We Don't Need Another CIVIL WAR!

”The quote is not of me, but of Dr. Walter Erlich.”

The parts before and after the comma are wrong. I know full well the quote wasn’t of you. It is presumptuous of you to presume I did think so. I knew whose quote it was when you said it was by Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. Note that the quote is not by Erlich. That was another quote which I thanked you for. I am surprised you take personal offense when I critique the quote of Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.

"Dred Scott ... probably helped to promote the Civil War, as it certainly required the Civil War to bury its dicta."
HD: That quote is not bad. In a cutesy, playful, spinny kind of way. Although in reality we can always count on you for the dicta. Right?

”Obviously, I do not deliver dicta.......”

You miss the point. The point being that the Civil War couldn’t “bury the dicta”, because we have you around to incessantly cite the dicta of the case.

”That the nascent Republican party used race as a wedge issue to divide the people, and concocted a fraudulent and moot case and took it before the Supreme Court is acknowledged.”

If this is true (and I am still waiting for you to answer, “by whom was it acknowledged?), they sure fooled Taney and the rest of the SCOTUS!

As for what Jefferson Davis may have said, you have provided no source indicating that he actually said it.

I’ll take that as a “no”, that you do not know he said it. I can provide a link.

”supercalifragilisticexpialidocious”

Coming from you that is really quite atrocious.

[Woodpusher] The dicta of Chief Justice Taney establish only his own opinion on some matter."
[BroJoeK] And today Crazy Roger Taney's opinions are supported by almost nobody except, curiously, our own DiogenesLamp who claims, amazingly, that the US Constitution made abolition by states illegal!
So DiogenesLamp tells us that Lincoln was correct in saying the Supreme Court could make Illinois a slave state.
DiogenesLamp claims Crazy Roger's SCOTUS was on the verge of correctly declaring abolition unconstitutional.

I am not DiogenesLamp. If you have a problem with DiogenesLamp, tell DiogenesLamp about it.

Each state was free to not establish slavery within the law of said state. It is also clear that, from the Founding to the Civil War, slave owners were able to transport their slave property through free states. Thomas Jefferson took his slave Sally to France. This did not mean that France had been unable to prohibit slavery. Sally could have petitioned for freedom in France, but didn't. Sally returned to the plantation with Thomas Jefferson and her slave status reattached.

Slaves brought into a free state with the consent of their owner could petition for their freedom, however, due to circumstances, they generally needed someone to do it for them. Inexplicably, there was no uprising of White Northern abolitionists in the North to petition the courts to free slaves in the North who were there with consent of their owners. And, of course, if the slave was found in the North as a runaway, then the Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 2, Cl. 3, mandates,"No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." In the Lemmon case, New York abolitionists petitioned the Court on behalf of the slaves, and the slaves (who had not run away) were set free.

The Underground Railway went all the way to Canada. I don't know what that was all about but suspect the fleeing slaves must have been hockey fans.

And as gradual emancipation was so effective at turning slaves into free men, it is astounding that the 1860 census found more free Blacks in the slave states than in the free states. It makes one wonder where al the slaves freed by gradual emancipation went.

Now you, woodpusher, tell us: no, no, no... that's not what Crazy Roger said, it's not what Crazy Roger meant and anyway, nobody else at the time agreed with Crazy Roger.
But your problem is that a lot of people did agree, especially slaveholders, and a lot of Northerners like Lincoln took them seriously.

The Court opinion is absolute proof of what Taney did, and did not, opine. Those who fantasize that misbeliefs adopted by many misguided people outweigh the beliefs of the nine as a matter of law are the crazy ones. Those who believe and preach all sorts of fictions attributed to the opinion by partisans aren't too good either.

That the abolitionist press lied and distorted, and people believed the lies and distortions then, and for political reasons, the lies and distortions continue to be propagated today. It is a problem, but not of my creation.

Curtis handed his opinion in on the last day of the term, March 7, 1857. On the same day, Curtis gave a copy of his opinion to a Boston editor. A version of Taney's opinion was published by the St. Louis Leader on March 13, 1857.

The Scott case was decided on March 18, 1857.

Having been confidentially informed that Taney had revised his opinion, On April 2, 1861 before publication, Curtis went behind Taney's back and sought a copy from the clerk. The clerk refused to provide said copy and informed Taney who had orally directed the clerk to not provide a copy to anyone before official publication. A clash of correspondence ensured between the Curtis and Taney.

Taney wrote:

Soon after the decision was given, circumstances occurred which satisfied the court that justice to itself required that the opinion in this case should be reported and brought before the public under the usual supervision and responsibility of the officer appointed by the court to perform that duty; and that it ought not to be separated from all of the other opinions delivered by the court during the term, and hurried before the public in an unusual manner, by irresponsible reporters, through political and partisan newspapers, for political and partisan purposes. It became my duty to carry into effect this determination of the court; and I therefore gave an order to Mr. Carroll not to give a copy to any one but the official reporter.
The order in the first instance was verbal. But some time before the opinion was printed and had undergone the accustomed revision of a printed copy, Mr. Carroll mentioned to me that he had been applied to for a copy by Mr. Charles P. Curtis, and wished to know whether, from his near and intimate connection with you, he would not be excepted from the operation of the order. Upon my inquiring if Mr. Curtis had stated for what purpose he wished a copy, he showed me his letter, in which Mr. Curtis says he is about to publish a large edition of your opinion in a pamphlet, and wished “ to introduce that of the Chief Justice” with yours, meaning, I presume, the opinion of the court delivered by me. I told Mr. Carroll he could not have it for such a purpose. It appeared to me that Mr. Curtis himself, upon more consideration, would feel that his plan was open to serious objections. For the publication of your individual opinion in this manner, in connection with that of the court, leaving out the individual opinions of the other judges, would hardly be respectful to them, as it would seem to imply that he thought their opinions less worthy of publication than yours; and, also, that upon further reflection he would hardly feel justified in anticipating the official reporter in the publication of this opinion of the court, and thereby taking for his own emolument the profits arising from its sale, which legitimately and justly belong to the officer appointed by law to perform that duty. And it is due to frankness also to say, that I thought it would have been as well for any gentleman, before he undertook to report the opinion of the court under his own supervision, and in what manner and in what form he pleased, anticipating the officer of the court, to have asked and obtained leave of the tribunal to do so. . . .
I put the order in writing, with the concurrence and approbation of Mr. Justice Wayne and Mr. Justice Daniel, who were the only two justices beside myself then in Washington, and authorized Mr. Carroll to show it, or give a copy of it, to any one who might apply for a copy of the opinion.

Taney opined that the Court had been, "greatly misunderstood and grossly misrepresented in publications in the newspaper." He insisted that the Court opinion "not be brought before the public garbled and mutilated, and with false glosses attached to it."

