Russian military convoy has advanced from Ivankiv to outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show (17 miles long)

CNN ^ | February 28th, 2022 | Paul P. Murphy

[Mariner]

A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.

On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.

Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.

The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.

Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.

[AdmSmith]

Russian equipment is not even worth the low cost:

from 04MAR2022: in the “last few” weeks, “what we've seen from India…is the cancellation of MiG-29 orders, Russian helicopter orders and anti-tank weapon orders.”
https://indianexpress.com/article/world/russia-ukraine-war-india-weapons-systems-us-7799245/

17MAY2023How EU sanctions on Russian crude helped India save $5bn last year
https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/eu-sanctions-in-russian-cruse-india-saved-5-billion-dollars-last-year-2380349-2023-05-17

An anonymous source cited by the writers said that Russia's export contracts have been relegated to “last priority” as Moscow doubles down on trying to replace its battle losses in Ukraine.

The same unnamed source mentioned that Russia would face considerable difficulties in fulfilling export contracts as foreign-made parts become harder to source due to sanctions and with its domestic arms industry struggling to produce substitute components. The anonymous source said that the poor performance of Russian weapons in Ukraine is a “demonstration” of their inferior quality.

Strangio notes that Russia's main comparative advantage over other arms exporters in Southeast Asia is price and its willingness to sell weapons to rights-abusing states such as Myanmar and Cambodia, which are under various Western sanctions and embargoes.

https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/russia-struggling-to-keep-its-se-asia-arms-markets/

[AdmSmith]

Girkin/Strelkov on the Ukrainian army:

The enemy continues to carry out the tactics of “creeping advance”. Not offensive, no. - The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not yet have any goals to attack Belgorod (if they were going to, they would from the very beginning bring not a battalion into battle near Grayvoron, but several reserve brigades and - on the effect of surprise - they could then reach the suburbs of Belgorod ). The enemy “plays long”. A military victory over the Russian Federation through breakthroughs and the capture of Moscow is the APU “too tough”.

It is important for them:
1) to “shake the situation” within the Russian Federation;
2) To do it in such a way that “the hero does not wake up, does not become furious and does not climb to fight to the death.”

I explain. The enemy previously refrained from massive shelling of “old” Russian territories, not at all because he was “forbidden” to do something by the Kremlin's dear western partners. Not at all! The enemy at the beginning and during the war suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, he needed time to conduct a series of mobilizations, receive weapons and equipment from NATO, train new units and formations, and restore the combat capability of the old ones.

While this was happening, it was very desirable for the Armed Forces of Ukraine that the Kremlin elders firmly believed in the inevitability of a “comfortable agreement” and therefore tried not to annoy them with too brazen blows. Kyiv pretended to agree to “a limited war” on its territory and did not plan to go beyond this framework. In parallel, various kinds of negotiations were conducted, “grain deals” were concluded, and so on.

And our cretins willingly “had” this bait, because it allowed them to continue to “not strain”, as they were used to for 20 (and some even for 30) years in power.

Now everything has changed. The enemy has really grown stronger, created a highly combat-ready army. In general, they successfully repelled our winter-spring offensive, while also managing to create large strategic reserves. And Moscow? And Moscow “rested on hopes.” The reserves recruited after the autumn defeats were wasted, no one thought to transfer the economy to a war footing, martial law was not introduced, the troops at the front were slowly decomposing and losing faith in the final victory. - And now the time has come for the “respectable Kyiv partners” not to be ashamed of anything - they feel strong enough and understand our current relative weakness. (I remind you that it was NOT I who called Poroshenko and Zelensky “respected partners” for 8 years of “sacred Minsk”, but Lavrov, Shoigu, Peskov, and the president himself, to be honest.

Now the “partners” are no longer afraid of “getting rid of the Russians at the very least” - we have NOTHING to do and SOMEONE to beat them now. And therefore, they are moving on to solving the main task - to undermine the Russian Federation from the inside. And what better way to turn the civilian population against the authorities than the unpunished murder of this population and the destruction of its property by enemies, whom for many years official propaganda humiliated in every possible way and promised to “extinguish with one hand, without straining”?

Therefore, they will beat. And the longer the Kremlin and Novo-Ogaryovo “celebrate a coward” and amuse themselves with idiotic (initially) hopes for a “final agreement” - the harder they will beat. And the more likely it is that when the Kremlin decides on the necessary military-political measures, it will be too late. And the population, instead of “in a single impulse to go to the front and to the machine” - in the same impulse they will say: “Go to hell, you cretins and traitors! We don't believe you and we won't go to die on your orders!”

