Posted on 06/22/2017 6:11:42 PM PDT by markomalley
A former State Department employee was arrested Thursday and charged with espionage for allegedly transmitting Top Secret and Secret documents to a Chinese government agent, according to an affidavit filed with the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, VA.
Kevin Mallory, 60, of Leesburg is a self-employed consultant who speaks fluent Chinese. Court filings show that Mallory was an Army veteran who worked as a special agent for U.S. State Departments Diplomatic Security Service from 1987 to 1990. Since then, Mallory has worked for various government agencies and defense contractors, maintaining a Top Secret security clearance. The Washington Post reports that Mallory was also an employee of the CIA.
Mallory faces life in prison under the federal Espionage Act, and could qualify for the death penalty if certain conditions are met.
According to court filings, Mallory traveled to Shanghai in April and was stopped by Customs agents at OHare Airport in Chicago after failing to report $16,500 in cash in his carry-on bags. A month later, FBI agents interviewed Mallory who told them that he met with two people from a Chinese think tank that he now suspects were Chinese intelligence agents.
The suspected operatives gave Mallory a special communications device to securely transmit documents, which he claimed was only used to transmit two unclassified white papers on U.S. policy matters.
However, when FBI forensics searched the device, they found several other documents which Mallory believed to have been deleted, according to the affidavit. One message from Mallory to the suspected Chinese agent read your object is to gain information, and my object is to be paid. The Chinese agents response was reportedly my current object is to make sure your security and try to reimburse you.
Upon further analysis of the device, investigators found four classified documents three of which were designated as Top Secret. According to the affidavit, Mallory was asked why some of the information at the top and bottom of certain pages was redacted to which the alleged U.S. spy responded that it was to conceal the Top Secret designation so that Unless read in detail, it appeared like a simple note, along with an assurance that the information was valuable.
Mallory appeared in court on Thursday wearing a gray tank top and black athletic shorts, and requested a court-appointed attorney. He was ordered held pending a Friday afternoon detention hearing.
2014 : (FBI ASSESSES THAT SSSB USES SASS EMPLOYEES AS SPOTTERS AND SASS AFFILIATION AS COVER IDENTITIES) Since at least 2014, the FBI has assessed that the Shanghai State Security Bureau (”SSSB”), a sub-component of the Ministry of State Security (”MSS”), has a close relationship with SASS and uses SASS employees as spotters and assessors. FBI has further assessed that SSSB intelligence officers have also used SASS affiliation as cover identities. The PRC intelligence services (”PRCIS”) encompass both the civilian and military components of Chinese intelligence programs. Civilian intelligence collection is handled by the MSS. The MSS can be described as an institution similar to the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (”CIA”) combined under one intelligence directorate responsible for counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence, and political security. The MSS consists of a central ministry, provincial state security departments, and municipal state security bureaus, such as the Beijing State Security Bureau (”BSSB”) and the SSSB.
16. Among other things, the MSS and its regional bureaus are focused on identifying and influencing the foreign policy of other countries, including the United States. The MSS and its bureaus seek to obtain information on political, economic, and security policies that might affect the PRC, foreign intelligence operations directed at the PRC, and biographical profiles of foreign politicians and intelligence officers.
17. Additionally, the MSS and its bureaus are tasked with conducting clandestine and overt human source operations, of which the United States is a principal target. These operations 5 use trained intelligence officers, as well as non-professional collectors called “cut-outs” r “cooptees.” A cut-out or co-optee is a person trusted by both the source and the intelligence officer who helps to provide a layer of insulation between an intelligence officer and a source, and thereby increases operational security. Cut-outs or co-optees can operate under a variety of covers, posing as diplomats, journalists, academics, or business people both at home and abroad. These individuals are tasked with spotting, assessing, targeting, collecting, and handling sources or assets with access to classified, open-source, proprietary, or sensitive information that the government of the PRC can utilize for economic, political, or military decision-making or advantage. Sources or assets are people who agree to help a foreign intelligence service by providing information to that service in response to taskings from foreign intelligence officers or agents.
18. PRCIS source operations tend to originate inside the PRC, where the PRCIS prefers to meet with its sources or assets. To facilitate continued meetings inside the PRC, the PRCIS will arrange and/or pay for travel and expenses. The PRCIS is known to pay their sources not only in
cash, but also through other means, including business considerations or other types of assistance within the PRC. -— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
He registered it as early as 2007
Same church/temple?