In their heated exchange of correspondence, Taney informed Curtis that it was his understanding that Curtis did not want the opinion for any official purpose, stating, "On the contrary, you announced from the bench that you regarded the opinion as extra-judicial, and not binding upon you or any one else."

Justice Curtis wrote,

As respects what you say concerning Mr. C. P. Curtis’s application to the clerk for a copy of the opinion of the court, I have only to observe, that whatever application Mr. Curtis may have made was without my knowledge; that I had no connection with it whatever, and do not perceive why I should make any observations concerning it, or concerning the purpose for which you say it was desired.

The son of Justice Curtis later wrote,

I find among the papers relating to this case a note in the handwriting of Judge Curtis, in which he says that Mr. Charles P. Curtis wrote to him to ask if he knew how he (Mr. C. P. Curtis) could obtain a copy of the opinion of the court. The note then proceeds: “ I answered that I did not. Subsequently, he mentioned to me that he had a letter from Mr. Carroll, saying that he could have a copy for sixty dollars ; upon which I made no comment.”

Taney wrote to Justice Taney,

Since my return home, I have again looked over it; and as I have no desire to continue the unpleasant correspondence which you have been pleased to commence, I should have been glad to find that there was nothing in your last letter which called for a reply on my part.
But there are some passages which cannot be passed by without notice, because my silence in relation to them might lead to erroneous inferences, unjust to the judges with whom I concurred in opinion, as well as to myself.
You say that you were informed, after you returned home, that the opinion of the court, in the case of Scott v. Sandford, was materially altered after it was delivered from the bench. I do not mean to inquire through what channel you sought or obtained information on that subject. But however obtained, if it came to you in a way sufficiently authentic to induce you to act upon it, perhaps the more usual and appropriate course between members of the same tribunal would have been to address an inquiry to the judge who delivered the opinion. And if this had been done in the present case, you would have been promptly and frankly answered. But as you now, for the first time, inform me that this information induced you to address your letter to me demanding a copy, it is proper to say that it had no foundation in truth. There is not one historical fact, nor one principle of constitutional law. or common law, or chancery law, or statute law, in the printed opinion, which was not distinctly announced and maintained from the bench; nor is there any one historical fact, or principle, or point of law, which was affirmed in the opinion from the bench, omitted or modified, or in any degree altered, in the printed opinion. You will find in it proofs and authorities to maintain the truth of the historical facts and principles of law asserted by the court in the opinion delivered from the bench, but which were denied in the dissenting opinions. And until the court heard them denied, it had not thought it necessary to refer to proofs and authorities to support them; regarding the historical facts and principles of law which were stated in the opinion as too well established to be open to dispute. But you will find nothing altered, nothing in addition but proofs to maintain the truth of what was announced and affirmed in the opinion delivered.
There is another topic in your letter upon which I ought not to be silent. You speak of the opinion of the court as having been improperly kept back from the public when they had a right to know it. It is true that the opinion was not given to a partisan, political journal, to be published for political and partisan purposes. But it was delivered in open court, in the hearing of every one who chose to listen. It was placed in the hands of the office!- appointed by law to report it, as soon as it had undergone the usual revision. And it has been published in the manner in which the opinions of the court have been published for more than fifty years; and much sooner after the close of the term than they have commonly been issued by the reporter. Yet I have never heretofore heard the court charged with improperly keeping back its opinion from the people.
It is also true, as you say, that the constitutional questions decided by the court in this case were at the time, and still are, the subjects of earnest discussion as political questions, and the public mind much excited about them. But this has often happened before; and whole States have been highly agitated upon constitutional questions of the deepest interest, at the very moment when they were brought before the Supreme Court and there decided. And it has happened, too, on such occasions, that differences of opinion existed among the members of the court, and the opinion of the majority has been elaborately contested and freely commented on by the dissenting members; and it has likewise happened in such cases that the opinion of the majority, after it was pronounced, was vehemently assailed and misunderstood and misrepresented in the political newspapers and journals of the day; — yet it was never deemed necessary, on that account, to depart from the usual and established mode of promulgating the opinion of the court, nor the opinion of any one of the dissenting judges. The majority who concurred in and gave the opinion, and the judges who dissented, were all of them content that their respective opinions should be reported and published in the usual manner, and submitted at the same time, and in the same volume, to the sober and enlightened judgment of the public; so that each opinion might speak for itself and be compared with the others when it was read. And although this has heretofore been the uniform course of proceeding, I have never heard the court or the dissenting judges accused of improperly keeping back their opinions from the public.
And if you supposed there was any thing new and peculiar to this case which made it proper to depart from the established usage, and to publish the opinion in the public journals immediately after it was delivered, it is to be regretted that you did not suggest such a measure to the court. A proposition of that kind coming from one of its members, his reasons for it would undoubtedly have been respectfully listened to and considered. And if the majority had come to the same conclusion, directions could have been given to the official reporter to carry the plan into execution. In that case a copy of the opinion of the court and of the judges who concurred in it, as well as of those who dissented, might have been prepared and ready for the press as soon as the judgment was pronounced; and all of the opinions would have appeared simultaneously and together, so that he who read one would have the others before him, and be able to compare them together, and not be left to form his judgment of the one from what might be said of it in another and adverse opinion.
But the measures taken by you effectually prevented the publication of the opinions together or simultaneously. You never suggested (at least I never heard of such a suggestion) that you thought the established mode of reporting and publishing the opinion of the court ought, in this instance, to be departed from. And although I received a note from you in relation to the law library the day after the opinions had been delivered, and the day before you left Washington, you said nothing in it about the publication of the opinions, nor intimated that a more prompt and different mode of publication than the usual one was desirable. Nor did you apprise me of your intention to publish at once your dissenting opinion. And I learned with great surprise that, immediately on your return to Boston, you had published it in a political journal, and that it was distributed, not only to the subscriliers to the newspaper, but widely circulated throughout the country. You yourself, therefore, rendered it impossible that the opinions could come out together, as you say would have been the case in England; and equally impossible that the readers of one should have the other always at hand in order to compare them and judge between them; for the thousands, and tens of thousands, of persons who read your opinion in the journal in which it was published, and in other newspapers associated with it in political partisanship, could by no possibility have the opinion of the court before them until some time after yours had been read, and made its impression. And the far greater part of the readers among whom it was hurried and profusely scattered will never have an opportunity of reading the opinion of the court, nor of knowing any thing about it except what they learn from your version of the opinion, and your account of the proofs and authorities on which it is founded. . . .
And the fact that the public mind had become highly agitated in several States upon these questions by the near approach of their elections, seemed to render any departure from the long-established practice of the court at such a time peculiarly objectionable. Hence the order of which you complain, and which you represent as having kept back from the people what they had a right to have. The order prevented the court from being placed in the attitude of a combatant in the political arena without its consent, but it did nothing more.
You complain also, that you were not consulted when the court came to this conclusion, and say that it was a violation of your judicial rights, as a member of the tribunal, to pass the order without first advising with you. But you will recollect that you had then published your own opinion, adverse to that of the court, without consulting the judges who gave the opinion, or apprising them of your intention; and I cannot see any just ground upon which you could claim the right to share in the control and disposition of the opinion of the court, when the avowed object of your dissenting opinion was to impair its authority and discredit it as a judicial decision.
I have now done. I had, indeed, supposed that, whatever difference existed on the bench, all discussion and controversy between members of the tribunal was at an end when the opinions had been delivered; and I believed that this case, like all others that had preceded it, would be submitted calmly to the sober and enlightened judgment of the public in the usual channels of information, and in the manner in which it has heretofore been thought that judicial decorum and propriety required. But if it is your pleasure to address letters to me charging me with breaches of official duty, justice to myself, as well as to those members of the court with whom I acted, makes it necessary for me to answer and show the charges to be groundless; and a plain and direct statement of the facts appears to be all that is necessary for that purpose.

