Iran, the United States, and Israel have not exchanged fire since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 8. Gulf states continue to report drone attacks against them, however. Bahrain's Defense Ministry stated on April 9 that it has intercepted seven Iranian drones since April 8.[1] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces announced on April 9 that an unspecified number of drones entered Kuwaiti airspace and that one of these drones targeted a Kuwaiti National Guard site.[2]
Iran is taking several steps to try to exert control over maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which have the net effect of keeping oil prices high. Iran likely aims to use high oil prices to exert economic pressure on the United States and extract concessions from the United States during negotiations. An unnamed senior Iranian source told Russian state media on April 9 that Iran will not allow more than 15 vessels per day to transit through the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire.[3] The Iranian Ports and Maritime Organization published a graphic on April 8 instructing ships to follow designated entry and exit routes in coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy to transit the strait.[4] These routes move international maritime traffic into Iranian-controlled waters. The graphic warns that ships risk hitting mines outside of these routes.[5] Unspecified US officials previously told Western media on March 23 that there are at least a dozen Iranian mines in the strait.[6] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei released a statement on April 9 in which he said that Iran will “take the management” of the Strait of Hormuz to a “new phase.”[7] This statement is consistent with other Iranian officials’ statements in recent weeks that Iran intends to use the strait as a point of leverage even after the war ends.[8] Commercial maritime tracking data showed that three cargo ships and one oil tanker entered the strait, while six cargo ships and four oil tankers exited the strait between 2:00 PM ET on April 8 and 2:00 PM ET on April 9.[9]
The US Government stated on April 8 that Iran submitted a “new” and “modified” proposal to the United States that will serve as the basis for the US-Iran talks.[10] US President Donald Trump stated on April 7 that this proposal is a “workable basis on which to negotiate.”[11] Iranian media previously published a version of its 10-point proposal, which included long-standing and maximalist Iranian demands.[12] The proposal called for guarantees against future strikes on Iran, Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, recognition of Iran's right to uranium enrichment, and the lifting of all US primary and secondary sanctions.[13] It also demanded the termination of United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions against Iran, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, war reparations, and a ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon.[14] Unspecified mediators told the Wall Street Journal on April 8 that Iran has softened several of its demands, including its demands related to nuclear enrichment, the withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East, and war reparations.[15] The Wall Street Journal also highlighted disagreements over the scope of the ceasefire, noting that the United States does not consider Lebanon part of the agreement despite Iran including it in its proposal.[16] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on April 9 that Israeli strikes on Lebanon render negotiations “meaningless.”[17] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately insisted that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire framework.[18]
Israeli and Lebanese officials will reportedly begin direct negotiations under US auspices next week in Washington, DC.[53] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed Israeli officials on April 8 to conduct direct negotiations with the Lebanese government “as soon as possible.”[54] Netanyahu stated that the negotiations will focus on disarming Hezbollah and establishing “peaceful relations” between Israel and Lebanon.[55] Netanyahu's statement reportedly followed calls between Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump, and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.[56] Senior US officials told Axios that Witkoff asked Netanyahu to “calm down” Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon and open negotiations with the Lebanese government.[57] US Vice President JD Vance suggested on April 8 that Israel had expressed willingness to “check themselves a little bit in Lebanon.”[58] Israeli officials have stated that Israel will not observe a ceasefire in Lebanon and will continue to strike Hezbollah, however.[59]
The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to immediately enforce the Lebanese state's monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[60] Salam’s order is a more targeted order than his cabinet's March 2 decision to formally ban Hezbollah's military activities across Lebanon.[61] Salam’s order comes amid consistent pressure from Israel on the LAF to disarm Hezbollah, and ahead of the Lebanon-Israel talks next week.[62]
Other Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis, did not claim any attacks against US assets, Israel, or other countries in the region on April 9. Multiple Axis of Resistance group leaders warned that they would resume attacks if the IDF continues its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however. ISW-CTP has not observed any claimed or reported Iranian-backed Iraqi militia or Houthi attacks since April 8.[63]
Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders called for Iraqi militias to resume attacks against US and Israeli targets in response to recent IDF strikes in Lebanon.[64] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al Walai called on April 8 for Axis of Resistance groups to attack Israel in response to its strikes in Lebanon, which the group framed as a ceasefire violation.[65] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi vowed on April 8 that the Axis of Resistance will “punish” Israel for its strikes in Lebanon.[66]
Houthi leaders also warned that the group may resume attacks against Israel if Israel continues its campaign in Lebanon. Houthi Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said in a speech on April 9 that the IDF’s campaign in Lebanon “may lead to the return of the entire battle.”[67] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti separately told Hezbollah media on April 9 that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is a “clear violation” that threatens to collapse the ceasefire and resume the conflict.[68] Bukhaiti warned that the Houthis could escalate their involvement in a resumed conflict, including by increasing their operations on “the Red Sea front.”[69] The threat is likely intended to coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its campaign against Hezbollah.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-9-2026/
On the positive side your report suggests Iran, Iraq, Houthis and US are so far exercising some restraint. Hopefully the Lebanese govt will get their Hezbollah groups disarmed or under some kind of control. If son Khamenei is or recently was in a coma, one wonders who is managing his auto-pen. It seems quite likely there are semi independent areas of control in Iran, some of whom might still be lobbing a few drones at places like Kuwait and Bahrain. In fact, one of the big problems faced by negotiators may be damaged and lacking communication within Iran.
