The Iranian delegation arrived in Islamabad on April 10 ahead of planned negotiations on April 11.[1] US Vice President JD Vance departed for Pakistan on April 10, operating under strict guidance from President Donald Trump.[2] Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff are also part of the US negotiating team, which also reportedly includes officials from the Pentagon, National Security Council, and State Department.[3] CBS reported that the negotiating teams are expected to remain in Pakistan even if Vance departs.[4] A Pakistani source familiar with April 11 talks told Reuters that “everything is on track,” citing de‑escalation in Lebanon as a “good sign,” and confirmed that advance teams from both Iran and the United States are already in place in Islamabad.[5]
It will remain difficult to determine whether the Middle East ceasefire conditions are being upheld, given the lack of mutually agreed-upon, written ceasefire documents available to the public. Iranian officials are using this ambiguity to frame the United States and its partners as aggressors who are attempting to collapse the ceasefire, which is far from clear. Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who are leading the Iranian negotiating delegation, insist that Lebanon must be included in the ceasefire and that Iran will be able to restrict shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as part of the ceasefire.[6] Ghalibaf wrote on X on April 10 that two ”mutually agreed“ measures — a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran's blocked assets — must be implemented before negotiations begin.[7] There is zero public evidence that any of these measures were ever included in the ceasefire by either party. It is additionally unclear whether the ceasefire extends to Iraq, for example, where Iranian-backed groups ambushed US diplomats on April 8. President Masoud Pezeshkian told Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan during a phone call on April 9 that the ceasefire depends on US commitments, while Araghchi separately stressed Lebanon's centrality to the ceasefire in a call with Iran's ambassador in Beirut.[8]
Iranian media reported on April 10 that Iranian parliamentarians are preparing to vote on a strategic Strait of Hormuz plan that would prohibit ”hostile” shipping (which would include US, Israel, and other vessels), require transit fees in rials, and mandate use of the term “Persian Gulf.”[9] This plan would force crews or countries to negotiate for safe passage through the international waterway, which would have economic impacts because it implies that Iran's conditions in these negotiations could change at any time and for any reason. An Iranian analyst close to the regime argued that the US-Iran War has reshaped Iran's security doctrine and deterrence posture, referring to Iran's control of the Strait.[10] An agreement that allows Iran to restrict shipping in the Strait, tax it, or otherwise threaten international shipping and keep energy prices high for the consumer.[11] Some shipping firms are calling on tankers not to pay Iran‘s toll, as it is a violation of freedom of navigation.[12] Even without a formal toll system, Iran is aware that it can coerce other powers in the future by threatening shipping through the strait.[13]
US President Trump warned on Truth Social on April 10 that Iran is engaging in “short‑term extortion” in the Strait of Hormuz and said that its leadership is negotiating only because it has “no cards.”[14] Fox News reporter Trey Yingst reported on April 10 that US intelligence agencies assessed that the IRGC is exploiting the two‑week ceasefire to solidify control over maritime traffic.[15] Vance stated that he and the negotiating team would not allow Iran to ”play them” before boarding his flight on April 10.[16]
Neither the US nor Iran has signaled any public shift on their stances on key issues in previous negotiations, which include nuclear enrichment limits, the highly enriched uranium stockpile, the missile program, sanctions, and access to frozen assets. Now these sticking points include the Strait of Hormuz as well. Trump continues to hold a firm red line against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, while Iranian officials such as Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi have reportedly refused to discuss the missile program, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[17] Mediators cited by the Wall Street Journal on April 8 said Iran has privately softened on several demands, including its previous positions on enrichment, US troop withdrawals from the region, and war reparations — though it remains unclear whether this reflects an official regime stance, however.[18] These mixed messages underscore the fragility of both the ceasefire framework and the diplomatic process now unfolding through indirect channels in Pakistan.
