The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

the author's site ^ | 1972 | Dallas Willard

[unspun]

The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

This paper has been read to the University of Southern California philosophy group and the Boston 1972 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, as well as to the Houston meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society. Appeared in The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, IV(1973), pp. 125-132. Numbers in "<>" refer to this journal.

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Among the principal assumptions of major portions of philosophy in recent decades have been: (1) That philosophy somehow consists of (some sort of) logic, and (2) that logic is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language. There, of course, follows from these a third assumption: (3) That philosophy is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language--though this implication should not be taken as representing any phase of the historical development of recent philosophizing. Instead of listing these three points as assumptions, it would probably be more correct to regard them as categories or complexes of assumptions; or perhaps, more vaguely still, as 'tendencies' or proclivities of recent philosophical thinking. But precision of these points need not be put in issue here, as this paper does not seek any large-scale resolution of the problem area in question. The aim here is to examine only one proposition which plays a role in the clearly existent tendencies referred to: Namely, the proposition that we think in or with language. I hope to show, first, that we do not always think in or with language; and then, second, that the very conception of thinking in or with language involves an absurdity. What implications this has for broader philosophical assumptions or tendencies will not be dealt with here, though the implications in question seem to me to be extremely important ones. That human beings think in language is explicitly stated in such diverse places as ordinary newspapers, the more sophisticated popular magazines and journals, and serious discourse in the humanities and the social sciences, as well as in the technical writings of philosophers. To prove this broad range of consensus would be idle; but, in order to have the philosophical context clearly before us, we may give a few brief quotations. <126>       (1) Man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it: the thinking which becomes conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof. And, we may say, the worst part:--for this conscious thinking alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. (Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, sub-sec. # 354)      (2) Let no one be contemptuous of symbols! A good deal depends upon a practical selection of them. Furthermore, their value is not diminished by the fact that after much practice, we no longer really need to call forth a symbol, we do not need to speak out loud in order to think. The fact remains that we think in words or, when not in words, then in mathematical or other symbols. (Frege, Mind, Vol. 73, p. 156)      (3) It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a 'mental activity'. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be an agent in writing. (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 6-7)      (4) ... The woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. (C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, II, p. 129)      (5) Words only matter because words are what we think with. (H. H. Price, Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XIX, p. 7)      (6) Theorizing is an activity which most people can and normally do conduct in silence. They articulate in sentences the theories that they construct, but they do not most of the time speak these sentences out loud. They say them to themselves.... Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery.... This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor without effort.... (Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 27. See also pp. 282-83 and 296-97) <127>      (7)This helps to elucidate the well-known difficulty of thinking without words. Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself. Consider the way in which I 'thinkingly' wrote the last sentence. I can no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking (or some equivalent activity). (J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 89) These quotations will suffice to establish the context within which philosophers speak of thinking in language (or with language). Many other quotations could be added from the literature.1 It is not assumed here that the persons quoted all occupy the same position with reference to the relationship between thought and language. Yet it would be interesting to see what any of these thinkers, or others who suppose that human beings think in language, could save of their position from the critique which follows. Uneasiness about the conception of thinking in or with language has been expressed by a number of writers, but only over limited aspects of it.2 Here we shall consider arguments which purport to call the conception into question entirely and in principle. First, consider a reason for rejecting the view that we always think in language. It consists in the fact that thinking often occurs without the production, manipulation, or perception of sense-perceptible signs, without which there is no use of language. Such occurrences often provoke offers of 'A penny for your thoughts.' Thinking: Whatever we may decide to call them, and however it is that we are conscious of them, there are intentional states of persons, more or less fixed or fleeting, which do not require for their obtaining that what they are about or of be perceived by, or be impinging causally upon, the person involved. In order to think of3 Henry the Eighth, <128> of the first auto one owned, of the Pythagorean theorem, or of the Mississippi River, it is not required that they should disturb my nervous system. Such states (t-states) of persons are often called 'thoughts', especially in contrast with 'perceptions', and being in such a state is one of the things more commonly called 'thinking'. One no more needs to be going through a change of such states