Quite properly, Curtis soon resigned from the Court. The government accepted his resignation without the usual formality of thanking him for his faithful and diligent service in the performance of his duties.

[woodpusher quoting McStea] "It is to be observed that the proclamation of April 15, 1861, was not a distinct recognition of an existing state of war.
The President had power to recognize it, The Prize Cases, supra; but he did not prior to his second proclamation, that of April 19....
in a civil war, only the government can know when the insurrection has assumed the character of war."
Legalese... important for some purposes, not for others.

The Protector, 79 U.S. 700

The Syllabus, which recites the holdings within the Opinion:

1. The beginning and termination of the late rebellion in reference to acts of limitation, is to be determined by some public act of the political department.
2. The war did not begin or close at the same time in all the States.
3. Its commencement in certain States will be referred to the first proclamation, of blockade embracing them, and made on the 19th April, 1861; and as to other States to the second proclamation of blockade embracing them, and made on the 27th April, 1861.
4. Its termination as to certain States will be referred to the proclamation of the 2d April, 1866, declaring that the war had closed in those States, and as to Texas to the proclamation of the 20th August, 1866, declaring it had closed in that State also.
5. Alabama was one of the States named in the first proclamation of blockade, and the first proclamation as to the termination of the war.
6. Accordingly an appeal from a decree by the Circuit Court of Alabama "of the 5th April, 1861, which was filed in the clerk’s office on the 17th May, 1871, was dismissed; it being held on the principles above stated, that more than five years had elapsed between the date of the decree and the filing of the appeal, allowing the suspension of the time produced by the war.

To show that these are, in fact, directly on point holdings, the full text of the Opinion of the Court in The Protector is presented.

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
The question, in the present case is, when did the rebellion begin and end? In other words, what space of time must be considered as excepted from the operation of the statute of limitations by the war of the rebellion?
Acts of hostility by the insurgents occurred at periods so various, and of such different degrees of importance, and in parts of the country so remote from each other, both at the commencement and the close of the late civil war, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to say on what precise day it began or terminated. It is necessary, therefore, to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons, those of the executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must be taken. The proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed, as marking the second. But the war did not begin or close at the same time in all the States. There were two proclamations of intended blockade: the first of the 19th of April, 1861, embracing the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the second, of the 27th of April, 1861, embracing the States of Virginia and North Carolina; and there were two proclamations declaring that the war had closed; one issued on the 2d of April, 1866, embracing the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas, and the other issued on the 20th of August, 1866, embracing the State of Texas. In the absence of more certain criteria, of equally general application, we must take the dates of these proclamations as ascertaining the commencement and the close of the war in the States mentioned in them. Applying this rule to the case before us, we find that the war began in Alabama on the 19th of April, 1861, and ended on the 2d of April, 1866. More than five years, therefore, had elapsed from the close of the war till the 17th of May, 1871, when this appeal was brought. The motion to dismiss, therefore, must be
Granted.

Grunting Harummmmpph! and proclaiming "legalese" does not cut it. Juvenile gestures do not reverse U.S. Supreme Court holdings.

I'm reminded of Von Clausewitz's maxim:
"War is a mere continuation of policy by other means."
Expanded on by Mao Zedong:
"Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."

I am reminded the United States law is found in the Constitution, Federal statutes, and Court opinions, but not in the musings of Von Clausewitz or Chairman Mao.

Whatever the legal status, the historical fact remains that Democrats have been at war or "politics" against the US Constitution since Day One, when they voted against ratification.

The historical fact is that on Day One, Democrats did not exist.

The Democratic-Republican Party was founded by Jefferson and Madison in the 1790s."
Jefferson is usually listed among the anti-Federalists.

Under the Constitution, Jefferson served as the first Secretary of State. As your beloved Wikipedia states, "Jefferson and James Madison organized the Democratic-Republican Party to oppose the Federalist Party during the formation of the First Party System." The Democratic-Republican Party opposed the Federalist PARTY and did not exist prior to the 1790s.

At the Framing, the Federalists supported ratification of the Constitution and the Anti-Federalists opposed ratification.

And Madison, known as the Father of the Constitution, co-authored the Federalist Papers, a pseudonymous marketing campaign to sell the Constitution to the people of New York.

Your point, if you have one?

DiogenesLamp: "I generally skip BroJoeK.
Talking to him is like arguing with a Moon Landing conspiracist."

Naw... here's what it is: like all Democrats, the only thing you hate more than the United States is the truth, itself.
Whenever the truth shows up you run away muttering "Moon Landing conspiracist."

Typical Democrat.

woodpusher: "I am not DiogenesLamp.
If you have a problem with DiogenesLamp, tell DiogenesLamp about it."

Both of you are here defending the Lost Cause.
But DiogenesLamp's version of the Lost Cause is somewhat different, possibly unique, and there's some value in noticing just where those differences lie.

woodpusher: "And as gradual emancipation was so effective at turning slaves into free men, it is astounding that the 1860 census found more free Blacks in the slave states than in the free states.
It makes one wonder where al the slaves freed by gradual emancipation went."

That's a claim sometimes repeated by DiogenesLamp, except with the explicit charge that Northern slaves were sold in the South rather than set free where they lived.
Here's the truth: in 1790 there were 32,000 freed-blacks in the South, mostly in Virginia & Maryland, plus 27,000 freed-blacks in the North, mostly in Pennsylvania, New York & Massachusetts.
By 1860 those numbers had grown to 251,000 freed-blacks in the South, still mostly in Virginia & Maryland and 226,000 in the North, now mostly in Pennsylvania, New York and Ohio.

So, from 1790 to 1860, how many Southern slaves escaped to become Northern freed-blacks and how many Northern slaves were sold in the South?
We suspect there were some of each, but nobody knows the real numbers.

woodpusher: "That the abolitionist press lied and distorted, and people believed the lies and distortions then, and for political reasons, the lies and distortions continue to be propagated today.
It is a problem, but not of my creation."