The US-Iran ceasefire talks are complicated by the fragmented nature of the Iranian negotiating team. The United States is dealing with a de facto committee composed of competing political, military, and security factions, rather than a unified delegation with a clear mandate and unified positions. These actors hold divergent views on the scope and purpose of the negotiations, and several are operating outside the formal responsibilities of their offices. The result is a fragmented team marked by internal rivalries, mixed signaling, and unclear lines of authority, especially between Iran's diplomatic institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi represents the diplomatic wing of the Iranian regime and has been supportive of using engagement as a tool to reduce pressure and stabilize the regional environment.[19] His position has been weakened by overt hostility from hardline elements. Social media users shared footage on April 9 of local IRGC affiliates and Basij supporters protesting outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry against Araghchi for negotiating with the United States.[20]
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the lead figure for the Iranian delegation for negotiations in Islamabad, a role more traditionally suited to the president or foreign minister.[21] President Masoud Pezeshkian has reportedly been sidelined in the regime's decision-making process.[22] Ghalibaf is a powerful political operator with strong ties to conservative networks, but he appears not to exercise command authority over the IRGC.[23] His leadership of the delegation creates a mismatch between responsibility and control, which may leave him exposed to criticism from hardliners and the IRGC while lacking the leverage to enforce consensus.[24]
IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi appears to wield outsized influence over Iran's diplomatic posture despite being a senior military officer and not a formal negotiator. Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member, serving as IRGC Quds Force Commander from 1988 to 1997 and now as the senior-most IRGC commander.[25] Iranian media reported that Vahidi was one of the five influential figures involved in the establishment of Hezbollah, which may make him more supportive of demanding a Lebanon ceasefire and reticent to cast aside Hezbollah in negotiations.[26] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are driving military decisionmaking, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[27] Vahidi is reportedly at odds with both Ghalibaf and Araghchi because Vahidi has pushed for SNSC Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr to be on the negotiating team, according to anti-regime media on April 10.[28] The SNSC Secretary does not normally take up these sorts of diplomatic responsibilities.[29] Ghalibaf and Araghchi’s negotiating team have pushed back on Vahidi’s request because Zolghadr lacks the necessary experience to be involved in these negotiations.[30] Vahidi notably pushed for Pezeshkian to select Zolghadr, whom he has worked with for decades, as SNSC secretary.[31] Vahidi’s influence highlights the continued dominance of security institutions over foreign policy when core defense capabilities are perceived to be at stake. His position effectively sets red lines that constrain negotiators who are ostensibly leading the delegation.
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr oversees coordination among Iran's military, intelligence, and security bodies and plays a central role in shaping national security policy, including war planning and crisis management. Zolghadr is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran's security and judicial apparatuses, he commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran–Iraq War, rose through senior IRGC leadership roles in the 1990s and early 2000s, helped engineer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2005 election after opposing reformist President Mohammad Khatami, later oversaw internal security and Basij repression—including during the 2009 Green Movement—and was sanctioned by the UN in 2007 for involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.[32] Zolghadr appears not to be in the negotiating delegation, however.[33] It also remains unclear what role the SNSC plays at the moment, whether it is directing strategy, arbitrating disputes, or simply lending institutional cover to factional maneuvering.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is notably absent from the process. The Supreme Leader is often viewed as an informal but critical mediator among Iran's rival factions during periods of elite disagreement.[34] Mojtaba’s lack of visible involvement has deprived the negotiations of a potential internal arbiter capable of harmonizing positions between the IRGC, the government, and the parliamentary leadership. This absence of clear mediation and coordination leaves the Iranian negotiating posture internally divided and externally unpredictable, which may complicate US efforts to assess credibility and reach enforceable agreements.
