Posted on 02/12/2017 4:26:47 PM PST by janetjanet998
Edited on 02/12/2017 9:33:58 PM PST by Admin Moderator. [history]
The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.
Oroville Dam: DWR wants to reconstruct more of damaged spillway this season
By Risa Johnson, Chico Enterprise Record |
PUBLISHED: July 13, 2017 at 6:51 am | UPDATED: July 13, 2017 at 6:56 am
Oroville – The state Department of Water Resources has filed a request with the Federal Energy Commission to demolish and reconstruct an additional 240 feet of the main Oroville Dam spillway upper chute this season.
The purpose of the change is to ensure the reconstruction can be complete in two seasons, per a recent FERC filing. Kiewit, the contractor, said demolition “must commence as soon as possible” to stay on schedule, according to the letter.
Erin Mellon with the California Natural Resources Agency said DWR expects to be granted permission in the next several days. Kiewit signed on to the project when design plans were incomplete and the department continues to make changes because of new information from the Board of Consultants, Kiewit and other entities, she said.
The independent forensic review team has yet to release its final findings of what caused the spillway to collapse in the first place. Its report is expected to be released in the fall.
snip
Other cities, counties file $22 million in spillway crisis claims - yet "carrot" of $1B of benefits promised in relicensing
Oroville City council is seeking $1 million in damages from the spillway incident (road damage, etc). Article notes that other communities are filing claims totaling to $22M.
Mayor Linda Dahlmeier has "eyes" on the $1B in benefits that are promised when Oroville Dam is granted relicensing by FERC - doesn't want the licensing to be delayed. $$
(note: not sure if these "claims" are tied to the city council item of "litigation" - may be a separate issue).
= = Article clips: (emphasis mine)
City attorney Scott Huber said the city filed a claim last week with the state for about $1 million. That includes losses immediately following the spillway incident and ongoing costs, like damage to city roads, he said after the meeting. Other downstream communities recently filed claims as well, including Yuba City, Marysville, Live Oak and Yuba and Sutter counties, as reported by the Appeal-Democrat.
“At every opportunity we have, we’re raising the safety of the dam as an issue,” Huber said.
As to why the city sees the state as liable to cover the costs, the city says in its claim, the state and DWR “failed to properly construct, inspect, repair, operate, and manage the facilities.”
. .
Vice Mayor Janet Goodson suggested including a request to delay relicensing of the dam under the management of DWR, echoing a letter just released from Rep. Doug LaMalfa, R-Richvale. All councilors present said they wished to delay the relicensing, at least until the independent forensic team investigating what caused the spillway to collapse releases its final report this fall.
. .
Mayor Linda Dahlmeier was the most vocal about going forward with the relicensing as soon as possible following release of the forensic report. She said Oroville would be the only community that would suffer if the license were not to be issued.
“When that license gets issued, that starts the clock on what DWR has to provide for this community, and that is $1 billion in recreation and environmental upgrades to this community,” Dahlmeier said. “If we ask for a delay, this will be put off.”
= = end Clip More at link:
http://www.orovillemr.com/article/NB/20170711/NEWS/170719931
= = Appeal Democrat news:
Cities, counties file $22M in spillway crisis claims
It's still too early to know just how significant an impact the February evacuation and Oroville Dam spillway incident had on Yuba and Sutter counties. So far, estimates put damages and losses around $22 million for local municipalities, and that number will continue to grow as county officials lock down estimates.
= = end clip
IMHO, the DWR, and by extension Gov Moonbeam, are scared spitless that FEMA won’t reimburse the repair costs.
Because of the designation of a natural disaster verses deferred maintenance as a "cause", DWR's exposure to this question likely is placing great pressure on the "Forensic Team's" forensic failure analysis report.
Besides FEMA, you have the CA "water contractors" who normally pay 96% of the costs associated with the dam's operation & maintenance. Even if FEMA came through to the 75%, the water contractors may point the finger of blame back at DWR regarding their burden of 25% of the repair costs. Thus lawsuits could result. Again, this gets back to the Forensic Team's report. This report has to be so thorough that it needs to withstand the scrutiny of "engineering, operations, and management evidence" in a legal sense & definition.
