Russian Fighters for American Airforce/Navy: The only prudent solution!

by Robert W. Kress with Rear Adm. Paul Gillcrist, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Editors’ note: In this wonderful piece of aeronautical and political irony, it seems that our newfound but uneasy friends, the Russians, may be our best source of new fighter aircraft. Bob Kress, ex-Grumman VP of advanced programs and chief engineer on the F-14, and Adm. Paul Gillcrist, retired USN fighter pilot, make a convincing argument that rather than spend ridiculous sums for new fighters that will probably show up too late to do us any good, we should buy Sukhoi Su-27 airframes and "Americanize" them with our engines and flight-control systems. Controversial? Absolutely! Logical? Make your own decision.

RIGHT: The Su-27 is bigger than the F-14 and F-15, and its capabilities and economics are so outstanding that a number of nations are in the process of adapting it to set it up as the primary U.S. foe in future conflicts (photo by Katsuhiko Tokunaga).

Soon after Desert Storm, by some inexplicable miscalculation, the U.S. Navy voluntarily opted out of the important sea-based, deep-interdiction mission it had brilliantly carried out during and since WW II. It decided on the early termination of the A-6 program and to scrap the new A-6 "composite wing" program for which Boeing had already been paid hundreds of millions of dollars. This would have carried A-6Fs well into the next century.

In the strike configuration for which it originally had been designed, the F-14D was to have been the bridging mechanism between the A-6 and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). It is hoped (repeat, hoped) the JSF will arrive easily in the next millennium. With the A-6 out of the picture, and until the JSF arrives, the F-14D is the only game in town that has the same punch.

The problem with using the F-14D as the bridge between the two aircraft is that it is on the edge of extinction. In another inexplicable move, beginning about 1990, the U.S. Navy, per orders of then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, planned to phase out of the F-14 program and, apparently to ensure there would be no second thoughts, ordered the destruction of all F-14 tooling. Incredible!

The F-18 E/F program that is supposed to take over the sea-based, deep-interdiction, precision-strike mission does not have a long-range, high-payload, precision-strike capability, so the F-14Ds are the current workhorse delivery men of the 2,000-pound, LGB/radar-guided bombs in the many trouble spots around the world, as required. The USAF tries to supplement U.S. Navy strikes but is handicapped by diplomatic and political constraints.

Unfortunately, the tragedy does not stop there. The requirement for the Nimitz and follow-on class carriers hinges, most experts say, on its ability to carry out sea-based, deep-interdiction missions. Without the F-14s, Congress will not support the construction of more $3.5 billion Nimitz-class carriers if deep-strike aircraft are not ready on the first day of the conflict.

LEFT: Grumman F-14Ds, as based on the USS Constellation, are on the edge of extinction and are our last Naval aircraft capable of carrying heavy bomb loads for long distances (photo by Randy Jolly).

Somebody in the White House will have to answer the President’s question, "Where are the carriers?" with the reply, "What carriers?" We decided not to build any; remember? The U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy retired the venerable long-range, heavy-attack A-6 aircraft, not because they lacked their original capability and survivability, but because they were disintegrating due to old age. They went into service in 1962—37 years ago!

LEFT: the Grumman A-6E Intruder, now taken out of the fleet, was neither fast, nor glamorous, but it was rugged, reliable and carried an immense bomb load on long, low missions. It has no direct replacement (photos by Randy Jolly)..

The F-14D has now taken over for the A-6 in the fighter/bomber role as it was originally designed to do. On top of that, when the Tomcat has loosed its bombs, it is a formidable dogfighter! With the 150 or so F-14s left, however, the U.S. Navy can only maintain this fighter/bomber force until about 2010—if it is lucky! And even doing that will require quick funding of restoration efforts to a lot of aircraft.

LEFT: according to the authors, the F/A-18 is simply too small to carry either the fuel or ordnance required by deep interdiction missions.