Statements coming from Iran regarding maintaining a payment of tolls to transit Hormuz have people thinking of alternate routes, including a canal across that spit of land thrust into the Gulf. A response from AI indicates that route is economically impractical because of mountains as high as 9,000 feet, and lack of water to float a boat. Below are other AI possible solutions as long term alternatives if Iran is unreasonably greedy.
“* Strategic and Geopolitical Risks:
—Relocated Vulnerability: While the canal would bypass the narrowest part of the Strait, ships would still pass through the Gulf of Oman, which is within range of conventional Iranian missile/drone attacks.
—Fixed Target: Unlike ships that can move, canal locks and infrastructure are static targets that are easily attacked or sabotaged during a conflict.
—Political Coordination: Building it requires complex cooperation between the UAE and Oman, including navigating the internal logistics of the rugged Musandam Peninsula.
* Alternatives to a Canal:
Experts suggest that expanding existing, lower-cost infrastructure is a more viable solution to Hormuz dependency:
—Pipelines: Expanding pipelines like the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) and Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline (Petroline) is far cheaper and faster than building a canal.
—Strategic Storage: Increasing oil storage capacity at the port of Fujairah, outside the strait, offers increased energy security with lower capital investment.
==Conclusion: The project is a “dream” to redesign geography that is held back by the “stubborn” reality of mountains and insurmountable costs.”
Personally I hope someone has a well hidden plan to arm and assist the freedom loving Iranians gain their objectives for which so many have already paid a tremendous price.
The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11.[1] US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.[2] Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff are also part of the US negotiating team, which also reportedly includes officials from the Pentagon, National Security Council, and State Department.[3] CBS reported that the negotiating teams are expected to remain in Pakistan even if Vance departs.[4] A Pakistani source familiar with April 11 talks told Reuters that “everything is on track,” citing de‑escalation in Lebanon as a “good sign,” and confirmed that advance teams from both Iran and the United States are already in place in Islamabad.[5]
It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public. Iranian officials are using this ambiguity to frame the United States and its partners as aggressors who are attempting to collapse the ceasefire, which is far from clear. Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who are leading the Iranian negotiating delegation, insist that Lebanon must be included in the ceasefire and that Iran will be able to restrict shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as part of the ceasefire.[6] Ghalibaf wrote on X on April 10 that two ”mutually agreed“ measures — a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran's blocked assets — must be implemented before negotiations begin.[7] There is zero public evidence that any of these measures were ever included in the ceasefire by either party. It is additionally unclear whether the ceasefire extends to Iraq, for example, where Iranian-backed groups ambushed US diplomats on April 8. President Masoud Pezeshkian told Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan during a phone call on April 9 that the ceasefire depends on US commitments, while Araghchi separately stressed Lebanon's centrality to the ceasefire in a call with Iran's ambassador in Beirut.[8]
Iranian media reported on April 10 that Iranian parliamentarians are preparing to vote on a strategic Strait of Hormuz plan that would prohibit ”hostile” shipping (which would include US, Israel, and other vessels), require transit fees in rials, and mandate use of the term “Persian Gulf.”[9] This plan would force crews or countries to negotiate for safe passage through the international waterway, which would have economic impacts because it implies that Iran's conditions in these negotiations could change at any time and for any reason. An Iranian analyst close to the regime argued that the US-Iran War has reshaped Iran's security doctrine and deterrence posture, referring to Iran's control of the Strait.[10] An agreement that allows Iran to restrict shipping in the Strait, tax it, or otherwise threaten international shipping and keep energy prices high for the consumer.[11] Some shipping firms are calling on tankers not to pay Iran‘s toll, as it is a violation of freedom of navigation.[12] Even without a formal toll system, Iran is aware that it can coerce other powers in the future by threatening shipping through the strait.[13]
US President Trump warned on Truth Social on April 10 that Iran is engaging in “short‑term extortion” in the Strait of Hormuz and said that its leadership is negotiating only because it has “no cards.”[14] Fox News reporter Trey Yingst reported on April 10 that US intelligence agencies assessed that the IRGC is exploiting the two‑week ceasefire to solidify control over maritime traffic.[15] Vance stated that he and the negotiating team would not allow Iran to ”play them” before boarding his flight on April 10.[16]
Neither the US nor Iran has signaled any public shift on their stances on key issues in previous negotiations, which include nuclear enrichment limits, the highly enriched uranium stockpile, the missile program, sanctions, and access to frozen assets. Now these sticking points include the Strait of Hormuz as well. Trump continues to hold a firm red line against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, while Iranian officials such as Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi have reportedly refused to discuss the missile program, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[17] Mediators cited by the Wall Street Journal on April 8 said Iran has privately softened on several demands, including its previous positions on enrichment, US troop withdrawals from the region, and war reparations — though it remains unclear whether this reflects an official regime stance, however.[18] These mixed messages underscore the fragility of both the ceasefire framework and the diplomatic process now unfolding through indirect channels in Pakistan.