Again I'd suggest you have a heart-to-heart with our own Lost Causer DiogenesLamp, who insists that not only was Crazy Roger Taney correct in his opinions, but so was Lincoln in saying that the Supreme Court could declare abolition "unconstitutional"!

woodpusher: "Taney opined that the Court had been, "greatly misunderstood and grossly misrepresented in publications in the newspaper." "

The truth here is that it's very hard to exaggerate the insanity of Crazy Roger's opinions, any more than those concurring opinions of our own DiogenesLamp.
In both cases they defy rational explanation.

Is it possible that ‘’woodpusher’’ and “DL’’ might be one and the same person?

woodpusher: "I am reminded the United States law is found in the Constitution, Federal statutes, and Court opinions, but not in the musings of Von Clausewitz or Chairman Mao."

You remind us of the proverbial man with a hammer who looks on all the world as just nails.
The truth is, there have been any number of wars never so declared by the Constitution, Federal statues or Court opinions.
Here is a listing of hundreds of US military actions, named "wars", "rebellions", "insurrections", "revolts", "removals", "riots", "terrorism" -- only a few of which were subject to official SCOTUS or Congressional definitions.

So your devotion to the legalisms of the US Supreme Court is quite touching, but I assure you, without doubt there is life, reality and truth that's not in the least effected by whatever SCOTUS may, or may not, have said about it.

woodpusher: "At the Framing, the Federalists supported ratification of the Constitution and the Anti-Federalists opposed ratification...
Your point, if you have one?"

1788 anti-Federalists joined Jefferson's anti-Administration faction which became the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican Party, aka "Democratics".
Today's Democrats can trace their political roots back to the anti-Federalists who first opposed ratifying the 1787 Constitution, and have opposed it ever since.

In the 1860s Democrats waged war against the Constitution and continue today with slightly less violence but vastly more deviousness.

jmacusa: "Is it possible that ‘’woodpusher’’ and “DL’’ might be one and the same person?"

Not likely -- it's the nature of FR anonymous screen-names that we never know for sure who we're responding to.
False-flaggers, enemy agents, outright lunatics (?) ...we never know for sure.
Some people get banned under one name but later come back as somebody else, but no way to tell for sure.

Over the years we've seen several posters similar to woodpusher, with seemingly unlimited access to official public records who happily post page after page of documents in order to make some obscure point.

DiogenesLamp is a bit different, rather than endless documents, he posts very imaginative historical "theories", often Marxist based and sometimes (but not always) grounded in original Confederate propaganda.
So his style & "take" are individualistic enough that I can't imagine him also posting as somebody very different like, for example, woodpusher.

Bottom line: all we can do is take each poster at face value until, or unless, they somehow demonstrate otherwise.

No way. One is a homing pigeon and the other is a stool pigeon. It is possible that one may be the mentor of the other. One is well grounded, the other is lost in space. One I can learn from, the other is toxic puffery. And one holds the other in high esteem.

Speech at Carlinville, Illinois [1]

August 31, 1858

> “He [Lincoln] said the question is often asked, why this fuss about ni***rs? It is dictated that their position is a small matter, but let us inquire whether it is or not. His speech at the June convention had been much commented upon, and he read an extract from it, and showed wherein it had been misrepresented as to the ultimate triumph or extinction of slavery; that, although the agitation of the question was commenced in '54 with the avowed object of putting a stop to it, yet, the agitation was still increasing. The policy then adopted professed to leave the subject to the people of the territories and save politicians further trouble. Buchanan and Douglas have often promised us that this agitation would cease, but it is still going on, and only last winter was the hottest of any time yet.”

Is this the part of the opening of his speech that you are asking me about? Or was it some other part? I believe I can see an inherent problem with the part I quoted. Can you see it?

LOL! The ‘’woodpecker’’ and “The Lampster’’.

”The quote is not of me, but of Dr. Walter Erlich.”
The parts before and after the comma are wrong.

The quote, "Dred Scott ... probably helped to promote the Civil War, as it certainly required the Civil War to bury its dicta," with the ellipsis, is of Walter Ehrlich. A simple quote of Frankfurter would either have no elision or any such elision would be attributed to me. I did not perform the elision, nor did Justice Frankfurter.

Although in reality we can always count on you for the dicta. Right?
”Obviously, I do not deliver dicta.......”
You miss the point. The point being that the Civil War couldn’t “bury the dicta”, because we have you around to incessantly cite the dicta of the case.

The point is you stated I deliver dicta.

We have you around to fantasize that all the dicta in Scott is holding, and majority opinions of the court. Someone has to tell you not to play with somebody else's dicta.

”That the nascent Republican party used race as a wedge issue to divide the people, and concocted a fraudulent and moot case and took it before the Supreme Court is acknowledged.”
If this is true (and I am still waiting for you to answer, “by whom was it acknowledged?), they sure fooled Taney and the rest of the SCOTUS!

It has been publicly acknowledged since 1857.

One interesting agreed statement of (purported) fact was,

In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said daughter Eliza, from said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them and each of them as slaves.
At the times mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at such times.
Further proof may be given on the trial for either party.

Indeed, for Dr. Emerson to convey anything, it would have to be done before his death in 1843 repeat 1843. However, if Dr. Emerson conveyed Scott to John Sanford in 1843, why was Irene Emerson the defendant in Scott v. Emerson?

Had John Emerson conveyed Dred Scott to John Sanford in or before 1843, the lawsuit captioned Scott v. Emerson (the defendant being Irene Emerson, then widow of John Emerson and owner of Dred Scott) which preceded Scott v. Sandford becomes inconvenient. Sanford's death shortly before the decision of 1857 was decidedly inconvenient. Sanford could not be purported to convey or manumit Scott after Sanford was dead. Were Sanford the owner, Scott could not be conveyed until the estate was probated. But Scott was conveyed to Taylor Blow in time for Blow to set him free in May 1857. While Chaffee claimed he could not free or convey Scott prior to the decision, what he meant to say was that he could not do so because it would moot the suit. Oh, that's catchy. And within a week of the decision, Chaffee's ownership was published in a newspaper. The bullcrap about Scott's ownership went downhill from there. The act of conveyance could not be concealed after Taylor Blow, along with Dred Scott and his family, made a public appearance in the Court at St. Louis to effect the writ of manumission.

Scott v. Emerson was decided in the trial court in 1850, and reversed in the Missouri Supreme Court in Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852)

As for what Jefferson Davis may have said, you have provided no source indicating that he actually said it.
I’ll take that as a “no”, that you do not know he said it. I can provide a link.

Or you can keep it as your little secret. I don't care. It's probably some wingnut website anyway.

When I cite something like the Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 3, page 77, that is a citation to the gold standard.

Both of you are here defending the Lost Cause.

There goes your vivid imagination again.