Cheney’s order of no more F-14 production was a wasteful move that cannot be explained rationally, nor was there ever any reason offered. The effect of the order, however, was to leave a clear path for further acquisition of the F-18A and its desperately needed mission-performance upgrade, the F-18E. The F-18s are good airplanes, but neither version comes close to the payload/range capability of the F-14 or the A-6.

The cake was iced by the acquisition of Grumman by Northrop in 1993—the cat devoured by the mouse, so to speak. Seventy percent of the aircraft on carrier decks at the time were Grumman-built. On the other hand, Northrop had never built a tactically significant aircraft in its entire 60-year history.

The USAF problem is different. The Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program resulted in the development of the excellent Lockheed F-22 stealth fighter and the very powerful and well-behaved Pratt & Whitney F-119 fighter engine. The USAF has many upgraded F-15 fighter/bomber aircraft in inventory and could build and upgrade even more. So, acquisition of the F-22 is not as critical an issue, timewise.

The problem lies in the enormous acquisition cost of the F-22 (see Aerospace America, November ’98). The cost associated with introducing it to service would probably result in the forced retirement of many workhorse F-15s. Further, the effects of stealth aircraft design measures on fighter aircraft performance, cost and combat operability have been seriously questioned.

Scale models show the relative sizes of the different fighters. From the left: MiG-29; F-14D; Su-27; F-15; F/A-18. Note the tiny relative size of the F/A-18 (photo by Walter Sidas).

On the other side of the fence, our combined U.S. Navy/USAF fighter/bomber force will face approximately 404 Russian Su-27 Flanker aircraft by 2002 ("Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft"). China has been licensed to build 200 (no license to export—so they say!).

The Su-27 is already known as a premier highly maneuverable fighter. What is less known is that it is a brute of an aircraft—bigger than the F-14 and F-15. It has a huge internal fuel capacity and, like the F-14, can carry a lot of very large bombs in attack roles—neatly hidden from radar detection between the podded engine nacelles. In addition, its external shape results in a naturally low radar signature without compromising its performance. The vaunted MiG-29 is a midget compared with the Su-27—not unlike comparing the F-18 with the F-14. No wonder the world market opts for Su-27 payload/range versus the MiG-29. Even better for our purpose, the Su-27 has already been modified for carrier operations, and it was planned for the first Russian carrier, the Adm. Kuznetzov.

By 2002, the U.S. will be outgunned by an ever-growing number of countries owning the Su-27. The Su-27 has a deep-strike capability that’s on a par with the current 500-nautical-mile U.S. capability, which, by the way, is in the process of rapidly fading to 300 n.m. as the F-14s go out of service and are replaced by F-18s with half the bomb load. The same goes for the F-15, except that its strike bomb load is on a par with the F-14, and it isn’t disappearing as quickly.

We need some more affordable, high-performance "big guys" soon! So what can be done?

Before assuming that the concept of buying Su-27s for the USAF and USN is a whacky idea, let’s first see whether it has some merit. The Su-27 is a known excellent fighter. It has been partially “navalized.” It is a big brute. In the event of a conflict, we will be nose to nose with it worldwide. It exists and is in production, so we could easily buy Su-27 aircraft models as gap-fillers; we already have acquired two for evaluation. To make things even better, the airplane is inexpensive by any standards.?

A recent unofficial quote from a Russian source says that Su-27s can be bought for about $8 million apiece. Perhaps the carrier version would cost substantially more. Compared with F-18E/F costs, the Su-27 may offer enormous procurement savings plus large mission- and combat-effectiveness benefits.

Aviation Week recently announced plans by Australia to replace its F/A-18s and F-111s with MiG-29s and Su-27s. Maybe this proposal is not such a crazy idea after all!

