Posted on 12/07/2020 4:51:32 AM PST by EyesOfTX
The origins of the Pearl Harbor attack can be traced back to 1853 when the United States essentially forced a feudal Japan to open trade via Commodore Matthew Perry’s squadron of armed ships. Japan, at that time was very much like much of Europe was centuries before with warlords using the obsolete sword as the primary weapon of war duking it out among their various tribes with little central control. This forced Japan out of some 250 years of self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world and they opened one port for international trade. Other nations, including Russia soon followed trading with Japan.
Japan’s leadership saw how far they were behind in weaponry and understood they were vulnerable to becoming a dominated colony. Unlike China and the Philippines and even America’s Native Americans they decided it was far better off to unite and be able to defend their homeland rather than be subjugated under another nation’s rule.
Of the seven major powers in World War II, only England was a mature nation with centuries of consistent governance. It took until the middle 1800s for America (1865 and many years after to recover from the Civil War), Japan (1868), and Italy and Germany to become unified nations. The ruling dynasties of Russia and China had collapsed by 1917 and the 1920s, respectively. Japan, once unified, took great pains to ‘catch up’ with western technology and essentially armed itself to the teeth to make it very costly for any power to colonize them. That coupled with their islands having virtually no exploitable resources ensured their independence on the world stage.
Throughout this period England had the most powerful navy and it only made sense that Japan would emulate it and in fact formed an alliance and a trading partnership with England. Originally warships and other weapons were imported, studied and copied and once their industrial base became developed, they built their own. England and other European Powers were happy to have another customer for its military accoutrements and with the purchaser on the other side of Asia they did not feel threatened. This was also the time when wooden sailing ships were being replaced by steel and coal power and other modern technologies from which Japan benefitted greatly.
Within twenty-seven years Japan embarked on being a colonial power and fought their first war with China where they gained Formosa (Taiwan) at little cost. Ten years later (1904-5), seeing the building of the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad as a threat, they launched a sneak attack on Russia and opened their second conflict without a formal declaration of war against a neighbor. They were unbelievably successful and defeated what was considered a first-class western power and navy; the world took notice.
Troubles with America began brewing at about this time and would fester for the next four decades until that fateful “Day of Infamy”. The highlights are:
Late 1800s, America acquired the Philippines which was viewed as a threat
Theodore Roosevelt intervened in the Russo-Japanese War and was and forced the Treaty of Portsmouth on Japan which halted the war, but was seen as another unwelcome intervention. The peace deal greatly benefitted Japan at the time because they were still very weak economically and even winning was bankrupting them. As an ally of England Japan defeated Germany in 1918 and gained many German colonies in the central Pacific at little cost by being on the right side. In 1921-2, the United States forced a naval arms limitation treaty on the Japanese which ultimately saved Japan from going broke and America from embarking on an expensive arms race. Japan and America were the only two countries not severely impacted by World War I and the other naval powers had no ability to engage in such a race. Japan wanted naval parity but was forced to accept second rate naval status; they greatly resented being limited to building 60% of what the United States and Great Brittan could. America, through its diplomacy, forced a fracturing of the Anglo-Japan trade and arms alliance further exacerbating the deteriorating relations. However, England still sent military equipment and a training – most notably in naval aviation – commission to Japan. America’s purpose was to prevent Japan and England ganging up on the US Navy from the Atlantic and Pacific in a continued alliance – we still were not all that friendly with England post World War I. America passed very restrictive immigration laws in the 1920s severely limiting Japanese immigration, and later during the Depression enacted trade tariffs which destroyed Japanese exports to the United States. While Japan was embracing capitalism and modern ways, their centuries old traditions were always in the forefront especially regarding the tradition of the emperor and racial purity. When the worldwide Depression hit, Japan was among the hardest hit. The militant wing of the military gradually took over and much of the nominal civilian control of their government was run by assignation throughout the thirties. The cause of much of this upheaval was the near total autonomy granted to the army and navy and the perceived failing of western capitalism as an economic system. In short, during the 1930s Tokyo could not control the Army and the Army could not control its mid-level officers when they were stationed next to Mongolia, China and the USSR.