in order to be thinking, than he needs to be changing his bodily position in order to be sitting or lying or sleeping. Rarely if ever--as is alleged in the case of mystic contemplation--are these t-states unchanging. Usually they flow, at varying rates, intermingled with person states of many sorts, governed by such transitional structures as inference, goal orientation, objective structures given in perception or in other ways, and elemental association of 'ideas', among others. In what follows, we shall use 'thinking' to cover both the single t-state and the flow of such states, without regard to how intermingled with other person states. Language: Sense perceptible signs or symbols are an essential constituent of language. It is always false to say that language is present or in use where no signs are present or in use. And, whatever else a sign may be, it is something which is apprehendable via its sensible qualities. That is, it is something which can be either seen, heard, felt, tasted or smelled. Moreover, the use of language requires some level of actual sensuous apprehension of the signs which are in use on the occasion. (Confusion or distortion of this sensuous feedback can render a subject incapable of writing or speaking; and, of course, without perception of the sign-sequences emitted, one cannot understand the person emitting language.) Now cases can be produced almost at will where thinking occurs without language being present or in use. This, of course, is something which everyone--including the proponent of thinking-in-language--very well knows. It is these cases which, together with the assumption that we always think in language, create what in (7) was called "the well-known difficulty of thinking without words." If, as in (3), "thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs," then when there are no signs--and when, consequently, the means by which we produce, manipulate, or perceive signs are not functioning--we do have a difficulty. In fact, a difficulty so severe that it amounts to a proof that thinking is not essentially the activity of operating with signs, and that often we think entirely without language. One cannot operate with signs where there are no signs. <129>  As the above quotations indicate, the most common move made to save 'thinking in language' at this point is the shift to 'silent soliloquy,' as in (6), or to 'pieces of intelligent talking to oneself,' as in (7). These are latter-day shades of John Watson's 'sub-vocal language.' Of course one can talk to oneself or write to onself. But talking and writing to oneself require the production and perception of sensuous signs just as much as talking and writing to another. The realization of this is what drives the thinking-in-language advocate to silent soliloquy or to nonvocal speaking--the written counterpart of which would be invisible writing. That is, they are driven to flat absurdities. A silent soliloquy--that is, silent speaking--is precisely on a par with a silent trumpet solo, for example, or silent thunder. A poet may say:        Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard             Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;        Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,             Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone;...                (Keats, Ode to a Grecian Urn) But there are in fact no unhearable melodies, no ears other than the "sensual," no ditties of no tone. What those who speak of silent discourse have in mind is, no doubt, the fact that interlaced with our thinking of or about things is a great deal of imaging of linguistic entities. (This is especially true of academics or intellectuals in general, because of their great concern with expression of thought. Probably an adequate phenomenology of thinking would exhibit great contrast between them and other classes of persons precisely at the relation between thinking and degree of activity in imaging linguistic entities and events.) But imaging a word is not using a word, any more than imaging a horse is using a horse. Moreover, imaging a word, phrase, or sentence is not producing or perceiving a word, phrase, or sentence any more than imaging a horse is producing or perceiving--or otherwise 'having'--a horse. To image a linguistic sequence is not to have it in a special sort of place--the mind--nor is it to have a special sort of linguistic sequence. To image is to exemplify a certain sort of thinking or intentional state, and a sort which does have interesting relationships with other kinds of thinking. But there is no reason at all to suppose that all kinds of thinking necessarily involve or are accompanied by this kind of thinking (imaging) directed upon language segments. And if there were, it still would not follow that all thinking requires language, since this kind of thinking about language segments is not itself language at all. Nor does it require any <130> language present in order for it to come to pass, since intentional inexistence applies to mental events when language segments are the objects, as well as when sticks and stones and animals are. Having considered a reason for rejecting the proposition that human beings always think in language, let us now consider whether they ever do. In fact, the difficulty is not, as Smart (above) and others have thought, in seeing how one can think without language, but in seeing how one would think with it. Thinking with or in language must consist in doing something with symbols, and so necessarily involves doing something to them--e.g., producing, altering, or perceiving them. If we would do something with the knife (e.g., cut the bread), we must do something to the knife, (e.g., clasp it in our hands). But, as we have seen, thinking occurs where nothing at all is being done to or with signs, there not being any signs in these cases. The power or act of having or changing t-states--that is, the power or act of thinking--is, then, not a power or act of having or altering linguistic symbols. (It is not, in fact, a power of doing anything with or in anything at all. The profound difference in kinds of powers and acts involved here is what Wittgenstein calls attention to in the last sentence of (3) above.) Thought is, of course, practical, in that it exercises an influence upon, or makes some difference in, the world of sense particulars. But it alone