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Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) Information and analysis to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. |
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm
China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons
 Artist conception of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. |
By Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi, and Angela Deters
In recent years, some U.S. politicians and analysts have claimed that China's reported efforts to develop anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons pose a direct threat to U.S. space assets (and thus U.S. space dominance).[1] Chinese development of ASAT weapons could constitute a potential threat to U.S. military forces, especially if China developed and deployed a robust ASAT capability. However, reports of Chinese efforts to develop anti-satellite weapons need closer scrutiny and further analysis before reaching an informed judgment on the potential threat.
There is a clear strategic logic for China's interest in anti-satellite weapons. Chinese media and military analysts have highlighted the growing importance of space in future warfare and paid increasing attention to U.S. military efforts to ensure future space dominance. As the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the recent Afghanistan campaign have demonstrated, the United States increasingly relies on space-based assets to support military operations. China's inability to compete directly with advanced U.S. technologies may lead the Chinese military to focus on asymmetrical methods such as ASAT weapons in an effort to counter U.S. military dominance.
Our assessment indicates that Chinese strategists recognize the potential importance of ASAT weapons as a tool of asymmetrical warfare and that Chinese scientists are pursuing research with potential ASAT applications. Moreover, China's existing civilian and military space program provides a base of knowledge and capabilities that could potentially be applied to the development of ASAT weapons. However, the available evidence is insufficient to determine if China has an active program to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. Given China's limited space capabilities and stated interest in preventing an arms race in outer space[2], Beijing's ultimate commitment to developing ASAT weapons remains ambiguous.
China, Asymmetrical Warfare and ASAT Weapons
Chinese defense analysts have increasingly recognized that space control provides the key to military victories in modern warfare. Starting with the Gulf War, China's military leadership began to appreciate the importance of high-tech warfare and the ability of sophisticated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems to link land, sea and air forces.[3] NATO operations in Kosovo reinforced lessons about the value of satellites in guiding precision munitions and transforming military operations.
Chinese attention to future space warfare has also been driven by such considerations as potential conflict over Taiwan and U.S. plans to deploy missile defense. These developments have not only strained Sino-U.S. relations, but also led China to view itself as the target of U.S. defense strategies. People's Liberation Army (PLA) analysts are aware of U.S. preparations for possible future space warfare against China. A 2001 war game held by U.S. Space Command pitted U.S. forces against an opponent threatening a small neighbor (i.e., China threatening Taiwan) and focused on the use of space assets by the two main countries. The war game's significance was not lost on Chinese commentators.[4]
As the United States intensifies efforts to deploy missile defenses, China's military planners are increasingly concerned about how missile defenses might affect their ability to deter unwanted U.S. actions, especially with regards to Taiwan. Many Chinese analysts also see missile defenses as part of a U.S. effort to negate China's nuclear deterrent and ensure complete U.S. dominance in the international arena.[5] Given that U.S. missile defense systems will rely heavily on satellite assistance, a Chinese ASAT capability could be a useful asymmetrical means of disabling U.S. satellites and thereby degrading U.S. missile defenses.
Chinese military strategists recognize that it will be impossible to catch up to U.S. technological capabilities in the near-to-medium term. The desire to have some chance of success against a technologically superior opponent is driving Chinese analysts to investigate inherently riskier asymmetrical strategies. PLA writings suggest that given heavy U.S. reliance on satellites and other space assets for military operations, jamming and destroying these space assets will become increasingly important in a future conflict. ASAT systems focus on disrupting enemy communications and intelligence systems, and are potentially powerful weapons against a technologically dominant adversary. As an article by a Chinese defense analyst stated: "For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice."[6]
This view of asymmetric warfare and the importance of space is evident in writings by PLA scholars, who have considered various types of anti-satellite systems, including kinetic energy weapons (KE ASAT), ground-based lasers, and satellite jammers. However, it remains unclear to what extent these academics and analysts are connected to the aerospace research community. Articles in the popular media tend to examine possible ASAT technologies or projects (normally from a sensationalist viewpoint) but rarely contain detailed technical explanations necessary to verify their claims. For example, two January 2001 articles in Hong Kong newspapers reported that China has developed and tested a parasitic ASAT.[7] However, little information about research on "parasitic" ASATs can be found in Chinese scientific or aerospace journals. Articles found in professional scientific journals often hint at technically feasible ASAT developments without directly stating that the research is intended for use in an ASAT program.