FEBRUARY 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY IS CONTACTED BY A CHINESE RECRUITER THROUGH A SOCIAL MEDIA SITE) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article157698274.html#storylink=cpy
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24. On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia. Mallory told the FBI agents he had been contacted on a social media site by a Chinese recruiter (hereinafter “PRC2”) in or around February 2017. Mallory recounted that, over 7 the next several days, he had phone interviews with PRC2 and was introduced by PRC2 to a potential client (PRC1, discussed above).—— —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MARCH 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY TRAVELS TO SHANGHAI, IS PAID $10,000 ) According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, Mallory, travelled to Shanghai in March and April 2017 and met with an individual (PRC1), who he believed was working for the Peoples Republic of China Intelligence Service (PRCIS). ... Kevin Mallory was previously entrusted with Top Secret clearance and therefore had access to classified information, which he allegedly shared and planned to continue sharing with representatives of a foreign government, said Mr. Vale. Furthermore, he allegedly misled investigators in a voluntary interview about sharing of this classified information. —— JUSTICE NEWS, Dept of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Thursday June 22, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/virginia-man-arrested-and-charged-espionage
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In March and April 2017, while visiting Shanghai, China, Mallory met with an
individual (hereinafter “PRC1”) who represented himself to Mallory as working for a PRC think
tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (”SASS”).—— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MARCH 2017 : (MALLORY REACHES OUT TO SEVERAL FORMER CIA COWORKERS)
24. On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia. Mallory told the FBI agents he had been contacted on a social media site by a Chinese recruiter (hereinafter “PRC2”) in or around February 2017. Mallory recounted that, over 7 the next several days, he had phone interviews with PRC2 and was introduced by PRC2 to a potential client (PRC1, discussed above). Mallory told the agents that he travelled to Shanghai separately in March 2017 and April 2017 to meet with PRC1 and PRC1’s boss (hereinafter “PRC3”). 25. Mallory told the agents that he had reached out in or around March 2017 to one or
more former co-workers (to include two individuals, hereinafter “Employee 1” and “Employee2”) from a U.S. government agency (hereinafter “USGA1”) requesting they help him get in contact with a specific department in USGA1. Mallory told agents that Employeel and Employee2 did not facilitate any contact with the specific department, or anyone at USGA1, as he had requested.
Mallory described to the agents how he again contacted Employeel in April 2017 requesting help arranging a meeting with USGA1 to discuss people Mallory had recently met with in the PRC.
Based on its investigation, the FBI knows this contact to have occurred after Mallory was subjected
to a secondary search and interview by CBP.—— —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MARCH 2017 LATE : (JUSTICE DEPT CHARGES STATE DEPT EMPLOYEE CANDACE CLAIBORNE WITH TAKING MONEY FROM CHINESE INTEL AGENTS)
APRIL 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY AGAIN TRAVELS TO SHANGHAI, IS PAID $15,000, AND RETURNS APRIL 21 VIA CHICAGO ; CUSTOMS AGENTS STOP HIM FOR FAILING TO REPORT $16,500 IN CASH) According to court filings, Mallory traveled to Shanghai in April and was stopped by Customs agents at OHare Airport in Chicago after failing to report $16,500 in cash in his carry-on bags. A month later, FBI agents interviewed Mallory who told them that he met with two people from a Chinese think tank that he now suspects were Chinese intelligence agents.—— BREAKING: Former State Dept And CIA Employee Arrested, Charged With Federal Espionage, iBankCoin, 6/22/17
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In March and April 2017, while visiting Shanghai, China, Mallory met with an
individual (hereinafter “PRC1”) who represented himself to Mallory as working for a PRC think
tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (”SASS”).—— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
APRIL 21, 2017 : (CHICAGO, IL : KEVIN MALLORY FIBS TO CUSTOMS AGENTS ABOUT CASH AND...CLAIMS THE PERSON HE MET WITH IN CHINA WAS SOMEONE HE KNEW THROUGH A FRIEND AT CHURCH [RATHER THAN SOCIAL MEDIA]) On or about April 21, 2017, after a return flight to the United States from Shanghai, Mallory was subjected to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (”CBP”) secondary search and interview by CBP at Chicago O’Hare Airport. ...