I am defending accurate history and law. You are making things up. I am correcting your unseemly misrepresentations of history and the law.

That's a claim sometimes repeated by DiogenesLamp, except with the explicit charge that Northern slaves were sold in the South rather than set free where they lived.
Here's the truth: in 1790 there were 32,000 freed-blacks in the South, mostly in Virginia & Maryland, plus 27,000 freed-blacks in the North, mostly in Pennsylvania, New York & Massachusetts.
By 1860 those numbers had grown to 251,000 freed-blacks in the South, still mostly in Virginia & Maryland and 226,000 in the North, now mostly in Pennsylvania, New York and Ohio.

Your 1860 figures are a false misrepresentation of what the Census of 1860 actually states.

Your response pertains to something unsaid, and ignores or seeks to change the impression of what I did say at my #422. I will repeat my statement regarding the Census of 1860.

it is astounding that the 1860 census found more free Blacks in the slave states than in the free states. It makes one wonder where al[l] the slaves freed by gradual emancipation went.

I made no comparison of states North and South. There were more free Blacks in the fifteen (15) slave states than in the free states. There were slave states North and South. There were fifteen (15) of them. Your Liberal interpretation of the 1860 Census ridiculously misidentifies the States attached to the statistics, and only proves that whatever you used for a source, it was not the actual Census Report.

The census recapitulates the “free colored population.” This is not a recapitulation of freed slaves. A slave who escaped from a slave state to a free state was not freed by anyone else, but by his own fast feet. Gradual emancipation only occurred in slave states. The statistics of 1860 identify what it identifies as “free colored people.” Free and freed are not synonymous. From what wackadoodle source did you get your misinformation about the 1860 Census?

The Census report of 1860 showed that there were 251,000 free colored persons in the fifteen slaveholding states, and only 237,283 free colored persons in the nineteen free states and the seven territories and the District of Columbia.

SOURCE: Population of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census, under the Directgion of the Secretary of the Interior, by Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Superintendant of Census, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1864.

At vii:

Looking cursorily over the returns, it appears that the fifteen slaveholding States contain 12,240,000 inhabitants, of whom 8,039,000 are whites, 251,000 free colored persons, and 3,950,000 are slaves. The actual gain of the whole population in those States, from 1850 to 1860, was 2,627,000, equal to 27.33 per cent. The slaves advanced in numbers 749,931, or 23.44 per cent. This does not include the slaves of the District of Columbia, who decreased 502 in the course of the ten years. By a law of April 16, 1862, slavery has been abolished in the District of Columbia, the owners of slaves having been compensated out of the public treasury. The nineteen free States and seven Territories, together with the federal District, contained, according to the Eighth Census, 19,203,008 persons, of whom 18,920,771 were white, 237,283 free colored, and 41,725 civilized Indians.

It is historical fact that there were more free Blacks in the fifteen (15) slave states than in the free states.

At xv:

MANUMISSION OF SLAVES.
With regard to manumission, it appears from the returns that during the census year, they numbered a little more than 3,000, being more than double the number who were liberated in 1850, or at the rate of one each to 1,388; whereas, during 1850, the manumissions were as one to every 2,181 slaves. Great irregularity, as might naturally be expected, appears to exist for the two periods whereof we have returns on this subject. By the Eighth Census, it appears that manumissions have greatly increased in number in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee, while they have decreased in Delaware and Florida, and varied but little in Kentucky, Missouri, South Carolina, and Virginia, and other slaveholding States not mentioned.

Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census.
Census Office, Department of the Interior,
Washington, May 20, 1862.

At 6:

Thus, in Boston during the five years ending with 1859, the city registrar observes: "The number of colored births was one less than the number of marriages, and the deaths exceeded the births in the proportion of nearly two to one." In Providence, where a very correct registry has been in operation under the superintendence of Dr. Snow, the deaths are one in twenty-four of the colored; and in Philadelphia during the last six months of the census year, the new city registration gives 148 births against 306 deaths among the free colored.
[...]
Owing, among other causes, to the extremes of climate in the more northern States, and in other States to expulsive enactments of the legislatures, the free colored show a decrease of numbers during the past ten years according to the census, in the following ten States: Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont.

The average life span of a free Black in one of the slave states exceeded that of a free Black in the free states.

[woodpusher #422] "That the abolitionist press lied and distorted, and people believed the lies and distortions then, and for political reasons, the lies and distortions continue to be propagated today. It is a problem, but not of my creation."
[BroJoeK #425] Again I'd suggest you have a heart-to-heart with our own Lost Causer DiogenesLamp, who insists that not only was Crazy Roger Taney correct in his opinions, but so was Lincoln in saying that the Supreme Court could declare abolition "unconstitutional"!

However, before he denigrated the Mexican race on page 235, on page 231 Lincoln observed,

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, nothing in Constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a slave.

The Constitution expressly recognized the right to hold slaves within the union. In Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, the Constitution states, “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.” Who were these “three-fifths of all other persons?”

The Constitution at Article 4, Section 2, Clause 3 states, “No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” It is known as the Fugitive Slave clause. Who do you think it pertained to, Whites who didn’t show up for work?

Article 5 provides, “no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article....”

Whatever was in those protected clauses?

The Constitution at Article 1, Section 9, Clause 1, provided, “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”

The Constitution forbade prohibition of the African slave trade for 20 years.

No power was delegated by the People, via the Constitution, to the Federal government regarding the institution of slavery. The people reserved such power to themselves, except for what they may have delegated to their State government.

Every State could choose to be a slave or free State. The people of a State could decide the issue by stating their preference within their State constitution.

[woodpusher #422] "Taney opined that the Court had been, "greatly misunderstood and grossly misrepresented in publications in the newspaper." "
[BroJoeK #425] The truth here is that it's very hard to exaggerate the insanity of Crazy Roger's opinions, any more than those concurring opinions of our own DiogenesLamp. In both cases they defy rational explanation.

The truth is that you have made self-evident that you have never read Taney’s opinion, or the other opinions in the Scott case. You have also made self-evident that your knowledge of the Constitution and U.S. law is dismal. You prefer your own fanciful projections of what Taney and the actual laws state. You can only shamefully run and hide in ignorance from the actual laws and the actual court opinions.

It is tough to take, but the Supreme Court actually remanded the case to the Circuit Court, with instructions for that Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The status of free or slave was a matter of State law, and was decided according to Missouri state law. Scott was in Missouri, and the case was brought in Missouri. The ultimate interpretation of State law is rendered by the highest court of the State. Such interpretation is not subject to review by the Federal courts. The status of Dred Scott was determined by the Supreme court of Missouri in Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). The opinion of the Court begins at 15 Mo. 582. I provide it here as you have obviously avoided reading it for the first time. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the holding of a lower court and held the status of Scott to be that of a slave pursuant to Missouri law.

