Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.
On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.
Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.
The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.
Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
Several Russian financial, economic, and military indicators suggest that Russia is preparing for a large-scale conventional conflict with NATO, not imminently but likely on a shorter timeline than what some Western analysts have initially posited. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the leaders of Russian State Duma factions on March 19 and outlined priorities for his fifth presidential term.[1] Putin emphasized the importance of developing the Russian economy and expanding the social programs announced in his February 29 address to the Federation Council.[2] Putin claimed on March 19 that he personally witnessed how corporate interests fueled appointments to legislative bodies while he was working in Leningrad and later St Petersburg, although he himself likely made substantial commissions from illegally endorsed contracts and licenses while serving as St. Petersburg Deputy Mayor and Head of Committee.[3] Putin urged the Russian State Duma faction leaders to act in the interest of the state instead of corporations or parties and emphasized the importance of appointing people based on skill and competence. Putin similarly criticized the Russian “elite” in his February 29 Federation Council address by claiming that the individuals who “lined their pockets” in the 1990s are not the elite, but that the “real elite” are workers and military servicemen who proved their loyalty to Russia.[4]
Putin is likely attempting to set conditions to stabilize Russia's long-term financial position at a higher level of government expenditure and is signaling that Russia's long-term financial stability will require imposing at least some pain on some wealthy industrialist siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence). Putin likely understands that financial crackdowns against industrialist siloviki could risk the political rapport Putin has built with them and is trying to mitigate those consequences. Russia does not appear to be facing imminent financial crisis, and increased military spending has been the most significant change in Russian budgetary policy, so efforts to secure Russia's financial future are much more likely intended to set long-term conditions than to address immediate financial concerns.[5] Russia continues efforts to circumvent international sanctions, and the International Monetary Fund assessed that Russia's GDP will grow by 2.6 percent in 2024 and reported that Russia's GDP grew faster than all Group of Seven (G7) countries’ economies in 2023.[6]
Polish President Andrzej Duda emphasized in a March 20 interview with CNBC that Putin is intensifying efforts to shift Russia to a war economy with the intention of being able to attack NATO as early as 2026 or 2027, citing unspecified German research.[7] Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated on February 9 that new intelligence indicates that Russia may attempt to attack a NATO country within three to five years, an accelerated timeline from NATO's reported assessment in 2023.[8] The timeline for the reconstitution of a significant Russian conventional military threat depends heavily on the financial resources Putin is willing to put against military efforts. In the absence of other explanations for Putin's apparent preparations to risk damaging his relationship with wealthy Russian clients and in the context of continuing announcements of plans to expand the Russian military considered below, Putin's attempts to set conditions to stabilize Russia's economy and finances are most likely part of Russian financial and domestic preparations for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO and not just for a protracted war in Ukraine.
Shoigu outlined several ongoing efforts to bolster Russia's conventional military capabilities, more likely as part of Russia's long-term effort to prepare for a potential conventional war with NATO than as part of the war against Ukraine. Shoigu stated that Russia has formed an army corps (AC) (likely either in reference to the AC currently forming in Karelia or to the 40th AC, which has deployed to Kherson Oblast) and a motorized rifle division (potentially in reference to the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, which is committed to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast line as part of the new 25th Combined Arms Army).[12] Shoigu also claimed that the Russian military plans to form two combined arms armies (CAAs) and 14 divisions, and 16 brigades by the end of 2024. Russia formed two new CAAs — the 25th and the 18th — in 2023, and it is unclear if Shoigu is suggesting that Russia intends to stand up two additional CAAs over the course of 2024.[13] Shoigu initially announced in January 2023 that Russia would also create three new motorized rifle divisions, two new air assault divisions, and reorganize seven motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions, and Shoigu’s March 20 speech did not differentiate between air assault and motorized rifle divisions, so it is likely that Shoigu is suggesting that Russia will stand up two new divisions in 2024 in addition to the 12 divisions (air assault and motorized rifle, inclusive) he announced in January 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russia currently lacks the manpower, military infrastructure, and training capacity to properly staff several entirely new divisions to army-level formations to full end strength in the immediate to medium term.[14] Such reforms, however, are more likely intended to build out Russia's long-term military capabilities vis-a-vis NATO, as opposed to immediately creating and staffing new formations up to the army level.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024
These institutions include Ping An Bank, Bank of Ningbo, China Guangfa Bank, Kunshan Rural Commercial Bank, Great Wall West China Bank, Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank, Dongguan Rural Commercial Bank, and China Zheshang Bank, said Alexey Poroshin, the director of the Pervaya Gruppa firm, in a comment for Izvestia.