is not capable of acting with the sorts of particulars used in linguistic behavior as its immediate instruments. It is just this incapacity which makes it impossible for the advocates of thinking-in-language to give any account of the mechanisms or the 'how' by which the words in which we, allegedly, think are produced, manipulated, and gotten rid of--though they must be produced (or stored and hauled out), manipulated, and, in some sense, gotten rid of, if we are to think with and in them as our tools or instruments. Merely to ask the question of how, in detail, this is done in the course of thinking reveals, I believe, the absurdity of 'thinking in language'. Mere thinking can do nothing to signs which might be used in a language, and hence it can do nothing with such signs, or in the act of modifying the conditions of such signs. It is absurd to suppose that one can do x with y without in some way bringing about a change in the condition, state, relations, or properties of y. It is this and only this that I put by saying that it is absurd to suppose that one can do something with y while doing nothing to y. If it is replied that, of course, the mind or thought does not do these things, but that when we write, speak, hear, see, and otherwise relate to actual words in the actual employment of language, we then are thinking, with bodily parts managing the symbols involved, then it <131> must be pointed out that, while we may indeed also be thinking in such cases, we are not simply thinking. The total event here, to which language certainly is essential, is not thinking. Correct use of language can even occur, as has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, without the occurrence of any peculiarly relevant t-states. On the other hand, thinking does occur without the use of hands, mouth, ears, eyes, fingers in any appropriately relevant manner. Hence, what can only occur by the use of these is not the same as thinking, though it may somehow involve or influence thinking. Smart remarks in (7) that, when he thinkingly wrote the sentence, "Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself," he could "no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking." This may be true of thinkingly writing the sentence (whatever that means). But it does not follow that one cannot think that certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself without the use of language, though Smart clearly thinks that it does. Of course one cannot thinkingly write without writing. But that is nothing to the point of whether or not we can and do think with or without words. Also, the comparison to graceful walking is not apt. We do, as above shown, sometimes think without words or symbols, while no cases of grace without behavior are known. Now it is very certainly true that some processes clearly involving thinking as described above depend for their occurrence upon linguistic behavior and the sensible signs which it involves, for example, the processes of learning algebra or the history of the Basques, or learning how to counsel emotionally upset persons. But it is to be noted that these are not themselves processes of thinking, but rather are extremely complex processes involving all kinds of events and entities other than language and other than thinking--e.g., feelings, perceptions, buildings, other persons, days and nights, books, and so on. None of these processes is a process of thinking; and for that reason alone it is invalid to infer from them that thinking is linguistic behavior, or that one thinks with language. What is essential to things or events of a certain sort must be shown essential to them taken by themselves, not in combination with many other things. With reference to the involved processes in question, it might be more appropriate (though it would still be wrong) to say--as some have said in recent years--that we live in or with language. Nevertheless, it is certain that some kind of dependence relation--probably similar to feedback mechanisms--exists between linguistic processes and their sensuous signs, on the one hand, and certain sequences of t-states on the other. What, exactly, this relation <132> of dependence is continues to be veiled by, among other things, a priori assumptions about what thinking and language must be and do. One such assumption is that which holds thinking essentially to be an operation with signs or symbols, or doing something with--or in--linguistic processes or entities. The view that we (necessarily) think without language is, today, regarded as so outlandish as not to merit serious consideration. But this is not due to a lack of arguments to support it. My object here has been to focus upon certain arguments purporting to show the absurdity of thinking in language. The main points in these arguments are: Thinking does occur without any accompanying language whatsoever, and thus shows itself not to be a power or act of managing linguistic signs, once it is clear what such a sign is. Thinking, as distinct from behavioral processes involving it, can do nothing to signs or symbols, and hence can do nothing with them. NOTES See for example, Ramsey's Foundations of Mathematics, p. 138, and Kneale's remarks in Feigl and Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 42. Return to text. See S. Morris Engel, "Thought and Language," Dialogue, Vol. 3, 1964, 160-170; Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, 1965, esp. p. 83; R. Kirk, "Rationality Without Language," Mind, 1967, pp. 369-368; G. Ryle, "A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking," in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, P. F. Strawson, ed., (Oxford: 1968), pp. 7-23. Interesting remarks on the issues here are also found in Bruce Aune's Knowledge, Mind and Nature, chap. VIII and H. H. Price's Thinking and Experience, Chap. X.  See also Wm. James, "Thought Before Language; A Deaf Mute's Recollections," Mind, Vol. I, 1892; and see Wittgenstein's comments on this in Philosophical Investigations, No. 342. Return to text. I use only think here, for simplicity; but think that and other structures of such intentional states (and sequences thereof) might also be mentioned. Specifically, I would also wish to hold that instances of thinking that, in the sense of inferring or puzzling something out, occur in the absence of appropriate linguistic entities or activities. Return to text.

