The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

the author's site ^ | 1972 | Dallas Willard

[unspun]

The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

This paper has been read to the University of Southern California philosophy group and the Boston 1972 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, as well as to the Houston meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society. Appeared in The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, IV(1973), pp. 125-132. Numbers in "<>" refer to this journal.

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Among the principal assumptions of major portions of philosophy in recent decades have been: (1) That philosophy somehow consists of (some sort of) logic, and (2) that logic is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language. There, of course, follows from these a third assumption: (3) That philosophy is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language--though this implication should not be taken as representing any phase of the historical development of recent philosophizing. Instead of listing these three points as assumptions, it would probably be more correct to regard them as categories or complexes of assumptions; or perhaps, more vaguely still, as 'tendencies' or proclivities of recent philosophical thinking. But precision of these points need not be put in issue here, as this paper does not seek any large-scale resolution of the problem area in question. The aim here is to examine only one proposition which plays a role in the clearly existent tendencies referred to: Namely, the proposition that we think in or with language. I hope to show, first, that we do not always think in or with language; and then, second, that the very conception of thinking in or with language involves an absurdity. What implications this has for broader philosophical assumptions or tendencies will not be dealt with here, though the implications in question seem to me to be extremely important ones. That human beings think in language is explicitly stated in such diverse places as ordinary newspapers, the more sophisticated popular magazines and journals, and serious discourse in the humanities and the social sciences, as well as in the technical writings of philosophers. To prove this broad range of consensus would be idle; but, in order to have the philosophical context clearly before us, we may give a few brief quotations. <126>       (1) Man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it: the thinking which becomes conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof. And, we may say, the worst part:--for this conscious thinking alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. (Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, sub-sec. # 354)      (2) Let no one be contemptuous of symbols! A good deal depends upon a practical selection of them. Furthermore, their value is not diminished by the fact that after much practice, we no longer really need to call forth a symbol, we do not need to speak out loud in order to think. The fact remains that we think in words or, when not in words, then in mathematical or other symbols. (Frege, Mind, Vol. 73, p. 156)      (3) It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a 'mental activity'. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be an agent in writing. (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 6-7)      (4) ... The woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. (C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, II, p. 129)      (5) Words only matter because words are what we think with. (H. H. Price, Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XIX, p. 7)      (6) Theorizing is an activity which most people can and normally do conduct in silence. They articulate in sentences the theories that they construct, but they do not most of the time speak these sentences out loud. They say them to themselves.... Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery.... This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor without effort.... (Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 27. See also pp. 282-83 and 296-97) <127>      (7)This helps to elucidate the well-known difficulty of thinking without words. Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself. Consider the way in which I 'thinkingly' wrote the last sentence. I can no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking (or some equivalent activity). (J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 89) These quotations will suffice to establish the context within which philosophers speak of thinking in language (or with language). Many other quotations could be added from the literature.1 It is not assumed here that the persons quoted all occupy the same position with reference to the relationship between thought and language. Yet it would be interesting to see what any of these thinkers, or others who suppose that human beings think in language, could save of their position from the critique which follows. Uneasiness about the conception of thinking in or with language has been expressed by a number of writers, but only over limited aspects of it.2 Here we shall consider arguments which purport to call the conception into question entirely and in principle. First, consider a reason for rejecting the view that we always think in language. It consists in the fact that thinking often occurs without the production, manipulation, or perception of sense-perceptible signs, without which there is no use of language. Such occurrences often provoke offers of 'A penny for your thoughts.' Thinking: Whatever we may decide to call them, and however it is that we are conscious of them, there are intentional states of persons, more or less fixed or fleeting, which do not require for their obtaining that what they are about or of be perceived by, or be impinging causally upon, the person involved. In order to think of3 Henry the Eighth, <128> of the first auto one owned, of the Pythagorean theorem, or of the Mississippi River, it is not required that they should disturb my nervous system. Such states (t-states) of persons are often called 'thoughts', especially in contrast with 'perceptions', and being in such a state is one of the things more commonly called 'thinking'. One no more needs to be going through a change of such states