Posted on 09/01/2002 5:55:31 AM PDT by Brian Mosely
Saturday, Aug. 31, 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell has been a good soldier in public, even as he has had to fight for every small victory against Administration hawks like Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. But he has privately grown more frustrated, and now, sources close to Powell tell Time, he has a firm plan for his exit: he will step down at the end of President Bush’s current term. “He will have done a yeoman’s job of contributing over the four years,” says a close aide. “But that’s enough.” The aide says Powell’s view of the matter is, “I did what my heart told me to do. I got (Bush) here and set him up. I did the best I could do.” If Bush wins a second term, only the imminence of a major diplomatic victory—in the Middle East, for example—could induce him to stay a short while longer. By the same token, the aide stresses that Powell is determined to serve out the entire term—even if the U.S. launches an invasion of Iraq, which Powell has fought to delay or derail.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher repeated Powell’s public assertion that he has no intention of leaving. “He serves at the pleasure of the President,” Boucher said. A Powell exit could cause political problems for the Republicans. The loss of his moderating voice would embolden the hard-liners and hurt the party’s efforts to broaden its base. And those who dream of a Powell presidential candidacy in 2008 have little cause for hope. Powell, the aide says, will “never run for President.”
You,too.
I am not going to be less impressed with his character because you said so.
Well,that's ok with me. Believe whatever you want to believe. I ain't your boss.
I don't know Powell personally. I have only what I've managed to glean through various media over the years, but there are a few things that seem to intersect, that make me uncomfortable about him as one with power in government in America.
His first tour of Vietnam, with MACV seems honorable enough. I believe he helped a fellow trooper from a helicopter crash, and got a Purple Heart from a pungi stake.
I believe he’s claimed via various sources that he was somewhat more bitter about the war’s course by his second tour then with Americal where he was then a Major O-4. Almost on the heels of the incident at My Lai, only about 40 clicks south of where he was now ensconced in air conditioned comfort for the bulk of this tour in Chu Lai, he was cued concerning wide scale mistreatment of indigenous civilians throughout Americal’s AO in central I Corps, which was in fact true by personal experience, though which I attribute to breakdowns in leadership, usually at Platoon level, but often up through Company and even through Battalion and Brigade levels through attitude.
Powell was ordered to submit a report to his commanders detailing any findings to this effect up the chain of command. What he actually did to ascertain such information he did not detail in the report, but from the report it can be reasonably inferred that he did nothing other than sit-down and merely think of what he what he almost certainly knew the higher-ups wanted to hear.
In the headquarters staff of the Americal Division in Chu Lai that December, a reassuring memorandum was prepared for the Adjutant General by Major Luther Colin Powell, the assistant chief of staff (operations). All new soldiers arriving in South Vietnam, he wrote soothingly, received a ninety-minute lesson on civic affairs and the importance of treating the Vietnamese with courtesy and respect. Another hour long course was given on their responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions concerning the proper treatment of prisoners. Showing all the signs of a soldier who had triumphed in the battle of military paperwork, Powell wrote what his superiors clearly wanted to hear. He described the Vietnamese people as being truly appreciative of the many civic improvement projects undertaken by Americal units and the direct interest the division’s soldiers took in their welfare and the improvement of the Vietnamese people’s standard of living. Maj. Powell, who twenty years later would briefly become President Reagan’s National Security Advisor and subsequently the country’s most important man in uniform as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Middle East war with Iraq, concluded even more complacently: “Although there may be isolated cases of mistreatment of civilians and POWs this by no means reflects the general attitude throughout the division. In direct refutation of this portrayal [by Tom Glen, a former 4/3 mortar crewman who had written a letter to then MACV commanding GEN Creighton Abrams about his concerns of abuse by Americans of Vietnamese in general, and spurred in large part by what he had heard of My Lai from some of its participants just a day later] is the fact that relations between Americal soldiers and the Vietnamese people are excellent.”
transcribed from Four Hours In My Lai, Bilton & Sim, 1992
Powell was only a grade in rank above 2LTCalley’s then CO, CPT Ernest Medina. He could’ve gotten down on the ground a little. But he didn’t.
Powell admits in is autobiography, My American Journey how he benefited by advancement in the Army through affirmative action. It’s hard not to think of this as an example of the truth of that admission.
Fast forward to Powell, now as CJCS during the Gulf War.
In his book profiling Desert Storm upper-echelon leadership, The Commanders, Bob Woodward revealed something – at least to me – that I’m not sure he is even aware of. And that was the tendency of Powell to make combat decision by consensus. On more than one occasion the General seems to have had a tough time making up his mind over several crucial issues unless he could acquire some level of agreement from his subordinates. And even then – again, it seems to me – he had to constantly check with the White House, even when it was clear he had the authority to act.
Frankly, I’m glad I never had to go into the field with him, where a split second’s indecision might well cost the lives of one’s men. But again, he had the luxury of now being ensconced in the Pentagon, thousands of miles from the battlefield.
So now he’s Secretary Of State, where some of his approaches to the mortal islamist enemies of America and the west seem frankly reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain, if not outright suicide…or possibly even….
I think I’ll stop here.
Though if you still think that I shouldn’t feel somewhat hesitant about Powell, feel free to try and convince me otherwise.
Best to you.
Because of what the x-42 administration did to our defenses, we were literally out of weapons to use in this conflict. The shortage was not replaced before April. From April thru September the weather does not permit armored war in Iraq. Also, some will resist starting an attack during Ramadan (November), which is why I think the attack will come in October.
He was a Major when this happened,and a staff officer. This is what he got the Soldiers Medal for,and it happened on his second tour.
and got a Purple Heart from a pungi stake.
First I've heard of that. I saw a photo of him after his first tour,and all he had were the standard VN service ribbons and a CIB. No Soldier's Medal,and no Purple Heart.
As a general, no. As a political leader, yes.
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