[AdmSmith]

In the near future, Lukashenko may be replaced prematurely due to serious health problems that have arisen. He is terminally ill and the prognosis is negative.
Russia and others are already working to identify which Russian puppet is most likely to take Lukashenko’s place.

https://twitter.com/Balkunets/status/1663922249961750530

IS SOMETHING COOKING IN BELARUS 🇧🇾?

Two 🇷🇺 FSB planes flew to Belarus 🇧🇾, and Viktor Lukashenko (son of Belarus Dictator Alexander) flew to China 🇨🇳.

This very same 🇷🇺 FSB aircraft was last seen in Minsk on August 18 & 26, 2020.

During that occasion, the Director of the 🇷🇺 FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, flew on it.

Belarus dictator's son may be setting up succession details (for after his father kicks the bucket), or seeking financial support from China 🇨🇳.

https://twitter.com/officejjsmart/status/1663920183881134080

🇧🇾 Dictator's son arrived in Beijing 🇨🇳 at 17:03 local time today. He is likely seeking money or other backing for succession.
https://twitter.com/officejjsmart/status/1663921599123275783

[AdmSmith]

[AdmSmith]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2023

The Russian military command has likely ordered Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces to begin offensive operations in Ukraine following the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces from Bakhmut.
The claimed return of Chechen forces to offensive operations would break Kadyrovites from a nearly yearlong hiatus from participating in high-intensity combat operations.
The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.
The Kremlin may also be attempting to sever Kadyrov’s relationship with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and re-emphasize federal authority over Chechen forces.
The official Russian responses to recent attacks against Russia remain likely insufficient to satisfy the Russian ultranationalist information space's desire for escalation in the war.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces continue to concentrate in southern Ukraine.
The Russian State Duma appears to be considering measures to legalize the military recruitment of current or formerly incarcerated Russian men.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine has a new avenue to repatriate Ukrainian children abducted to Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023

[AdmSmith]

[AdmSmith]

It is heating up, when will the showdown come?

Read the post above https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=4164#4164

Girkin/Strelkov:

Question: “How to regard the attacks of the “near boyars” of Kadyrov - Delimkhanov and Daudov against Prigozhin with a practical challenge to him” on the arrow “? What answer from Prigozhin do you predict?”

Answer:
Apparently, Ramzan Akhmatovich weighed all the possible “pluses and minuses” of blocking with Prigozhin and considered him unnecessary or harmful as an ally. Prigozhin’s faction cannot offer Kadyrov what he needs (and he certainly does not need a “change of the system” at the moment, which Prigozhin is accelerating with his actions). That is, through the mouths of his closest people, Kadyrov demonstrated that he is not only against the “military and political rise” of “Cook”, but is also ready to actively prevent it.
This is an “affront” against the Kiriyenko group (and, probably, the Kovalchuks).
Naturally, Ramzan Akhmatovich does not intend to fight alone in this struggle - he also has serious “support from above.” Which one - I'll leave my guesses to myself for now (I'm not quite sure about them).
It should be noted that Prigozhin had previously actively and publicly sought an alliance with Kadyrov. Therefore, for him it is a serious blow and a challenge.

In addition to the “apparatus-undercover” struggle (a subjective reason), one can also see a completely objective one: in essence, “Wagner” is a direct competitor of the military and paramilitary structures at the disposal of Kadyrov (special forces “Akhmat”, etc.). At the same time, Akhmat and other “ethnic Chechen” (formally, since they are actively recruiting both Russians and representatives of other nationalities) units in the struggle for influence and funding. At the same time, it is precisely the “Chechen” formations that are completely (albeit formally) “inscribed” in the legitimate institutions of law enforcement authorities - in the “Rosgvardia” and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But PMC “Wagner” - no.
Prigozhin’s claims to a “special place” in the hierarchy of “siloviki” objectively infringe on the interests of Kadyrov,
And the very figure of Prigozhin cannot but arouse suspicion on the part of the current Chechen elite, since the Chechens are well aware of the “price” of all agreements and obligations on the part of the Russian criminal element.

As for Evgeny Viktorovich's likely answer, this is the second problem. Do not answer at all and simply remain silent - the most beneficial in all respects, but “not like a kid.” Delimkhanov and Daduov - they do not act on their own (although “in terms of caliber” for Prigozhin this is definitely a humiliation - after all, he “double basses the whole Infante Shoigu”, and then some henchmen of one of the heads of regions run over).

And here it will not work either to threaten to “piss on the corpse” or “to bring the commanders to justice”, how could he (without fear of anything) answer me, or to “play with a sledgehammer” (the Chechens have their own “sledgehammers” and they have been able to use them for a long time and better than Evgeny Viktorovich).

