Lincoln’s 'Great Crime': The Arrest Warrant for the Chief Justice

Imagine that America had a Chief Justice of the United States who actually believed in enforcing the Constitution and, accordingly, issued an opinion that the war in Iraq was unconstitutional because Congress did not fulfill its constitutional duty in declaring war. Imagine also that the neocon media, think tanks, magazines, radio talk shows, and television talking heads then waged a vicious, months-long smear campaign against the chief justice, insinuating that he was guilty of treason and should face the punishment for it. Imagine that he is so demonized that President Bush is emboldened to issue an arrest warrant for the chief justice, effectively destroying the constitutional separation of powers and declaring himself dictator.

An event such as this happened in the first months of the Lincoln administration when Abraham Lincoln issued an arrest warrant for Chief Justice Roger B. Taney after the 84-year-old judge issued an opinion that only Congress, not the president, can suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln had declared the writ null and void and ordered the military to begin imprisoning thousands of political dissenters. Taney’s opinion, issued as part of his duties as a circuit court judge in Maryland, had to do with the case of Ex Parte Merryman (May 1861). The essence of his opinion was not that habeas corpus could not be suspended, only that the Constitution requires Congress to do it, not the president. In other words, if it was truly in "the public interest" to suspend the writ, the representatives of the people should have no problem doing so and, in fact, it is their constitutional prerogative.

As Charles Adams wrote in his LRC article, "Lincoln’s Presidential Warrant to Arrest Chief Justice Roger B. Taney," there were, at the time of his writing, three corroborating sources for the story that Lincoln actually issued an arrest warrant for the chief justice. It was never served for lack of a federal marshal who would perform the duty of dragging the elderly chief justice out of his chambers and throwing him into the dungeon-like military prison at Fort McHenry. (I present even further evidence below).

All of this infuriates the Lincoln Cult, for such behavior is unquestionably an atrocious act of tyranny and despotism. But it is true. It happened. And it was only one of many similar constitutional atrocities committed by the Lincoln administration in the name of "saving the Constitution."

The first source of the story is a history of the U.S. Marshal’s Service written by Frederick S. Calhoun, chief historian for the Service, entitled The Lawmen: United States Marshals and their Deputies, 1789–1989. Calhoun recounts the words of Lincoln’s former law partner Ward Hill Laman, who also worked in the Lincoln administration.

Upon hearing of Laman’s history of Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and the mass arrest of Northern political opponents, Lincoln cultists immediately sought to discredit Laman by calling him a drunk. (Ulysses S. Grant was also an infamous drunk, but no such discrediting is ever perpetrated on him by the Lincoln "scholars".)

But Adams comes up with two more very reliable accounts of the same story. One is an 1887 book by George W. Brown, the mayor of Baltimore, entitled Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861: A Study of War (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1887). In it is the transcript of a conversation Mayor Brown had with Taney in which Taney talks of his knowledge that Lincoln had issued an arrest warrant for him.

Yet another source is A Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, a former U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Judge Curtis represented President Andrew Johnson in his impeachment trial before the U.S. Senate; wrote the dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case; and resigned from the court over a dispute with Judge Taney over that case. Nevertheless, in his memoirs he praises the propriety of Justice Taney in upholding the Constitution by opposing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. He refers to Lincoln’s arrest warrant as a "great crime."

I recently discovered yet additional corroboration of Lincoln’s "great crime." Mr. Phil Magness sent me information suggesting that the intimidation of federal judges was a common practice in the early days of the Lincoln administration (and the later days as well). In October of 1861 Lincoln ordered the District of Columbia Provost Marshal to place armed sentries around the home of a Washington, D.C. Circuit Court judge and place him under house arrest. The reason was that the judge had issued a writ of habeas corpus to a young man being detained by the Provost Marshal, allowing the man to have due process. By placing the judge under house arrest Lincoln prevented the judge from attending the hearing of the case. The documentation of this is found in Murphy v. Porter (1861) and in United States ex re John Murphy v. Andrew Porter, Provost Marshal District of Columbia (2 Hay. & Haz. 395; 1861).

