Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.
On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.
Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.
The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.
Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
Russian officials proposed laws that would restrict the actions of foreign citizens in Russia, likely to support continued efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Russian Duma deputies Alexei Zhuravlev, Mikhail Matveev, and Dmitri Kuznetsov proposed a bill that would consider migration violations an aggravating circumstance in a criminal offense.[23] Zhuravlev, Matveev and Kuznetsov cited figures that Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin released on September 25 claiming that the number of serious crimes that foreign citizens committed in Russia increased by 32 percent from 2022 to 2023.[24] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on November 28 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) proposed a bill that would require all foreigners entering Russia to sign a ”loyalty agreement” banning them from discrediting Russian domestic and foreign policy, denying Russian family values, or “disrespecting the diversity of regional and ethnocultural ways of life” in Russia among other restrictions.[25] The proposed measures likely seek to increase Russian law enforcement's ability to investigate and arrest migrants with foreign citizenship as part of an effort to coerce them into Russian military service. Russian authorities are also continuing efforts to coerce migrants with Russian citizenship into the Russian military by threatening to revoke their citizenship and forcibly issuing them military summonses.[26]
Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)’s Central Asian service Radio Azattyk reported on November 28 that a Kazakh court sentenced Kazakh citizen Alexei Shompolov to six years and eight months in prison on charges of mercenarism.[40] Shompolov reportedly fought in a Wagner Group artillery unit near Bakhmut.[41] Shompolov’s case represents the second charge of mercenarism pursued by a Central Asian country against a combatant who fought for Russia in Ukraine—an Uzbek court similarly sentenced an Uzbek man who fought with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) troops in Ukraine in 2014–2015 on October 31.[42] Russian milbloggers responded to Shompolov’s sentencing by criticizing Kazakh leadership for taking an “anti-Russian” stance and questioned if Kazakh authorities would similarly charge Kazakh citizens who fought in the Ukrainian army.[43] Russia's continued insistence on leveraging Central Asian populations for force-generation purposes, both within Central Asian countries and in Central Asian migrant communities in Russia itself, is likely to create friction between Russia and its neighbors as Central Asian countries use mercenarism laws to punish residents who fought for Russia.[44]
Russian authorities continue to facilitate the arrival of Central Asia migrants to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter the demographics of occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 29 that more than 100,000 Central Asian migrants have arrived in occupied Ukraine and are mainly working for Russian-controlled construction companies.[107] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian authorities may offer the migrants Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in the future, which would be consistent with ongoing Russian efforts to coerce Central Asian migrants into military service.[108]
full report https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2023
“Given the evidence currently available to us, it is almost certain that Stalin - a paranoid, inactive, generally unhealthy man in his mid-70s who routinely imprisoned and executed his own physicians, with a longstanding history of chronic untreated hypertension - died exactly the way that the Soviet government declared: from a left MCA hemorrhagic stroke secondary to his hypertension.”
The qualifier “the evidence currently available to us” though recognizes that the question is far from settled.
Yes
A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in Ukraine has almost halved since February 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not. Independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles stated that data from its October 17-22, 2023, telephone survey indicates that respondents who are “consistent” supporters of the war - those who expressed support for the war, do not support a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and think that Russia should prioritize military spending - decreased from 22 percent to 12 percent between February 2023 and October 2023.[1] Chronicles stated that 40 percent of respondents supported a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war aims, and that this number has remained consistent at about 39 to 40 percent throughout 2023. Chronicles stated that 33 percent of respondents did not support a Russian withdrawal and favored a continuation of the war and noted that this number has been consistently decreasing from 47 percent in February 2023 and 39 percent in July 2023. Recent polling by the independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published on October 31 indicated that 55 percent of respondents believed that Russia should begin peace negotiations whereas 38 percent favored continuing the war.[2]
The Russian war in Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts. Relatives of mobilized personnel continue making widespread complaints and appeals for aid for mobilized personnel despite reported Russian efforts to censor such complaints.[3] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 29 that Russians have sent over 180,000 complaints about issues concerning the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian Presidential Office for Working with Citizens’ Appeals since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[4] The majority of these complaints reportedly concern payments to soldiers, mobilization status, missing persons, and poor medical care.[5] The Kremlin has also been capitalizing on recent ethnic tensions in Russia to support ongoing force generation measures and appeal to Russian ultranationalists, establishing a cycle that keeps these tensions at the forefront of ultranationalist dialogue.[6] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that protest activity and social tension are increasing in Russia, particularly in western Russia, due to the war in Ukraine and that the top echelons of Russian leadership are discussing these tensions.[7] The GUR noted that increasing crime, alcohol abuse, inflation, and high consumer goods prices also contribute to rising social tensions, and many of these factors are likely exacerbated by the continued Russian war in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin has consistently failed to place Russian society on a wartime footing to support the Russian war effort, and the shifting poll numbers and exacerbated social tensions indicate that this failure is having a tangible effect on Russian society ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential elections.[9]
full report:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2023
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) blew up a freight train in a tunnel on a vital rail link between Russia and China, sources have told Kyiv Post. The operation, conducted overnight, struck in the Severomuysky Tunnel on the Baikal Amur Mainline deep inside Russia, north of Mongolia.
A source in Ukraine's military leadership told Kyiv Post four explosions targeted the train as it passed through the tunnel. They added: “Currently, the Russians use this route, including for military supplies. After the explosion, it was paralyzed.”