[thinktwice]

For those interested, here is the Objectivist position about language as it pertains to thinking.

----- From "Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand" by Leonard Piekoff (pages 78 and 79)

A concept (writes Ayn Rand) is like an arithmetical sequence of specifically defined units, going off in both directions, open at both ends and including all units of that particular kind. For instance, the concept "man" includes all men who live at present, who have ever lived or will ever live. An arithmetical sequence extends into infinity, without implying that infinity actually exists; such extension means only that whatever number of units does exist, it is to be included in the same sequence. The same principle applies to concepts: the concept "man" does not (and need not) specify what number of men will ultimately have existed -- it specifies only the characteristices of man, and means that any number of entities possessing these characteristics is to be identified as "men."

The tool that makes this kind of integration possible is language. A word is the only form in which mand's mind is able to retain such a sum of concretes.

If a man, deprived of words, were to perform only the steps indicated so far, he would have before his mind a complex, unwieldy phenomenon: a number of similar objects and a resolve to treat them and everything like them together. This would not be a mental entity or a retainable mental state. Every time the man would want to use his concept, he would have to start afresh, recalling or projecting some relevant similars and performing over again the process of abstraction.

A word changes the situation dramatically. A word (aside from proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept; it is a concrete, perceptually graspable symbol. Such a symbol transforms the sum of similars and the resolve to treat them together into a single (mental) concept.

Only concretes exist. If a concept is to exist, therefore, it must exist in some way as a concrete. That is the function of language. "Language," writes Ayn Ran, "is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the ... function of converting auditory symbols into the mental equivalent of concretes."

It is not true that words are necessary primarily for the sake of communication. Words are essential to the process of conceptualization and thus to all thought. They are as necessary in the privacy of a man's mind as in any public forum; they are as necessary on a desert island as in society. The word constitutes the completion of the integration stage; it is the form in which the concept exists. Using the soul-body terminology, we may say that the word is the body, and the conscious perspective involved, the soul -- and that the two form a unity which cannot be sundered. A concept without a word is at best an ephemeral resolve; a word without a concept is noise. "Words transform concepts into (mental) entities," writes Miss Rand; "definitions provide them with identity.

[unspun]

AG, cc: tort.: Thanks for this illustrious post and its Scriptures, A-G.

Christianity is not for everyone, it was never intended to be. And it is not intended to make sense to the world at large

For helping to define this very troubling matter from the other end too:

"But do not forget this one thing, dear friends: With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day. The Lord is not slow in keeping his promise, as some understand slowness. He is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance."
2 Peter 3:8-9

I urge, then, first of all, that requests, prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for everyone-- for kings and all those in authority, that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness. This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all men--the testimony given in its proper time. And for this purpose I was appointed a herald and an apostle--I am telling the truth, I am not lying--and a teacher of the true faith to the Gentiles.
1 Timothy 2:1-7

(It should be noted that "repentence" means simply put, "the condition of having turned" as in, to turn to the one to whom we are subject.)

Goodness & wellness,
(God being well found in the paradoxes He provides....)

[fifteendogs]

There are those of us who think in term of language. There are those of us who think in terms of symbology. There are those of us who think in terms of pure thought.

Which are you?

[Consort]

For instance, the concept "man" includes all men who live at present, who have ever lived or will ever live.
The tool that makes this kind of integration possible is language.

Using language, "man" can also mean one person, one adult person, of one particular gender, etc. Therefore, the term "man" reqires context. However, the terms "human" or "mankind" or "humankind" or "human race" might be better choices in the above sentence.