SCOTT J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action instituted by Dred Scott against Irene Emerson, the wife and administratrix of Dr. John Emerson, to try his right to freedom. His claim is based upon the fact that his late master held him in servitude in the State of Illinois, and also in that territory ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36 degrees 30 minutes, north latitude, not included within the limits of the State of Missouri.
It appears that his late master was a surgeon in the army of the United States, and during his continuance in the service, was stationed at Rock Island, a military post in the State of Illinois, and at Fort Snelling, also a military post in the territory of the United States, above described, at both of which places Scott was detained in servitude—at one place, from the year 1834, until April or May, 1836; at the other from the period last mentioned, until the year 1838. The jury was instructed, in effect, that if such were the facts, they would find for Scott. He, accordingly, obtained a verdict.
The defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection by the court, which being denied to her, she sued out this writ of error.
Cases of this kind are not strangers in our courts. Persons have been frequently here adjudged to be entitled to their freedom, on the ground that their masters held them in slavery in territories or States in which that institution was prohibited. From the first case decided in our courts, it might be inferred that this result was brought about by a presumed assent of the master, from the fact of having voluntarily taken his slave to a place where the relation of master and slave did not exist. But subsequent cases base the right “to exact the forfeiture of emancipation,” as they term it, on the ground, it would seem, that it is the duty of the courts of this State to carry into effect the constitution and laws of other States and territories, regardless of the rights, the policy or the institutions of the people of this State.
[*583] The States of this Union, although associated for some purposes of government, yet, in relation to their municipal concerns have always been regarded as foreign to each other. The law of descents of one State is not regarded in another, in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons. So of the law of wills, administrations, judicial proceedings, and all other matters of mere internal police. The courts of one State do not take judicial notice of the laws of other States. They, when it is necessary to be shown what they are, must be proved like other facts. So of the laws of the United States, enacted for the mere purpose of governing a territory. These laws have no force in the States of the Union, they are local, and relate to the municipal affairs of the territory. Their effect is confined within its limits, and beyond those limits they have no more effect, in any State, than the municipal laws of one State would have in any other State: State of Virginia acts; Cohen’s 6 Wheat. This doctrine is declared and maintained, not only with respect to nations strictly foreign to each other, but also to the several States of this Union. Every State has the right of determining how far, in a spirit of comity, it will respect the laws of other States. Those laws have no intrinsic right to be enforced beyond the limits of the State for which they were enacted. The respect allowed them will depend altogether on their conformity to the policy of our institutions. No State is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws. In the Conflict of Laws, sec. 86, it is said: “but of the nature, and, extent and utility of this recognition of foreign laws, respecting the state and condition of persons, every nation must judge for itself, and certainly, is not bound to recognize them, when they would be prejudicial to their own interests. It is, in the strictest sense a matter of the comity of nations, and not of any absolute paramount obligation, superseding all discretion on the subject.” So in sec. 32, it is said, “it is difficult to conceive, upon what ground a claim can be vested, to give any municipal laws an extra territorial effect, when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other nations or to those of their subjects; it would at once annihilate the sovereignty and equality of every nation, which should be called upon to recognize and enforce them, or compel it to desert its own proper interests and duty to its own subjects in favor of strangers, who were regardless of both. A claim so naked of any principle or just authority to support it, is wholly inadmissible.”
Again, “the comity of nations is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the state by which it is shown, and is inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy or prejudicial to its interests.
[*584] In the silence of the positive rule, affirming or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interest.” sec. 38. It is a humiliating spectacle, to see the courts of a State confiscating the property of her own citizens by the command of a foreign law. If Scott is freed, by what means will it be effected, but by the constitution of the State of Illinois, or the territorial laws of the United States? Now, what principle requires the interference of this court? Are not those governments capable of enforcing their own laws; and if they are not, are we concerned that such laws should be enforced, and that, too, at the cost of our own citizens?—States, in which an absolute prohibition of slavery prevails, maintain that if a slave, with the consent of his master, touch their soil he thereby becomes free. The prohibition in the act, commonly called the Missouri Compromise, is absolute. How is that to be interpreted? That act prevails along our entire western boundary; if our courts take upon themselves the task of enforcing the laws of other States, it is nothing but reasonable that they should take them as they are understood where they are promulgated. If a slave passes our western boundary, by the order of his master, and goes into the territory subject to the Missouri Compromise, does he thereby become free? Most of the courts of this Union would say that he does, if his freedom is sought to be recovered under the laws of that territory. If our courts undertake the task of enforcing that act, should they not take it as most of the other States would? Some of our old cases say, that a hiring for two days would be a violation of the constitution of Illinois and entitle the slave to his freedom. If two days would do, why not one? Is there any difference in principle or morality between holding a slave in a free territory two days more than one day? and if one day, why not six hours? The old cases say, the intent is nothing, the act is the thing.
Now are we prepared to say, that we shall suffer these laws to be enforced in our courts? On almost three sides the State of Missouri is surrounded by free soil. If one of our slaves touch that soil with his master’s assent, he becomes entitled to his freedom. Considering the numberless instances in which those living along an extreme frontier would have occasion to occupy their slaves beyond our boundary, how hard would it be if our courts should liberate all the slaves who should thus be employed. How unreasonable to ask it. If a master sends his slave to hunt his horses or cattle beyond the boundary, shall he thereby be liberated? But our courts, it is said, will not go so far. If not go the entire length, why go at all? Thy obligation to enforce to the proper [*585] degree, is as obligatory as to enforce to any degree. Slavery is introduced by a continuance in the territory for six hours as well as for twelve months, and so far as our laws are concerned, the offence is as great in the one case as in the other. Laws operate only within the territory of the State for which they are made, and by enforcing them here, we, contrary to all principle, give them an extra territorial effect. Chancellor Kent says: “A statute, though not in the nature of a judicial proceeding, is, however, a record of the highest nature. But if a statute, though a matter of record, was to have the same effect in one State as in another, then one State would be dictating laws for another, and a fearful collision of jurisdiction would instantly follow. That construction is utterly inadmissible, while it is conceded to be a principle of public law, requisite for the safe intercourse and commerce of mankind, that acts, valid by the law of the State where they arise, are valid everywhere, it is at the same time, to be understood, that this principle relates only to civil acts founded on the volition of the parties, and not to such as proceed from the sovereign power. The force of the latter cannot be permitted to operate beyond the limits of the territory, without affecting the necessary independence of nations.” 2 Kent, 117, 8.
This language is used when speaking in reference to the legislation of other States of the Union. It is conceived, that there is no ground to presume or to impute any volition to Dr. Emerson, that his slave should have his freedom. He was ordered by superior authority to the posts where his slave was detained in servitude, and in obedience to that authority, he repaired to them with his servant, as he very naturally supposed he had a right to do. To construe this into an assent to his slave’s freedom would be doing violence to his acts. Nothing but a persuasion, that it is a duty to enforce the foreign law as though it was one of our own, could ever induce a court to put such a construction on his conduct. The present atitude of the parties to this suit is conclusive, as to an actual consent, and nothing but the foreign law or the aid derived from it, can raise an implied one. If the State of Missouri had prohibited slavery within her limits, and our courts were called upon to execute that law, some zeal might be tolerated in our efforts to execute it; but while slavery obtains here, there is no consideration which would warrant us in going such lengths against our own citizens, for having permitted their slaves to remain in the territory of a State where slavery is prohibited.
In States and Kingdoms in which slavery is the least countenanced, and where there is a constant struggle against its existence, it is admitted law, that if a slave accompanies his master to a country in which [*586] slavery is prohibited, and remains there a length of time, if during his continuance in such country there is no act of manumission decreed by its courts, and he afterwards returns to his master’s domicil, where slavery prevails, he has no right to maintain a suit founded upon a claim of permanent freedom. This is the law of England, where it is said that her air is too pure for a slave to breathe in, and that no sooner does he touch her soil than his shackles fall from him. The case of slave, Grace, 2 Haggard Adm’rl’ty Rep. 94. Story, in his conflict of laws, says, “it has been solemnly decided that the law of England abhors and will not endure the existence of slavery within the nation, and consequently, so soon as a slave lands in England, he becomes ipso facto, a free man, and discharged from the state of servitude; and there is no doubt that the same principle pervades the common law of the non-slaveholding States in America: that is to say, foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after their removal thither.” But he continues, “it is a very different question how far the original state of slavery might re-attach upon the party, if he should return to the country by whose laws he was declared to be and was held as a slave:” Sec. 95, 6. In the case of the commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Ames, 18, Peck, Judge Shaw, although declining to give an express opinion upon this question, intimates very clearly that if the slave returns to his former country where slavery obtains, his condition would not be changed. In the case of Graham vs. Strader, 5 Mon. 183, the court of Appeals in Kentucky held, that the owner of a slave, who resides in Kentucky, and who permits his slave to go to Ohio in charge of an agent for a temporary purpose, does not forfeit his right of property in such slave.
An attempt has been made to show, that the comity extended to the laws of other States, is a matter of discretion, to be determined by the courts of that State in which the laws are proposed to be enforced. If it is a matter of discretion, that discretion must be controlled by circumstances. Times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. Although we may, for our own sakes, regret that the avarice and hard-heartedness of the progenitors of those who are [*587] now so sensitive on the subject, ever introduced the institution among us, yet we will not go to them to learn law, morality or religion on the subject.
As to the consequences of slavery, they are much more hurtful to the master than the slave. There is no comparison between the slave in the United States and the cruel, uncivilized negro in Africa. When the condition of our slaves is contrasted with the state of their miserable race in Africa; when their civilization, intelligence and instruction in religious truths are considered, and the means now employed to restore them to the country from which they have been torn, bearing with them the blessings of civilized life, we are almost persuaded, that the introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the providences of God, who makes the evil passions of men subservient to his own glory; a means of placing that unhappy race within the pale of civilized nations.
Judge Ryland concurring, the judgment will be reversed, nnd the cause remanded.