The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team. The United States is dealing with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions. These actors hold divergent views on the scope and purpose of the negotiations, and several are operating outside the formal responsibilities of their offices. The result is a fragmented team marked by internal rivalries, mixed signaling, and unclear lines of authority, especially between Iran's diplomatic institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi represents the diplomatic wing of the Iranian regime and has been supportive of using engagement as a tool to reduce pressure and stabilize the regional environment.[19] His position has been weakened by overt hostility from hardline elements. Social media users shared footage on April 9 of local IRGC affiliates and Basij supporters protesting outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry against Araghchi for negotiating with the United States.[20]
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the lead figure for the Iranian delegation for negotiations in Islamabad, a role more traditionally suited to the president or foreign minister.[21] President Masoud Pezeshkian has reportedly been sidelined in the regime's decision-making process.[22] Ghalibaf is a powerful political operator with strong ties to conservative networks, but he appears not to exercise command authority over the IRGC.[23] His leadership of the delegation creates a mismatch between responsibility and control, which may leave him exposed to criticism from hardliners and the IRGC while lacking the leverage to enforce consensus.[24]
IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi appears to wield outsized influence over Iran's diplomatic posture despite being a senior military officer and not a formal negotiator. Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member, serving as IRGC Quds Force Commander from 1988 to 1997 and now as the senior-most IRGC commander.[25] Iranian media reported that Vahidi was one of the five influential figures involved in the establishment of Hezbollah, which may make him more supportive of demanding a Lebanon ceasefire and reticent to cast aside Hezbollah in negotiations.[26] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are driving military decisionmaking, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[27] Vahidi is reportedly at odds with both Ghalibaf and Araghchi because Vahidi has pushed for SNSC Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr to be on the negotiating team, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[28] The SNSC Secretary does not normally take up these sorts of diplomatic responsibilities.[29] Ghalibaf and Araghchi’s negotiating team have pushed back on Vahidi’s request because Zolghadr lacks the necessary experience to be involved in these negotiations.[30] Vahidi notably pushed for Pezeshkian to select Zolghadr, whom he has worked with for decades, as SNSC secretary.[31] Vahidi’s influence highlights the continued dominance of security institutions over foreign policy when core defense capabilities are perceived to be at stake. His position effectively sets red lines that constrain negotiators who are ostensibly leading the delegation.
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr oversees coordination among Iran's military, intelligence, and security bodies and plays a central role in shaping national security policy, including war planning and crisis management. Zolghadr is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran's security and judicial apparatuses, he commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran–Iraq War, rose through senior IRGC leadership roles in the 1990s and early 2000s, helped engineer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2005 election after opposing reformist President Mohammad Khatami, later oversaw internal security and Basij repression—including during the 2009 Green Movement—and was sanctioned by the UN in 2007 for involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.[32] Zolghadr appears not to be in the negotiating delegation, however.[33] It also remains unclear what role the SNSC plays at the moment, whether it is directing strategy, arbitrating disputes, or simply lending institutional cover to factional maneuvering.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is notably absent from the process. The Supreme Leader is often viewed as an informal but critical mediator among Iran's rival factions during periods of elite disagreement.[34] Mojtaba’s lack of visible involvement has deprived the negotiations of a potential internal arbiter capable of harmonizing positions between the IRGC, the government, and the parliamentary leadership. This absence of clear mediation and coordination leaves the Iranian negotiating posture internally divided and externally unpredictable, which may complicate US efforts to assess credibility and reach enforceable agreements.