The second ruling contained a letter from Judge W.M. Merrick, the judge of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, explaining how, after issuing the writ of habeas corpus to the young man, he was placed under house arrest. Here is the final paragraph of the letter:

After dinner I visited my brother Judges in Georgetown, and returning home between half past seven and eight o’clock found an armed sentinel stationed at my door by order of the Provost-Marshal. I learned that this guard had been placed at my door as early as five o’clock. Armed sentries from that time continuously until now have been stationed in front of my house. Thus it appears that a military officer against whom a writ in the appointed form of law has first threatened with and afterwards arrested and imprisoned the attorney who rightfully served the writ upon him. He continued, and still continues, in contempt and disregard of the mandate of the law, and has ignominiously placed an armed guard to insult and intimidate by its presence the Judge who ordered the writ to issue, and still keeps up this armed array at his door, in defiance and contempt of the justice of the land. Under the circumstances I respectfully request the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court to cause this memorandum to be read in open Court, to show the reasons for my absence from my place upon the bench, and that he will cause this paper to be entered at length on the minutes of the Court . . . W.M. Merrick Assistant Judge of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia

As Adams writes, the Lincoln Cult is terrified that this truth will become public knowledge, for it if does, it means that Lincoln "destroyed the separation of powers; destroyed the place of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional scheme of government. It would have made the executive power supreme, over all others, and put the president, the military, and the executive branch of government, in total control of American society. The Constitution would have been at an end."

Thomas J. DiLorenzo [send him mail] is the author of The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War, (Three Rivers Press/Random House). His latest book is How Capitalism Saved America: The Untold Story of Our Country’s History, from the Pilgrims to the Present (Crown Forum/Random House, August 2004).

[cr #649] Thank you for chiming in> I refer you to the text of Amy Warwick (1862):

This is the part of the Prize Cases unique to the Amy Warwick. You did, however, find a different way to cite the case without referring to the Prize Cases. It is one ruling dealing with four ships, (1) The Amy Warwick, (2) The Hiawatha, (3) The Brilliante, and (4) The Crenshaw.

I. The case of the brig Amy Warwick.
This vessel was captured upon the high seas by the United States gunboat Quaker City, and with her cargo was sent into the district of Massachusetts for condemnation. The brig was claimed by David Currie and others. The cargo consisted of coffee, and was claimed, four hundred bags by Edmund Davenport & Co., and four thousand seven hundred bags by Dunlap, Moncure & Co. The title of these parties as respectively claimed [67 U.S. 635, 675] was conceded. All the claimants at the time of the capture, and for a long time before, were residents of Richmond, Va., and were engaged in business there. Consequently, their property was justly condemned as 'enemies' property.'
The claim of Phipps & Co. for their advance was allowed by the Court below. That part of the decree was not appealed from and is not before us. The case presents no question but that of enemies' property.
The decree below is affirmed with costs.

That is the text of Amy Warwick which you cited.

[cr #636] A blockade is considered an act of war when one country does it to another country. But there are not two or more countries in a "civil war." In fact, your compatriots have been belly-aching about Lincoln's blockade of port "before they seceded!" Lincoln's blockade was not an act of war, but (to use a more modern term) it was an internal "police action."

[cr #649] The Supreme Court finds:
(1) The rebellion is an insurrection and not a war betwenn countries,
(2) The "so-called blockade" was not a blockade under international law, and
(3) Closing the ports was a valid exercise of executive authority.

"Blockade is a belligerent right. There must be war, before there can be blockade in the international sense, giving jurisdiction in prize. There may be an interruption of commerce, 'in the nature of a blockade.' But this is the exercise of the legislative power, and is purely municipal." -- Justice Grier.

Lincoln did eventually get around to closing the ports -- on April 11, 1865, four days before he died.

Just before the war ended, Lincoln issued an order closing the ports, rather than blockading them.

From Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Johnson, First Paper, Galaxy Magazine, April 1872, p. 523

Mr. Seward, who had been uneasy since his return, [nc: Seward had been thrown from his carriage and injured] read to the Secretary of the Treasury and myself the draft of a proclamation he had prepared for the President to sign, closing the ports of the Southern States. This was a step which I had earnestly pressed at the beginning of the rebellion, as a domestic measure, and more legitimate than a blockade, which was international, and an admission that we were two nations.
* * *
The President reached Washington on the evening of Sunday, the 9th of April. When I called on him the next morning he was in excellent spirits, the news of Lee’s surrender, which however was not unanticipated, having been received. While I was with him he signed the proclamation for closing the ports and expressed his gratification that Mr. Seward and myself concurred in the measure, alluding to our former differences.

OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 3, vol 5, Part 1, page 107

(Union Letters, Orders, Reports)

VII. April 11, 1865.-Closing certain ports.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, by my proclamations of the nineteenth and twenty-seventh days of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one the ports of the United States in the State of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were declared to be subject to blockade; but whereas, the said blockade has, in consequence of actual military occupation by this Government, since been conditionally set aside or relaxed in respect to the ports of Norfolk and Alexandria, in the State of Virginia; Beaufort, in the State of North Carolina; Port Royal, in the State of South Carolina; Pensacola and Fernandina, in the State of Florida, and New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana;

And whereas, by the fourth section of the act of Congress approved on the thirteenth of July, eighteen hundred and sixty- one; entitled "An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes," the President, for the reasons therein set forth, is authorized to close certain ports of entry:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the ports of Richmond, Tappahannock, Cherrystone, Yorktown, and Petersburg, in Virginia; of Camden (Elizabeth City), Edenton, Plymouth, Washington, New Berne, Ocracoke, and Wilmington, in North Carolina; of Charleston, Georgetown, and Beaufort, in South Carolina; of Savannah, Saint Mary's, and Brunswick (Darien), in Georgia; of Mobile, in Alabama; of Pearl River (Shieldsborough), Natchez, and Vicksburg, in Mississippi; of Saint Augustine, Key West, Saint Mark's (Port Leon), Saint John's (Jacksonville), and Apalachicola, in Florida; of Teche (Franklin), in Louisiana; of Galveston, La Salle, Brazos de Santiago (Point Isabel), and Brownsville, in Texas, are hereby closed, and all right of importation, warehousing, and other privileges shall, in respect to the ports aforesaid, cease, until they shall have again been opened by order of the President; and if, whole said ports are so closed, any ship or vessel from beyond the United States, or having on board any articles subject to duties, furniture, and cargo, shall be forfeited to the United States.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this eleventh day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-ninth.

Four years previously, on April 19, 1861, Lincoln had proclaimed a BLOCKADE. He invoked the Law of Nations. He proclaimed the punishment of piracy.

The international community understood it perfectly well to be a BLOCKADE. They declared NEUTRALITY. And Justice Grier found that Lincoln didn't really, really mean to say BLOCKADE, as three months after proclaiming a BLOCKADE he wrote a message referring to it as being "in the nature of a BLOCKADE," so after he proclaimed to the world that it was a BLOCKADE, and after various nations declared neutrality, the court decided that it was not really, really a BLOCKADE, but rather something like a BLOCKADE, but not a BLOCKADE, and the declarations of neutrality did not really count, and the CSA was not really, really recognized as a separate nation.

It was sort of a municipal action invoking the Laws of Nations and proclaiming the penalty of piracy.

And even though it was not a BLOCKADE, but a Closing of the Ports, for some reason, four years later, Lincoln felt compelled to proclaim a Closing of the Ports and say, "Whereas, by my proclamations of the nineteenth and twenty-seventh days of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one the ports of the United States in the State of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were declared to be subject to blockade; but whereas, the said blockade has, in consequence of actual military occupation by this Government, since been conditionally set aside or relaxed..." and he proclaimed a Closing of the Ports.

To sum up, he BLOCKADED the ports before the court said he really, really, closed them, and then Lincoln proclaimed, in 1865, that they had been BLOCKADED all that time, and he proclaimed that they were then being closed.

http://www.angelfire.com/my/abrahamlincoln/Blockade.html

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A PROCLAMATION:

Whereas an insurrection against the Government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed therein comformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States:

And whereas a combination of persons engaged in such insurrection, have threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels, and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United States: And whereas an Executive Proclamation has been already issued, requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force for the purpose of repressing the same, and convening Congress in extraordinary session, to deliberate and determine thereon:

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall ceased, have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the law of Nations, in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach, or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the Commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will endorse on her register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable.