https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1770730162813911169
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2024
Russian officials continue to highlight the work of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) in supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Russian DIB enterprises in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on March 21.[72] The general director of an unspecified Russian plant told Shoigu that the plant began mass producing FAB-3000 aerial bombs in February 2024 and at least doubled its production of FAB-1500 and FAB-500 aerial bombs over the past year, all of which Russian forces likely further modify to use as glide bombs. The plant also reportedly increased its production of artillery and aviation weapons fivefold over the past year. Shoigu visited another plant that produces artillery ammunition and claimed that Russia is producing enough artillery ammunition to supply the Russian military in Ukraine.[73] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also visited Russia’s Tambov gunpowder plant and called on Russian DIB enterprises to “work faster” to support the Russian military in Ukraine.[74]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024
AS-23a Kodiak = Kh-101
AS-24 Killjoy = Kh-47M2 Kinzhal
Shoigu found a “way” to finish the [invasion of Ukraine] this year. Because of this, we had to dig up the grave of the great commander.
https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6097#6097
The enemy struck the officers who had gathered near the ashes of commander Suvorov. Unfortunately, there are fatalities.
An emergency occurred in the Zaporozhye region last Friday. The ashes of the great commander were brought here from Crimea , and, as planned, they are beginning to transport them along the front line.
“The officers gathered around the ashes of Alexander Vasilyevich. Pray, talk. The mistake was to gather them close to the front line, in one of the command and control points. A shell arrived. As a result, unfortunately, four died and 7 were wounded,” a source in the Ministry of Defense told us.
Another confirmed the tragedy. And he said that Suvorov’s ashes “suffered, but only slightly.” Protected by a special armored box in which the remains of Alexander Vasilyevich are carried. Suvorov’s ashes, despite what happened, will continue to be carried along the front line so that it strengthens the spirit of our military. Let us remind you that the remains of the great commander were temporarily removed from the grave for this purpose on the personal order of Sergei Shoigu.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/3833
When the Kremlin is ruled by superstition, you know they are going down.
Russia is reportedly delaying the delivery of two S-400 air defense systems to India, likely due to limitations in Russia's production of S-400 systems, an increased need for air defense systems to protect cities and strategic enterprises in Russia from Ukrainian drone strikes, and a reported souring of Russian relations with India.
The Economic Times reported on March 20, citing unspecified defense sources, that Russian officials informed India that Russia will deliver two remaining squadrons of S-400 air defense systems by August 2026 after delivering three of the five squadrons that Russia reportedly agreed to deliver by the end of 2024.[32] The Economic Times stated that Russian officials claimed that they are unable to supply the S-400 systems on time due to the “developing situation” and “requirements” of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian drone strikes against targets in Russia may be constraining Russian air defense systems and prompting the Russian military command to reallocate air defense systems to better defend Russian cities and strategic facilities.[33] Russia likely also has a limited number of air defense systems allocated for export and may be choosing to delay deliveries to India in favor of supplying more steadfast allies following India's recent decisions to turn away Russian oil tankers over concerns about Western sanctions.[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed concerns about Russian ultranationalist reactions to the Crocus City Hall attack. Kadyrov claimed that the scale of the Crocus City Hall attack is ”much larger and deeper” than solely the attack itself because Russia's enemies are trying to undermine Russia by promoting nationalism.[32]
Kadyrov claimed that Russia has always been a multiethnic and multiconfessional country but that ”false patriots” are trying to play on people's emotions and ”call for fascist methods.” Kadyrov also threatened to have a ”short conversation” with instigators of ethnic conflict. Kadyrov is likely attempting to address Russian ultranationalists who used the Crocus City Hall attack to express animosity toward non-ethnic Russian minorities and migrants within Russia.[33] Kadyrov has previously been at the center of high-profile interethnic and religious scandals, which has likely disrupted his attempts to balance between upholding Chechnya's Islamic values and supporting an increasingly ultranationalist Kremlin.[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024
Who said forget about Belgorod?
Belgorod and the region are under daily shelling. According to our information, part of the air defense was removed from there to protect Moscow during the elections, and after the attacks, the refineries began to cover energy infrastructure facilities. Evil tongues say that part of the air defense systems was also taken out of Crimea . This allowed the enemy to deliver a serious blow to several important targets at once.
But why is the topic of Belgorod not on the front pages in the federal media? Rumor has it that an unspoken decree was issued from above not to press this topic. It would be nice if we were talking about attacks on Donetsk or Mariupol, where, unfortunately, they are used to war. But Belgorod!