These hotheads provoked border clashes with all three nations. In 1930, another naval arms treaty was forced upon Japan which was even more unpopular with its hawks in the navy. In 1931 army officers precipitated the Manchuria ‘incident’. The result was a large territorial gain with some resources but international condemnation. Ultimately this led to Japan walking out on the worthless League of Nations when they were condemned by the body in 1934. At around this time Japan also quit the naval treaty restrictions as of 1936. Japan was rapidly becoming a rogue nation and was seen as a regional bully. With the depression deepening, the hotheads in the military never being sanctioned by their superiors and gaining ever more power, Japan saw its destiny as being the leader of the Orient, they had their own version of lebensraum (living space), which was dubbed “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” with the ultimate goal of driving out the European colonial powers.
In 1937 another boarder ‘incident’ was provoked, this time with China which was embroiled in its own civil war and was always seen as being weak since the collapse of its running dynasty decades earlier. This conflict resulted in an eight-year quagmire with no victory, great losses, and a near premature war with the United States. Only a massive diplomatic apology for sinking a US Navy gunboat, the Panay, averted open conflict.
Soon thereafter, there was another boarder clash – this time with the USSR – and the Japanese Army got its nose bloodied and quickly sued for peace and later signed a long-term non-aggression pact with Stalin. This ‘incident’, as Japan liked to call their undeclared wars was a disaster for her because it forced the permanent deployment of over half its army to defend against a feared USSR attack and paralyzed their military doctrine which effectively reduced their ability to fight America in the Pacific.
Japan soon thereafter allied with Germany and Italy, by formally joining the Axis. Further incursions into China caused the United States to begin trade embargoes on vital resources. When Japan’s Army bullied its way into French Indochina (Vietnam) in July of 1941 to gain a key staging point, Roosevelt got the world to cut off all oil supply to Japan. This was intolerable and Japan was going to have to either accede to America’s demands which included leaving ALL of China in order to get the oil and other resource trade resumed or fight. Even without the embargo Japan was going to default on foreign trade by 1942. The only way to stave off economic disaster was territorial expansion and take the resources it needed to achieve hegemony and self-sufficiency. Being in a similar circumstance as Germany in 1938, they followed Hitler’s route to war and national destruction.
Japan’s initial targets were England’s Malaysia, Singapore and Burma and the Netherlands’ (Dutch) East Indies in order for it to survive as an independent nation and not a colony under the Allies’ thumb. As events transpired, France had fallen which allowed for the bloodless grab of their Indochina colony which gave them a vital operation base for future expansion. The Netherlands likewise fell to Hitler and their oil producing islands were ripe for conquest. England was known to be extremely weak in Asia and was fighting for its very existence, so her prized colonies were also vulnerable. Furthermore, in late 1941 the USSR was on the brink of collapse and not a threat at that time. All these ambitions could have been successfully realized at this time except for one major problem.
That problem was the United States and its Philippine possession which laid astride the main line of advance to the southern resource areas that Japan needed. Earlier in 1941 the US Navy was permanently stationed at Pearl Harbor from the US west coast which represented a major threat that could not be ignored. Japan’s plans of conquest would likely succeed only if America remained neutral. However, since America was already seen for decades as a probable future belligerent, it had to be incorporated into the grand scheme. And finally, one other event occurred which forced the Pearl Harbor attack decision: After the fall of France, America embarked upon a massive naval building program that would be realized in 1943-44.
In 1941 Japan’s Navy was equal to or held numerical superiority over the US Pacific Fleet, however it would be dwarfed by the US Navy in three years AND be out of oil. The window of opportunity and time to strike was at the end of 1941 when American strength and the other allies were at their nadir. The strategic situation was never going to be better and the economic and military dynamic was only going to deteriorate. By mid-1941, Japan had found itself truly between a rock and a hard place, but it was a rock and a hard place largely of its own making.
The three thousand plus mile sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was extremely contrary to Japan’s Naval doctrine which was basically defensive in nature and designed to be fought within a thousand or so miles of their home Islands. The main reason Pearl Harbor was attacked was to disable the US Pacific Fleet (like they did with Russia in 1904) to gain a six month breathing space whereby Japan could conquer the southern islands, get their resources flowing and capture the Philippines without interference form the (on paper) powerful US Pacific Fleet. In that regard she succeeded brilliantly with their tactical raid which should have been strategic attack. In the end it was a strategic blunder because it galvanized a lethargic America like nothing else could have and spelled Japan’s doom.
