History What-If: Could Custer Have Survived the Battle of Little Big Horn? [June 25, 1876]

e can never know what frantic thoughts raced through George Armstrong Custer’s mind in the last hour of his life. But surely, as ever-growing numbers of angry, well-armed Plains Indians closed in on his 210 troopers of the 7th Cavalry, he must have realized that he had fatally misjudged the size of the hostile force now surrounding him.

His plan to subdue a large Indian village had completely broken down. He had been warned repeatedly by his scouts that his target, an Indian encampment on Montana’s Little Bighorn River, was far larger than he had imagined. Now, on this very hot June day in 1876, he must have known that he was going to die.

Even to the very end of what is now known as Custer’s Last Stand, we can picture the desperate, dust-covered Custer looking hopefully to the southeast for expected help from the rest of his command. He died not knowing why Major Marcus Reno and Captain Frederick Benteen never came up in support.

But we know. It is not a story of great valor, although certain moments of extraordinary bravery shine through. Benteen and Reno spent the rest of their lives defending their leadership and action—or lack of action—that day. An examination of the known facts reveals that they had a lot to defend.

The growing presence and power of the white man, backed by overwhelming military strength, had gradually forced many of the Plains tribes onto reservations. However, some militant Indians still defied the United States government and chose to continue their nomadic lifestyle in the Unceded Territory. That huge expanse stretched from the Bighorn and Rocky Mountains on the west to the Great Sioux Reservation along the Missouri River to the east. It was there that the final battles of the Indian wars were fought.

On November 3, 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant and a few carefully selected cabinet members and Army generals met in secret session. The decision was made to launch a decisive war against the Indians and cripple their ability to further disrupt western expansion. Although no one knew it at the time, Custer’s fate had been sealed.

On December 6, the government issued an ultimatum. All roaming Indians would have to return to the reservations by January 31, 1876, or risk being considered “hostile.” In early February, Lt. Gen. Philip Sheridan, commanding the Division of Missouri, ordered his forces to prepare for operations against the hostiles. The military plan was a three-pronged affair. One force under Brig. Gen. George Crook moved out from Fort Fetterman in Wyoming. Colonel John Gibbon marched from Fort Ellis in Montana. The third unit, led by Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, advanced from the Dakota Territory. Terry released Custer and his 7th Cavalry as a mobile strike force to track and locate the Sioux and Cheyenne tribesmen thought to be in Montana Territory in the Little Bighorn Valley.

By late June, however, the plan to link up and trap the hostiles was falling apart. Crook was defeated by an Indian force on the Rosebud River. Terry and Gibbon got temporarily lost. Custer was essentially on his own. In fact, Terry had given Custer unusual freedom. One part of his orders read, “We place too much confidence in your zeal, energy and ability to impose precise orders upon you which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy.” That was all the ambitious, headstrong Custer needed to hear. It triggered the inevitable chain of events that led to his death.

Counting 35 Indian scouts and civilians, Custer led 12 companies, 680 men, seemingly a substantial strike force. But by the time he headed out from Fort Abraham Lincoln on June 22, the number of Indians camped along the Little Bighorn had swelled to 7,000. Between 1,000 and 1,500 of these were warriors. Custer’s scouts found numerous trails leading to the Little Bighorn, and soon discovered the massive encampment that now held seven different Indian bands in a straight line stretching almost three miles. Even then, Custer did not seem to understand how many armed warriors he was facing.

On June 25, as the main cavalry body drew closer, Custer feared that his force had been detected, and instead of waiting for a surprise assault at dawn, he decided to attack that afternoon. Although his scouts continued to offer strong warnings, Custer discounted their advice. Lieutenant Edward Godfrey recalled Ree scout Bloody Knife saying, “We’ll find enough Sioux to keep us fighting for two or three days.” But, Godfrey said, “Custer remarked laughingly that he thought we could get through in one day.” Lieutenant Charles Varnum overheard Custer’s chief scout, the mixed-blood Mitch Boyer, tell Custer, “General, if you don’t find more Indians in that valley than you ever saw before, you can hang me.” Custer testily replied, “Well, a lot of good that would do me.”