In the long term, we would want to upgrade Su-27 models in thrust and avionics to give us an edge over the worldwide Su-27 threat. The Pratt & Whitney F-119 engine is significantly more powerful than the Russian Su-27 powerplants and can be built with elegant pitch and yaw thrust vectoring. The General Electric F-120 F-23 engine could also be used. Without being specific, the U.S. avionics industry should be able to substantially upgrade Su-27 systems. Cost will be the driver, but here, the Su-27 may be the solution for the U.S. Navy and USAF as interim gap-filler aircraft. For the long term, there are several options:

• Buy bare airframes made to specifications for completion in the U.S. • Obtain a license to build Su-27s in the U.S. without export rights. • Build some parts in the U.S. and buy major subassemblies from Russia for assembly in the U.S. (really a variant of the second option).

On the carrier version of the Su-27, both the wings and the horizontal tail fold. The authors argue that the Russian fighter/bomber can do the F-14’s job at a fraction of the cost of a new, U.S.-built airplane (photo courtesy of Paul Gillcrist).

As a side issue in the procurement of these aircraft, the U.S. would certainly be funding a large part of Russia’s economic recovery, which would help to keep it stable and less of a threat. Obtaining a really good deal on Su-27s should be realistic and beneficial to both countries. It would also further cement the collaboration between Russia and the U.S. in the face of jointly perceived threats.

Somebody (let’s see some hands, folks) should carefully explore the procurement cost and fleet readiness implications of the proposals we’ve presented. Since we’re supposedly retired, this is something we can no longer explore without the help of a major agency.

As long as we’re asking questions about the future fighter programs, what about the JSF program? It is a joint U.S. Navy/USAF/USMC next-generation fighter program! (Heard that one before?) But this time, a dimly perceived USMC VTOL fighter is the objective!

Has anyone figured out that when an engine fails during hover, a twin-engine VTOL will do a rollover very quickly, thus preventing pilot ejection? Even Harriers require quick pilot action to avoid insidious, slow, roll-control loss if the nose was allowed to get too high in a crosswind hover. Many were lost. Thus, a VTOL for the Marines must be a single-engine configuration, which means that it must be a single-engine aircraft. It also means that the JSF will be another fighter in the 30,000-pound class (using the F-119 engine, for example).

You might wonder why we are taking these positions. We could talk about politicians, the specifics of current international events and future perils—of which we know nothing of substance.

What we do know is how we perceived the world unfolding as youngsters on December 7, 1941. Our leaders saw what was coming but were too late to achieve a high state of readiness. So, we listened to the radio and watched “Movietone News” in horror, grief and fear until our industrial capability at last turned the tide.

On the surface, the current world situation is not as threatening, but many world trouble spots may demand military attention via conventional forces and weapons. Events that do arise will do so quickly, leaving little time to build up the military. Our forces must be ready at all times—something that seems to have lost its importance in the last decade. Tactical airpower must be refreshed in strategy and form, unencumbered by politics and corporate interference. In other words, we’ll always need the ability to dash in, drop a lot of bombs and get out. If we don’t do something about the impending vacuum of that capability very soon, we may find ourselves unable to effectively smack some dictator’s backside when he needs it.

In the tables that follow, we’ve attempted to compare the fighter/bomber mission performance of the F-14D, F-18A, F-18E and Su-27. We cannot obtain or use classified U.S. Navy data. However, "Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft" is presumably an accurate source of aircraft data. Tactical missions and loads differ from aircraft to aircraft, but an aeronautical engineer can extract some valid, nearly accurate comparisons and conclusions.

So here we go. We apologize for dragging you through the technical mud! Table 1 compares the F-18A, F-18E, F-14D, A-6E and Su-27 in the long-range fighter/bomber mission. In so doing, some fundamental issues of physics begin to emerge.