In closing, America also bears some of the blame in its clumsy handling of Japan in the forty years prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and because it began rebuilding its military and navy far too late to thwart Japan’s imperialist ambitions. Had the mobilization and new construction begun when Japan quit the limitation treaties, invaded China, attacked the USSR, when Germany attacked Poland, or when Japan joined the Axis, it would most likely have persuaded its leaders that a war with the United States was a no-win proposition under any circumstances. Reagan’s doctrine of “Peace Through Strength” was a true then as it was in the 1980s and is true today. A powerful unassailable United States would probably have kept Japan at bay and it likely would have forced them to play nice on the international stage.
A perceived weak United States always emboldens mischief from nations controlled by tyrants.
No, FRiend, like any Democrat, you are still ignoring the facts which don't suit your pet theory.
In fact, by the end of 1941, as the graphs clearly show, US unemployment was down around 5% and US employment was the highest ever, to date.
All that was without a US declaration of war.
So FDR did not "need" war for economic reasons, but he did want, as was explained at the time, to help out US allies and to respond to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Soon enough, Hitler declared war on the U.S., and so FDR made defeating Nazi Germany his first priority.
FDR's terms, pretty much from Day One of the U.S. war were: Unconditional Surrender by Axis powers and a United Nations to help prevent future wars.
In fact, by the end of 1941, as the graphs clearly show, US unemployment was down around 5% and US employment was the highest ever, to date.
Well, except it wasn't. Unemployment was at 10% by the end of 1941. It only hit 5% in 1942 once we were at war.
You keep shifting your argument.
Without the gearing up for the War, the economy under the New Deal wasn’t working.
He was for court packing.
He was for socialism.
He was a big government guy.
I'm starting to suspect you might be for all of those as well.
Once again: Japan's diplomatic codes were broken years before 1941.
Japan's naval codes were not broken in time for Pear Harbor, but were partially broken in time for the Battle of Midway.
Breaking Japan's naval codes made a world of difference at Midway.
Nothing in Japan's diplomatic codes told Washington the time, place or nature of the coming Pear Harbor attack.
eagleone: " He [FDR] knew war was coming with Japan...and as I've stated previously, believe he wanted the US in the war. "
FRiend, we do not disagree on that particular point!
But you also claim FDR wanted war solely for economic reasons, and the facts show otherwise.
You also seem to suggest FDR knew specifically the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming, and again, the facts do not support such claims.
In the final weeks of November 1941, Washington sent out official "War Warnings" to ALL Pacific area commanders, telling them to expect and be prepared for a Japanese attack.
But when actual attacks came, none were prepared to defeat them.
I don't blame FDR for that.
Most of that is pure fantasy.
Japan's diplomatic messages did not contain specifics on their upcoming attacks, which included not just Pearl Harbor but also Wake, Guam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Dutch New Guinea and many smaller islands.
None of this was known in advance from Japan's diplomatic messages.
As for a Soviet ultimatum supposedly delivered to Morgenthau for Japan... FDR's pre-war terms for restored good relations with Japan were a Japanese withdraw from recently conquered countries.
Those terms did not originate with the Russians, but we're FDR's idea and resulted in Japan deciding to attack Pearl Harbor.
It's true that FDR seemed to like "Uncle Joe" Stalin, and took no actions to suppress Communists in his administration.
But FDR understood better than most that the loss of Tsarist Russia in the First World War helped prevent the Allies from thoroughly defeating the Kaiser's Germany, and FDR was determined not to repeat that mistake in the Second World War.
There's no evidence I've ever seen to suggest that "Uncle Joe" was calling FDR's strategic shots through ultimatums to Morgenthau or anything else.
Nothing against Hart, I don't know much about him...
Did his fleet help in the defense of the Philippines?
Did they fight battles against the forces attacking MacArthur there?
You say he didn't lose any ships... how many were in the fight?
My argument has not shifted, but your own graph makes my point, namely that in 1941 US unemployment was down from ~20% in 1938 and nearing the 5% it soon after achieved.
Employment was higher than ever, to date, so by comparison the U.S. economy was already booming, without a declaration of war.
I'm not saying FDR didn't want to join the World War, I am saying his motives were not purely economic.