Not only did Custer reject the warnings, he divided his force into four groups. He ordered Benteen to take three companies of 120 men, scout a series of ridges to the southeast to spot any Indians trying to flee, and then rejoin him. Private Charles Windolph later reported that he heard Benteen protest, “Hadn’t we better keep the regiment together General? If this is as big a camp as they say, we’ll need every man we have.” Custer curtly replied, “You have your orders.” Custer then ordered Reno to take three companies of 140 troopers and 35 scouts and launch an attack from the south end of the village. The slow pack train, under Captain Thomas McDougall, was given another 175 men. Custer retained five companies with 210 mounted soldiers and civilians. He promised to support Reno in the attack. To say the least, the plan was impulsive and uncoordinated.

A few minutes after 3 pm, Reno forded the Little Bighorn River, which the Indians called “Greasy Grass,” and raced his mounted troopers into the southern end of the village. Custer mistakenly believed that the Indians were trying to escape. But the Indians were not fleeing. Instead, Reno quickly rode into a growing number of counterattacking warriors. The troopers halted, dismounted, and formed a skirmish line, then watched in dismay as hundreds of Indians, some mounted and others on foot, began to outflank them. In less than an hour of heavy fighting, the soldiers were in danger of being surrounded. Bloody Knife, standing next to Reno, was struck in the head, spraying the major with blood and brains. In shock, Reno panicked, issued wildly confusing orders, and ran for it. No retreat order was passed to the troopers, but as he desperately mounted his horse to flee, Reno shouted, “Any of you men who wish to live, make your escape—follow me!”

The uncoordinated rush back to the river was total chaos. The soldiers drove their horses into the water, crossed the river, and clawed their way up the steep 100-foot bluffs on the other side. The Indians, riding on their flanks, poured a withering fire into the wildly retreating soldiers. Some 80 troopers, including 13 wounded, managed to get to the top. Seventeen others were left in the woods. Thirty of Reno’s men were killed initially, and another 27 died in the fighting. Reno insisted later that his retreat was actually a charge.

Custer never crossed the river. Instead, he led his men north on the near or east side along high bluffs above the valley, apparently hoping to block any Indians from getting away in that direction. Although a clear view of the valley bottom was difficult, he briefly spotted Reno fighting and saw for the first time, with his own eyes, the immense size of the enemy encampment. He quickly sent Sergeant Daniel Kanipe to find Benteen. Fifteen minutes later he dispatched trumpeter John Martin to carry another urgent message to the captain. Custer’s famous written order read: “Benteen—Come on—Big village—Be quick—bring packs. PS—Bring [ammunition] packs.”

Historian Walter Camp, who interviewed many of the participants soon after the battle, cited Benteen’s reply upon receiving the message: “After he read the message handed to him by Martin, he was heard to remark, ‘Well, if he wants me to hurry how does he expect that I can bring the packs? If I’m going to be of service to him I think I had better not wait for the packs.’” As Benteen rode closer, he suddenly saw Reno’s men scrambling to the top of the hill as Indian warriors swarmed in front. It was now 4:10 pm. A few minutes later, Benteen’s force joined Reno’s position. Martin, who stayed with Benteen, told historian Colonel W.A. Graham that he heard Reno exclaim, “For God’s sake, Benteen, halt your command and help me. I’ve lost half my men!” Benteen immediately distributed his extra ammunition to Reno’s men.

At almost the same time, heavy firing was heard coming from a few miles downstream. This was the critical moment. The Indians had spotted Custer’s cavalrymen approaching from the other end. Almost all the Indians now rushed off to meet the new threat. Although many troopers urged them to ride to the sound of the guns, neither Reno nor Benteen made any effort to move in that direction. They later denied even hearing any firing. Benteen told an army court of inquiry in Chicago in 1879, “I have heard officers disputing about hearing volleys. I heard no volleys.” At the same hearing, Reno blandly testified, “I heard no firing from down river.”