TABLE 1 F-18A F-18E F-14D A-6E Su-27 Weight empty (lb.) 23,832 30,564 43,879 27,888 38,580 Pilot and ammo (lb.) 535 535 838 500 500 Mm/no. of rounds 20/570 20/570 20/675 0 30/150 Internal fuel (lb.) 10,860 14,400 16,200 15,939 20,723 External fuel (lb.) 7,431 7,206 3,854 0 0 AAM (2); Sidewinders 472 472 472 0 472 No. of tanks/capacity 3/330 2/480 2/280 0 0 Bomb weight in lb. 4,000 4,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 Bombs: no. and type (2) Mk 84* (4) Mk 83 (4) Mk 84 (4) Mk 84 (4) Mk 84 Takeoff gross weight (lb.) 47,130 57,177 73,253 52,327 68,275 Takeoff fuel weight as % of gross takeoff weight 37.5 36.8 27.4 30.5 30.4 * Two 1,000-lb. Mk 83s used in Desert Fox, not 2,000 lb. Mk 84.

The message of Table 1 is that big is beautiful! The F-18A and substantially puffed-up F-18E don’t carry much of a weapon load compared with the big guys. As you will see in the next table, they don’t carry it very far either, in spite of their huge external fuel loads that prevent large weapon load-outs by using up wing store stations. Note the large takeoff fuel percentages: the big boys fly farther on less fuel, as Table 2 shows.

One caution in viewing these numbers; although they have been extracted from "Jane’s," aircraft companies are marvelously innovative at hiding the facts while appearing to be completely candid; we’ve been there. Further, for some numbers in the table and the tables that follow, we have made corrections to establish a common baseline.

Now that we have a common attack mission, let’s address the mission performance and fundamental aero/propulsion issues. Table 2 clearly shows where "big is beautiful" comes from. Look at the radius multiplied by bomb-load factor (R x B). The F-14Ds and the SU-27s have twice the capability of the F-18s, so only half as many aircraft and crew need to be endangered (the bombs are twice as big and in-flight refueling is rarely needed). The mission radius comparison speaks for itself.

TABLE 2 F-18A F-18E F-14D A-6E Su-27 Store stations (2) 2,500 Same as F-18A (4) 2,000 (5) 3,600 (7) 2,000 (2) 2,350 Same as F-18A (2) 2,200 — — (1) 2,400 Same as F-18A (2) 1,800 — — Wing area (sq. ft.) 400 500 565 484 667 Wingspan 37.5 44.7 64.1/38.2 53 48.2 Sea level static afterburner thrust (lb.) 32,000 44,000 55,600 18,600 (*1) 55,100 Attack wing loading (bombs on board) (lb./sq. ft.) @ 60% fuel 100 98 115 94.9 90 Wing loading (bombs dropped) (lb./lb.) @ 60% fuel 90 90 101 NA 78 Attack thrust/weight (lb./lb.) @ 60% fuel .80 .90 .85 NA .92 Thrust/weight (bombs dropped; lb./lb.) @ 60% fuel .89 .98 .97 NA 1.06 Turning drag/lift factor 28.5 24.4 15.9 16.4 25.8 Attack-mission radius in n.m. 290 (*2) 390 (*2) 402 (*2) 500 (*2) 420 (*2, *3) Radius x bomb load (R x B); n.m. x lb./10^6 or 1,000,000 1.16 1.56 3.22 4.00 3.36 *1 No afterburner, *2 "Hi-lo-lo-hi" mission, *3 Probably low, NA=not available

Wing loading and thrust to weight require a bit more explanation. Wing loading at the attack-mission weight simply defines your predicament if you are jumped while carrying a full bomb load. After dropping the bombs, your wing loading is much better, as shown in the table; so is the thrust-to-weight ratio (T/W). Note that the F-18E and F-14D are nearly equal in T/W at .98 and .97 compared with the Su-27 at 1.06. The reason is that the weight of bombs dropped is doubled for the big guys.