My argument has not shifted, but your own graph makes my point, namely that in 1941 US unemployment was down from ~20% in 1938 and nearing the 5% it soon after achieved.
Whoa....you said in 1940 unemployment was 5%. It clearly wasn't.
If you're wrong on that fact.....
I think we're arguing two points here.
One, what was needed to end the Great Depression.
Two, did FDR want the US in the War.
How are those two related?
I agree FDR recognized the danger arising in Europe and Japan. He wanted the US in the War. He also wanted the Great Depression to end(?). That one I might have some issues with as it allowed him to grow government.
So how are these related?
Without the War, or even helping via Lend Lease, the economy was not on track.
Morganthau noted in his diary in May 1939:
" We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work. And I have just one interest, and if I am wrong ... somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country prosperous. I want to see people get a job. I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises. ... I say after eight years of this Administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started. ... And an enormous debt to boot."
http://www.burtfolsom.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/Morgenthau.pdf
<(On a side note....reading the memo is insightful as it's full of typical liberal talking points. We don't tax enough, etc, etc.
At one point he notes he doesn't pay enough in taxes!
Well, here's the simple solution: write a check if you feel you don't pay enough.)
So they recognized the New Deal had failed.
They needed something else.
The declines in unemployment are in part reflective of the increase spending on defense/defense related items.
So to keep the economy going he needed the War or some degree of involvement in the War.
I argue his reasons for wanting the war was to primarily get the US out of the economic mess he'd continued with his failed policies.
Don’t have time to give a detailed rebuttal. Please be more detailed about the fantasy. I should not have written “The war was precipitated by an ultimatum.” If White’s memo was contrary to the official policy it would have been ignored. The rest I will defend. I believe the diplomatic message gave the hour to break off relations. Whites role: “In May 1941 Vitalii Pavlov, in the role of a Soviet diplomatic courier, contacted White. Pavlov was concerned that White might be unwilling to assist the Soviets because of their alliance with Nazi Germany. Pavlov related the account of his contact with White in the Moscow magazine, News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in 1995. He had retired from Soviet intelligence in 1987 with the rank of Lieutenant General. Pavlov reported that he provided White with a note containing a recommendation that the U.S. take a firm stand in their negotiations with Japan.” “There’s no evidence I’ve ever seen.” That can be a problem. I disagree with Haynes and Klehr on significant points but on this we can agree. See their Venona book.
“FDR wanted to help out our British, French, Dutch, Norwegian & other allies.” You left out the most important one: the Soviet Union. He was able to give them half of Europe and decisive power in the Far East.
Seems that Hart was based in the Philippines and may have played a role in their defense.
Bottom line was Hart did not lose his command, he was deemed expendable and Washington thought he would be hit and destroyed, he wasn’t, he was ready.
Are you referring to my post #81?
If so then my exact words were:
eagleone: "The declines in unemployment are in part reflective of the increase spending on defense/defense related items.
So to keep the economy going he needed the War or some degree of involvement in the War. "
Sounds to me like we agree on pretty much everything except your last sentence:
Even assuming that's true, it is still far from amounting to Soviets pulling FDR's strings regarding Japan.
Consider: if Churchill had made a similar recommendation, would it mean that Roosevelt was dancing to Winston's jig?
Anyone can recommend anything.
There's a huge difference between 10% and 5% unemployment.
If you're off this much in your statement on unemployment, why should I take your word on anything else.
This is an easily verifiable fact.
You also said the US economy was doing just fine at 14% unemployment.
I'm really beginning to question your grasp of what is a strong economy and history.
Two different issues.
I'm arguing FDR new the New Deal had failed, as admitted by his on Treasury Secretary, and knew a war would economically benefit the US.
That has nothing to do with whether the public was in favor of the war or not.
I'm discussing FDR's mindset.
There's no doubt that after June 1941, Roosevelt's administration favored the Soviets over the Nazis.
And doubtless most of that was strictly, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."
But some was naivety, perhaps deliberate naivety, and some was FDR's hubris in thinking he could deal effectively with Stalin.
Realists at the time and ever since have understood that the Allies' choice was to win back Western Europe for freedom ("half a loaf"), at the sacrifice of Eastern Europe to Stalin, OR, turn over ALL of Europe to the Nazis.
FDR, Churchill & the others chose "half a loaf".
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