in order to be thinking, than he needs to be changing his bodily position in order to be sitting or lying or sleeping. Rarely if ever--as is alleged in the case of mystic contemplation--are these t-states unchanging. Usually they flow, at varying rates, intermingled with person states of many sorts, governed by such transitional structures as inference, goal orientation, objective structures given in perception or in other ways, and elemental association of 'ideas', among others. In what follows, we shall use 'thinking' to cover both the single t-state and the flow of such states, without regard to how intermingled with other person states. Language: Sense perceptible signs or symbols are an essential constituent of language. It is always false to say that language is present or in use where no signs are present or in use. And, whatever else a sign may be, it is something which is apprehendable via its sensible qualities. That is, it is something which can be either seen, heard, felt, tasted or smelled. Moreover, the use of language requires some level of actual sensuous apprehension of the signs which are in use on the occasion. (Confusion or distortion of this sensuous feedback can render a subject incapable of writing or speaking; and, of course, without perception of the sign-sequences emitted, one cannot understand the person emitting language.) Now cases can be produced almost at will where thinking occurs without language being present or in use. This, of course, is something which everyone--including the proponent of thinking-in-language--very well knows. It is these cases which, together with the assumption that we always think in language, create what in (7) was called "the well-known difficulty of thinking without words." If, as in (3), "thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs," then when there are no signs--and when, consequently, the means by which we produce, manipulate, or perceive signs are not functioning--we do have a difficulty. In fact, a difficulty so severe that it amounts to a proof that thinking is not essentially the activity of operating with signs, and that often we think entirely without language. One cannot operate with signs where there are no signs. <129>  As the above quotations indicate, the most common move made to save 'thinking in language' at this point is the shift to 'silent soliloquy,' as in (6), or to 'pieces of intelligent talking to oneself,' as in (7). These are latter-day shades of John Watson's 'sub-vocal language.' Of course one can talk to oneself or write to onself. But talking and writing to oneself require the production and perception of sensuous signs just as much as talking and writing to another. The realization of this is what drives the thinking-in-language advocate to silent soliloquy or to nonvocal speaking--the written counterpart of which would be invisible writing. That is, they are driven to flat absurdities. A silent soliloquy--that is, silent speaking--is precisely on a par with a silent trumpet solo, for example, or silent thunder. A poet may say:        Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard             Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;        Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,             Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone;...                (Keats, Ode to a Grecian Urn) But there are in fact no unhearable melodies, no ears other than the "sensual," no ditties of no tone. What those who speak of silent discourse have in mind is, no doubt, the fact that interlaced with our thinking of or about things is a great deal of imaging of linguistic entities. (This is especially true of academics or intellectuals in general, because of their great concern with expression of thought. Probably an adequate phenomenology of thinking would exhibit great contrast between them and other classes of persons precisely at the relation between thinking and degree of activity in imaging linguistic entities and events.) But imaging a word is not using a word, any more than imaging a horse is using a horse. Moreover, imaging a word, phrase, or sentence is not producing or perceiving a word, phrase, or sentence any more than imaging a horse is producing or perceiving--or otherwise 'having'--a horse. To image a linguistic sequence is not to have it in a special sort of place--the mind--nor is it to have a special sort of linguistic sequence. To image is to exemplify a certain sort of thinking or intentional state, and a sort which does have interesting relationships with other kinds of thinking. But there is no reason at all to suppose that all kinds of thinking necessarily involve or are accompanied by this kind of thinking (imaging) directed upon language segments. And if there were, it still would not follow that all thinking requires language, since this kind of thinking about language segments is not itself language at all. Nor does it require any <130> language present in order for it to come to pass, since intentional inexistence applies to mental events when language segments are the objects, as well as when sticks and stones and animals are. Having considered a reason for rejecting the proposition that human beings always think in language, let us now consider whether they ever do. In fact, the difficulty is not, as Smart (above) and others have thought, in seeing how one can think without language, but in seeing how one would think with it. Thinking with or in language must consist in doing something with symbols, and so necessarily involves doing something to them--e.g., producing, altering, or perceiving them. If we would do something with the knife (e.g., cut the bread), we must do something to the knife, (e.g., clasp it in our hands). But, as we have seen, thinking occurs where nothing at all is being done to or with signs, there not being any signs in these cases. The power or act of having or changing t-states--that is, the power or act of thinking--is, then, not a power or act of having or altering linguistic symbols. (It is not, in fact, a power of doing anything with or in anything at all. The profound difference in kinds of powers and acts involved here is what Wittgenstein calls attention to in the last sentence of (3) above.) Thought is, of course, practical, in that it exercises an influence upon, or makes some difference in, the world of sense particulars. But it alone