[woodpusher #423 "I am reminded the United States law is found in the Constitution, Federal statutes, and Court opinions, but not in the musings of Von Clausewitz or Chairman Mao."
[BroJoeK #427] You remind us of the proverbial man with a hammer who looks on all the world as just nails.
The truth is, there have been any number of wars never so declared by the Constitution, Federal statues or Court opinions.

The truth is no war has been declared by the Constitution, Federal statute, or by a Court opinion. Congress has issued a Proclamation of a State of War, but a Proclamation is not a Statute. Once again you are babbling nonsense and have no clue what you are talking about.

In The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1871) we find the holding,

It is necessary, therefore, to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons, those of the executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must be taken.

The start and end of war is determined by the public acts of the political departments, not the judicial department. In the Civil War, it was obvious to the Court, that the public acts of the Executive Department marked the start of the war, namely the proclamation of a blockade of April 19, 1861.

That you do not like what was obvious to the Court, signifies only that your insane prejudice blinds you from historical facts, prevents you from learning.

[woodpusher #419] Did you know what Lincoln said to start his speech at Carlinville, Illinois on August 31, 1858? It is in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, available online at The University of Michigan. See Volume 3, page 77.

[Handandy #430] Speech at Carlinville, Illinois [1] August 31, 1858 “He [Lincoln] said the question is often asked, why this fuss about ni***rs?” ....

Please advise what is the cause of your confusion. How many speeches of Lincoln at Carlinville, Illinois on August 31, 1858 in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 3, on page 77 did you find?

There is the remarkably similar content from a Lincoln speech at Clinton, Illinois but that is not at page 77 and is given in a different city on a different date.

The same may be said for the remarkably similar content in the Lincoln speech at Elwood, Kansas, but that was more than a year later, in a different city, and also not on Volume 3, page 77.

I cannot see a problem with Lincoln’s speech in your post. However, you do seem to have hidden something Lincoln said by using asterisks. Perhaps you quoted Wikipedia rather than the Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln.

Of course, the fifth Lincoln-Douglas debate was entirely different, on a different date, in Galesburg, Illinois, at Volume 3, page 77, page 235. There, Lincoln denigrated the Mexican race.

However, before he denigrated the Mexican race on page 235, on page 231 Lincoln observed,

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, nothing in Constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right off property in a slave.

“”The quote, "Dred Scott ... probably helped to promote the Civil War, as it certainly required the Civil War to bury its dicta," with the ellipsis, is of Walter Ehrlich. A simple quote of Frankfurter would either have no elision or any such elision would be attributed to me. I did not perform the elision, nor did Justice Frankfurter.

Wrong, wrong and wrong. Or, the below is wrong. You have contradicted yourself. You also posted this:

WP: post#411“As you like quotes of justices, try this one. "Dred Scott ... probably helped to promote the Civil War, as it certainly required the Civil War to bury its dicta." Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court New York, Oxford, 1993, pp. 120-121.”

You are confused.

The point is you stated I deliver dicta.

I never stated that you deliver dicta. Show me where I stated that you deliver dicta.

”Or you can keep it as your little secret. I don't care. It's probably some wingnut website anyway.

Here’s the link to Jeff Davis’ quote: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1864/09/our-visit-to-richmond/522843/

I hope the link is to your satisfaction, eminence. You have to read a bit to get to the quote, it is near the end. But you like reading. In fact you hide behind walls of text. And when you do peek out from behind your walls of text you........don’t present well.

“I cannot see a problem with Lincoln’s speech in your post. However, you do seem to have hidden something Lincoln said by using asterisks.“

I will try to explain to you, Mr Smartass, what the problem is in the first line of the Lincoln speech. Hint: transcriber/editor f’d up. Try to concentrate for a second. To review, Lincoln’s speech began thusly:
“He [Lincoln] said the question is often asked, why this fuss about ni***rs?”

