who led the US delegation in the first round of negotiations on April 11 and 12, told Fox News on April 14 that Iran moved closer to the US position but “didn't move far enough.”[22] Two senior Iranian officials and one US official told the New York Times that Iran responded to the US demand for a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a pause “for up to five years.”[23] Iran's willingness to pause enrichment for five years would represent an Iranian concession and notable inflection in Iran's position. Vance also said that the Iranian delegation was “unable to cut a deal” and instead had to return to Tehran to get approval from “the Supreme Leader or someone else.”[24] Vance's statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions.[25]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-14-2026/

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