The turning drag/lift factor is proportional to the span loading (W/b^2) at a given G loading and indicated airspeed (IAS). It is related to induced drag and is familiar to aerodynamicists. It is the dominant parameter in calculating sustained G. In air-combat turns, the induced drag at a given G level is directly proportional to the span loading. With its wings unswept below Mach .7 via the sweep programmer, the F-14’s induced drag in turns is half that of the other aircraft tabulated due to its big span (squared). And aircraft combat maneuvering at the Yuma range proved that after the initial engagement, most of the time was spent below Mach .7.

Cost of one stealth bomber vs the cost of eight support planes and a non-stealth bomber....financially speaking, stealth is cheap.

Not so. We've known that the F-117 is detected by low band search radar from day one. The British made this known to the world when they successfully tracked them from ships sailing in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm. Every single B-2 that flew missions over the Balkans and Afghanistan were accompanied by two Marine Corps or Navy EA-6Bs providing ECM and SEAD protection. Couple that with ~60 man hours of maintenance for every hour of flight, virtual nondeployability and a ~$1 billion/copy price tag and your financial argument gets flushed down the commode.

How widely deployed is the AA-12? How many batches have been produced so far? The Russian Airforce isn't expected to field the Adder till 2004 or 2005. And the AMRAAM you compare this to must be the AIM-120A that was deployed in 1992. Because surely you'd know about all the enhancements made in B/C/C5. I would suggest some glossy marketing brochures from Raytheon to balance the views.

First of all i am not trying to 'sell' Russian products. It might seem like it, and the moniker Spetznaz smacks like the Spetsnaz Special forces fielded by russia, but i assure you i am not a sales person for Mikoyan nor for Sukhoi Brand. All i am trying to do is make people think about this idea, and actually i already know it is a useless thread. The reason it is useless is because no matter how many Freepers may agree with me that it is worth a thought(and many seem to) there is no way it would EVER get passed by congress!

Anyway the reason i am writing is to reply on the missile.

All the missiles i wrote about have already been fielded, and even the Atoll you seem to believe is still coming out in 'small batches' is actually out in such number the US government bought some from some Eastern European nation (i do not remember which, but i know it bought some R-73s, soem R-27s and some R-77s) in order to 'put them out of harms way.' In my guess it is for the guys at Ratheon to split them open and have a look at them.

Also when i was talking about the R-77 as compared to the AMRAAM i was using data for 1999/2000. Not 1992! The Aim-120A may have been improved over the years, but so has the Rateka. And sadly the slammer is still 'conventional' as compared to the Rateka.

This is not to say that the Aim-120 is lesser and a 'bad' missile. Nope! The AMRAAM can still knock any jet out of the sky and not break a sweat. However comparing an AMRAAM to an AMRAAM-ski R-77 is like comparing a Mercedes to a Rolls Royce; however make the Rolls Cheaper in this case, and with better fuel efficiency making ti go 50km further, and also with more manoeuvrability.

So i was not trying to discredit the American missiles, just saying there were some Israeli and Russian versions that are just as good, or better. And i respect the slammer, for sure i know i would not like to be strapped to some cockpit with one screaming at mach speeds towards me!

However that doesn't mean i should be oblivious to what other people have. Going back to cars; just because we have US made Lincolns does not mean we should ignore Porsches and Lamborghini Murcielagos!

Same thing with missiles.

However Cheney decided to destroy the tooling and molds for the Tomcat, and effectively put the 'cat to sleep. As the current planes age there will be no replacements, and it is sayonara for them.

The probable reason for that faux pas was probably to ensure the JSF and the F-18E/F SuperHornet were not relegated in favor of a souped up Tomcat. Think of it, it would be evry hard to push for the superhornet if a superTomCat with modern avionucs and new tech rolled out. If the current Tomcats (that originally rolled out in 1973) are better than the current crop of SuperHornets, imagine the competition a 2002 TomCat would have given to the SuperHornet, and possibly even the JSF.

And yes, i know the Israeli pilots are trained like crazy since they do not have the numerical advantages the USAF has, but 220 out of 240! Do the kill ratio on that one!