And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State

[cr] His purpose was to stamp his racist views on the issue of Negro citizenship. His views on Negroes as "inferiors" were well established for years. Ferhenbacher notes (in The Dred Scott Case, pg 340):

In The Slaveholding Republic by Don E. Fehrenbacher, completed and edited by Ward M. McAfee, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 204, the same Fehrenbacher says, "Southern Supreme Court justices Roger B. Taney, John A. Campbell, and James M. Wayne displayed sterner disapproval of the slave trade than their northern colleagues Robert C. Grief and Samuel C. Nelson, and it was not until the eve of the Civil War that certain federal courts in the South became conspicuously reluctant to enforce the slave-trde laws. In short, there is little evidence confirming the view that southern men in positions of power made it a practice down through the years to undermine the enforcement program.

Quote without link or source disregarded.

[cr] Your references to the mention of slavery in the Constitution (although never by that term!) are well known and have been discussed on this forum.

A slave by any other name is a slave. The Constitution clearly recognized and protected slavery. Were that not so, the Constitution would not have been ratified.

[cr] It is worth mentioning, too, that those "bound to service" in the American colonies were not initially African blacks. It has been documented that the first "indentured servants" were poor whites. And in the areas formerly under Spanish control, Indians were held under similar conditions.

African slaves arrived in August 1619, before the Mayflower landed.

[cr] Over 40% of the Taney opinion was spent on the issue of Negro citizenship.

I guess you have conceded that you are unable to argue the merits of the case and want to digress. You could observe that Taney spent 40% of his opinion discussing the Washington Social Register and it would be equally relevant. Scott was in Missouri when he filed suit claiming to be a citizen of Missouri. The law of Missouri governed the case. Under the law of Missouri, Scott had not become free. That accords with British and American precedent. It appears you have no legal argument and just want to chat.

Over 30% of Taney's opinion was added after it was read from the bench, addressing all the matters that Justice Robbins insisted on addressing in dissent and releasing to the press. The opinion of Justice Robbins was longer than that of Taney. Of course, his brother George T. Curtis argued the case (in part) for Scott, and Justice Curtis did not want to let his brother down.

Well, there were all those laws of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, etc., to cover.

And as long ago as 1822, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided that free negroes and mulattoes were not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States; and the correctness of this decision is recognized, and the same doctrine affirmed, in 1 Meigs's Tenn. Reports, 331.

And if we turn to the legislation of the States where slavery had worn out, or measures taken for its speedy abolition, we shall find the same opinions and principles equally fixed and equally acted upon.

Thus, Massachusetts, in 1786, passed a law similar to the colonial one of which we have spoken. The law of 1786, like the law of 1705, forbids the marriage of any white person with any negro, Indian, or mulatto, and inflicts a penalty of fifty pounds upon any one who shall join them in marriage; and declares all such marriage absolutely null and void, and degrades thus the unhappy issue of the marriage by fixing upon it the stain of bastardy. And this mark of degradation was renewed, and again impressed upon the race, in the careful and deliberate preparation of their revised code published in 1836. This code forbids any person from joining in marriage any white person with any Indian, negro, or mulatto, and subjects the party who shall offend in this respect, to imprisonment, not exceeding six months, in the common jail, or to hard labor, and to a fine of not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars; and, like the law of 1786, it declares the marriage to be absolutely null and void. It will be seen that the punishment is increased by the code upon the person who shall marry them, by adding imprisonment to a pecuniary penalty.