According to our data, first deputy head of the Presidential Administration Alexey Gromov personally suggested that attacks on Belgorod and attacks on border villages and cities should be hidden as much as possible . The same one that hit the bar with an interview with President Tucker Carlson.
Doesn't Gromov want to go to Belgorod himself and sit under fire? Kiriyenko, by the way, travels to the DPR and, in general, often visits the front. Has anyone seen Gromov on the front line?
Update on the “Security Alert: Avoid Large Gatherings over the Next 48 Hours”
How should this be assessed?Prior to Putin's accession, a number of bombings were organized which continued with the Second Chechen War in order to raise the acceptance of Putin.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Russian_apartment_bombings
Are we facing a similar turn of events in view of the Russian presidential elections in a week? Note that the Russian blogger is close to the Kremlin and this text could be a way of not blaming Putin for what might happen.
https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6058#6058
22MAR2024 Kamil Galeev:
In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
-snip-
And the last detail. What was interesting about the Moscow bombings, is that they targeted poorer, non affluent districts of the East and South. If it was a false flag operation, then it was designed in a way that the elite/upper class would not get hurt even accidentally
Full text:
The March 22 Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) attack on Moscow's Crocus City Hall is a notable Russian intelligence and law enforcement failure, and explaining currently available open-source evidence does not require any wider and more complicated conspiracy theory either within or against the Russian state. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during an address on March 25 that “radical Islamists” committed the attack, but immediately and basely accused the United States of trying to cover the “Ukrainian trace” of the attack, directly accusing Ukraine of being the “customer” of the attack.[1] ISW continues to assess that the attack itself, as well as the claim pattern following the attack, is highly consistent with the way IS conducts and claims such incidents and has observed no evidence that Ukraine was involved in the attack.[2] Available open-source evidence indicates that the Crocus City Hall attack was the result of a significant Russian intelligence failure, not a conspiracy initiated by, or targeting, the Russian intelligence apparatus. Russian investigative opposition outlet Dossier Center reported on March 24 that Russian intelligence services were closely monitoring IS-K activities before the March 22 attack and alleged that the Russian Security Council received a warning that IS-K might use Tajik citizens for an attack in Russia a few days before IS-K carried out the attack on Crocus City Hall.[3] Dossier Center and other Russian insider and opposition outlets also noted that Russian law enforcement was very slow in responding to the incident and reported that security officers first arrived at Crocus City Hall an hour after the attack began, despite the fact that the Moscow Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) headquarters is less than three kilometers away from the hall.[4]
Sources familiar with the US intelligence community previously noted that the United States warned Russia about “fairly specific” indicators that IS-K wanted to carry out attacks in Russia, and the US Embassy in Russia issued a warning on March 7 that it was monitoring reports of extremist plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, including concerts, over the proceeding 24 hour period.[5] Putin dismissed the warnings as “provocative statements” on March 19, three days before the attack.[6] The Kremlin's acknowledgement of the US intelligence warnings prior to the attack shows that the Russian government was aware of US warnings, but likely discounted them. The United States also notably warned Iran about an IS-K attack against Iran ahead of the IS-K attack against Kerman on January 4, 2024, a warning that Iran also apparently disregarded.[7]
The responses by both the Russian intelligence apparatus and law enforcement agencies must be situated in the wider domestic Russian context. Russian intelligence could well have decided to ignore the US intelligence warning because of the extreme distrust of the United States Putin has driven deep into the Russian information and security spaces. Russian authorities may have also been concerned about the second-order effects of acting on the intelligence by seeming to target Muslim communities within Russia, which would likely cause even more discontent and alienation in a community that Russia already discriminates against yet relies on for the forcible generation of manpower for its war in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin may have balanced the cost of acting on intelligence from an adversary it does not trust with the risk of impacting a critical source of mobilizable manpower and found the risk of action too great. Russian law enforcement, for its part, has likely been conditioned to respond to mass-casualty events such as the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis and 2004 Beslan School Siege, so the delay in Russian law enforcement's deployment to Crocus City Hall may have resulted from conditioning about the need to proceed cautiously in what could have become a mass-hostage situation.[9] Those incidents evolved over the course of several days. Even during the 2015 attack on the Bataclan Theater in Paris the first armed responders did not enter the building until roughly 25 minutes after the attacker had begun shooting on the street but had to withdraw and wait about an hour and a quarter before sufficient backup arrived to start clearing the scene.[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2024
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