It has long been maintained that the Reno-Benteen forces were trapped on the hilltop by hundreds of Indians. In fact, Benteen told the court of inquiry, “The 900 Indians I saw in the valley remained there perhaps a half an hour then most of them went down the river.” In truth, the Indians were gone within minutes of Benteen’s arrival. Letters, memoirs, and subsequent interviews with both Indians and army troopers refute his sworn testimony.

Godfrey, in an 1892 interview, said, “At this time [4:20] there were a large number of mounted Indians in the valley. Heavy firing was heard down river. Suddenly, they all started down the valley and in a few minutes scarcely a horseman was to be seen. During this time questions were being asked. ‘What are we staying here for?’” William Taylor, a private with Benteen at the time, in a first-person narrative published after his death, wrote, “We heard firing off in the direction Custer was supposed to have gone. ‘Why don’t we move?’ was a question asked by more than one. The troops that were engaged in the valley were somewhat demoralized but that was no excuse for the whole command to remain inactive.”

In an interview with Camp, Martin said, “We heard a lot of firing down the river. It kept up for half an hour. It sounded like a big fight was going on. We wanted to hurry and join them but they wouldn’t let us go.” The great Sioux medicine man Sitting Bull was asked in an 1887 interview, “Did your war chiefs not think it necessary to keep some of the young men there to fight the troops in the entrenchments?” He answered, “No, only a few soldiers were left on those bluffs. There were none but squaws and children in front of them.” Cheyenne warrior Wooden Leg, in an interview when he was 70, said, “In the hills to the north there was another force of soldiers. The Indians shooting at the first soldiers began to leave and ride toward those on the northward hills.”

Lieutenant Charles DeRudio, one of those who remained hiding below in the valley, said, “Soon after Major Reno left the timber, firing commenced at the other end of the village. I heard immense volleys and more than half the Indians left.” In a 1916 interview, Crow scout Hairy Moccasin said he saw Reno’s fight in the valley, which he described as “a big scramble with lots of Sioux.” Later, Custer asked him, “How is it going?” He replied, “Reno’s men are fighting hard.” Boyer then sent him back south, where he met Benteen on the hilltop. Hairy Moccasin said to him, “Do you hear that shooting back where we came from? They’re fighting Custer there now.” This was specific information on Custer’s location that Benteen later denied knowing.

Similar information was given to Reno. At the Chicago court of inquiry, McDougall testified, “The firing I heard was to the north on my right as I went toward the Little Big Horn. It was just two volleys. I told Major Reno about it.”

At 5:05 pm, Captain Thomas Weir, who had been seen arguing strongly with Reno and pointing excitedly downstream, took his company, on his own, in that direction. From what is now known as Weir’s Point, he saw the end of the Custer battle, then returned to the top of the hill. He reported that he had seen Indians firing at troopers’ bodies already inert on the ground.

The critical 10 to 15 minutes after Benteen joined Reno was the time in which a more determined leader might have taken charge. Admittedly, trying to mount an immediate relief force would have been difficult; the slow pack train with more ammunition had not yet come up. Perhaps it wouldn’t have made a difference and would have only resulted in more dead soldiers, but to refuse to try violated Custer’s order to “Come on—Come quick.”

Perhaps the most revealing testimony came from Benteen himself. He told the Chicago court, “A movement could have been made down the river in the direction Custer had gone upon my arrival on the hill, but we would have all been there yet.” Apparently, Benteen didn’t like the odds and figured that any soldiers who went that way also would have been killed. His sworn testimony that he and Reno heard no shooting, that they were tied down by 900 Indians, and that they didn’t really know where Custer was is not convincing.