The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense spokesperson stated on April 10 that Kuwaiti armed forces detected and engaged seven Iranian drones in Kuwaiti airspace over the past 24 hours.[35] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry added that Iranian drone attacks targeted Kuwaiti National Guard facilities, injuring several personnel.[36] The ministry reported that explosive ordnance disposal teams handled 14 separate incidents during the same period.[37] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Public Relations office denied reports that Iran conducted drone or missile attacks in Gulf states.[38]
Iranian threats and restrictions regarding the Strait of Hormuz continue to limit the flow of maritime traffic through the strait. Commercially available maritime tracking data shows that three cargo vessels, including one ship sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), have entered the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 9.[39] The ship sanctioned by OFAC is the Iranian-flagged Ganj, which is subject to secondary sanctions.[40] Commercially available maritime tracking data also shows that five vessels, including four cargo ships and one tanker, exited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[41] Three of the five vessels were Iranian-flagged, and two of the Iranian vessels, the Basht and the Negar, are sanctioned by OFAC.[42] The Basht and the Negar are both subject to secondary sanctions.[43]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias probably used first-person view (FPV) drones to ambush US Embassy personnel near the Baghdad International Airport on April 8. An unspecified US State Department official told a White House correspondent that Iraqi militias launched multiple drones at US embassy staff near the airport, causing no casualties.[44] The official did not specify the type of drone, but ordinary Iranian-made drones would lack the accuracy to ”ambush” moving personnel, especially individual personnel on foot or in a vehicle. This suggests that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia responsible for this attack utilized a FPV drone. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to use FPV drones.[45] FPV drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or outfitted with strike capabilities to conduct precise targeting, thus making this the most likely type of drone used in the attack.[46] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts have assessed that drone footage posted by multiple Iraqi militias during the war has appeared to be from fiber-optic FPV drones, making it likely that the militias already possess this technology.[47] US Deputy Secretary of State Christoper Landau summoned Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Nizar Khirullah on April 9 to condemn Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against US diplomatic personnel and facilities, including the attack on the Embassy personnel near the airport on April 8.[48]
The State Department noted on April 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted hundreds of attacks during the war against US citizens, diplomatic facilities, and commercial interests, as well as Iraqi institutions, civilians, and neighboring countries.[49] Landau emphasized the Iraqi government's failure to prevent these attacks.[50] Iraqi authorities conducted a few arrests during the war, but militia attacks continued. Iraqi authorities arrested four individuals on March 25 responsible for launching a drone attack at a former US military base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[51] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s office said on March 8 that Sudani told French President Emmanuel Macron that the Iraqi authorities had arrested the perpetrators of a drone attack on a French base in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 12 that killed one French soldier.[52]
Current economic challenges in Iran are causing Iranian officials to fear that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern. Iranian Parliament Budget Committee member Mehrdad Lahouti stated on April 10 that Iranian banks are in poor condition and warned that current challenges risk pushing banks toward crisis or bankruptcy.[62] Lahouti added that production has ”practically” stalled and that exporters have halted activity.[63] Lahouti stated that producers cannot pay wages and that many hotels in Tehran have closed, noting that these businesses must pay workers.[64] Unspecified political insiders close to the Iranian establishment told Reuters on April 8 that Iranian officials viewed the economy as Iran's “Achilles heel” and feared that economic deterioration could threaten the regime's ability to govern.[65] Unspecified insiders added that any comprehensive peace agreement would need to lift sanctions and release frozen funds because Iranian authorities would otherwise face severe difficulty meeting payroll obligations and repairing damaged infrastructure.[66] The internet blackout has also exacerbated economic strain. A recent NetBlocks report on April 10 indicates that Iran's nationwide internet blackout, exceeding 42 days, has severely disrupted financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations, compounding broader economic deterioration.[67] Netblocks previously estimated that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[68]