is not capable of acting with the sorts of particulars used in linguistic behavior as its immediate instruments. It is just this incapacity which makes it impossible for the advocates of thinking-in-language to give any account of the mechanisms or the 'how' by which the words in which we, allegedly, think are produced, manipulated, and gotten rid of--though they must be produced (or stored and hauled out), manipulated, and, in some sense, gotten rid of, if we are to think with and in them as our tools or instruments. Merely to ask the question of how, in detail, this is done in the course of thinking reveals, I believe, the absurdity of 'thinking in language'. Mere thinking can do nothing to signs which might be used in a language, and hence it can do nothing with such signs, or in the act of modifying the conditions of such signs. It is absurd to suppose that one can do x with y without in some way bringing about a change in the condition, state, relations, or properties of y. It is this and only this that I put by saying that it is absurd to suppose that one can do something with y while doing nothing to y. If it is replied that, of course, the mind or thought does not do these things, but that when we write, speak, hear, see, and otherwise relate to actual words in the actual employment of language, we then are thinking, with bodily parts managing the symbols involved, then it <131> must be pointed out that, while we may indeed also be thinking in such cases, we are not simply thinking. The total event here, to which language certainly is essential, is not thinking. Correct use of language can even occur, as has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, without the occurrence of any peculiarly relevant t-states. On the other hand, thinking does occur without the use of hands, mouth, ears, eyes, fingers in any appropriately relevant manner. Hence, what can only occur by the use of these is not the same as thinking, though it may somehow involve or influence thinking. Smart remarks in (7) that, when he thinkingly wrote the sentence, "Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself," he could "no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking." This may be true of thinkingly writing the sentence (whatever that means). But it does not follow that one cannot think that certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself without the use of language, though Smart clearly thinks that it does. Of course one cannot thinkingly write without writing. But that is nothing to the point of whether or not we can and do think with or without words. Also, the comparison to graceful walking is not apt. We do, as above shown, sometimes think without words or symbols, while no cases of grace without behavior are known. Now it is very certainly true that some processes clearly involving thinking as described above depend for their occurrence upon linguistic behavior and the sensible signs which it involves, for example, the processes of learning algebra or the history of the Basques, or learning how to counsel emotionally upset persons. But it is to be noted that these are not themselves processes of thinking, but rather are extremely complex processes involving all kinds of events and entities other than language and other than thinking--e.g., feelings, perceptions, buildings, other persons, days and nights, books, and so on. None of these processes is a process of thinking; and for that reason alone it is invalid to infer from them that thinking is linguistic behavior, or that one thinks with language. What is essential to things or events of a certain sort must be shown essential to them taken by themselves, not in combination with many other things. With reference to the involved processes in question, it might be more appropriate (though it would still be wrong) to say--as some have said in recent years--that we live in or with language. Nevertheless, it is certain that some kind of dependence relation--probably similar to feedback mechanisms--exists between linguistic processes and their sensuous signs, on the one hand, and certain sequences of t-states on the other. What, exactly, this relation <132> of dependence is continues to be veiled by, among other things, a priori assumptions about what thinking and language must be and do. One such assumption is that which holds thinking essentially to be an operation with signs or symbols, or doing something with--or in--linguistic processes or entities. The view that we (necessarily) think without language is, today, regarded as so outlandish as not to merit serious consideration. But this is not due to a lack of arguments to support it. My object here has been to focus upon certain arguments purporting to show the absurdity of thinking in language. The main points in these arguments are: Thinking does occur without any accompanying language whatsoever, and thus shows itself not to be a power or act of managing linguistic signs, once it is clear what such a sign is. Thinking, as distinct from behavioral processes involving it, can do nothing to signs or symbols, and hence can do nothing with them. NOTES See for example, Ramsey's Foundations of Mathematics, p. 138, and Kneale's remarks in Feigl and Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 42. Return to text. See S. Morris Engel, "Thought and Language," Dialogue, Vol. 3, 1964, 160-170; Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, 1965, esp. p. 83; R. Kirk, "Rationality Without Language," Mind, 1967, pp. 369-368; G. Ryle, "A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking," in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, P. F. Strawson, ed., (Oxford: 1968), pp. 7-23. Interesting remarks on the issues here are also found in Bruce Aune's Knowledge, Mind and Nature, chap. VIII and H. H. Price's Thinking and Experience, Chap. X.  See also Wm. James, "Thought Before Language; A Deaf Mute's Recollections," Mind, Vol. I, 1892; and see Wittgenstein's comments on this in Philosophical Investigations, No. 342. Return to text. I use only think here, for simplicity; but think that and other structures of such intentional states (and sequences thereof) might also be mentioned. Specifically, I would also wish to hold that instances of thinking that, in the sense of inferring or puzzling something out, occur in the absence of appropriate linguistic entities or activities. Return to text.