Through the years, both Reno and Benteen tried to improve their version of what happened. They wrote letters and gave interviews in which they maintained that shortly after linking up on the hilltop, the ammunition pack train arrived and a movement was made in Custer’s direction. However, John Gray, in his 1991 book, Custer’s Last Campaign, convincingly shows that it was at least an hour before any such movement was launched, and that was only after continued prodding by Weir and others. Even then, it was a half-hearted advance. Benteen and Reno took only three companies down toward Custer’s position. By then, the window of opportunity had closed. Custer’s 220 men had been annihilated in a little less than an hour, and the victorious Sioux and Cheyenne were now coming back upstream. Quickly, the companies were forced to retreat to their position on the hilltop with the rest of the survivors.

Over the next several hours the Indians made repeated charges against the soldiers’ line. By all accounts, Benteen rallied the men, took control of the defense, and was responsible for preventing a rout. In later years, even his critics—and there were many—admitted that Benteen had held the force together. By evening, the shooting diminished and the companies remained through the night, listening to the shouts and loud victory whoops coming from the Indian encampment below.

In fairness, some participants believed that an attempted linkup would have been doomed. Varnum, Custer’s chief of scouts, told Camp that he never thought Benteen and Reno had any real chance of rescuing Custer. The same opinion was expressed later in a 1923 letter from General W.S. Edgerly, who had been a lieutenant with Benteen on the hilltop. Edgerly wrote, “In my opinion there was no chance to have saved Custer’s command or any considerable part of it from destruction [even] if Reno had advanced at once upon Benteen’s junction with him and without waiting for the ammunition.” He told Camp the same thing, adding significantly, “With the information they had at the time there was no reason not to have tried it.”

After a nervous night on the bluff, the troopers strengthened their position for an expected attack in the morning. Although the Indians resumed sniping and harassing, they made no serious attempt to drive the soldiers off the hill. Writer David Humphreys Miller, who in the 1930s interviewed aged Indian participants, said that Sitting Bull told him that he believed the issue was settled, that the white soldiers had taken a drubbing, and he was willing to let it go at that. Numerous Native American accounts contend that it was only after a direct order from Sitting Bull that they were not allowed to attack and overwhelm the Reno-Benteen force as they had done earlier with Custer.

To the relief of the surviving troopers, in the late afternoon of the 26th the huge Indian camp began to pack up and move out. They had been warned by their scouts of the approach of Terry’s force. Fewer than 100 of their warriors had been killed in the fighting on the bluff and in action against Custer’s force to the north.

The next day Terry’s column arrived. Fighting at the Little Bighorn was over. Terry found the bodies of Custer and his men scattered above the river in various separate places where different companies had tried to make a stand. The dead bodies had been stripped and mutilated. Custer’s body was one of the few that had not been scalped. Grisly newspaper accounts of the battle and its aftermath outraged Americans across the country. They demanded retribution. From that time on, the Indians’ freedom to migrate, hunt buffalo, and celebrate their spirited lifestyle was running out. The military stepped up efforts to bring any still-roaming Indians under control. Western migration increased, new train tracks were laid, fortune seekers poured in for gold, and the traditional world of the Plains Indians soon disappeared. Custer’s Last Stand was also theirs.

The question remains: Could at least part of Custer’s five companies have been saved? Whether Reno and Benteen might have pulled it off can never be known. That they didn’t even try, and then grossly misrepresented the reasons why they didn’t, is no longer open to dispute.

“...I was at the site and remember it was not entirely level. We started buy the center and went out and down a decline where some markers indicated where items were found. Maybe they would have put the guns up on the bluff and waited there?” [morphing libertarian, post 166]

The only flat terrain is the primary floodplain of the Little Bighorn River, which is about one mile wide at the battle site and extends southeast to northwest for several miles. The river winds through it and is quite close to the eastern edge for most of the length of the site. Timber patches and dense underbrush grow along the river.

Surrounding terrain away from the river varies: the low hills and gently rolling prairie you posted about, interspersed with dendritic drainage patterns cut into the soil, of moderate to deep depths. The steepness of the washes, gullies, gulches, draws, and valleys increases and the features go deeper as the river is approached. There are no clear pathways from southeast to northwest, the direction the 7th Cav had to travel to approach the site from their encampment of the night before.