So, too, in Connecticut. We refer more particularly to the legislation of this State, because it was not only among the first to put an end to slavery within its own territory, but was the first to fix a mark of reprobation upon the African slave trade. The law last mentioned was passed in October, 1788, about nine months after the State had ratified and adopted the present Constitution of the United States; and by that law it prohibited its own citizens, under severe penalties, from engaging in the trade, and declared all policies of insurance on the vessel or cargo made in the State to be null and void. But, up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there is nothing in the legislation of the State indicating any change of opinion as to the relative rights and position of the white and black races in this country, or indicating that it meant to place the latter, when free, upon a level with its citizens. And certainly nothing which would have led the slaveholding States to suppose, that Connecticut designed to claim for them, under the new Constitution, the equal rights and privileges and rank of citizens in every other State.

The first step taken by Connecticut upon this subject was as early as 1774, wen it passed an act forbidding the further importation of slaves into the State. But the section containing the prohibition is introduced by the following preamble: 'And whereas the increase of slaves in this State is injurious to the poor, and inconvenient.'

This recital would appear to have been carefully introduced, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of the motive which induced the Legislature to pass the law, and places it distinctly upon the interest and convenience of the white populationexcluding the inference that it might have been intended in any degree for the benefit of the other.

And in the act of 1784, by which the issue of slaves, born after the time therein mentioned, were to be free at a certain age, the section is again introduced by a preamble assigning a similar motive for the act. It is in these words:

'Whereas sound policy requires that the abolition of slavery should be effected as soon as may be consistent with the rights of individuals, and the public safety and welfare'-showing that the right of property in the master was to be protected, and that the measure was one of policy, and to prevent the injury and inconvenience, to the whites, of a slave population in the State.

And still further pursuing its legislation, we find that in the same statute passed in 1774, which prohibited the further importation of slaves into the State, there is also a provision by which any negro, Indian, or mulatto servant, who was found wandering out of the town or place to which he belonged, without a written pass such as is therein described, was made liable to be seized by any one, and taken before the next authority to be examined and delivered up to his master-who was required to pay the charge which had accrued thereby. And a subsequent section of the same law provides, that if any free negro shall travel without such pass, and shall be stopped, seized, or taken up, he shall pay all charges arising thereby. And this law was in full operation when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, and was not repealed till 1797. So that up to that time free negroes and mulattoes were associated with servants and slaves in the police regulations established by the laws of the State.

And again, in 1833, Connecticut passed another law, which made it penal to set up or establish any school in that State for the instruction of persons of the African race not inhabitants of the State, or to instruct or teach in any such school or institution, or board or harbor for that purpose, any such person, without the previous consent in writing of the civil authority of the town in which such school or institution might be.

And it appears by the case of Crandall v. The State, reported in 10 Conn. Rep., 340, that upon an information filed against Prudence Crandall for a violation of this law, one of the points raised in the defence was, that the law was a violation of the Constitution of the United States; and that the persons instructed, although of the African race, were citizens of other States, and therefore entitled to the rights and privileges of citizens in the State of Connecticut. But Chief Justice Dagget, before whom the case was tried, held, that persons of that description were not citizens of a State, within the meaning of the word citizen in the Constitution of the United States, and were not therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in other States.

The case was carried up to the Supreme Court of Errors of the State, and the question fully argued there. But the case went off upon another point, and no opinion was expressed on this question.

We have made this particular examination into the legislative and judicial action of Connecticut, because, from the early hostility it displayed to the slave trade on the coast of Africa, we may expect to find the laws of that State as lenient and favorable to the subject race as those of any other State in the Union; and if we find that at the time the Constitution was adopted, they were not even there raised to the rank of citizens, but were still held and treated as property, and the laws relating to them passed with reference altogether to the interest and convenience of the white race, we shall hardly find them elevated to a higher rank anywhere else.

A brief notice of the laws of two other States, and we shall pass on to other considerations.

By the laws of New Hampshire, collected and finally passed in 1815, no one was permitted to be enrolled in the militia of the State, but free white citizens; and the same provision is found in a subsequent collection of the laws, made in 1855. Nothing could more strongly mark the entire repudiation of the African race. The alien is excluded, because, being born in a foreign country, he cannot be a member of the community until he is naturalized. But why are the African race, born in the State, not permitted to share in one of the highest duties of the citizen? The answer is obvious; he is not, by the institutions and laws of the State, numbered among its people. He forms no part of the sovereignty of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it.