[Hank Kerchief]

Well, we're really getting off on the wrong foot.

Precepts, I assume you mean....

No, I meant "percepts." noun: the representation of what is perceived

Generally consciousness is considered to have three levels, in the simplest creatures, sentience, the more complex, perception, and the highest (only humans) conception. Instances of consciousness at each level would be sensations, percepts, and concepts. This is very general, just so you know what I mean by percepts.

I don't suppose you could recast this explanation with a little more concreteness--I believe it's making me a little dizzy trying to follow along in the playbook.

Well, you did assume I was mistaken by the very first term I used and replaced it with your own. It might make a little more sense now that I have cleared that up, I hope.

The concepts are not easy, I know, and readily admit I have difficulty making them clear when both space and time are limited.

Hank

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so very much for your post and your endorsement! Hugs!!!

I also hope for the day when materialism is finally buried. The way things are going in scientific research into the inception of all that there is - it seems to me that either materialism will be assigned to the dustbin of intellectual trials - or those who willfully reject God (or a greater power) will be forced to present the anthropic principle as the edge of the map of all that there is, beyond which nothing else exists (like in the ancient days, “beyond here, there be dragons…”)

[Billthedrill]

Good heavens! Back after a long weekend and this obscure little thread about something that nobody cares about...is now a 500-post monster! My congratulations, and well done!

Still digesting some of the more arcane references so I shall avoid stepping on my tongue or other sensitive areas. But I will say that this has been a serious blow to my solopsistic view of the universe. I thought when I logged off all you bums winked out of existence! Hey, wait a minute...maybe you did...hah! Had me going for a minute there. You imaginary people are gonna have to get up pretty early in the morning to fool ol' BtD...

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for the heads up on all your posts and for the special ping at 413!

I appreciate your analysis and summary at 376; indeed, it is directly on point with the subject of the article. I also believe it is a wonderful thing that the discussion has broken off into several different directions. Evidently people have a lot of related concerns and this has been an exceptionally gifted group to consider all of them.

With regard to the question of ego - we just spent several hundred posts on a previous thread on a related issue, namely willfulness and the Word. My opinion on that thread applies on this thread (and everywhere in life.)

In sum, whereas there are different ways to approach being, thinking, doing and saying (including posting on Free Republic) - I have chosen to surrender to Christ. So, if anyone wishes to object to my posts for any reason other than a flaw on my part, I rejoice because it means the effort did not go unnoticed and/or there is a blessing to be had for the fussiness!

It is all a big mosaic to me, unspun. Some things are most clearly visible when set in contrast!

[Billthedrill]

You mean "solipsistic," don't you, you twit?

[Billthedrill]

Shut up. It's my durn universe and I'll spell it any dang way I want to. There's nobody here but me anyway. Wait a minute - who are you?

[Roscoe]

Billthedrill is talking to himself again.

[tortoise]

Do you think it would be useful to draw distinctions between and ?knowing? and ?understanding??

Possibly, with some caveats. If I were to make the distinction, I would say that "knowing" refers to a pattern in a single context, and that "understanding" refers to a pattern in all possible contexts. The primary caveat is that a finite system can only possibly "understand" vastly more finite systems than itself, a mathematical consequence. When people say they "understand" something, it usually means they "know it in the finite number of experiential contexts they have", which really isn't the same thing. I think there is substantial evidence that most people believe they "understand" things when they really only "know" things in a very limited experiential context.

