Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.
On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.
Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.
The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.
Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
Shoigu urgently demanded that part of the ashes of commander Suvorov be brought to him.
source: https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4160
Russia and China have moved to increase their stakes in Kazakh uranium production, impacting global energy security and highlighting allegations of corruption and covert deals within the industry.
China, which is on track to edge the U.S. as the top major nuclear power producer, has a huge appetite for the resource. The country plans to double its nuclear capacity by constructing 150 reactors by 2035. Chinese companies, including the state-backed China General Nuclear Power Corporation, have already acquired rights to 60 percent of future Kazakh uranium production, according to the mining industry specialist platform Minex Forum. Meanwhile, Russian entities control over 22 percent of yearly production and a quarter of Kazakhstan's uranium deposits.
Another headache for Washington is that “while Kazakhstan is already the world's biggest producer and can produce more, it has no processing capacity. All of its uranium is processed in Russia,” Weafer pointed out. This means that despite Washington's ban on Russian uranium imports, it remains heavily dependent on the country to fuel American nuclear power reactors.
Reports have surfaced of corruption and clandestine deals between local mining industry players and Russian and Chinese entities. Express cited sources claiming insider knowledge that one such company, Aurora Minerals Group, is reportedly under the control of Russian investors.
Founded by former civil servants Kaisar Kozhamuratov and Said Sultanov, the company says it is a “full-chain mineral exploration service provider.” Express's sources alleged that the company has been running a mining operation without a license and netted millions of dollars in uranium sales.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-tighten-grip-global-nuclear-energy-supply-1904418
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2024
A limited segment of the Russian ultranationalist information space has resumed its standard public criticisms of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and warned that new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov may not solve certain systemic issues within the Russian MoD and military. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor warned that any “emerging progress” from Belousov’s appointment and the dismissals of several senior defense officials may “not be allowed” to go far enough to address systemic issues currently hindering the Russian war in Ukraine.[42] The former Storm-Z instructor particularly highlighted the poor, incomplete, and short training of new personnel as having a compounding effect on other systemic issues, including “excessive and unjustifiably” high casualties, no troop rotations, poor tactical and operational decision-making, degradation of combat-experienced units, inability to preserve combat knowledge, and lack of command-staff accountability.[43] The Storm-Z instructor claimed that these issues are all interconnected and cyclical and that Russia has accumulated significant reserves that are not undergoing training due to these systemic issues.[44]
Other Russian milbloggers, many of whom frequently complained about the Russian MoD prior to the mass MoD dismissals in late April-May 2024, agreed with the Storm-Z instructor and claimed that Russian “middle management” has been operating under the assumption that the current war in Ukraine is not actually a war, which is consistent with prior milblogger complaints that the Kremlin has failed to mobilize Russian society into a wartime mindset.[45] The Storm-Z instructor claimed that the fact that certain high-ranking officials, such as Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, have retained their positions further supports this complaint and that the appointments of new deputy defense ministers will indicate whether or not Belousov may be able to solve some of these systemic issues.[46]
The Russian ultranationalist information space has largely praised Belousov and the dismissals and arrests of senior Russian defense officials thus far. The milbloggers’ praise of Belousov and the dismissals comes with harsh criticisms of the corruption and ineptitude under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, representing a significant break with the self-censorship largely enforced by the MoD following the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023.[47] The condemnation of the MoD’s ineptitude prior to the dismissals and the resulting praise for Belousov’s appointment has largely benefited the MoD thus far as it helps rehabilitate the MoD’s image to Putin’s core ultranationalist constituency, secure their loyalty, and message to MoD officials that no one is safe from the consequences of falling from Putin’s favor.[48] The former Storm-Z instructor’s warning and resulting skepticism among like-minded milbloggers may represent the start of a return to prior complaints that undermined the MoD. The former Storm-Z instructor highlighted in his complaint that he was censoring himself throughout the conversation, suggesting that the MoD may not intend to lift censorship and self-censorship requirements on Russian milbloggers even if the bounds on what is acceptable criticism have shifted in the short term.[49]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin as Secretary of Russia's State Council on May 29.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Dyumin will “resolve issues” regarding the functions of the State Council, which is an advisory body that tasks and coordinates the implementation of domestic and foreign policy between Russia's federal, regional, and municipal authorities, including occupation administrations in occupied Ukraine, and assists in drafting Russia's “strategic goals.”