[betty boop]

I acknowledge that not everyone is on the same page in this regard. On one hand, you have many theologians who have argued that the reason people should believe in Christianity is that it is eminently rational. On the other hand, you have many people (and other theologians as well, though they typically seem to fall into the first camp) who believe that rationality has nothing to do with it.

Certainly not everyone is on the same page in this regard, tortoise; not even Christians are on the same page in this regard. There was a great split in Christian thought and dogma, back in the 17th century. It divided the community of Christian faith into two “camps,” the partisans of the “old [corrupt]” faith (i.e, Roman orthodoxy), and the “reformed” faith, inspired by great spirits and thinkers such as Martin Luther, John Calvin, Jacob Boehme, Jacob Hermansz, John Wesley, et al.

This “fatal split” came about due to irreconcilable differences in theology, dogma, and practice that divided Christianity into a multiplicity of sects. The reformers were largely motivated by a burning desire to purge the Church of corruption and abuse, which by the 17th century was obvious and rampant. The reformers at large tended to believe that the best corrective for the abuses of the clergy and the bishops was to be found in popular democracy, where the people would elect (or dismiss) their own clergy, and control the activities and expenditures of their church. (Few people realize the debt that America owes to the Reform Church – and particularly to its Puritan expression -- for her own foundational principles.)

You may wonder, tortoise, where I’m going with this. Please bear with me. The question we’re dealing with is the extent to which reason is preeminent – or not -- in Christianity. Though I sense you’d like to take that question beyond “mere” Christianity, and extend it to “religion” or faith itself, I’m personally not adequate to perform that task.

Because that would be a search for a universal; and I am ill-positioned (for reasons you well appreciate) to conduct such a search. What I can do, however, is speak about my own tradition, that is, Western culture. Which cannot be done without invoking its sources, which lie in Jerusalem and Athens.

You wrote:

There are two perspectives at play here that aren't really even mutually exclusive. On the one hand, you have people who already believe in Christianity and accept it as essentially axiomatic. From this perspective there is no need to rationalize Christianity any more than you spend time rationalizing any other axiom. On the other hand, I believe many of the rationalizing theologians are concerned selling the idea to everyone else, i.e. people who are not Christians or at least do not automatically consider Christianity to be axiomatic. You can't tell a moderately rational person "this is admittedly irrational but you should believe it anyway". It just doesn't fly that well with a good segment of the population, and would be as difficult to sell as astrology if you put it that way. There are plenty of Christians who believe only because it seems rational to them, not because they've ever had a "religious" experience.

How do I interpret this passage? You say that there are Christians who regard their belief as axiomatic, and therefore have no need to “rationalize it.” This doesn’t bother you. But where you get to be bothered is when Christians engage in “selling” their ideas to you. Because you apparently think these ideas are irrational: “You can’t tell a moderately rational person ‘this is admittedly irrational but you should believe it anyway’” is how you put it.

But what’s “irrational” about Christianity? You seem to be ambivalent about that; for you also say, “There are plenty of Christians who believe only because it seems rational to them, not because they’ve ever had a ‘religious’ experience.”

The “seems” may be the fatal giveaway from your point of view: We can’t get from “seems” to “rigor.” Science (or universal axioms) doesn’t want seems; it wants rigor.

Yet all that "seems" alludes to is what can be deduced from actual human experience, reflectively understood in terms of human existence as part of a Whole that comprehends the conceiving mind.

Is it therefore irrational to say that, if you can’t get rigor, then you have to settle for seems? I don't think so. Because there is no one “universal axiom” that explains everything that is, was, or ever will be – at least not one that man can conceive or derive, from his limited, finite, contingent position -- or that he could understand, from his partial position within the totality that embraces him.

So along this line of reasoning, if things necessarily get stuck in the “seems” category, on what does “seems” rely for its validation? To put it crudely, if “seems” is all we’ve got to go on, how do we know it’s “honest” – that is to say, true?

It seems the truth of “seems” cannot rely on any personal, individual judgment. That sort of thing, writ large, spells only social chaos, anarchy.

Which is where “religion” comes into the picture. Religion deals with those aspects of human existence that are not explicable in terms of finite human experience. That is to say there is more to a man than merely his physical body. He has extension beyond space and time. And thus is subject to an order that is not itself bound by space and time.