It follows then that we are stuck with a Heinlein-ian "Fair Witness" as a local ideal. We know what we know AND we recognize that this knowledge only exists within a finite context and therefore we cannot assert true understanding. We can understand finite systems, but to extend ones understanding of a finite system to the universal case is an error in reasoning (a common one it seems).

To put it another way, more people really should understand Bayes theorem and why it applies to them. All the above is really just a restatement of a corollary of reasoning in finite systems: "correct" and "rational" are not required to be the same thing and frequently are not. Many, many regular arguments could be stopped if people understood the difference and why it is important.

[Roscoe]

It follows then that we are stuck with a Heinlein-ian "Fair Witness" as a local ideal.

"If we reflect upon our languages, we find that at best they must be considered only as maps." -- Alfred Korzybski

[D-fendr]

Thanks very much for your discussion.

What I said was if I draw conclusions about that which I perceive, it is my reasoning that is wrong, not the perception.

Logic is used to develop new knowledge from data perceived about the observable universe, not to determine the data itself.

If I beleive the light is green (when it is red), because I am color blind, it is not the grey color I see…

Perhaps I see where you are going: the logic telling you it should be green is in error. But this isn't what I'm getting at - You saw grey, your perception was in error, any reasoning following this false premise is on shakey ground - certainly not moving toward a valid proof.

Logic, on the level we're discussing, starts with an observation, or a premise, axiom, "self-evident" truth statement. It does not "prove" these. (In the case of science, observation is not derived using logic, but by using our sense organs and instruments that extend the senses - direct perception, not "drawing conclusions" - that comes later).

If the premise is wrong - whether it be a scientific measurement or a major premise - even correct logic can likely result in a false conclusion.

Again the point is that logic alone is insufficient to determine "all that can be known of reality." The BEGINNING point for use of logic/reason is after a great deal of important knowledge is determined (or assumed to be true) - it is done so, not in error, or on a whim or for lack of desire, but because logic/reason cannot be used for that purpose.

Without true sense data, empirical sense data, logic is blind.

Really. How do you know that? I mean, without logic?

Non sequitor unless you think I'm stating that logic cannot be used as a tool for knowing - which I have said many times that I'm not. [Am I to suppose you would then agree with the statement since I developed it logically?]

If, as you believe, all we can know about the ultimate human objective can, and must, only be known using logic/reason, I think it would be useful to the discussion to examine that, in your own knowledge, and see if it is true.

I'll be glad to discuss it. I already know it is true. Then, it follows, that you only know it using logic/reason.

I appreciate the opportunity to continue the dialogue I attempted before:

You know, using logic alone, that:   The ultimate human objective is to live in whatever way their nature requires them to live successfully and to enjoy their lives.

First, we'd need at least one clarification of terms. By "ultimate" do you mean highest/most developed/most significant (a qualitative value definition), or do you mean the "last" or final objective?

Next, of course, I'll ask for a proper logical proof of your statement's truth - in order that it may be "known by the use of logic."

Thanks very much for your reply.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your excellent post, betty boop! I strongly agree with the “pretty good definition” of a doctrinal thinking in post 426!

The word reality has been heavily in play throughout this thread. From my perspective - theology, philosophy, politics and science all seek to discover what is commonly understood to be ”reality”.

Nevertheless, each discipline is likely to come up with a different meaning for “what is real” and within disciplines, the meanings may vary. IOW, I see this as a potential definition stumblingblock both for the discussion and for those following it.

Perhaps it would be useful to define reality for the purposes of this thread? I would like to offer this draft definition:

reality - the sum of all things, conditions and abstractions which the person believes to exist objectively before discovery, observation or measurement

But even with that definition it is obvious to me, that ”reality” is but a profession of faith – or “reason” in the case of a metaphysical naturalist, objectivist or autonomist. IOW, a person can rationalize a ”reality” which is self-contained and thus “real” to that person but not necessarily “real” to the next person, who may have a different domain or rationale.

[Dataman]

What, no comments from thee?

Sorry. I've been involved in the absurdity of darwinian thought threads. There I find language often divorced from thinking.