Again, in 1822, Rhode Island, in its revised code, passed a law forbidding persons who were authorized to join persons in marriage, from joining in marriage any white person with any negro, Indian, or mulatto, under the penalty of two hundred dollars, and declaring all such marriages absolutely null and void; and the same law was again re-enacted in its revised code of 1844. So that, down to the last-mentioned period, the strongest mark of inferiority and degradation was fastened upon the African race in that State.

It would be impossible to enumerate and compress in the space usually allotted to an opinion of a court, the various laws, marking the condition of this race, which were passed from time to time after the Revolution, and before and since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In addition to those already referred to, it is sufficient to say, that Chancellor Kent, whose accuracy and research no one will question, states in the sixth edition of his Commentaries, (published in 1848, 2 vol., 258, note b,) that in no part of the country except Maine, did the African race, in point of fact, participate equally with the whites in the exercise of civil and political rights.

The legislation of the States therefore shows, in a manner not to be mistaken, the inferior and subject condition of that race at the time the Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards, throughout the thirteen States by which that instrument was framed; and it is hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose that they regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a class of beings whom they had thus stigmatized; whom, as we are bound, out of respect to the State sovereignties, to assume they had deemed it just and necessary thus to stigmatize, and upon whom they had impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation; or, that when they met in convention to form the Constitution, they looked upon them as a portion of their constituents, or designed to include them in the provisions so carefully inserted for the security and protection of the liberties and rights of their citizens. It cannot be supposed that they intended to secure to them rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State.

* * *

Another of the early laws of which we have spoken, is the first militia law, which was passed in 1792, at the first session of the second Congress. The language of this law is equally plain and significant with the one just mentioned. It directs that every 'free able-bodied white male citizen' shall be enrolled in the militia. The word white is evidently used to exclude the African race, and the word 'citizen' to exclude unnaturalized foreigners; the latter forming no part of the sovereignty, owing it no allegiance, and therefore under no obligation to defend it. The African race, however, born in the country, did owe allegiance to the Government, whether they were slave or free; but it is repudiated, and rejected from the duties and obligations of citizenship in marked language.

The third act to which we have alluded is even still more decisive; it was passed as late as 1813, (2 Stat., 809,) and it provides: 'That from and after the termination of the war in which the United States are now engaged with Great Britain, it shall not be lawful to employ, on board of any public or private vessels of the United States, any person or persons except citizens of the United States, or persons of color, natives of the United States. Here the line of distinction is drawn in express words. Persons of color, in the judgment of Congress, were not included in the word citizens, and they are described as another and different class of persons, and authorized to be employed, if born in the United States.

And even as late as 1820, (chap. 104, sec. 8,) in the charter to the city of Washington, the corporation is authorized 'to restrain and prohibit the nightly and other disorderly meetings of slaves, free negroes, and mulattoes,' thus associating them together in its legislation; and after prescribing the punishment that may be inflicted on the slaves, proceeds in the following words: 'And to punish such free negroes and mulattoes by penalties not exceeding twenty dollars for any one offence; and in case of the inability of any such free negro or mulatto to pay any such penalty and cost thereon, to cause him or her to be confined to labor for any time not exceeding six calendar months.' And in a subsequent part of the same section, the act authorizes the corporation 'to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which free negroes and mulattoes may reside in the city.'

"You mean it still counts if the Army of a different nation controls your country and they can defend the borders? Do they have a fully functioning national government? "

I detect the stench of an anti-war liberal.

"CR - In that event we will not recognize the validity of the state, but Canada would undoubtedly still be recognized by other neighbor(s) and historic partners. "WHAT other neighbors? Your condition at #639 was "(5) Diplomatic recognition neighboring nations,"

They were "attributes," not conditions, but if you want to get technical then I could list Denmark controlled Greenland and French controlled territory in the StLS.

But in your narrow construction you, as usual, miss the point. "Neighboring countries" are not confined to bordering countries. Just as your "next-door neighbors" are not the only "neighbors" you have in your "neighborhood," neither is there some "requirement," other than in your simple mind, that neighbor must border. For instance, our "Latin American neighbors" are all not on our border.