Therefore, I think Prigogine will quietly (or maybe loudly - but outsiders will not see this) rage, and then - with a smile in his face - will agree to “meet and discuss everything with his dear Chechen brothers.” Well, that's the smartest thing he can do in this situation.

https://t.me/strelkovii/5180

Note that Strelkov not is mentioning FSB, as most of them are against Kadyrov as he usually threaten them and have killed many of them in Chechnya.

[AdmSmith]

RussiaBrief:

The real trust rating is not this one.

The real catch is this:
1. Putin 28%
2. Mishustin 21%
3. Prigozhin 19%
4. Lavrov 17%
5. Sobyanin 17%
6. Kadyrov 14%
7. Shoigu 11%
8. Matvienko 7%
9. Bortnikov 7%
10 Strelkov 6%
……
Medvedev, Volodin, Peskov, Zyuganov, Solovyov below 2%.

https://t.me/rusbrief/122107

[AdmSmith]

Putin's party putting pressure on Prigozhin:

State Duma deputy Sultan Khamzaev (United Russia) said that well-known persons for public swearing should be fined at least 1 million rubles. According to him, now the platforms and administrations of social networks are actually responsible, and “everything ends at best with the blocking of individual users,” RIA Novosti.

https://t.me/rusbrief/122148

[AdmSmith]

RussiaBrief:

At a meeting with the heads of the CIS special services, Alexander Lukashenko explained why Belarus would not take part in the NWO [1]. The reason is the extremely difficult social and political situation in the country.
In addition, Lukashenka’s entourage does not rule out a forceful scenario of a change of power in Minsk.
As the head of Belarus said, we are preparing a forceful scenario for a change of power. We see it.

https://t.me/rusbrief/122187
Ref: 1 Russian invasion of Ukraine]

[AdmSmith]

[AdmSmith]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2023

Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes on Ukraine overnight on May 31 to June 1 and during the day on June 1.
Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) reportedly conducted another raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 1.
Russian officials and milbloggers’ responses to the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast are indicative of a continued heightened anxiety within the Russian information space regarding the war in Ukraine.
Chechen commanders and officials launched a concerted attack on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 1 in a likely attempt to undermine Prigozhin’s appeal.
Prigozhin responded to the attacks claiming that he will continue to voice his opinions until Russian MoD officials are punished for their mistakes in planning the invasion of Ukraine
Chechen attacks on Prigozhin’s character may be a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to discredit and undermine Prigozhin as his forces withdraw from the frontlines.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Svatove.
The tempo of Russian and Ukrainian offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction remains low as of June 1, and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along the southern axis.
The Russian State Duma rejected a draft law that would have granted mobilization exemptions to candidates and doctors of the science.
Russian occupation authorities announced that regional elections in occupied territories will take place on September 10.
Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin announced on May 31 that Ukraine is investigating over 2,900 crimes against children committed by Russian forces.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2023

[AdmSmith]

[AdmSmith]

[AdmSmith]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2023

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project confidence and competence in the MoD’s ability to respond to perceived threats.
Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids.
Russian forces conducted another series of strikes against Ukraine using cruise missiles and Iranian-made drones on the night of June 1-2.
Head of the Russian Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky announced that the Russian military will form two new military districts and other new formations by the end of 2023. Budinsky’s statements likely aim to reintroduce and reamplify Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s standing proposals to significantly expand the Russian military.
Russian sources appear to be reorienting the debate about the attribution of responsibility for small-scale tactical gains in the Bakhmut area to an ongoing offensive operation to capture Marinka, a small, almost leveled settlement where Russian sources have struggled to advance since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These discussions about responsibility coincide with the reported arrival of Chechen forces to assume responsibility of the Donetsk front and complete the capture of Marinka and other settlements in the area.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on June 2 that calls for a ceasefire are unacceptable because they will freeze the current lines in place and enable Putin to consolidate control of occupied areas and prepare for future attacks on Ukraine.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks in Marinka.
A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains during limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian sources claimed that Ukraine struck the port area in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, with Storm Shadow missiles.
Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian cadets from higher military academies are deploying to areas near the Ukrainian border within Russia.
Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly transport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2023

[AdmSmith]

Continued increased destruction of the Russian equipment before the next stage.

[AdmSmith]

Continued increased destruction of the Russian equipment before the next stage.

[AdmSmith]

RussiaBrief:

The United Arab Emirates has become a key trading center for Russian gold. following the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia. According to Russian customs data, in 2022 the Emirates imported more than 75 tons of Russian gold for a total of US$ 4.3 billion, while in 2021 this volume was 1.3 tons.
For comparison, China and Türkiye imported about 20 tons. Thus, these three countries accounted for 99.8% of Russian gold exports.

https://t.me/rusbrief/122488

[Firehath]

ruble

good investment

[AdmSmith]

Rubble?