22. During the CBP interview, Mallory stated that he was outside the United States for one week, and he was returning from Shanghai. Mallory stated that it was a business trip as well as a father/son vacation. Mallory stated that he was currently a consultant for “GlobalEx,” which was a company he founded in 2010.
While in the PRC on this trip, Mallory said he met with an
individual whom he knew through Mallory’s church, and stated that he was consulting with this individual on anti-bullying/family safety development. Mallory also stated that he did not receive anything from this individual during his trip.
23. Mallory checked “no” in response to question no. 13 on the CBP Customs Declaration Form 6059b, which asked whether he was carrying over $10,000 in U.S. or foreign currency. CBP, however, found $16,500 U.S. Dollars (”USD”) in Mallory’s two carry-on bags.
Mallory was allowed to amend his customs declaration to reflect the correct amount of money he was bringing into the United States. —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
and bill and hillary are still free
APRIL 2017 : (SOME TIME AFTER INTERVIEW BY CUSTOMS, KEVIN MALLORY AGAIN CONTACTS FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE TO REQUEST HELP ARRANGING A MEETING ) 24. On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia. Mallory told the FBI agents he had been contacted on a social media site by a Chinese recruiter (hereinafter “PRC2”) in or around February 2017. Mallory recounted that, over 7 the next several days, he had phone interviews with PRC2 and was introduced by PRC2 to a potential client (PRC1, discussed above). Mallory told the agents that he travelled to Shanghai separately in March 2017 and April 2017 to meet with PRC1 and PRC1’s boss (hereinafter “PRC3”). 25. Mallory told the agents that he had reached out in or around March 2017 to one or
more former co-workers (to include two individuals, hereinafter “Employee 1” and “Employee2”) from a U.S. government agency (hereinafter “USGA1”) requesting they help him get in contact with a specific department in USGA1. Mallory told agents that Employeel and Employee2 did not facilitate any contact with the specific department, or anyone at USGA1, as he had requested.
Mallory described to the agents how he again contacted Employeel in April 2017 requesting help arranging a meeting with USGA1 to discuss people Mallory had recently met with in the PRC.
Based on its investigation, the FBI knows this contact to have occurred after Mallory was subjected
to a secondary search and interview by CBP.—— —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MAY 1, 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY SENDS MESSAGE TO A CHINESE CONTACT) In a recovered secure message sent from the device on or about May 1, 2017, Mallory wrote, “Also, we may need to go again step by step in my getting the document to become
part of the image. Then sending it to you.” —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MAY 3, 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY SENDS MESSAGES TO ONE OR MORE CHINESE CONTACTS) 36. In messages sent on or about May 3, 2017, PRC1 and Mallory discussed two documents, “nol and no2,” which Mallory had provided to PRC1.
37. During the May 3, 2017 communication, PRC1 wrote, “I suggest you send all and retype the handwriting. And NO1 is obvious the first page of a complete article, where the else is and why it is black on top and bottom....We will try our best to apply for another sum of amount, as you required. However, I’m not sure it will be the Same amount for now and I will try, and for safety, we cannot send u in one time or in a short period altogether, need to figure out a better way.” In messages sent on or about May 3, 2017, Mallory responded, “The black was to cross out the security classification (TOP SECRET//ORCON//...I had to get it out without the chance of discovery. Unless read in detail, it appeared like a simple note...I have arranged for a USD account in another name. You can send the funds broken into 4 equal payments over 4 consecutive days.. .When you agree I will send you the bank E.g. instructions.”
39. Later in this same conversation, Mallory stated, “It was dicey (look it up) when they asked for me by name. If they we looking for me in terms of State Secrets, and found the SD 11 card..., we would not be talking today. I am taking the real risk as you, [PRC3], and higher up bosses know... “When you get the OK to replace the prior payment, then I will send more does. I will also type my notes. NOTE: In the future, I will destroy all electronic records after you confirm receipt.. .1 already destroyed the paper records. I cannot keep these around, too dangerous.” —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MAY 3, 2017 : (MALLORY SENDS MESSAGE TO CHINESE AGENT ABOUT HIS BLACKING OUT HEADERS TO CROSS OUT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ) Http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article157698274.html#storylink=cpy
MAY 5, 2017 : (MALLORY SENDS MESSAGE ABOUT HIS OBJECTIVES) In messages sent on or about May 5, 2017, Mallory wrote, “your object is to gain information, and my object is to be paid for.” PRC1 responded, “My current object is to make sure your security and try to reimburse you.”