"Do you mean that it took the most powerful nation in the world four years to beat a disorganized territory with no functioning government?"

The Union forces operated almost entirely in the enemy's backyard. I give the Confederate soldiers much credit for their ability to defend their homeland, despite the ineptitude of the governmental leaders.

"How many dead Union soldiers were there after the first four months? Why was there a need for huge drafts?"

I don't know the casualty figures for the first four months of the war. I do know that the Union's battlefield casualties of about 140,000 were roughly twice the rebels 75,000. For armies that spent much of the time on offense (excepting McClellan of course!), the 2:1 ratio is about as expected. Why the need for "huge" drafts? They weren't "huge" and draftees or substitutes constituted a low percentage of all serving in the Union military (or confederate, for that matter). But why the draft? To win and win convincingly.

And IIRC, Texas was never taken. The last battle of the war was fought in Texas and the Union forces lost.

True, they prudently surrendered before theirs became the next battleground. Texas, and the Trans-Mississippi theater for that matter, were backwaters compared to other areas. Nevertheless, Texas was cut off from the bulk of the Confederacy and the government in Richmond had little control over it. I would say it the Union strategy with respect to Texas was not unlike the American strategy of cutting off and bypassing Japanese garrisons in the PTO during WWII. Those garrison were left to wither on the vine. They posed no offensive threat and were not worth the effort and expenditure of troops.

"Were [France and Poland] nations before the Germans invaded? Germany proved they could not defend their border. Is Mexico a nation? Can it defend its northern border should the USA feel like taking the rest of Mexico from it?"

France, Poland, and Mexico had the presumption of statehood because they were recognized by the community of nations. All of these countries established internationally recognized borders. They have defended those borders. In the case of France and Poland, the German occupation was temporary. Contrast this with, for instance, nomadic people. They do not establish boundaries and they do not attempt to defend them.

The CSA was an insurrectionist body politic with no recognized claim to territory, and no ability to successfully defend the territory they claimed - further proof of the invalidity of their position. The CAS failed the test.

[nc #668] "You mean it still counts if the Army of a different nation controls your country and they can defend the borders? Do they have a fully functioning national government? "

[cr #672] I detect the stench of an anti-war liberal.

Change your huggies. I served my 20 years active duty. Your homepage proudly proclaims you missed the draft and stayed in school.

Who is defending the Iraqi borders?

[nc #668] "CR - In that event we will not recognize the validity of the state, but Canada would undoubtedly still be recognized by other neighbor(s) and historic partners. "WHAT other neighbors? Your condition at #639 was "(5) Diplomatic recognition neighboring nations,"

[cr #672] They were "attributes," not conditions, but if you want to get technical then I could list Denmark controlled Greenland and French controlled territory in the StLS.

Caught lying again, sounding more and more like #3cr. You said they were "essential attributes of nationhood." Of course, you may invoke the California liberal exemption and claim that "essential" means "optional." For example, one might say that balls are essential to manhood. As a California liberal, you might claim the exemption and assert that in your case, they are optional. Arnold calls these California liberals "girly men."

[cr #635 to 4CJ]
Your lack of education is showing. There are a set of criteria known as "essential attributes of nationhood." These describe features that real countries share, and include:
(1) A shared cultural heritage,
(2) A common language,
(3) A sense of national identification,
(4) Recognized and defensible borders,
(5) Diplomatic recognition neighboring nations,
(6) A functioning national government If one were to concede the CSA the first three factors (which I don't for various reasons), there is no way they could claim the last two.

[cr #672] But in your narrow construction you, as usual, miss the point. "Neighboring countries" are not confined to bordering countries. Just as your "next-door neighbors" are not the only "neighbors" you have in your "neighborhood," neither is there some "requirement," other than in your simple mind, that neighbor must border. For instance, our "Latin American neighbors" are all not on our border.

Well, if not border, try the same continent. WHO are you saying is Canada's other neighbor? Mexico or Santa Claus?

[cr #653] Defended for 4 years! They weren't defended for 4 months!!