Apart from the muddled and fragmented memories of the surviving cavalry troopers, and the oral traditions of the American Indians present, no one really knows how the engagement played out. Archaeological clues (expended cartridges, dropped equipment, broken weapons) cannot tell us everything.

Since it was impossible for the Gatling guns to have been brought into action, and employment doctrine was embryonic, their emplacement and use in action remains imponderable.

Best guesses as to how the clash played out seem to run along lines of Custer’s detachment being surprised, overrun, and annihilated in detail before he & troops in his immediate vicinity could react - conceiving a defense plan, digging in, and countering the Indian onslaught was out of the question.

The other two detachments were too far away, possessed of inadequate intelligence, and insufficiently familiar with the ground to provide support in the short time available. Serious personal tensions existed between the commanders, which could only have slowed their response in any event. Marcus Reno seems to have suffered a personal crisis at the key moment. Frederick Benteen was known to harbor antipathy toward George Custer and was jealous of his entire family.

.”I am not aware of the War College doing a Custer Battlefield Staff Ride...” [centurion316, post 173]

It wasn’t a staff ride.

It was a classroom exercise using subscale models of the landscape, vegetation, and forces engaged: they were called sand table or tabletop exercises as I recall. Something wargamers used to do quite a bit of, before better computer simulation made higher video fidelity possible. Which led to more-interesting gaming of all sorts.

When I was a cadet, there were several clubs devoted to the pastime (which figured in classroom lessons as well). One roommate would set up entire platoons & companies of what were essentially toy soldiers, testing assumptions and recreating specific battles.

Regret to report I cannot recall the publication in which the article on the exercise appeared. The key point was that the instructors deliberately sanitized the specifics in advance, to hamper the students when it came to figuring out what actual battle was being reenacted, thus negating any tendency toward prejudgment. And the only noteworthy outcome was that the students ended up making the same decisions that the real officers did on the day of the actual battle in 1876.

A staff ride on real live horses must have been of special interest. I’ve heard about lots of staff rides, but in actuality most could be termed “walks.” Or the groups proceed in modern vehicles.

I never went on any - was never enough of a fast burner, nor sufficiently politically connected, to attend any senior service schools.

“...The replacement rounds were brass, not sure how they were manufactured, probably bored.
It appears that the cavalry was issued carbines which shot 45-55s rather than the normal 45-70 cartridges...” [buffaloguy, post 167]

Hadn’t heard before, of US military small arms cartridge cases fashioned by drilling & machining. It’s all been deep draw die forming, except for extractor grooves in some special instances. Or so I’d been given to understand.

The British made early centerfire rounds by a build-up process, from many different materials: applied to the 557 Snider, 577/450 Martini-Henry, 476 M-H and possibly others. The charge was wrapped in waterproof paper, then a carboard sleeve, then coiled brass wire of square cross-section, and finally thin copper (later brass) sheeting after the bullet was placed in the neck. The rim was of iron, pierced and swaged to hold the primer cup. It was hollow riveted to a short cup of thicker copper or brass (still very thin), which was then crimped onto the cartridge head. The final product looked a lot like a modern shotshell, except for the metal-sheet body and the bullet.

These built-up rounds remained issue items until deep-draw manufacture of cases from 70-30 brass was perfected. The other big innovation was differential heat-treatment of the brass after forming: head and lower case body remained hard (brass hardens during drawing), while neck was annealed.

Early in the 2000s, one of the more scholarly-oriented firearms publications (Man at Arms, Rifle, Handloader, Small Arms Review or some such) published a lengthy article on firearms of the Little Bighorn battle. Trapdoor carbines and Colt Single Action Army revolvers - adopted in 1873 and only recently issued to field units - were looked on as the latest hi-tech super weapons and confidence was high that they’d give the troops a substantial advantage against the Indians.