As daunting as that may sound, the Christians say that God made a world that is ordered and, thus, intelligible. And God made man precisely to fit the challenges of living in such a world, by vesting in him reason (intelligence) and free will. Arguably, it is the correspondence, or consonance, between these two terms – God-given world and God-given man -- that gives us humans the idea of Truth.

Which takes us back to the original controversy, whether or not religious faith of the Christian sort is rational or not. I’d have to say in response: Not only is Christianity rational through and through; but what possible alternative can logically exist to supplant the Christian understanding of God-Man-Society-Nature – the totality of human experienced existence and of the existence of every other thing in this universe?

Anyhoot, to wrap up by citing the beginning of this reply, the question whether it is rational to believe. To me, it is irrational NOT to believe.

For without belief, without confidence in God and the world He made, how can we live in this world, the most part of which is entirely outside our own direct ken or will – past, present, and future? And on a second count, how can human society organize itself in a manner that is conducive to human liberty and justice -- if the organizing criteria are left to whatever subjective human judgment, aligned to effective social/political power that alone can make its “wishes” come true -- if there is no higher (i.e., more truthful) standard to go by than human wishing or willing?

I’ll just leave the problem there, tortoise, for your introspection.

Thank you so much for speaking with me about these issues, tortoise. Truly I respect the acuity of intelligence and honesty of methods that I see alive in you.

p.s.: I meant to delve into the “ideological” distinctions between orthodox and reform (i.e., Protestant) Christianity here. But figured that problem could be dealt with later, assuming anyone’s interested. On my take, the division in the Church set up the necessary conditions without which the ensuing Enlightenment would have been impossible. And what was “reformed” was the tendency of the Church to find its “reasons,” not only in the Life of Christ as captured by the Holy Scriptures, but increasingly in the needs of social man. The great classical thinkers of 5th century Athens, whose insights were imbibed and illuminated by the great Scholastic Fathers of the Church, were consigned to obivion and the "teaching fathers" along with them. It was individuals like this that reformed church folk deigned to call "pagans," of the very same status as the famously barbarous ancient Germanic tribes -- no difference to be noted there! Well…another story for another time, perhaps.

Point is: At no time has Christianity been divorced from the conscious life of reason. On the contrary, in the West, Christianity has specified what “reason” is, or consists of.

Please let me know your thoughts in this regard, tortoise.

[Consort]

reqires = requires

[tpaine]

To me, it is irrational NOT to believe.

---- How can human society organize itself in a manner that is conducive to human liberty and justice --

-- if the organizing criteria are left to whatever subjective human judgment, aligned to effective social/political power that alone can make its "wishes" come true --
-bb-




"The utterly insufferable arrogance of power, and the need for it, is an absolute fact of the human condition. -- Nothing can be done about it. - Just as the poor shall always be with us, so shall we have these infinitely shrewd imbeciles who live to lay down their version of 'the law' to others."
-unknown-

[Consort]

Because there is no one “universal axiom” that explains everything that is, was, or ever will be – at least not one that man can conceive or derive, from his limited, finite, contingent position -- or that he could understand, from his partial position within the totality that embraces him.

We could change all the words after the dash to read: "- at least not one that man will accept."

As far as there being one "universal axiom", the link in Post #53 of this thread provides an example of such an axiom, but we will all find reasons to not accept it at all or in part. It also seems to be the exact opposite of Objectivism.

[thinktwice]

Using language, "man" can also mean one person, one adult person, of one particular gender, etc

In standard english, the word "man" works well to describe the group consisting of male and female humans.

Words such as dog, cat, horse and duck serve similarly well in the english language.

[Consort]

In standard english, the word "man" works well to describe the group consisting of male and female humans.

Yes, I agree. That's why I included the words "also" and "context".

[thinktwice]

in the West, Christianity has specified what “reason” is, or consists of.

Please don't go to too much trouble, but I would like to know how "reason" is specified by Christianity.

[Kudsman]

Hello again. Firstly about last night....It was short and boorish of me. My apologies to all involved. Believe me there were extenuating cicumstances. If you would permit me a rambling re:

1. Do we always think in language? 2. Do we ever think in language? You may have already said, but would you like to post your determinations?

If you are thinking epistemoloically then wouldn't "in language" be the predominant (if not sole) way you would think? I mean if you start out with rigid, box (or whatever shaped) limits then all thoughts would seek to define everything "in the box" it seems to me.