We could do what you suggested rmlew, and churn out upgraded F-14s, but sadly that is not possible. And personally i view the F-14 Tomcat/Bombcat as one of the best (and best looking) sighters out there.
We have the planes and the designs. Can't we make or reverse engineer the molds?
As for jets that look good, I hate like the Canard/Delta araingment of the Rafale or Grippen.

However Cheney decided to destroy the tooling and molds for the Tomcat, and effectively put the 'cat to sleep. As the current planes age there will be no replacements, and it is sayonara for them.
Pentagon politics: Bureacracy and companies first, America last.

The JSF is a multi-national project to replace the Hornet, Falcon, and Harrier. It is not threatened by a Bombcat. The JSF has too short a range.

Such a thing could not happen, and thus the tooling was destroyed and the Tomcat program effectively killed. All in favor of the F/A-18! A plane that Israeli F-16s (in mock matchups) beat 220 times out of 240 (yes, you read me correctly! In an Israeli F-16/American F-18 match up the Israeli jets won the American hornets 220 times out of 240).
And yes, i know the Israeli pilots are trained like crazy since they do not have the numerical advantages the USAF has, but 220 out of 240! Do the kill ratio on that one!

The real test would be American vs American. Israeli pilots are driven by the knowledge that the loss of an engagment can doom the country.

The real test would be American vs American. Israeli pilots are driven by the knowledge that the loss of an engagment can doom the country.

Yes, i agree the reason the Israelis possibly won was due to the fact they knw that in any future engagements they would probably find themselves faving a horde of armies from a myriad of Arab nations attacking from different dirrections (a recoup of the 6 day war), and since Israel is virtually surrounded by them, and it is small, the pilots would have to be almost super-men.

However a kill ratio of 220 out of 240 (220 for the Israelis, and only 20 for the US navy F-18s) is still very shocking. Very. And i know the Israelis have done stuff to their F-16s to make them more maneuverable (possible even Thrust vectoring), but still...220 out of 240.

It just made me doubt seriously the efficacy of the Hornet against a comparable fighter flown by a competent pilot! We cannot assume that every nation we fight against will have an airforce composed of mig-19s and mig-21s piloted by Idiots!

220 out of 240!!!!!!!! There are no excuses for that one. None!

By the way the German test pitted the F-15 against the su-27 (or maybe it was the su-30, but one of them), and they were both flown by American pilots. And the Sukhois won!

Note: they were flown by pilots who did not have much experience with the flanker, against pilots who were literally bron strapped to the cockpit of an F-15.... yet the Flanker won!

I could somewhat swallow the Israeli case (even though 220 israeli wins: 20 American wins is still quite shocking), but what is the excuse for the Sukhoi f-15 matchup?

And that was the F-15, a superb fighter. How is the F/A-18 supposed to cope with that?

I believe so myself. The Israelis must have been using the Python asraam. However the point still remains that the American military machine is vulnerable if it was to face an adept foe, with similar (or better) tech. We automatically asume everyone we will face in the future will be a walkover.

And by the way the Python had been offered to the states, however it was denied (i don't know whether it was by brass or by congress....although i would put my money on congress). It would have been a welcome addition to our arsenal since the no.2 is Russian (the R-73) and is in use in some other nations.

However, Python missile and Helmet slaved firecontrol or not, a ratio of 220 out of 240 for the Israelis is still shocking when you consider the 'foe' was American F-18s!

This is a short sighted proposal. As a 21 year USAF logistician in support of aircraft from props to the B-1. I can tell you that only about 40% of lifecycle cost are the development and acquisition costs. 60% of life cycle cost is related to reliability and operational costs. These costs have been completely ignored. The Russian equipment has historically had very poor reliability, requiring much maintenance and logistics cost.

There are always people willing to offer seeming easy solutions to problems that after a complete look turn out to very poor choises.

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