[cr #672] The Union forces operated almost entirely in the enemy's backyard. I give the Confederate soldiers much credit for their ability to defend their homeland, despite the ineptitude of the governmental leaders.

The first four months of the war (or rebellion or insurrection) ended in August 1861. There was one major battle. Are you claiming the Confederate side failed to defend its borders at the first Battle of Bull Run?

[nc #668] "How many dead Union soldiers were there after the first four months? Why was there a need for huge drafts?"

[cr #672] I don't know the casualty figures for the first four months of the war. I do know that the Union's battlefield casualties of about 140,000 were roughly twice the rebels 75,000.

The first four months of the war would have ended in August 1861. That's assuming there was a war. You vacillate, as it suits you, to maintain that it was either a war, a rebellion or an insurrection.

Your figures for "casualties" are just a bit out to lunch.

LINK

COMBAT DEATHS

Union         110,070  
Confederate    74,524  
Combined      184,594

Casualties


             Enrolled   Combat    Other   Wounded       Total              
Union         2,803.3  110,070  249,458   275,175     634,703   
Confederate   1,064.2   74,524  124,000   137,000 +   335,524   
Combined      3,867.5  184,594  373,458   412,175 +   970,227

Combat deaths refers to troops killed in action or dead of wounds. Other includes deaths from disease, privation, and accidents, and includes losses among prisoners of war. Wounded excludes those who died of their wounds, who are included under Combat Deaths. Ratio is the proportion of wounded in action to combat deaths. Note that the wounded figures do not include cases of disease. Under Percentages, KIA refers to the percent of those enrolled killed in action, Dead to the percent dead from all causes, and Casualty to the percent killed or injured. KIA/Month, killed in action per month, gives a fair indication of the intensity of combat

Notes:
* Non-battle deaths not known for these wars.
+ Confederate non-battle deaths and wounded estimated.
& Actually only six weeks of sustained combat.
^ There was only one month of combat.

[cr #672] For armies that spent much of the time on offense (excepting McClellan of course!), the 2:1 ratio is about as expected. Why the need for "huge" drafts? They weren't "huge" and draftees or substitutes constituted a low percentage of all serving in the Union military (or confederate, for that matter). But why the draft? To win and win convincingly.

Why would one expect to fight four years and lose men at a 2:1 ratio when one has about a 3:1 advantage in manpower, all of the medicine, every logistical advantage imaginable, a long standing organized government opposed to a people just forming a government?

If those drafts were not huge, it boggles the mind to imagine what qualifies as #3cr huge. One almost wonders why there were draft riots in the North. The men were served a draft notice and given about 90 days to supply a substitute, buy their way out of that draft, volunteer and receive a bounty, or get drafted and get nothing. There was "assisted" volunteering.

[nc #668] "Were [France and Poland] nations before the Germans invaded? Germany proved they could not defend their border. Is Mexico a nation? Can it defend its northern border should the USA feel like taking the rest of Mexico from it?"

[cr #672] France, Poland, and Mexico had the presumption of statehood because they were recognized by the community of nations. All of these countries established internationally recognized borders. They have defended those borders. In the case of France and Poland, the German occupation was temporary. Contrast this with, for instance, nomadic people. They do not establish boundaries and they do not attempt to defend them.

So you mean your "essential attributes of nationhood" are all waived if the community of nations waives them. How interesting.

In your terms, temporary lasts how many years? And recall that it was not France and/or Poland who removed their occupier.

Iraq is not defending its borders, the U.S. Armed Forces are. It matters not how long the German occupation of France and Poland was, Germany proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a moral certainty, that at the time of the invasion those putative nations failed to meet the #3cr "essential attributes of nationhood" by being unable to defend their borders. How can they be nations if they lack the #3cr "essential attributes of nationhood?"

[cr #672] The CSA was an insurrectionist body politic with no recognized claim to territory, and no ability to successfully defend the territory they claimed - further proof of the invalidity of their position. The CAS failed the test.

They had an established government and proceeded to govern for four years. Nobody denied they were a de facto government. Only a Lincoln apologist can maintain that they were not a de jure government.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.