[15] Putin recently appointed Dyumin to the supervisory board of state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec and has specifically tasked Dyumin with assisting Russian efforts to provide the Russian military with its necessary weapons and equipment and oversee Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).[16] Some Russian milbloggers amplified the news of Dyumin’s new position, and one Russian milblogger claimed that Dyumin has “all [the] best qualities” of the infamous Soviet director of the Soviet People's Commissariat for International Affairs (NKVD) Lavrentiy Beria.[17] The milblogger is likely referring to Beria's lesser-known role in expanding the Soviet Union's defense production by mobilizing slave labor in the Soviet Union's Gulag — a system of labor camps and prisons that imprisoned millions of criminals and political prisoners — insinuating that Dyumin will similarly succeed in expanding Russia's defense production.[18]
Belarus suspended its participation in the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe Treaty on May 28.[28] The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Belarus would resume its implementation of the CFE Treaty if NATO member countries also implement the CFE Treaty.[29] Russia withdrew from the CFE Treaty in 2023, and Belarus’ and Russia's respective suspension and withdrawal from the treaty are likely part of ongoing attempts to deter the West from providing military aid to Ukraine and from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[30] Russian officials criticized Moldova's suspension of the CFE Treaty in March 2024 and claimed that it was against Russian interests.[31] Russian officials notably did not criticize Belarus for suspending the CFE Treaty, and Kremlin newswire TASS claimed that Belarus had “made every effort” to preserve the CFE treaty, although it is unclear what efforts TASS is referring to.[32]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2024
Russian blogger
“The generals will start a riot and march on the Kremlin”? We explain what is happening.
Rumors that a military coup is being prepared in Russia appeared more than a week ago, when it finally became clear that the purges among the generals were gaining momentum.
[see this from 24MAY2024 https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6445#6445] At first we were not going to write anything about this, since we do not comment on gossip. But they were repeated by too many serious sources.
“I have heard several times that many generals are dissatisfied with the current lawlessness, so they are almost preparing a military coup, a riot with a march on the Kremlin, and so on. It seems like nonsense, but they talk about it a lot,” a high-ranking interlocutor at the General Staff told us.
According to another, they wanted to make Ivan Popov , “an honest general who is being revenged for his position,” a symbol of this rebellion (we have to agree with this statement). And the president allegedly decided to appoint Alexei Dyumin as Secretary of the State Council so that he could more effectively fight possible conspiracies. In this context, they recall, among other things, Dyumin’s actions during the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Sources we trust confirm: these rumors are “nonsense and a deliberate provocation.” “Of course, Belousov infuriates many people. But no one will definitely stage a military coup in the current difficult conditions. We believe in the president, and we also believe that Belousov will calm down,” a source in the Ministry of Defense told us. The Kremlin does not see any threat of a coup either. “This is some kind of nonsense, we don't even want to think about it,” assured a source close to Vladimir Vladimirovich.
The same position was repeated to us by more than five high-ranking interlocutors. So we want to reassure everyone - don't believe the rumors!
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4170
The lack of consistent decisions in the Kremlin leads to others filling the void. Horror vacui!
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30, 2024
NATO member states reportedly lack sufficient air defense capabilities to protect members of the Alliance in Central and Eastern Europe in the event of a full-scale attack. The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 29, citing people familiar with confidential 2023 NATO defense plans, that NATO countries can provide “less than five percent of air defense capacities deemed necessary” to protect NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe against a full-scale attack.”[22] A senior NATO official told FT that NATO currently does not have the ability to defend against missile and air strikes in Eastern Europe, but that these capabilities are a “major part” of NATO’s plan to defend Eastern Europe from a potential invasion. Another NATO official stated that air defense is “one of the biggest holes [that NATO has].” ISW continues to assess that NATO rearmament is necessary to deter — and if necessary, defeat — any future Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank, given that Kremlin officials are increasingly threatening NATO member states, and NATO and its member states are increasingly warning of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members in their territory.[23] Continued Western military support for Ukraine directly contributes to pushing Russia’s air defense network east and away from NATO members, given that a Russian military victory in Ukraine would allow Russian forces to station long-range systems in occupied Ukraine to further threaten NATO’s eastern flank.[24]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024
Putin reprimanded Peskov for speaking about a “senseless war.”
