Journal of the Federal Convention June 18th 1787 (Hamilton Speech)

On motion of Mr. DICKINSON to postpone the 1st. Resolution in Mr. Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz-"that the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the Government of the U.S. adequate to the exigences, the preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.

Mr. HAMILTON, had been hitherto silent on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues, he could by no means accede. The crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose.

On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted. -As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A federal Govt. he conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one. Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet-& among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals.

He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va. [Mr. R.] that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the exigences of the Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because it was not [FN1] clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the States can not ratify a plan not within the purview of the article of [FN2] Confederation providing for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason assigned agst. it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.

The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans-prove that there were essential defects in both-and point out such changes as might render a national one, efficacious. -

1. An active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts-their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress.

2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the controul of the Genl. Government. It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl. Govt. as of the particular Govts. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of Govt. attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as Virga. will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance & self-sufficiency?

3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the State Govt. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear [FN3] Govt. to a people, are dispensed to them.

4. Force by which may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion of arms. Congs. have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Masss. is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.

5. Influence. He did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist.

All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the Genl. Govt. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Genl. Govt. and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force agst. delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their Councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any Union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another.

How then are all these evils to be avoided? Only by such a compleat sovereignty in the general Governmt. as will turn all the strong principles & passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? Does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to Congs. but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves can not be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort? Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia: France or Engd. with other countries of Europe. Pena. with N. Carola. will the relative pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on situation. Cont. N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the Union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn? From Commerce? Even from exports which notwithstanding the common opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas.

Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va. & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd. long abide by it. It shocks too much the [FN4] ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a Govt. tho slow are sure in their operation and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Congs. at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. Ps. plan provides no remedy. -If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Congs. is such that they could never be properly & effectually exercised. The members of Congs. being chosen by the States & subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is agst. all the principles of a good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Congs. must eventuate in a bad Govt. or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do.

What then is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a general Govt was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Govts. as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great oeconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Govt. He did not mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals: corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the center of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the 1st. branch would [FN5] only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Govt. This view of the subject almost led to him despair that a Republican Govt. could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise & good, that the British Govt. was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still going on.

It was once thought that the power of Congs. was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst. the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only Govt. in the world "which unites public strength with individual security." -In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have [FN6] power, that each may defend itself agst. the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money, installment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier agst. every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The Senate [of Maryland] which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they would would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it. -Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Govt. is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the remark.

As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on Republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question: for can there be a good Govt. without a good Executive. The English model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad-and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home. one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermedling Neibours. Sweeden was a striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former.

What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require, so so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a Republican Govt., it will be asked? Yes if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of election originating with the people.

He was sensible that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his ambition wd. be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a [FN7] war, he would avail himself of the emergence, [FN8] to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an elective Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Govt.

He wd. reply that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate wd. be a monarch for life-the other propd. by the Report from the Comtte of the whole, wd. be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective monarchies wd. be the best if they could be guarded agst. the tumults excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the Army. In Poland the election is made by great rival princes with independent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as will defend the community agst. these effects in any dangerous degree?

Having made these observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he shd. prefer to either of those under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved-he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies-he sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in the public mind.

He thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr. R. wd. place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes.

He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read [FN9] his sketch in the words following: towit

I. "The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.

II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to serve for three years.

III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the people: in order to this the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal or resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the district from which he came.

IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour-the election to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid-The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed, to have the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.

V. On the death, resignation or removal of the Governour his authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.

VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.

VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in Judges to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the general Government or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.

VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute Courts in each State for the determination of all matters of general concern.

IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit-All impeachments to be tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or Judge of the superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary.

X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governour or president of each State shall be appointed by the General Government and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is [FN10] Governour or President.

XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the Militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.

On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations [FN11] corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.

FN1 The word "not" is blotted in the notes but is retained because it is in the transcript.

FN11 In the transcript the following footnote was inserted with reference mark after "observations": "The speech introducing the plan, as above taken down & written out was seen by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal changes, which were made as he suggested. The explanatory observations which did not immediately follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H. who did not find leisure at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained. "Judge Yates, in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the introductory observations of Mr. Hamilton (under date of June 19th, a typographical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Hamilton, in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made the remark attributed to him by Judge Yates, that they were 'but pork still with a little change of sauce."'

A motion by John Dickinson (DE) passed by 10-0-1, which proposed to amend the Articles adequate to the exigencies, preservation and prosperity of the union.

(Beginning below, Mr. Hamilton would speak for nearly six hours. His plan was not presented as a motion to the committee, but as a reflection of his ideas of good government. No delegate stood up during his speech to either denounce or praise it. It was an odd interlude, considering the Randolph Plan debate was postponed to receive the Patterson/NJ Plan and now Mr. Hamilton came up with another plan, admittedly not for submission, but a radical departure from recent discussion. One of my references surmise the possibility that Hamilton intended to make the Randolph Plan appear benign and the Patterson/NJ Plan appear impossible. Neither the Hamilton nor Patterson/NJ Plans had a real chance. The latter was more of what had already failed, and the former resembled too much of what had been fought against in the Revolutionary War.)