41. In messages sent on or about May 5, 2017, Mallory wrote, “I can also come In the middle of June. I can bring the remainder of the documents I have at that time.”
Analysis of the device revealed a handwritten index describing eight different documents. Four of the eight documents on this list were found stored on the device.
43. USGA1 analyzed the four documents found on the device and confirmed that three of the documents are USGA1 documents, containing classified information. USGA1 further
confirmed that one of the three documents was classified at the TOP SECRET level at the time it was transmitted to PRC1 in early May 2017 and continues to be classified at that level. USGA1 further confirmed that the remaining two documents were classified at the SECRET level at the
time they were transmitted to PRC1 in early May 2017 and continue to be classified at that level.
—— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MAY 12, 2017 : (MALLORY MEETS AT USGA1[CIA, according to Wash Po] WITH EMPLOYEE3) On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia.... Mallory told the agents that Employedl facilitated a meeting for him at USGA1, which the FBI knows to have been on May 12, 2017, where he met with an employee of USGA1 (hereinafter “Employee3”). Recounting that meeting to the agents, Mallory said that he had informed Employee3 that he now believed that individuals he had met with in Shanghai (previously identified as PRC1 and PRC3) were affiliated with the PRCIS. Mallory stated that he had told Employee3 about receiving a communication device from PRC1, and that he had been trained in how to use it. According to Mallory, he had agreed with Employee3 to meet again with U.S. government employees to allow the device to be technically examined. —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MAY 24, 2017 : (FBI AGENTS INTERVIEW KEVIN MALLORY) Mallory told the FBI Agents that he had come to the May 24, 2017 meeting voluntarily, expecting to meet with Employee3. Upon arrival, he was introduced to the FBI agents.
8 During the May 24 meeting with the FBI agents, Mallory signed a voluntary consent form permitting the FBI to search the device provided to Mallory by PRC1, which he had brought to the meeting. At that time, the FBI extracted an image of the device, and returned the device to Mallory.
The FBI conducted further technical examination of the imaged copy of the device after the interview. ....
While demonstrating the capabilities of the device at the meeting on May 24, 2017, Mallory voluntarily showed agents how to move from normal message mode to secure message mode. When doing this, Mallory expressed surprise at seeing some secure message history. Prior to the demonstration, he had told the agents that he believed the communication system was designed to delete all previous history. When questioned on the secure messages which were visible on the device, Mallory pointed out to the agents which messages he had sent and which messages PRC1 had sent. One message he had sent stated, “I can also come In the middle of June I can, bring the remainder of the documents I have at that time.”
33. Upon questioning, Mallory said that comment was a reference to the two white papers he had already told agents about regarding open source U.S. policy information. Mallory stated that the reference to the “remainder of the documents” was just stringing PRC1 along, and that he did not actually have anything to give PRC1.
....Mallory made materially false statements during the FBI interview on May 24, 2017 in Ashburn, Virginia. After being informed of the identities of federal agents, Mallory knowingly and willfully made numerous materially false statements about sending documents to presumed PRC I0s, including by:
12
Claiming to FBI agents that he had not provided additional documents, beyond two
unclassified white papers, to individuals he identified as PRC I0s.
Claiming to FBI agents that he had never transmitted documents, other than a test
message, using the device.
—— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
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FBI agents interviewed Mallory who told them that he met with two people from a Chinese think tank that he now suspects were Chinese intelligence agents.
The suspected operatives gave Mallory a special communications device to securely transmit documents, which he claimed was only used to transmit two unclassified white papers on U.S. policy matters.—— BREAKING: Former State Dept And CIA Employee Arrested, Charged With Federal Espionage, iBankCoin, 6/22/17
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Kevin Mallory was previously entrusted with Top Secret clearance and therefore had access to classified information, which he allegedly shared and planned to continue sharing with representatives of a foreign government, said Mr. Vale. Furthermore, he allegedly misled investigators in a voluntary interview about sharing of this classified information. The FBI will continue to investigate those individuals who put our national security at risk through unauthorized disclosures of information.