A number of analysts, including some in the U.S. defense and intelligence communities, believe that China has the technical capacity to rapidly develop effective counter-space capabilities. However, China's technical ability to develop and deploy advanced space weapons such as ASATs is uncertain and there is some evidence that China wants to avoid an arms race in outer space. Examining Chinese space capabilities that could support ASAT weapons and ASAT-relevant research underway in China can provide indirect evidence about possible Chinese ASAT weapons capabilities.
China's Space Capabilities: Are the Preconditions for ASAT Present?
China's civilian and military space programs provide many of the capabilities that would be necessary to support an ASAT program. Examples of such ASAT-enabling capabilities include on-orbit maneuvering, mission management, and high-powered laser technology. Miniaturization of satellites would also allow for lower cost access to space and an enhanced level of maneuverability, while increasing the ability for launch-on-demand. To have an effective ASAT capability, China would need a certain level of supporting space capabilities along with specific ASAT weapons.
Economic reforms have contributed to the rapid development of China's space capabilities since the 1980. Developments in commercial (profit-oriented) programs have had a positive effect on all levels of China's space program, including the military side. China has also benefited from international cooperation on various aspects of its civilian space program, including extensive assistance from Russia on its manned space program. Some reports suggest that Russia is also providing laser and missile interceptor technology that could be incorporated into Chinese ASAT programs.
China currently has three launch facilities, which are used for both military and commercial launches. China averages one satellite launch every two months. China's satellite tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) capabilities include eight domestic tracking sites, two sites on foreign soil (one in Kiribati in the South Pacific; one in Namibia[8]), and four Yuanwang-class tracking ships. An effective TT&C system is essential to track and identify the space assets of a potential adversary. Recent improvements to China's tracking and control systems include the expansion to S-band tracking capabilities, a frequency regularly used for tracking geo-stationary satellites.
China's space program has increasingly focused on the Shenzhou [Magic Vessel] program and its ultimate goal of manned space flight. Although the manned program has attracted more resources to China's overall space efforts, it may also have diverted resources away from military space programs. China's first manned space flight is tentatively scheduled for 2005. The Shenzhou program has contributed significantly to improvements in China's tracking and satellite maneuverability.[9] Some analysts view the push toward manned space flight as part of the Chinese modern war-fighting strategy, which would also include launch-on-demand, ASAT weapons, and ground-based lasers as means to deny others the use of space.[10] However other analysts counter that the program is mainly intended to increase China's national prestige.[11]
Small satellites are another "dual-use" technology with potential ASAT applications. Chinese academic journals have increasingly focused on the development of small satellites. Miniature satellites potentially allow for lower-cost access to space, enhanced maneuverability, and increased ability to launch-on-demand. These factors can be advantageous in communications and meteorological applications. China has worked with a number of foreign civilian entities (recently the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom) to develop small, lightweight satellites. However, small satellites can also contribute to ASAT development, especially with regards to kinetic-energy ASATs. In the last few years, Chinese research on small mobile launch vehicles has shown an increased focus on nano-satellites.[12] Developments in this area could enable China to launch satellites swiftly and allow the launchers to be mobile. These are important factors in a space-warfare environment.
High powered lasers have also been a notable priority for development in China. An examination of recent Chinese research illustrates some work being done on high-powered ground-based lasers, including specific links to ASAT applications. A recent analysis of the Chinese space program suggests that ground-based laser technology is well within China's reach, and a more likely alternative to space-based technologies due to lower relative costs and superior control capabilities.[13] However, ground-based lasers would require significant advances in adaptive optics and would likely require large fixed power sources that would be visible and vulnerable to attack.
ASAT-Relevant Research
Available evidence suggests that preliminary research on ASAT technologies has been underway in China since the 1980s.[14] Research normally viewed as applicable to ASAT weapons includes research or unambiguous topics such as kinetic kill vehicles, high-powered lasers, satellite jamming, homing and tracking and research with broader space applications such as small satellites, ground control and command, satellite protection, telemetry management, formation flying, and precision attitude control.