Alexander Hamilton (NY) had said little until today. He was at odds with other members from NY. (The dispute would soon result in the absence of a voting NY delegation. For a while, the convention would be down to nine States.) Neither the Randolph or NJ Plans met with his approval. Leaving sovereignty in the states could not answer the purpose. He discussed variations of the term “federal;” thought doubts on the scope allowed the convention were too subtle, and agreed with Randolph that they must do what they deem essential to the happiness of the country. It was no time to sacrifice means to an end.

Mr. Hamilton compared the problems in both plans and suggested changes.

A government must be supported by its constituent parts. That did not exist under the Articles. The states constantly pursued interests adverse to the whole. Requisitions were ignored. Rather than show a willingness to part with power, they retrieved powers delegated to the Confederation. Powerful demagogues were more resistant to a change in government than the people. The people support state government because it is the source of law, judicial protections. Coercion of laws or a coercion of force were the choices. Coercion by force meant war and dissolution of the Union. Because “passions” and “avarice, ambition, interest” were powerful in the states, they would tend to overwhelm the general government in a confederacy. History backed up his points in the examples of the Amphyctionic Council, Phocian War, German Confederacy, and Swiss Cantons which more than once made war with one another.

The only way to correct the evils was with complete sovereignty in the general government. Yes, the impost in the Patterson Plan would supply some revenue, but not enough. Requisitions from the states proved unworkable. States will pay on the basis of whether they agree or not with laws passed by Congress. One delinquent state would encourage others. To use land values as the basis of requisitions was to invite more trouble. Non commercial, non trading states would also be at a disadvantage if the basis of taxation is by proportional population. Less unequal are taxes on exports and excises.

Equality of state suffrage would become destructive. There were doubts as to whether or not troops and ships could be kept under the current and proposed Articles of Mr. Patterson. Hamilton did not believe so.

Hamilton prophesized the states or the general government would eventually swallow up one or the other.

Two sovereignties could not coexist in Congress. It would be against the tenets of good government to vest such powers in a single body. The Patterson Plan would eventuate in either bad government or no government at all.

Hamilton broached the notion of doing away with state governments, yet denied it was a proposal to be considered by the convention. States were irrelevant to commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Certainly, there must still be incorporated towns and distinct courts of justice. He foresaw difficulty getting distant representatives from the far corners of a large republic to the center. Small Congressional salaries would only attract petty demagogues. The Senate was a starting point for those intent on eventual government offices. He doubted a republican government could be established over such a great extent, but knew it would be unwise to propose any other form.

A single house government was demonstrably inadequate. The people would eventually appreciate the benefits of “public strength with individual security” inherent in the British system. Hamilton viewed government as a contest between factions, owners and employees, debtors and creditors, etc. Each should have the means to protect their interests. Lack of such balance led to paper money, installment laws. The House of Lords served to check these inclinations from the Commons or Crown alike. A temporary Senate will not answer. Even with a seven year term, they will be subject to the democratic spirit. He asked New England delegates if recent experience did not verify this.

An effective executive could not be established on republican principles. Can there be good government without an executive? The King of England was indistinguishable from the nation, so wealthy he was beyond corruption, and was sufficiently independent yet controlled. Republics were more liable to foreign corruption.

Hamilton wished to go as far as republican principles would allow. Give lifetime appointments to Senators and Executives. But would this be republican? Yes, if the people or their representatives make the elections or appointments. A seven year Executive would make “creatures,” I take to be officers and perhaps men of private station beholding to him. There would be temptations to prolong his term beyond seven years. An executive for life would have no need to expand his powers or enrich others. A monarch for life would be safer than one for seven years. Roman Emperors and the executives of Poland and Germany were all elected by select groups. The American Union could devise safeguards to prevent tumults associated with elected executives.

Hamilton offered ideas, not as an alternative to Randolph’s or Patterson’s Plans, but as a means to inform members of his thoughts. He did not think either the R or P plan would be ratified by the people.

With the Union dissolving or already dissolved and the people moving toward democracy, the time would come when the people would favor his principles.

(The notes of Robert Yates (NY), Rufus King (MA), Alexander Hamilton (NY) this day can be viewed Here)

Adjourned.

Yep, yer absolutely right...

Why should we protest a government doing everything it can to control every aspect of our lives, our economy, our happiness, etc etc etc...

Seems to me what was said here back in the 1780’s is as relevant today as it was back then...

The one thing has changed...The Federal Government has become the massive malignant cancerous tumor that is killing the basic freedoms ()for us,the people) to do just about everything, and wants more every single day from us to justify its own importance and existance...

I (and many other people) want the Federal Government to be placed back in its support role and to operate under the strict guidelines set forth in those original documents...You know the ones I’m talking about...

But some people would say Steve, thats a stupid idea...It can’t be done, it’s too big a problem...

Hummmph, guess yer right...

I may come across as a simple person who reads these things and sees the problem as a huge undertaking, but we’ve been trying to get things fixed for way too long,and the problem gets harder and harder to solve due to the malignantnature of the beast...

If I didn’t value life as much as I do, and do things I can to effect reasonable, peaceful change to the way things were before governemnt became such a monstrocity, I’d recommend we pull the plug and start over...How can that simple act of mercy be so difficult to fathom???

Would the world come to an end if America cleaned its own house??? Would the sun and moon cease to function if this ever occured???

Some people forget that these old white guys back in the day thought about the situation we are experiencing today with astounding forethought and clarity...And yet some people blindly go about their days oblivious to the repair manual(s) given to us a long time ago...

My thoughts go way beyond the mere implications of my sarcasm...;-)

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