Can you see the problem now, your eminence? I gave you a hint. It’s really not that hard. You see, this is Lincoln’s speech. He is the person uttering the words. The transcriber/editor (probably a Lost causer) stuck in “[Lincoln]” in brackets. Has it occurred to you that it should be [Douglas] in brackets? Did you think that Lincoln was talking about himself when he said “he”? Of course he wasn’t. He was talking about Douglas!! The “He” that Lincoln was referring to was [Douglas]. As is clear once you read the entire speech and note where the transcriber/editor correctly puts [Douglas] in brackets. Let me straighten this out for you after lo these many scores of years have passed. Read it this way: “He [Douglas] said the question is often asked, why this fuss about ni***rs?” Lincoln was paraphrasing Douglas. Now do you understand why I double checked if I had the correct speech. There is no there there. I’m sorry dude but you have turned out to be a dud. You can take the rest of your dictum and stick it up your rectum.

Very much admire your work.

woodpusher: "I am defending accurate history and law."

But only such history and law as might support claims of Lost Causers, right?

woodpusher: "Your 1860 figures are a false misrepresentation of what the Census of 1860 actually states."

Nonsense, my final numbers are close to the preliminary you quoted, one difference being that I added up each state's numbers to arrive at sum totals, ignoring Washington, DC.
This is my source, UVA.

woodpusher: "I made no comparison of states North and South.
There were more free Blacks in the fifteen (15) slave states than in the free states.
There were slave states North and South.
There were fifteen (15) of them."

You sound very confused & disoriented, let me help you straighten it out: for purposes of most discussions, "North" = free states and "South" = slave states.
So "South" includes such Border States as Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky & Missouri -- are you with me so far?
Now the question is free-men or freed-blacks or free colored persons.
In your defense of the Lost Cause you point out -- correctly -- that in 1860 there were more free colored persons in the South than the North.
What you chose to ignore is that was always the case, since at least 1790, and indeed, the percentages of Southern freed-blacks had actually declined, slightly:

1790 59,000 total free colored 54% in Southern states.
1800 108,000 total free colored, 57% in Southern states.
1810 174,000 total free colored, 56% in Southern states.
1820 229,000 total free colored, 57% in Southern states.
1830 312,000 total free colored, 56% in Southern states.
1840 377,000 total free colored, 55% in Southern states.
1850 424,000 total free colored, 54% in Southern states.
1860 477,000 total free colored, 53% in Southern states.

Of course I "get" that you were hoping desperately to use the populations of free colored people as yet another weapon against Northern Republicans.
But the reality is that numbers grew roughly the same, North & South, slightly faster in Northern states and there were no large population declines in any state, North or South.

woodpusher: "A slave who escaped from a slave state to a free state was not freed by anyone else, but by his own fast feet."

That might explain why Confederate armies felt free to grab any blacks they found in Northern states, for sale in Confederate slave markets.
Confederates assumed any Northern blacks were fugitives and so subject to contraband declarations.

The reality is, we don't know how many Northern African-Americans were born free and how many were recent fugitives from Southern slavery.

woodpusher: "...the free colored show a decrease of numbers during the past ten years according to the census, in the following ten States: Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont."

Those were preliminary numbers, so, let's look at final numbers, as reported here, UVA.

Arkansas 1850 free colored: 608 1860: 144 change: -464
Florida 1850 free colored: 932 1860: 932 change: 0
Mississippi: 1850: 930 1860: 773 change -157
Texas: 1850:397 1860: 355 change -42
Total South: 1850: 228,000 free colored, 1860 251,000 change: +23,000
Indiana: 1850: 11,262 1860: 11,428 change: +166
Maine: 1850: 1,356 1860: 1327 change: -29
New Hampshire: 1850: 520 1860: 494 change: -26
New York 1850: 49.069 1860: 49,005 change: -64
Oregon: 1850: 0 1860: 128 change: +128
Vermont: 1850 718 1860: 707 change -9
Total North: 1850: 196,000 free colored 1860: 226,000 change: +30,000

So, between 1850 and 1860 the total population of free African Americans grew by 23,000 in the South and by 30,000 in the North.
Three Southern states and four Northern states had very small population losses, losses that totaled 663 in the South, 128 in the North.

woodpusher: "The average life span of a free Black in one of the slave states exceeded that of a free Black in the free states."

I've seen no evidence to support such a claim, even though common sense might well suggest that people living a healthy life-style in the country might expect longer lives than those in crowded, dirty cities.

woodpusher: "No power was delegated by the People, via the Constitution, to the Federal government regarding the institution of slavery.
The people reserved such power to themselves, except for what they may have delegated to their State government."

And yet... and yet... Crazy Roger Taney, Abraham Lincoln, many Northerners in 1860 and even our own DiogenesLamp believed the US Supreme Court could declare abolition "unconstitutional""

"We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free; and we shall awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State."

It helped turn a lot of pro-slavery Northern Democrats into anti-slavery Republicans.

woodpusher: "The truth is that you have made self-evident that you have never read Taney’s opinion, or the other opinions in the Scott case. "

I've read plenty enough to know that Crazy Roger was deeply insane, as is anyone who tries to defend his opinions.
I notice that you, woodpusher, have not defended Taney's opinions, merely argued (at great length) that his opinions were irrelevant and mischaracterized in the Northern press.

I'm saying Taney's opinions were not irrelevant because they convinced a huge number of Northerners that the US Supreme Court had become, to use DJT's term, an "enemy of the people" and was on the verge of overthrowing the 1787 Constitution in favor of one which looked more like the 1861 Confederate constitution.

woodpusher: "You can only shamefully run and hide in ignorance from the actual laws and the actual court opinions.
It is tough to take, but the Supreme Court actually remanded the case to the Circuit Court, with instructions for that Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction."

And that is totally irrelevant to the effect Crazy Roger's opinions had on Northern voters.

woodpusher: "The truth is no war has been declared by the Constitution, Federal statute, or by a Court opinion. Congress has issued a Proclamation of a State of War, but a Proclamation is not a Statute.
Once again you are babbling nonsense and have no clue what you are talking about."

No, I merely repeated your own words back to you, hoping you'd thereby see clearly how much babbling nonsense you've posted.

woodpusher: "That you do not like what was obvious to the Court, signifies only that your insane prejudice blinds you from historical facts, prevents you from learning."

Odd... you know our FRiend jmacusa recently speculated that woodpusher and DiogenesLamp might actually be the same person posting under different screen names.
Naturally, I pooh-poohed it as being very unlikely considering the differences in posting styles.
But this particular sentence sounds just like what DiogenesLamp would say under these circumstances.
And your excessive focus on legalisms to the exclusion of everything else sounds just a little... dare I say it... Aspergers-like.