Distinguishing between civil and military programs in China is difficult since the civilian and military space programs are heavily intertwined. Research on ASAT-relevant technologies is often carried out in multi-purpose institutions and organizations which cover both civil and military programs. Often, institutes that have a specific military purpose will be co-located with institutes with a commercial focus. There is also a significant sharing of personnel and resources. One example of this intermingling is Cao Gangchuan, who is head of the General Armaments Department of the Chinese PLA, a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and chief director of the manned spacecraft program.[15]
Many of the organizations and institutes involved in ASAT-relevant research fall under the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation (CASC), an umbrella organization formed after the break-up of the China Aerospace Corporation in 1999. Subsidiary organizations that have conducted relevant research include the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, and the China Academy of Space Technology. All of these institutes, and numerous others under CASC, have published research on dual-use topics such as satellite miniaturization, satellite tracking, and precision altitude control, as well as on more ASAT-specific areas such as satellite jamming, kinetic kill vehicles, and high powered lasers.
Example of articles with ASAT-relevant research include:
| Year | Article Title | Journal |
| 2000 | Laser Harm to Electro-optics and the Anti-Satellite Reinforced Technologies |  (Electronic Optics and Control) Issue No. 3 |
| 1998 | High Precision Computation for Space Interception Nonlinear Control Problem |  (Flight Dynamics) Volume 16, Issue No. 1 |
| 1998 | Research and Analysis of Composite and Structure Against Hypervelocity Impact |  (Missile and Space Vehicles) Issue No. 1 |
| 1998 | Development of Laser Blinding Weapon System |  (Wing Missile Journal) Issue No. 1 |
| 1996 | S-Band Short Backfire Antenna for Ground Telemetry Stations |  (Telemetry and Telecontrol) Volume 17, Issue No. 4 |
| 1994 | Miniaturization and Intellectualization of Kinetic Kill Vehicles |  (Modern Defense Technology) Issue No. 2 |
Limitations
Despite numerous indications that China is interested in developing ASAT weapons and significant overall improvements in China's space program over the last two decades, China still lacks a number of capabilities that would be required for a viable ASAT program. These limitations include:
- Limited tracking capabilities. China continues to rely heavily on shared and leased space tracking facilities, which might not be available in the event of a conflict. Despite a domestic network, two foreign sites, and four tracking ships, the Chinese tracking system does not have a global reach.
- Limited launch capabilities. Although its launch capabilities have been improving, China still lacks the launch on-demand capability required for space warfare and for an effective ASAT system.
- Vulnerable infrastructure. China's immobile launch facilities, tracking facilities, space infrastructure, and possible ground-based laser sites would all be vulnerable to attack.
Assessment
Chinese strategists recognize the potential importance of ASAT weapons as a tool of asymmetrical warfare and Chinese scientists are pursuing research with potential ASAT applications. China's existing civilian and military space programs also provide a base of capabilities that could potentially be applied to the development of ASAT weapons. Although open source information clearly indicates Chinese interest and scientific research in ASAT weapons and technologies, the available evidence is insufficient to determine if China has an active program to develop and deploy ASAT weapons.
This conclusion is based largely on an assessment of China's current space capabilities and inferences based on open-source information about Chinese ASAT-relevant scientific research. Direct information on Chinese ASAT weapons programs and possible operational capabilities is limited and of questionable reliability. The evidence is insufficient to reach a definitive judgment on whether China has an active ASAT weapons program or a limited operational ASAT capability. However, if China did have a robust operational capability, there would probably be more indications (in terms of tests and physical infrastructure) than have been observed to date.
Although China's current space program is gradually developing technologies that could be used to support ASAT development, its overall near to mid-term space capabilities remain limited. Although the Chinese have a strong strategic motivation to pursue asymmetric programs such as ASAT weapons, serious questions remain about their technical capabilities and political will to undertake such a costly program. China has been extremely vocal in international fora with regards to the demilitarization of outer space and is a strong proponent of a multilateral treaty banning space weapons, indicating internal pressures may exist that could slow progress towards ASAT development and deployment. This seems to signal that Beijing, although interested for strategic reasons in counter-space and ASAT capabilities, is not keen to enter an expensive and potentially open-ended space race. Given China's limited space capabilities and stated interest in preventing an arms race in outer space, Beijing's ultimate commitment to developing ASAT weapons remains ambiguous.
Sources:
[1] See the most recent Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," (Report to Congress) released July 12, 2002 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf; and comments by Richard Fisher in Leonard David, "China's Space Program Driven by Military Ambitions," Space.com, March 13, 2002, http://www.space.com/news/china_space_020313.html. See also Bill Gertz, "Need seen for future space weapons; Top Air Force general foresees satellites orbiting in 'region of tension'," The Washington Times, August 2, 2001.