Whether the War Dept or Army Ordnance performed any meaningful tests before adopting the new guns and new rounds isn’t clear. Quite apart from the hubris exhibited by BGen Benet, operational testing was in its infancy, and environmental conditions were not fully understood, especially when it came to their impact on small arms functional reliability. The author put some effort into arguing that the heat of that late June day in southeastern Montana put stresses on the copper-cased internal-primed ammunition that no one had believed possible, during acceptance trials; they bulged and stuck at a greater rate than ever seen previously. And when attempts were made later, to duplicate conditions in hope of divining “what went wrong,” the experiments fell short. Head scratches all around.

45-55 rounds were either identical externally, or slightly shorter in case length, than standard 45-70 rounds: Downloaded on purpose, to reduce recoil. I read someplace that 45-55 was also issued to the Corps of Cadets at West Point.

I’d not have cared to march nor ride with the troops of the 1870s. Not at all: I’d have wimped out early on. I have fired Trapdoors just once, with low-pressure smokeless loads specially prepared for those rifles. I was shooting the full-length infantry rifle- perceptibly heavy than any carbine. After eight shots, I was more than done for the day.

“Thank you very much, schurmann...” [laplata, post 161]

Glad to help.

The history of military art & science is stuffed full of a lot of detail, and obscure happenings, that rarely get mentioned in the opinion pieces and odes to “common sense” or hallowed tradition that become the subject of threads here. Tends to dull the edge of what many traditionally-minded citizens hold very dear.

After spending almost 29 years in uniform, and a further 19 years researching and reflecting on the topics, it occurred to me that the years of peace have been as important to military advancements as the years of war have been.

Or perhaps more important.

Advances in technology through science, research, and development happen in greater number during peacetime; so also do advances in theory, organization and tactical innovation - only then do the big brains and true intellects among the officer corps get the chance to reflect on what has already happened, debate and mull over the implications and formulate better approximations to apply the next time.

In wartime, no one has a chance to do much of anything but react, do what they are already trained to do, and rely on proven systems and past developments. Brilliant innovations in the midst of conflict are rare.

I've read where American ingenuity and the military allowing freedom of ideas and action at the lowest levels is what set us apart from the strictly regimented Soviets. And I imagine that goes for the Nazi's, Chinese - heck - any totalitarian regime.

I was watching some History Channel “Greatest Tank Battles” from the first Gulf War. A few of our tanks wiped out a huge bunch of Republican Guard tanks - I think we lost one tank and just one person dead in the battle.

The captured General was put into a vehicle, and there was a picture of Rommel on the inside. The Iraqi General asked who that was (Nazi uniform, etc.) Some Private shouted from the back of the vehicle something like “If you knew, maybe you wouldn't have gotten your butts handed to you.”

Oh - that battle was won because our guy in charge went charging in through the black smoke from the initial skirmish not knowing what lay beyond - and that was against typical protocol. But he took the initiative based on the circumstances and kept the element of surprise.

Hmm - just the little bit that I know about Little Bighorn - I guess that is one reason the Indians won - they changed their tactics.

The battlefield is one of my favorite spots to visit.

“I was able to find a reference to early cartridge manufacturing from about 1861...very soft brass was swaged...Very slow compared to cold drawn brass..” [buffaloguy, post 195]

Wow.

Never seen any cartridge case made of brass, dating so far back.

Was this a patent drawing?

Did the text mention brass specifically? Were there any further details on material or metallurgy?

My sense of the industrial history here is that copper was used exclusively, for a very long time, especially in rimfire applications where pressures had to remain low, of necessity.

Just what alloying & heat treating came to be used, I’ve no idea. But for a number of years I did work for a small dealership which sold a line of collector cartridges: not sure how far back their inventory dated, but they had some 46 Rimfire, 56-50 Spencer Rimfire (I think - one of the Spencer rounds at any rate), 44 Rimfire (not Henry Flat though), 41 Short Rimfire, many 38 Rimfire (in a profusion of lengths), some 25 Rimfire, a few 22 Extra Long Rifle Rimfire, plus a couple others whose designations I’ve forgotten. All had copper cases - or so the metal looked to the unaided eye.

“Brass” was a generic term for copper/zinc alloys, until rather late. “Cartridge brass” is often defined as 30 percent zinc, 70 percent copper.