The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 9 that Iran likely aims to restrict access to the tunnel complex and delay or complicate any ground operation to reach or seize the highly enriched uranium stored at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in Esfahan Province. The Institute reported that Iran has constructed new makeshift roadblocks at all three tunnel entrances at the ENTC.[73] All three tunnel portals remain backfilled with dirt, and Iran has not made any effort to clear them or regain access.[74] The Institute added that Iran added additional barriers, including earthen berms, rubble piles, and possible fencing and a chicane at the northern entrance to restrict movement toward the tunnel complex.[75] French outlet Le Monde previously reported on March 28 that satellite imagery from June 9, 2025, showed a large convoy transporting sealed blue barrels, possibly containing nuclear-related material or highly enriched uranium, into the ENTC ahead of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[76]
The IDF reported on April 10 that the Israeli Air Force conducted more than 8,500 operational sorties and over 1,000 air missions in Iran since the beginning of the war.[81] The IDF added that it employed more than 18,000 munitions and executed over 10,800 strikes across more than 4,000 targets and 6,700 target components.[82]
more + maps and graphs: https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-10-2026/
Al Jazeera channel broadcasts footage showing for the first time Iranian targets of civilians in Qatar and contradictions in Iranian statements - Broadcast for the first time footage from inside the vacant Al Udeid base, free of military presence
https://x.com/alrougui/status/2042715222704558408
6 min video
Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.[1] The Iranian delegation is explicitly framing the talks as leverage for a broader reset in the US-Iran relationship.[2] Iranian demands include sovereignty claims over the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for war damages, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a region-wide ceasefire across the “Axis of Resistance,” which creates an imbalance in expectations that sets the talks up for deadlock.[3] Two people briefed on negotiations told the Financial Times that the April 11 negotiations have reached a ”stalemate” over the main sticking point — the status of the Strait of Hormuz.[4]
The composition of Iran's at least 70-person delegation, headed by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, underscores Iran's wide-ranging negotiating intentions.[5] The large and heavily securitized team blends diplomats, parliamentarians, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-adjacent figures, and high-level economic technocrats, indicating that Iran is pressing a long list of demands across a range of issue areas.[6] The inclusion of the Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and economic specialists points to a focus on sanctions architecture, frozen assets, and alternative financial mechanisms, suggesting preparation for prolonged economic and strategic bargaining rather than confidence-building compromise.[7]
The unusually large size of the Iranian delegation likely also reflects internal divisions and deep mutual distrust among regime power centers, rather than a unified negotiating strategy. There was reportedly infighting between the regime factions before the negotiations.[8] Ghalibaf and Araghchi reportedly clashed with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi over Vahidi’s effort to insert longtime IRGC affiliate and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr into the talks, despite Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations.[9] An IRGC-affiliated media outlet reported on their English language X account that Zolghadr was in the delegation in Islamabad, along with Defense Council Secretary IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, but Iranian Persian-language media did not disclose if Zolghadr was present.[10] The presence of overlapping political, security, and economic actors suggests a need for constant internal monitoring.[11]
Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy, which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States. Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a “hazardous area” that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait. Ships seeking to avoid the Iranian-declared hazardous area must transit Iranian territorial waters.[12] Iran then shakes down these merchant ships by extracting “protection fees.”[13] These “protection” fees protect ships from Iranian attacks. This protection racket is illegal under maritime law. No state bordering a strait is permitted to restrict traffic or extract fees under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[14] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times on April 11 that Iran laid its mines—of which there are reportedly fewer than a dozen, according to a previous March 23 report—” haphazardly,” which has prevented Iran from locating or removing them. These mines may or may not be in the 1,394 sq km “hazardous area.”
The threat of mines also enables Iran to keep the price of oil and shipping insurance as high as possible for as long as possible without conducting attacks that would cause the ceasefire to collapse. Iran may calculate that the high price of oil and shipping insurance would cause the United States to cave on some of Iran's demands.