However, if you add in the hypostatization of a sentient ....mind (for lack of better word) being the impetus of A thought, you struggle with words to define any boundaries. I would humbly suggest that the Bible properly understood and followed might be the language that could guide those thoughts. It wouldn't matter what man language it was written in. The truths and parables would have the same meaning. This would make the second thinking condition livable by a human on earth. (as it is in heaven) :-) JMOFWIW.

[unspun]

Very apt observations and I learn from them. However, look at the semantics of Dr. Willard's position. (I've tried not to answer any of these answers to the 'poll' question, because one time would tend to lead to another and so forth, and I'd become too present/obnoxious and besides, I'm just not educated enough nor have the time or patience or, something.) Almost, thou persuadest me, though to attempt a synopsis, since I would tend to agree with the good doctor. Maybe I'll try my hand at that after a bit, or maybe someone else will.

But like I said, I not only agree but also learn from what you have said.

[unspun]

And now, I will check in on my Free Republic Federalist League Baseball team in fantasysports.yahoo.com, my presently cellar dwelling but upwardly mobile Algernon Sidneys....

[man of Yosemite]

I think a mind working properly will come to faith in God. The book of Job teaches us the foolishness of not coming to a childlike faith in God. No man has the capacity for these things, they are like the stars above us. Stephen Hawking has missed the greatest truth of all, his own inadequacy for the task at hand. A mind thinking clearly is a mind that sees how very great a God it must be that has created so wonderfully. Think of how the moon travels around this planet and rotates with such perfection that we always see the exact same side of it. How could it possibly be so exact? Try running up and down flights of stairs while you think intently about what you're doing. When your mind gets in the way you crash. There are a multitude of actions we do everday that are acheived quite apart from our thinking.

[unspun]

There are those of us who think in term of language. There are those of us who think in terms of symbology. There are those of us who think in terms of pure thought. Which are you?

I tend to like to be functional in all my capacities. As a matter of fact, I deeply believe I am transcendently responsible to be actively engaged in all the faculties of my inner self.

I posted something you might like to peruse a few hundred posts ago... let me see.... There's that puppy! ;-`

05/25/2003 1:25 PM CDT #376 of 855

I'd appreciate your thoughts.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your post, unspun!

I do not see a paradox at all, i.e. both selections fit together perfectly. Your selections show it is God’s desire that all should be saved and my selections show that He wants only those who have “ears to hear” and not to use “wisdom of words” to reach people.

My comments are directed to those “rationalizing theologians” who try to “sell” Christianity. I see this as wandering beyond the teaching of Christ much like trying to convert people at the point of a sword.

The proper way according to the Scriptures I selected is to preach Christ crucified, the gospel as we received it. The results will be like Christ described in the parable of the sower in Matthew 13 (some seed fell on stony places, some among thorns, some on fertile ground.)

In I Corinthians 3, Paul gives the example of Christians needing spiritual milk first before they can handle meat. He uses the metaphor again in Hebrews 5. The metaphor is also used in I Peter 2 – always illustrating that even the newborn Christian cannot digest deep spiritual truths at first. How much less can a general target audience handle the “rationalizing theologians’” erudition?

IOW, spiritual meat is for Christians who have been weaned from spiritual milk.. Efforts to make spiritual meat “marketable” are doomed to fail, IMHO.

[Kudsman]

However, look at the semantics of Dr. Willard's position.

My simplistic response is Dr. Willard is man (at least human in form). Unless some insider knowledge not being cited is present, the good Doctor's opinions are just that. Semantics, science, and just as valid as any poster on this thread's. Opinion. It is good but I feel the need for more. Call it a WORD if you will. Love.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so very much for your great post, betty boop! I very much agree:

At no time has Christianity been divorced from the conscious life of reason. On the contrary, in the West, Christianity has specified what “reason” is, or consists of.

I do hope you will post the ideological differences between the orthodox and reform Christianity and the effect it has had on all of us!

p.s. My sidebar with tortoise and unspun does not deal with Christianity and reason but rather with theologians formulating rationalizations to "sell” Christianity to the unregenerate. It is a different subject, i.e. evangelizing.

[fifteendogs]

For some one who pretends to understand clear thought, you sure use lots of big words. Clear thought doesn't require words, short, long or many. If you are into clear thinking, you should try and develope you inate ability to use telepathy. Private, quiet and meaningful.