Please bear in mind that it isn’t always possible to identify the alloy simply by looking; “gilding metal” - 5 percent zinc, 95 percent copper - looks just like copper but has been the brass alloy of choice for many bullet jackets since about 1929. Its perfection put an end to most metal-fouling problems, but even so it isn’t much use in its raw state - needs special heat-treating.

Deep-draw (”cold”) forming is very closely related to swaging.

We may need to consult the International Ammunition Association (cartridgecollectors.org).

“...the technology of today’s Army is pretty awesome compared to what we had.
“Brilliant innovations in the midst of conflict are rare”.
One great example comes to mind and it was very simple and saved the day, so to speak, and that was the Rhino tank at Normandy.”

I should have said “brilliant scientific/technical innovations that radically alter the strategic situation and impact the battlefield don’t occur very often during wartime.”

That is a big generalization. And one specific invention often has to wait until additional inventions make it feasible to combine all of them into a system that can give one side or the other the edge.

However:

- Gunpowder (in the West) did not appear while Euro powers were slugging it out.

- The steam engine appeared before 1700. But steam powered ships and railroads didn’t emerge during the French Revolution nor the Napoleonic Wars that followed. Only after.

- Breechloading guns (little and big) were around for centuries, before technical advances of the 1810s-1840s made them more feasible.

- Industrial innovations of the 1860s-1870s made production of better steel possible, in greatly increased quantities, enabling production of better artillery. Euro wars of the time were short & limited compared to before & after.

- Innovations in chemistry that led to nitro propellants (smokeless powder) and high explosives happened before 1850; improvements in metallurgy and industrial technique that made self-contained cartridges possible proceeded from the 1830s into the 1880s.

- However, major changes in the equipage of the world’s armed forces came only after the American Civil War, during which repeating arms first saw use. Rimfire cartridges dated to the 1850s, and centerfire cartridges appeared in the 1860s. Gatling’s mechanically actuated rapid-fire gun did emerge during ACW, but its impact remained small until better ammunition was developed. It (and a number of other mechanically actuated guns like Nordenfelt, Gardner, Hotchkiss etc) contributed to the development of the self-powered machine gun; the invention of hydro-pneumatic recoil braking enabled much higher rates of artillery fire. All of these contributed to the firepower revolution that made World War One so terrible. None came about during wartime.

- Flight (lighter-than-air) dated to the 1780s, but remained only marginally useful until aeronautics saw lengthier research, and a sufficiently light power source could be developed. Once the principles were figured out, and internal combustion engines were developed, heavier-than-air flight became a reality soon after.

- The tank (cross-country armored fighting vehicle) was a major development during World War One, but consisted of innovations (tracks, engines, QF guns) that had appeared in peacetime.

- Almost no innovation at all occurred in aviation during WW1, save the production of more powerful engines and heavier airplanes. The invention of gun-synchronizer systems was about the limit, which did alter the direction of development in air combat. Real advances in powered flight did not happen until the 1920s, when truly reliable air-cooled engines first appeared, aerodynamics enjoyed increased theoretical understanding, and catalytic petroleum refining permitted the production of much higher octane fuels (1930s).

- The submarine appeared in the 1770s, and development advanced from 1860 to 1900. Well before it had major impact during WW1.

- Gas turbine developments belonged to the 1920s, permitting the creation of jet-powered aircraft, which only began to affect the military situation as World War Two was ending.

- Advancements in electronics dated back before 1900, and were only spottily pursued to develop long-range radio communications (1910 or so), tactical radio (about 1920), radar (1930s), electronic computing (late 1930s - early 1940s), unmanned aircraft (1940s), cruise missiles (mid 1940s), and ballistic missiles (mid 1940s).

The production of hedgerow-cutting devices mounted on armored vehicles (Rhino tanks you spoke of) was indeed a brilliant adaptation, but it wasn’t a new invention. Says great things about the savvy & moxie of US GIs - and the openness of the American military hierarchy to needed changes - but it was a field modification, not a new system.

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