The United States is attempting to undermine Iran's ability to use the threat of mines in the “hazardous area” by using US Navy destroyers to prove that the normal traffic separation scheme is safe and viable for traffic. Iran can only use the threat of mines to keep these costs high if the fear of mines persists. US President Donald Trump said on April 11 that the United States is “starting the process of clearing out” the strait.[15] Arleigh Burke-Class destroyers USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy transited the Strait to clear the Strait of naval mines.[16] US CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper said that the US Navy will share the route of safe passage with civilian shipping as soon as possible.[17] Such a move would undermine Iran's threats and badly damage its leverage in negotiations. The Qatari Transport Ministry announced later on April 11 that it will resume operations ”for all types of maritime vessels and ships” between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM local time on April 12.[18]
The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran's missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.[19] Such effects are temporary, however, and the ceasefire provides Iran with an opportunity to reorganize itself for more coordinated missile attacks. This is especially notable because Iran still retains roughly 1,000 of the 2,500 medium-range ballistic missiles it had before the war and well under 50% of its one-way attack drones.[20]
The US-Israeli air campaign has nonetheless severely degraded elements of Iran's ballistic missile program, which is a system of systems that relies on many complicated and bespoke components to function. These components cannot be easily replaced. The air campaign targeted the critical capabilities of Iran's ballistic missile program to prevent the missile forces from executing their campaign design.[21] The US-Israeli campaign, for example, targeted Iranian missile fuel production, missile guidance systems, steel production that could be used for ballistic missiles, ball bearing factories (which are key for inertial guidance systems on Iranian missiles), and other key components.[22] Such assets are not easily replaced, and when and if Iran expends its remaining missiles, it will struggle to replace them rapidly. This will play into Iranian strike package decisions if the war resumes.
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader's compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba’s face and injured one or both of his legs.[23] The sources added that Mojtaba remains “mentally sharp” and continues to participate in major decisions, including war and negotiations with the United States, through audio conferences with senior Iranian officials.[24] It is notable that the sources noted that the strikes disfigured his face–which implies at least some degree of head injuries–and felt it necessary to note he remains ”mentally sharp” in that context. Mojtaba has not appeared in public or in any new images or videos since his March 8 appointment as supreme leader.[25] The regime has circulated only older footage of him and has issued written statements.[26] Iranian state television described Mojtaba as a “janbaz,” which is a term for those wounded in war.[27] The reporting from individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle is consistent with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks on March 13 that Mojtaba is “wounded and likely disfigured.”[28]
The People's Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.[29] Two of the sources told CNN that the PRC is attempting to route the shipments through third-party countries to obfuscate their route and origin.[30] The upcoming transfer may be the result of two-year-long negotiations between Iran and the PRC over Iran's acquisition of MANPADS and other weaponry, including anti-ship cruise missiles.[31] These negotiations ”accelerated sharply” after the 12-Day War, and Iran and the PRC were still discussing the issue as of February 24, according to Reuters.[32] The PRC Embassy in Washington denied that the PRC has provided weapons to any party in the conflict.[33] Tehran has similarly sought to acquire MANPADS from Russia in the lead-up to the recent conflict.[34]
Iran may be eager to use the current cessation of hostilities in preparation for possible renewed US or Israeli strikes should negotiations fail. The combined force has degraded Iranian air defenses and established air superiority over Iran, but new systems could present a threat to the combined force aircraft, particularly those flying at low altitudes. US aircraft have flown at low altitudes over several areas of southern Iran during the conflict, which suggests that the combined force severely suppressed or destroyed local Iranian anti-air capabilities, including MANPADS, in those areas.[35] Iran could use these systems to attempt to bolster defenses around Iranian naval assets along the Persian Gulf coast amid combined force efforts to limit the Iranian threat to international shipping. Iran reportedly deployed MANPADS to reinforce its defenses on Kharg Island in late March, for example.[36] MANPADS alone cannot replace the damage inflicted upon Iranian integrated air defense systems by US and Israeli strikes during this conflict and previous rounds of strikes in 2024, however.[37]
The PRC's reported preparations to send Iran MANPADS underscore the nature of the PRC's military partnership with Iran. The PRC has historically limited its support with Iran due to its close economic ties to the Gulf and has shown a willingness to bolster Iran's capabilities without risking direct entanglement in Iran's conflicts in the region.[38] The PRC is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears to be willing to sell military equipment to Iran; however, as also seen through the recent near-agreement to transfer PRC anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.[39] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran to reconstitute its missile program and has likely continued this support by sending missile fuel precursor even during the conflict.[40] Iranian officials may also seek the PRC to fulfill previous agreements that it has made with Iran, particularly regarding dual-use technologies to help Iran rebuild after the war. US officials recently accused the PRC's largest chipmaker, SMIC, of sending chipmaking technology to the Iranian military for nearly a year, for example.[41]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-11-2026/