[2] For more information on the history of China's stance on space weapons, see "China's Attitude Toward Outer Space Weapons" produced by the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available on the Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacepos.htm.
[3] Wang Xiaodong, "Special Means of Warfare in the Information Age: Strategic Information Warfare," Jianchuan zhishi [Warship Information], June 30, 1999, in FBIS-FTS19990727000426 and FBIS-FTS19990727000941; Wang Baocun, "Subduing Enemy Force Without Battle and Informationized Warfare," Zhongguo junshi kexue [China Military Science], May 4, 1999, pp.60-63 in FBIS-FTS19990823000602; James D. Perry, "Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing," Aerospace Power Journal XIV:2 (Summer 2000), pp.79-91.
[4] "U.S. War Game Signals New Arms Race in Space Weaponry in 21st Century," Jiefangjun bao [PLA Daily], February 21, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010221000091; Teng Jianqun, "Thoughts Arising from the U.S. Military's Space War Exercise," Jiefangjun bao, February 7, 2001, p.9, in FBIS-CPP20010207000050; Nicholas Berry, "Space War Games and China as Vader's Empire," The Weekly Defense Monitor 5:5 (February 1, 2001); Jason Sherman, "China Looks Askance At Space War Game," Defense News, February 28, 2001, pp.3, 19.
[5] See "China's Opposition to US Missile Defense Programs," produced by the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available on the Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, http://www.nti.org/db/china/mdpos.htm.
[6] Wang Hucheng, "The U.S. Military's 'Soft Ribs' and Strategic Weaknesses," Liaowang, Vol. 27, reprinted in Xinhua Hong Kong Service, July 5, 2000, in FBIS-CPP20000705000081.
[7] Tung Yi, "China Completes Ground Test of Anti-Satellite Weapon," Hong Kong Tao Jih Pao (Internet Version), January 5, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010105000026 ; and "China is Developing Anti-Satellite Weapons as a Counter Measure," Hong Kong Ming Pao (Internet Version), January 30, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010130000049. In the Tung Yi article, a "parasitic satellite" is defined as a "micro-satellite which can be launched to stick to enemy satellites; in a time of war it will jam or destroy the enemy satellite according to the command it receives." In the Ming Pao article the same weapons are described as "piggyback satellites."
[8] "China Building Satellite Tracking Station of Tarawa," Asian Defense Journal, March 1997, p 66;
Maggi Barnard, "Space Station Set for Lift-Off," The Namibian (Windhoek), October 11, 2000 in FBIS- AFP20001208000152.
[9] Howard O. DeVore, China's Aerospace and Defense Industry, Jane's Special Report Jane's Information Group, December 2000, pp 197-200. See also comments by Dean Cheng in Leonard David, "China's Space Ambition Keeps Experts Guessing," Space.com, July 8, 2002, http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/storming_heaven_020708-1.html.
[10] Alex Lo, "Military Ambitions Behind the Space Race," South China Morning Post, March 29, 2002; Leonard David, "China's Space Program Driven by Military Ambitions," Space.com, March 13, 2002, http://www.space.com/news/china_space_020313.html.
[11] Kevin Platt, "China Launch for Respect," Christian Science Monitor, November 23,1999, pg. 1; Robert J. Saiget, "China Seeks Prestige Via Space," AFP, November 22, 1999, posted on SpaceDaily.com, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-99p.html; "Defense Department Details Chinese Military Space Capabilities and Plans," SpaceDaily.com, June 28, 2000, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-milspace-00a.html.
[12] Wei Long, "China to Launch Micro Imaging Birds," Space Daily.com, November 20, 2000, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-00zzq.html
[13] Col David J Thompson, USAF, "China's Military Space Program: Strategic Threat, Regional Power, or National Defense," China in Space: Civilian and Military Developments, Air War College, Maxwell Papers No.24, August 2001.
[14] Mark A Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, September 1999.
[15] "President Jiang Hails Return of Unmanned Spaceship," People's Daily Online (English Version), March 26, 2002.
Contacts for more information on China anti-satellite research:
- Phillip Saunders
Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP)
phillip.saunders@miis.edu
Tel: 831-647-4619 - Jing Dong Yuan
Senior Research Associate, East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP)
jingdong.yuan@miis.edu
Tel: 831-647-4621 - Stephanie Lieggi
Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP)
stephanie.lieggi@miis.edu
Tel: 831-647-4620
"When I die I wanna go to Texas."