US Guns, German Armour

The Chieftain's Hatch ^ | April 1, 2012 | The Chieftain's Hatch

[Billthedrill]

Excellent article, and thanks for posting. BTT.

[Hugin]

Part of the situation was Army Ground Forces doctrine. Tanks were vehicles of exploitation. They were to play the role of horse cavalry.

True. That doctrine was part of the debate between wars between the traditional three branches of the Army, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery, each of which claimed the tank should be dedicated to them.

The Infantry wanted it to be a support vehicle. They wanted a heavy, wide tracked tank with a long, high velicity gun for destroying bunkers and enemy tanks. They didn't care about speed, as they claimed it didn't need to go faster than the infantry.

The Artillery considered anyting with a cannon to be theirs, and viewed tanks as mobile artilery. They objected to any long, high velocity gun, as they burned out barrels faster. They insisted that a barrel should last at least 1,000 rounds. According Belton, it's doubtful any tanks lasted long enough in combat to ever fire a thousand rounds.

Finally there was the Cavalry. With horses obsolete, the clear answer for cavalry officers like Patton was the tank. They wanted light fast tanks to fill the cavalry role. Although they won the argument in terms of doctrine, the M4 was a compromiise; light and fast, but with a low velocity gun the artillery favored.

[Hoplite]

Second your recommendation - “Death Traps” was a great read.

[First_Salute]

Thanks.

[blueunicorn6]

I had the good fortune to talk to a couple of the American Officers involved in the Battle of Nancy/Arracourt. I think one was Jimmy Leach. He talked of the advantages of the Sherman’s powered turret over the Panther’s hand-cranked turret.

[17th Miss Regt]

Because the Germans didn't use any at Kursk,

Lauchert's Panzer Brigade at Kursk was equipped with early versions of the Panther.

[TweetEBird007]

Saw some of these German tanks on tours of Aberdeen Proving Ground during my 1961 or 1963 Engr EOOC school at Ft Belvoir, VA. Also demo of multi barreled Vulcan during one of these tours.

[razorback-bert]

ping

[henkster]

Very thorough and informative article. Thank you. In regard to some of the earlier posts, and some additional comments:

The Germans did indeed employ Panthers at Kursk. In part, Operation Zitadelle had been delayed until a quantity of Panthers was available. However, those Panthers had been rushed into production before they had been properly tested and were prone to breakdown, particularly their transmissions. The gun and armor scheme was still the same that the Allies would face in Normandy a year later. The Soviets captured a number of Panthers, and several of them were undamaged and had simply broken down. The Soviets knew exactly what they were faced with and as a result, they up-gunned the T-34 from the 76mm to the T-34/85.

The problem was that our Soviet friends didn’t allow an American military mission to go to the front or make a meaningful personal inspection of the captured German equipment. They didn’t tell us that they knew their T-34/76, which was comparable to the Sherman, was not a match for the Panther. And they didn’t tell us that the Germans were producing the Panther in substantial numbers.

These things would have been nice to know from our allies. It’s not like it would have compromised their national security, unlike that bomb thing we were working on.

[M1911A1]

Thanks for posting that.

[X Fretensis]

Another book that describes the Sherman in action is
“Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks” by Dmitriy Loza.
By the end of the war, Loza was a battaion commander.
His memoirs cover mid-1944-through the capture of Vienna.
His battalion was then shipped to Mongolia for operations against the Japanese.

[TalonDJ]

My understanding is that the early model panthers they did have at Kursk were such a maintenance nightmare that they had no effect. More of them would not have helped until the teething problems were resolved.

[TalonDJ]

The major oppenent of the change was none other than Gen. George Patton, who falsely believed that a heavier tank with wider tracks would have to be slower on roads. He took the view that tanks would fill the roll of cavalry, running free behind enemy lines, and did not consider tank to tank fighting to be a major role.

Other historians have debunked this and laid the blame for sticking with the M4 at the feet of McNair. The Wikipedia article on the M26 has a summary of some of the competing views of this.

[17th Miss Regt]

The Panther-A model was a bit of a mess because of transmission problems, among others. But the Russians noted it very clearly and captured a few when the offensive was called off and the Germans pulled their forces back. The super 75 gun made them about as effective as a Tiger I. But, yes, the teething troubles at Kursk caused some real fast redesign work for that model.

[CougarGA7]

Really cool stuff. Thanks for posting it.

[Hugin]

Interesting article. Of course it’s possible that both McNair and Patton opposed a heavier tank. McNair cites a prevaailing veiw among combat commanders that a heavy tank was not needed, and there was no role for tank on tank combat. Patton certainly could have been one of those commanders.

[RatSlayer]

When the Soviets refused to take any of our tanks or artillery and said, just send us every deuce and a half truck and that you can, it should have been really obvious that all of our tanks and artillery pieces stunk.

We had from ‘42 to ‘44 to do something about it, but too many people were in denial.

[conservatism_IS_compassion]

When the Soviets refused to take any of our tanks or artillery and said, just send us every deuce and a half truck and that you can, it should have been really obvious that all of our tanks and artillery pieces stunk.

According to

Freedom's Forge:

How American Business Produced Victory in World War II
Arthur Herman

It was realized that you could pack ten times the tonnage in a Liberty Ship as parts as you could as assembled vehicles. So the agreement was made with Iran to set up an assembly line in Iran, and just make all the parts in America. Parts would arrive by Liberty ship and be efficiently laid out to feed the assembly line. Each Soviet driver who arrived at the port would be handed the keys to a truck which had just been assembled there and been loaded with other military supplies. They would drive in convoys back to the USSR.

We had from ‘42 to ‘44 to do something about it, but too many people were in denial.

Sounds pretty much like the torpedo lashup . . .

[alfa6]

Holy Carp, A Treadhead ping

and a cool one at that!!!

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

[SoCal Pubbie]

If the switch was made to the Pershing tank before D-Day, there would have been no American tanks at the landing. They would have been too big for the landing craft, and there would have been no way for them to wade ashore.

Add to that the fact that most American rail cars has a load limit of 40 tons. The Pershing weighed 43-46 tons. According to the book “Tanks Are Mighty Fine Things,” put out by Chrysler in 1946, the minimum load limit of the cars required to ship one Pershing was 118,000 pounds. That means a lot fewer tanks in theater.

There was also a shortage of flat cars of of any capacity. On Christmas day of 1944 the Chrysler plant had 75 tanks ready to ship and only 18 flat cars on hand. Even Shermans had to be shipped one to a car unless a 50 ft flat car turned up. If the US Army was building tanks as heavy as the King Tiger, it would have reduced the number of rail lines able to move the loads, further clogging the pipeline.

These logistical issues never seem to show up in armchair discussions of the M4 in WWII.