[Dataman]

I will be happy enough if we can just bury Materialism.

Between Two Worlds (1944) begins with people on a ship who haven't yet figured out that they are dead. Kinda like materialism?

[Consort]

reality - the sum of all things, conditions and abstractions which the person believes to exist objectively before discovery, observation or measurement.

Sounds good, but would would you call it after discovery, observation or measurement?

[Hank Kerchief]

So...can your consciousness continue on when your material aspects are scattered to dust?

What would I be concsiuos of and how would I be conscious? Conscious does not belong to some other realm of existence. There is only one existence. But concsiousness is a "quality" of that existence that does not itself have any material qualities, but, it only exists in entities (which are material) which have another "quality" which is iteself non-material called life (that which differentiates organisms from all other kinds of entities), but neither life or consciousness can exist independently of the material entities of which they are qualities.

Do you draw a distinction between your consciousness and your incorporial spirit?

What is an "incorporeal spirit? If you equate spirit with consiousness, yes. If you equate spirit with some independent "ghost-like" invisible being who lives inside my body, I do not have one of those.

Hank

[Hank Kerchief]

Thanks for the comments.

You saw grey, your perception was in error ...

How can it be in error? For the kind of physiological "eyes" the color blind person has, grey is the correct information. When you see "red," for example, your actual perception might be the same as my "blue," but both of us would agree when pointing to something of that color that it is red. It is not the subjective experience that is "right" or "wrong." It can be neither, because it is whatever it is. Perceptions make no judgement or interpretation, they just are. Right and wrong, true and false pertain only to judgements or statements.

I think I know where our problem is. It is obvious reason cannot reason about nothing. But existence and consciousness are axiomatic to me. Existence is that which I am directly conscious of, however I am conscious of it, and all my reasoning is about that. Of course we must be conscious of something before we can reason about it.

Now, blind people, deaf people, and people with many other kinds of perceptual handicaps are able to learn everything about the material world that those without the handicaps are able to learn. If differences in perception were erroneous information about the world, only those with perfect perception would be able to learn science, for example, or history or anything else.

A few year ago some scientiest asked some students to wear special glasses as part of an experiment. These glasses cause everything to appear upside down. Within a couple of days, the students wearing the glasses no longer saw things upside down.

In this case we know the sensory information reaching the brain was "incorrect," as you would put it. It did not matter. Even at the pre-cognitive level of consciousness, the data was "corrected."

You quoted me: The ultimate human objective is to live in whatever way their nature requires them to live successfully and to enjoy their lives.

Then said: By "ultimate" do you mean highest/most developed/most significant (a qualitative value definition), or do you mean the "last" or final objective?

Both, I suppose. Any system of values is hierarchical in nature. Values define what things one should seek to achieve, gain, and keep, and what things one should shun, avoid, and eliminate, but such a system requires a primary or highest value, an "ideal" if you like, that all other values are directed toward.

It is this highest value or ideal that I meant by ultimate human objective. But, if one is successful, of course, at the conclusion of one's life, they will have achieved that ideal. So, it is both.

Next, of course, I'll ask for a proper logical proof of your statement's truth.

You could ask it, but I do not think you undestand what is being said. It is not the kind of thing one proves. If I tell my child, learning the times tables will make all of mathematics easier, once you have learned them, it is not something I would or ought to attempt to prove, and he either will or won't learn the truth of it to his benefit or detriment.

Values pertain to only one classs of existents, living organisms. Things can only be good or bad in relationship to some objective or purpose, and only living things have a purpose. The ultimate purpose or objective of any organism is its own existence. All of its behavior is directed toward that end.

Only one class or organims requires a system of values. Human beings. The nature of all other organims provides an automatic pattern of behavior appropriate to the requirements of their nature that guarantees, within the environment and conditions required, the survival of the organism. This automatic pattern of behavior is called instinct.

Human beings do not have an automatic pattern of behavior that guarantees they will bahave in a way appropriate to the requirements of their nature. They must learn what the requirements of their nature are, and what kind of behavior, action, and choices are appropriate to that nature.

We mean by "enjoying one's life" that state in which a human being is doing what is appropriate to the requirements of their nature and they know it.

Since any more would require a complete exposition of my theory of ethics, I stop here.

