2014 : (FBI ASSESSES THAT SSSB USES SASS EMPLOYEES AS SPOTTERS AND SASS AFFILIATION AS COVER IDENTITIES) Since at least 2014, the FBI has assessed that the Shanghai State Security Bureau (”SSSB”), a sub-component of the Ministry of State Security (”MSS”), has a close relationship with SASS and uses SASS employees as spotters and assessors. FBI has further assessed that SSSB intelligence officers have also used SASS affiliation as cover identities. The PRC intelligence services (”PRCIS”) encompass both the civilian and military components of Chinese intelligence programs. Civilian intelligence collection is handled by the MSS. The MSS can be described as an institution similar to the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (”CIA”) combined under one intelligence directorate responsible for counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence, and political security. The MSS consists of a central ministry, provincial state security departments, and municipal state security bureaus, such as the Beijing State Security Bureau (”BSSB”) and the SSSB.
16. Among other things, the MSS and its regional bureaus are focused on identifying and influencing the foreign policy of other countries, including the United States. The MSS and its bureaus seek to obtain information on political, economic, and security policies that might affect the PRC, foreign intelligence operations directed at the PRC, and biographical profiles of foreign politicians and intelligence officers.
17. Additionally, the MSS and its bureaus are tasked with conducting clandestine and overt human source operations, of which the United States is a principal target. These operations 5 use trained intelligence officers, as well as non-professional collectors called “cut-outs” r “cooptees.” A cut-out or co-optee is a person trusted by both the source and the intelligence officer who helps to provide a layer of insulation between an intelligence officer and a source, and thereby increases operational security. Cut-outs or co-optees can operate under a variety of covers, posing as diplomats, journalists, academics, or business people both at home and abroad. These individuals are tasked with spotting, assessing, targeting, collecting, and handling sources or assets with access to classified, open-source, proprietary, or sensitive information that the government of the PRC can utilize for economic, political, or military decision-making or advantage. Sources or assets are people who agree to help a foreign intelligence service by providing information to that service in response to taskings from foreign intelligence officers or agents.
18. PRCIS source operations tend to originate inside the PRC, where the PRCIS prefers to meet with its sources or assets. To facilitate continued meetings inside the PRC, the PRCIS will arrange and/or pay for travel and expenses. The PRCIS is known to pay their sources not only in
cash, but also through other means, including business considerations or other types of assistance within the PRC. -— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
FEBRUARY 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY IS CONTACTED BY A CHINESE RECRUITER THROUGH A SOCIAL MEDIA SITE) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article157698274.html#storylink=cpy
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24. On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia. Mallory told the FBI agents he had been contacted on a social media site by a Chinese recruiter (hereinafter “PRC2”) in or around February 2017. Mallory recounted that, over 7 the next several days, he had phone interviews with PRC2 and was introduced by PRC2 to a potential client (PRC1, discussed above).—— —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MARCH 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY TRAVELS TO SHANGHAI, IS PAID $10,000 ) According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, Mallory, travelled to Shanghai in March and April 2017 and met with an individual (PRC1), who he believed was working for the People’s Republic of China Intelligence Service (PRCIS). ... “Kevin Mallory was previously entrusted with Top Secret clearance and therefore had access to classified information, which he allegedly shared and planned to continue sharing with representatives of a foreign government,” said Mr. Vale. “Furthermore, he allegedly misled investigators in a voluntary interview about sharing of this classified information. —— JUSTICE NEWS, Dept of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Thursday June 22, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/virginia-man-arrested-and-charged-espionage
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In March and April 2017, while visiting Shanghai, China, Mallory met with an
individual (hereinafter “PRC1”) who represented himself to Mallory as working for a PRC think
tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (”SASS”).—— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MARCH 2017 : (MALLORY REACHES OUT TO SEVERAL FORMER CIA COWORKERS)
24. On May 24, 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the FBI in Ashburn, Virginia. Mallory told the FBI agents he had been contacted on a social media site by a Chinese recruiter (hereinafter “PRC2”) in or around February 2017. Mallory recounted that, over 7 the next several days, he had phone interviews with PRC2 and was introduced by PRC2 to a potential client (PRC1, discussed above). Mallory told the agents that he travelled to Shanghai separately in March 2017 and April 2017 to meet with PRC1 and PRC1’s boss (hereinafter “PRC3”). 25. Mallory told the agents that he had reached out in or around March 2017 to one or
more former co-workers (to include two individuals, hereinafter “Employee 1” and “Employee2”) from a U.S. government agency (hereinafter “USGA1”) requesting they help him get in contact with a specific department in USGA1. Mallory told agents that Employeel and Employee2 did not facilitate any contact with the specific department, or anyone at USGA1, as he had requested.
Mallory described to the agents how he again contacted Employeel in April 2017 requesting help arranging a meeting with USGA1 to discuss people Mallory had recently met with in the PRC.
Based on its investigation, the FBI knows this contact to have occurred after Mallory was subjected
to a secondary search and interview by CBP.—— —— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf
MARCH 2017 LATE : (JUSTICE DEPT CHARGES STATE DEPT EMPLOYEE CANDACE CLAIBORNE WITH TAKING MONEY FROM CHINESE INTEL AGENTS)
APRIL 2017 : (KEVIN MALLORY AGAIN TRAVELS TO SHANGHAI, IS PAID $15,000, AND RETURNS APRIL 21 VIA CHICAGO ; CUSTOMS AGENTS STOP HIM FOR FAILING TO REPORT $16,500 IN CASH) According to court filings, Mallory traveled to Shanghai in April and was stopped by Customs agents at O’Hare Airport in Chicago after failing to report $16,500 in cash in his carry-on bags. A month later, FBI agents interviewed Mallory – who told them that he met with two people from a Chinese think tank that he now suspects were Chinese intelligence agents.—— BREAKING: Former State Dept And CIA Employee Arrested, Charged With Federal Espionage, iBankCoin, 6/22/17
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In March and April 2017, while visiting Shanghai, China, Mallory met with an
individual (hereinafter “PRC1”) who represented himself to Mallory as working for a PRC think
tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (”SASS”).—— http://www.alexandrianews.org/2017/anfiles/2017/06/Kevin-Mallory-Criminal-Complaint.pdf