During a voluntary interview with FBI agents on May 24, Mallory stated that PRC1 represented himself as working for a Peoples Republic of China think tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS). Since at least 2014, the FBI has assessed that Chinese intelligence officers have used SASS affiliation as cover identities.
Mallory told FBI agents he travelled to Shanghai separately in March and April to meet with PRC1 and PRC1s boss. After Mallory consented to a review of a device he had been using to communicate with PRC1, FBI viewed a message from Mallory to PRC1 in which Mallory stated that he had blacked out security classification markings on documents transmitted to PRC1. Analysis of the device also revealed a handwritten index describing eight different documents. Four of the eight documents listed in the index were found stored on the device, with three containing classified information pertaining to the same U.S. government agency. One of those documents was classified TOP SECRET, while the remaining two documents were classified SECRET.
—— JUSTICE NEWS, Dept of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Thursday June 22, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/virginia-man-arrested-and-charged-espionage
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24. On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia. Mallory told the FBI agents he had been contacted on a social media site by a Chinese recruiter (hereinafter “PRC2”) in or around February 2017. Mallory recounted that, over 7 the next several days, he had phone interviews with PRC2 and was introduced by PRC2 to a potential client (PRC1, discussed above). Mallory told the agents that he travelled to Shanghai separately in March 2017 and April 2017 to meet with PRC1 and PRC1’s boss (hereinafter “PRC3”). 25. Mallory told the agents that he had reached out in or around March 2017 to one or
more former co-workers (to include two individuals, hereinafter “Employee 1” and “Employee2”) from a U.S. government agency (hereinafter “USGA1”) requesting they help him get in contact with a specific department in USGA1. Mallory told agents that Employeel and Employee2 did not facilitate any contact with the specific department, or anyone at USGA1, as he had requested.
Mallory described to the agents how he again contacted Employeel in April 2017 requesting help arranging a meeting with USGA1 to discuss people Mallory had recently met with in the PRC.
Based on its investigation, the FBI knows this contact to have occurred after Mallory was subjected to a secondary search and interview by CBP.—— —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
Here’s what Hillary Clinton’s pals were doing in 2015 - fretting over their classified document problem :
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/3481117/posts
With them all tied up in Russian investigations how did they find the time.
The deep state is sending out their message!
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The ChiComs have become more and more emboldened with their espionage efforts,especially with the last boy President that was in office. The punishment needs to be severe to those that threaten our National well being. Also makes me wonder, why on God’s green earth do we do business at all with these ChiComs????
I don't see Club Fed as any deterrent value. Gitmo or Leavenworth perhaps but Club Fed is too much of an 'oh well' moment for these traitors. <<< notice Blackbirds use of the plural, traitors. We are rife with them. Try them then kill them deader than hell. Maybe hold off on the kill shot until after you have wiped out all of their ill gotten gains, show them how you have expanded your investigation into all of their family and close associations. Make them watch their shame being cleansed from society. Throat punches until they suffocate. Maybe I'm just a little more hardcore than most. Medieval even. <<< Alas, no animals were harmed in my version Caesar! ref:sack cloth, bobcat, water. That's me softening my tone.
From the article or comment:
“...He worked at State with Hillary. He left government work when she did. How is he still getting his hands on top secret documents? Hint: Hillary still has top secret clearance. ...”
And why does illary still have TS clearance?
When someone leaves a job, the clearance lapses; there’s no longer a “need to know”.
Just —who— is maintaining her status, in regards to TS clearance?
Cementjungle wrote:
“He worked at State with Hillary. He left government work when she did. How is he still getting his hands on top secret documents? Hint: Hillary still has top secret clearance.”
Who is keeping illary’s clearance current?
How is it being kept current?
When someone leaves a job, their clearance lapses, since they no longer have a “need to know”.
Drain his brain of everything in it, get it on video, and then pull the trigger.
Send him to Club Gitmo with a prayer rug for the rest of his miserable life.
Seize his home, his money and every asset and sell them. Then donate that fund to the Salvation Army.
Nice digs he has there.
RICO it.
The ChiComs have been in bed with the Clintons forever, and Obama got into that bed when he became president.
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