Hank

[Hank Kerchief]

Your definition: reality - the sum of all things, conditions and abstractions which the person believes to exist objectively before discovery, observation or measurement

This definition makes reality dependent on our beliefs. It is subjective in nature. It is the very thing Betty Boop was objecting to in post #456, I quote: "...reality is not at all dependent on my (or your) conceptualization of it in language. It is even independent of my perception of it. It doesn't need me to be what it is..." with which I totally agree. No one needs to believe anything about it for it to be what it is.

Here is the definition from "An Introduction to Autonomy": By reality we mean all that is the way it is.

Reality is what is so, whether anybody knows what is so or not. Reality includes everything that is and excludes everything that is not. It includes everything, not as a random collection of unrelated things but every entity, every event and every relationship between them. It includes fictional things as fictions, hallucinations as hallucinations, historical things as historical things, and material things as material things. Reality does not include fictions (such as Santa Claus) as material or historical facts. It does include the fact that Santa Claus is a common fiction used for the enjoyment of Children at the Christmas season.

Hank

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your post and your very engaging question:

Sounds good [definition of reality], but [what?] would would you call it after discovery, observation or measurement?

I don't think it becomes a newer or better "reality" by having been discovered, observed or measured. I'm inclined to call such things "information."

[unspun]

Said:

reality - the sum of all things, conditions and abstractions which the person believes to exist objectively before discovery, observation or measurement

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I must demur.  For to embrace this definition would, it seems, be giving a big virtual cozy-up to the one who said, "Yea, hath God said...?"  I have to insist that as for me an my house, we will go by the "old time," tried and true definition I'm relieved is still in dictionaries (or at least dictionary.com):

re·al·i·ty    ( P )  Pronunciation Key  (r - l -t )
n. pl. re·al·i·ties

1. The quality or state of being actual or true.
2. One, such as a person, an entity, or an event, that is actual: “the weight of history and political realities” (Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.).
3. The totality of all things possessing actuality, existence, or essence.
4. That which exists objectively and in fact: Your observations do not seem to be about reality 

Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition

And I'm glad to see that even a "Revised" dictionary agrees with reality:

reality

\Re*al"i*ty\, n.; pl. Realities. [Cf. F. r['e]alit['e], LL. realitas. See 3d Real. and cf. 2d Realty.]
1. The state or quality of being real; actual being or existence of anything, in distinction from mere appearance; fact.
A man fancies that he understands a critic, when in reality he does not comprehend his meaning. --Addison.

2. That which is real; an actual existence; that which is not imagination, fiction, or pretense; that which has objective existence, and is not merely an idea.
And to realities yield all her shows. --Milton.
My neck may be an idea to you, but it is reality to me. --Beattie.

3. [See 1st Realty, 2.] Loyalty; devotion. [Obs.]
To express our reality to the emperor. --Fuller.

4. (Law) See 2d Realty, 2.
Source: Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, © 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc.

I know that people talk about "your realit" vs. "my reality," but I sincerely hope that they say this tongue in cheek, if they do, as opposed to forked tongued.  Thank you for your motive of being kind, but the truth is much kinder.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your reply! You said:

This definition makes reality dependent on our beliefs. It is subjective in nature. It is the very thing Betty Boop was objecting to in post #456, I quote: "...reality is not at all dependent on my (or your) conceptualization of it in language. It is even independent of my perception of it. It doesn't need me to be what it is..." with which I totally agree. No one needs to believe anything about it for it to be what it is.

Indeed, I personally agree with betty boop that “reality” exists before it is discovered, observed or measured. However, I do condition the definition of the word “reality” to what a person believes because - IMHO – it would help the discussion to recognize the differences .

If I turn to a metaphysical naturalist, “reality” is all that exists in nature.

If I turn to an autonomist or objectivist, evidently “reality” is all that rationally exists in a mortal sense.

If I turn to a mystic, “reality” may include thought as substantive force and hence, a part of “reality.”

If I turn to Plato, reality may include redness, chairness – but if I turn to another mathematician/philosopher, these things are not reality but language.

If I turn to some physicists, “reality” may the illusion of quantum mechanics.

If I turn to myself – a Christian – “reality” is God’s will and unknowable in its fullness.