The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.[35] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry added that Iranian drone attacks targeted Kuwaiti National Guard facilities, injuring several personnel.[36] The ministry reported that explosive ordnance disposal teams handled 14 separate incidents during the same period.[37] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Public Relations office denied reports that Iran conducted drone or missile attacks in Gulf states.[38]
Iranian threats and restrictions regarding the Strait of Hormuz continue to limit the flow of maritime traffic through the strait. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that three cargo vessels, including one ship sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), have entered the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 9.[39] The ship sanctioned by OFAC is the Iranian-flagged Ganj, which is subject to secondary sanctions.[40] Commercially available maritime tracking data also shows that five vessels, including four cargo ships and one tanker, exited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[41] Three of the five vessels were Iranian-flagged, and two of the Iranian vessels, the Basht and the Negar, are sanctioned by OFAC.[42] The Basht and the Negar are both subject to secondary sanctions.[43]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. An unspecified US State Department official told a White House correspondent that Iraqi militias launched multiple drones at US embassy staff near the airport, causing no casualties.[44] The official did not specify the type of drone, but ordinary Iranian-made drones would lack the accuracy to ”ambush” moving personnel, especially individual personnel on foot or in a vehicle. This suggests that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia responsible for this attack utilized a FPV drone. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to use FPV drones.[45] FPV drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting, thus making this the most likely type of drone used in the attack.[46] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts have assessed that drone footage posted by multiple Iraqi militias during the war has appeared to be from fiber-optic FPV drones, making it likely that the militias already possess this technology.[47] US Deputy Secretary of State Christoper Landau summoned Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Nizar Khirullah on April 9 to condemn Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against US diplomatic personnel and facilities, including the attack on the Embassy personnel near the airport on April 8.[48]
The State Department noted on April 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted hundreds of attacks during the war against US citizens, diplomatic facilities, and commercial interests, as well as Iraqi institutions, civilians, and neighboring countries.[49] Landau emphasized the Iraqi government's failure to prevent these attacks.[50] Iraqi authorities conducted a few arrests during the war, but militia attacks continued. Iraqi authorities arrested four individuals on March 25 responsible for launching a drone attack at a former US military base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[51] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s office said on March 8 that Sudani told French President Emmanuel Macron that the Iraqi authorities had arrested the perpetrators of a drone attack on a French base in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 12 that killed one French soldier.[52]
Current economic challenges in Iran are causing Iranian officials to fear that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern. Iranian Parliament Budget Committee member Mehrdad Lahouti stated on April 10 that Iranian banks are in poor condition and warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy.[62] Lahouti added that production has ”practically” stalled and that exporters have halted activity.[63] Lahouti stated that producers cannot pay wages and that many hotels in Tehran have closed, noting that these businesses must pay workers.[64] Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran's “Achilles heel” and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern.[65] Unspecified insiders added that any comprehensive peace agreement would need to lift sanctions and release frozen funds because Iranian authorities would otherwise face severe difficulty meeting payroll obligations and repairing damaged infrastructure.[66] The internet blackout has also exacerbated economic strain. A recent NetBlocks report on April 10 indicates that Iran's nationwide internet blackout, exceeding 42 days, has severely disrupted financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations, compounding broader economic deterioration.[67] Netblocks previously estimated that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[68]
The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 9 that Iran likely aims to restrict access to the tunnel complex and delay or complicate any ground operation to reach or seize the highly enriched uranium stored at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province. The Institute reported that Iran has constructed new makeshift roadblocks at all three tunnel entrances at the ENTC.[73] All three tunnel portals remain backfilled with dirt, and Iran has not made any effort to clear them or regain access.[74] The Institute added that Iran added additional barriers, including earthen berms, rubble piles, and possible fencing and a chicane at the northern entrance to restrict movement toward the tunnel complex.[75] French outlet Le Monde previously reported on March 28 that satellite imagery from June 9, 2025, showed a large convoy transporting sealed blue barrels, possibly containing nuclear-related material or highly enriched uranium, into the ENTC ahead of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[76]
The IDF reported on April 10 that the Israeli Air Force conducted more than 8,500 operational sorties and over 1,000 air missions in Iran since the beginning of the war.[81] The IDF added that it employed more than 18,000 munitions and executed over 10,800 strikes across more than 4,000 targets and 6,700 target components.[82]
more + maps and graphs: https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/