Vladimir Putin did not like Dmitry Peskov’s statement that the war in Ukraine is “senseless.” He personally called Peskov and expressed a number of wishes to him.
“Dmitry Sergeevich, you are an experienced and talented speaker. You need to formulate your thoughts more clearly, by God,” the president said.
Let us recall that Peskov spoke about the supply of weapons to Ukraine from the United States and other allies for attacks on Russia. Thus, Peskov said, NATO countries are provoking Ukraine to continue the “senseless war” and “a new level of tension.”
It's true, it's not entirely clear how such an experienced press secretary as Peskov could say such nonsense. After all, the Northern Military District began with certain goals, how can you call the war in Ukraine senseless? Here, of course, there could be a joke that Peskov would be imprisoned for discrediting the Russian army, but I would not want to joke about the topic of war, when hundreds and thousands of our soldiers are dying.
Russia's continued efforts to rally Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member countries around an imagined confrontation with the West likely stems from Russian concerns about the CSTO’s longevity as a vector for Russian influence. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov addressed a meeting of the CSTO Council of Defense Ministers in Almaty, Kazakhstan on May 31 and claimed that a tense situation in Eastern Europe and an alleged NATO military buildup threaten the security of CSTO members.[22] Belousov alleged that the US and its allies are a destabilizing geopolitical force and that NATO countries seek to strengthen their positions in the Caucasus and gain access to resources in the Caspian Sea and direct access to Central Asia.[23] Belousov warned that the West has unleashed an information war and sanctions against CSTO members to undermine the organization and called on CSTO members to coordinate their foreign policies to present a united front.[24] Belousov stated that Russia is specifically concerned about alleged US and NATO plans to involve nominal CSTO member Armenia in the West's sphere of interest.[25] Armenia has effectively ceased participation in the CSTO following Russia's failure to prevent Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia remains a CSTO member only in name.[26] The Kremlin has explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the CSTO and return to a pro-Kremlin alignment.[27] Armenia has specifically questioned the value of its CSTO membership following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Kremlin is likely concerned that deteriorating relations with Armenia could prompt other CSTO members to question the utility of their CSTO membership.[28] Recent tensions in the Russian-Tajik relationship following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack and Central Asian concerns about the impacts of secondary sanctions may be incentivizing the Kremlin to intensify efforts to convince CSTO members that the organization and their involvement in other Russian-led multilateral organizations is worthwhile.[29]
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are unlikely to buy into the Kremlin's imagined geopolitical confrontation with the West, and the Kremlin will likely have to offer more concrete promises to maintain the CSTO as a viable collective security organization oriented around Russian interests. Belousov met with Tajikistani Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo in a bilateral meeting on May 31 and stressed that the CSTO will address the escalating situation on the CSTO’s southern border.[30] Belousov claimed that the situation in Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism remain the main sources of instability in Central Asia and that the CSTO must have timely responses to this threat, including strengthening the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border.[31] Russia is currently considering delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization and will likely strengthen cooperation with the Taliban to combat the Islamic State's Afghan branch IS-Khorasan (IS-K), which conducted the Crocus City Hall attack.[32] IS-K recruited Tajikistani citizens for the Crocus City Hall attack, and Tajikistan likely views multilateral counterterrorism operations as a way to repair strained relations with Russia while also combating transnational terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan.[33] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Russian Security Council on May 31 and also emphasized strengthening international cooperation on counterterrorism.[34] Other Central Asian states, including CSTO members Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, likely view Russian offers for counterterrorism cooperation as attractive benefits of continued security relations with Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2024
The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine. US National Security Council Director for Europe Michael Carpenter told the Voice of America in an interview published on May 31 that the US policy allowing Ukrainian forces to strike certain Russian military targets in Russia “applies to counter-fire capabilities that are deployed just across the [Ukrainian] border [into Russia]” and “is meant to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves against what would otherwise be a Russian sanctuary across the border.”[7] Responding to a question about whether this policy permits Ukrainian strikes with US-provided weapons across the border from Sumy Oblast, Carpenter responded vaguely “yes, across the border for Russian attacks that are coming across, where otherwise Russians would enjoy a relative sanctuary.” Politico reported on May 31 citing two people close to the Ukrainian presidential administration that Ukrainian officials are frustrated that Ukrainian forces are “restricted to the border area in Kharkiv [Oblast]” when using US-provided weapons to strike Russian territory, however.[8] Carpenter’s comments and the Politico report together suggest there is ambiguity on what the US has explicitly authorized regarding these strikes amid signaling that the US is open to expanding these authorizations to other areas in Ukraine should Russian forces launch offensive operations elsewhere along the international border area.