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24856
To avoid the Severomuysky Tunnel,#ruzzians used a detour over a 35m bridge at #devilstown ,where the #SBU where waiting.
https://twitter.com/RcMuzzleflash/status/1730522328780484858
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to falsely characterize Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine as part of an “active defense” in an effort to temper expectations about the Russian military's ability to achieve operationally significant objectives. Shoigu stated on December 1 during a conference call with Russian military leadership that Russian forces are conducting an “active defense” in Ukraine and are capturing more advantageous positions in every operational direction.[6] Shoigu distinguished the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District), 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk Peoples Republic [DNR] Army Corps), and the 4th and 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps) for their service.[7] All of these elements are reportedly or likely operating in areas where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in eastern Ukraine and not defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Shoigu and Putin both previously called Russian offensive operations to capture Avdiivka an “active defense” following the failure of the first Russian mechanized push to achieve significant tactical gains in early October 2023.[9] Russian forces launched two subsequent large-scale pushes to capture Avdiivka since early October 2023 and continue a high tempo of attritional infantry assaults around the settlement.[10] Russian officials’ characterization of these offensives as being part of an “active defense” are intentionally misleading. Ukrainian forces have never conducted offensive operations at scale in the Avdiivka area since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and Avdiivka has been a famously static Ukrainian defensive position since 2014. Russian leadership has nevertheless continued to falsely frame operations around Avdiivka as an ”active defense” likely to recontextualize the lack of any major Russian progress around Avdivka despite over two months of large-scale Russian attacks there.[11]
The Russian military command would have to pursue an identifiable operational objective if it acknowledged the operations to capture Avdiivka as an offensive effort. The “active defense” framing, therefore, allows the Russian military leadership to declare success as long as Russian forces prevent Ukrainian forces from making any significant gains, an entirely achievable objective considering that Ukrainian forces are not conducting and never have conducted counteroffensive operations in the area. The Russian command's “defensive” framing of the offensive effort around Avdiivka as well as localized offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine suggests that it lacks confidence in the Russian military's ability to translate tactical gains into operationally significant advances.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin, apparently concerned about decreasing Russian support for the war ahead of the 2024 Russian Presidential elections, has likely chosen to downplay the scale of Russian operations to the Russian public.[13] The increasing disconnect between heavy Russian losses in these offensive efforts and the Russian command's framing of these operations may nevertheless fuel discontent in the wider Russian information space.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023
The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three third party entities involved in the transport of Russian crude oil above the G7 price cap. OFAC announced on December 1 that it imposed sanctions on two United Arab Emirates-based and one Liberian-based shipping companies that own vessels that carried Russian crude oil above $70 barrel after the G7’s $60 price cap took effect in December 2022.[16] Russia relies on a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers without insurance from Western countries to skirt the G7’s price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products.[17]
full report https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2023
Gerasimov was accused of negotiations with Ukraine and the fact that our army is fighting poorly near Avdeevka. He responded with words about heroism and 2 thousand dead military personnel. The head of the General Staff has begun difficult times, which please his enemies, including Sergei Shoigu. But Valery Gerasimov does not give up.
Firstly, Valery Vasilyevich had to respond to the words of journalist Seymour Hersh that the head of the General Staff was allegedly conducting secret peace negotiations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny.
“I am not conducting any negotiations. This Hersh is just an idiot. Or someone paid him,” Gerasimov said in personal communications with several generals from his inner circle. At the same time, he decided not to mention that he tried several times to contact Kiev back in the summer and transmitted signals through the Americans. The head of the General Staff did not receive any answers from Ukraine to proposals for negotiations. Let us note that Gerasimov has repeatedly given reasons for suspicion. In particular, he proposed to give Tokmak and Artemovsk (Bakhmut) to the enemy in order to preserve the personnel of our army. They didn't listen to him then. But the fact that there are no negotiations between Gerasimov and Zaluzhny was confirmed to us by six sources in the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, including those whom we trust one hundred percent. True, the fact that there are no negotiations does not mean that rumors about them are not used against the head of the General Staff.
Secondly, Shoigu directly accused Gerasimov of the fact that our army is failing the SVO. According to sources in the General Staff, a meeting was recently held with the participation of the country's military command. There Gerasimov stated that our troops advanced in the Avdeevka area and achieved success in Marinka, practically taking control of the city. “What are you telling me? You command the army disgracefully! Avdeevka was not taken before December 1, as Vladimir Vladimirovich wanted, the president's order to recapture the entire DPR by the end of the year will also not be fulfilled. And in the Kherson region we retreat and hide it. Step aside and let the normal generals take charge!” - the Minister of Defense addressed the head of the General Staff.
Gerasimov reacted sharply to these words. And Shoigu said that just near Avdeevka (this is data as of the morning of Friday, December 1) more than 2 thousand military personnel died in a week. And the army fights heroically and does everything possible. And this is in conditions when “it is unclear how many fighters will remain at the front soon - due to losses and possible partial demobilization.” One of the meeting participants told us that “it's good that it was held online, otherwise Gerasimov and Shoigu would have attacked each other.”
By the way, Vladimir Putin reacted calmly to the failure to fulfill his order to take Avdeevka by December 1, but made it clear to the military that he was expecting serious victories at the front. The president did not take part in the meeting at which Gerasimov and Shoigu quarreled.
It was proposed in the State Duma to introduce a tax on childlessness in Russia. The initiative was taken by deputy Evgeny Fedorov. This will increase the birth rate in the country, he believes. The deputy recalled that the concept of such contributions to the budget worked well in the USSR.
The tax “on bachelors, single and small-family citizens” was introduced in the USSR in November 1941. Many experts believe that already at the very beginning of the war, the authorities began to think that it was necessary to compensate for the colossal human losses that the Union suffered during the Great Patriotic War.
The task of Russian citizens is to produce soldiers to be ground down.
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