This US ambiguity misses an opportunity to deter Russian preparations for offensive operations elsewhere across the border into northern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are also concentrating forces in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts across the border from Sumy Oblast, and ISW has previously assessed that even a limited grouping would achieve its desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces to this area.[9] The Kremlin may decide to launch offensive operations in different Ukrainian border oblasts outside of Kharkiv Oblast if it believes it can continue to mass forces across the border without risk of Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian forces would be forced to defend against such offensive operations before the US grants explicit authorization necessary for cross-border strikes outside of areas bordering Kharkiv Oblast. The increased likelihood of other Russian offensive operations in northern Ukraine would require Ukrainian forces to reallocate existing resources to deter or defend against the offensive operations, creating opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere in the theater to exploit. US clarity that Ukraine can use US-provided weapons against Russian ground forces concentrations in Russia that appear to be preparing for imminent cross-border operations would likely change Russian commanders’ calculations about the wisdom of making such ostentatious preparations. ISW continues to assess that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia’s operational and deep rear with US-provided weapons.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024
A message was left at Prigozhin’s grave on his birthday.
The day before, in St. Petersburg, many people came to the Porokhovskoye cemetery to honor the memory of Yevgeny Prigozhin. June 1 was the birthday of the creator of the Wagner PMC; he would have turned 63 years old. Flowers were brought to his grave all day long. Mostly men in camouflage and with patches of the Wagner PMC. They came in groups, sometimes families. The police and FSB officers in plain clothes kept order.
At the end of the day, cemetery staff found a note among the flowers. “Prigozhin is alive. We will take revenge.” It is not clear who left it. The authorities did not notice; now they will monitor the surveillance cameras. The reason for such activity of the organs is clear - this is the second message in two months with similar content .
By the way, who will take revenge on whom is also not clear. However, it is no secret that Prigozhin died under extremely strange circumstances. His plane crashed in the Tver region. Companions of the former owner of the Wagner PMC blame several people at the top, including Sergei Shoigu. However, after the death of Prigozhin and several prominent leaders of Wagner, the structure of the PMC changed greatly, some of the units came under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
At the same time, we recently told you that on the eve of the anniversary of that very rebellion, the FSB plans to take Prigozhin’s associates under special control .
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4182
As Russians do not trust their mass media, rumors abound with conspiracy theories like the one about Prigozhin being alive, and many of them hope that a strong leader will replace the current weak Tsar.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2024
The New York Times (NYT) published an investigation on June 2 into the forced relocation and deportation of 46 Ukrainian children from a foster home in occupied Kherson Oblast during 2022.[15] The NYT analyzed photos, social media posts, and official government documents and concluded that Russian government officials participated in the forced relocation of these children and that occupation officials are withholding the children from their parents and relatives as part of a wider effort to strip Ukrainian children of their identities. The NYT reported that a Russian federal adoption site listed 22 of these Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia and placed at least two children with Russian families. The NYT consulted legal experts who determined that the Russian intent to strip children of their Ukrainian identity is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and may amount to a war crime. ISW analysts assisted with the preparation of this report by reviewing some of its findings and sources.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2024
If we assume that 15 other people know each of them (= 7.5 million), then 13 - 14 million Russians have a personal relationship with the “losses”.
Russia has a population of 144 million, but more than 1.5 million have left the country, i.e. a population of 142 million. 13.5 out of 142 = 9.5% of the Russian population have a relationship with the “losses”.
This has a major impact.
today
A Russian soldier revealed the true meaning of the offensive near Volchansk. According to him, this is nothing more than another meat grinder, where untrained Russian soldiers are sent under machine guns and drones and are not allowed to retreat. Result: one after another, groups are simply destroyed, and new ones come to replace them. In the company of this soldier, contract soldier Anton Andreev from the 5th company of the 1009th regiment, only 12 people out of 100 remained.
At the same time, he realizes that orders to his superiors come from Moscow, and they also cannot do anything about it.
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1797537971224080807
When does it break? 10 %, 15 %
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