Setting up a "hotline" gmail address for anonymous tips or information to be sent to the Forensic Team does not sound like they have a strong case in this sense. That is why I believe there may be tension at play in their investigation. - Money and lots of it is on the line….
= = Article clip:
California State Assembly Hearing with DWR alerts residents to the hazard of problems with the Oroville Dam
Written by Valerie L. Price
Steemed May 14, 2017
"John Laird answers the question of who will be responsible for paying the costs associated with repairs to the dam by stating that 96% of costs associated with the dam have historically been paid by water contractors, and 4% has been paid by the State. He says that “water contractors will have to step up here,” and there is only a question of whether federal funds will offset any of the costs."
= = end clip More at Link:
These "accidents" could be said to set the "mood" for a potential face off over footing the bill in repair costs from the spillway failure & the emergency spillway failure/emergency armoring. (i.e. I suspect they're already unhappy from DWR's prior "accidents").
(note: this article is on earthquake safety assessment. Quote below is 14 paragraphs down).
= = SacBee Article clip:
"Any repairs or problems at Oroville Dam are paid for by the 29 urban and agricultural water contractors that buy water from the State Water Project, which include the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Kern County Water Agency, Santa Clara Valley Water District and others. These contractors, in turn, pass along their costs to ratepayers, including homeowners, business owners or farmers."
"Those costs have been mounting at Oroville Dam after two expensive and high-profile accidents."
"In 2009, five workers were injured when a steel bulkhead inside the dam blew out when two large river outlet valves were opened during a test. The valves have been inoperable ever since, and millions of dollars in repair costs are still looming. A subsequent investigation found that poor safety practices at the DWR contributed to the accident."
"In 2012, a major fire occurred at the Thermalito Pumping-Generating Station, which is part of the hydroelectric system at the dam. The fire significantly reduced electric generating capacity at the dam and complete repair costs are still unknown. The DWR recently opened bids for a major cleanup project, the lowest of which was $11.9million. Additional work is needed to get the station operating again."
"Negotiations are underway now between the DWR and its contractors to draft new terms for long-term water supply contracts. Among the key disagreements is how much the contractors will pay into a contingency fund so the department can respond more rapidly to emergencies."
The parties also are wrangling over other contract terms to finance two massive water diversion tunnels in the Delta. The $25billion project, supported by Gov. Jerry Brown, will be the most expensive water project ever undertaken in the state.
Leah Wills, a water consultant to Plumas County involved in the negotiations, said the contractors are reluctant to take on more expenses. Plumas County is a state water contractor, though often a contrarian in such negotiations because it is the only state contractor north of the Delta.
“There is no doubt in my mind this is all a big dance over how these new costs are going to be apportioned,” Wills said. “The contractors are kind of legitimately panicked. Somewhere there’s going to be this huge blank check that lands in their laps.”
= = = end clip More at link:
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/environment/article2584322.html#storylink=cpy
Oroville Chamber of Commerce asks for Oroville Dam relicensing delay
Josh Copitch
Posted: Jul 13, 2017 04:41 PM PDT
Updated: Jul 13, 2017 07:18 PM PDT
OROVILLE, Calif. - The Oroville Chamber of Commerce initiated a letter from the Oroville Dam Coalition to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission asking for a delay in the relicensing of the Oroville Dam.
A delay in the relicensing of the Dam would allow for the Board of Consultants and the Forensic Team, tasked by FERC to investigate the spillway, to be completed. This way relicensing participants could assess the impacts of the spillway incident.
“We are asking for a pause to allow the forensic report to come back and allow FERC to thoroughly vet their findings,” said Sandy Linville, President and CEO of the Oroville Chamber of Commerce. “We want to make sure DWR is looking at dam safety as being paramount, and that the new license reflects that.”
Signers hope that the Commission will issue a new license only when there is clarity on the current spillway reconstruction project and how the damage from the spillway incident is going to be addressed by the licensee.
Current signers of the Oroville Dam Coalition letter to FERC are: Oroville Area Chamber of Commerce, City of Biggs, Town of Paradise, Feather River Recreation and Parks District, City of Wheatland, Sutter County Board of Supervisors, Live Oak Chamber of Commerce, Yuba-Sutter Chamber of Commerce, Yuba-Sutter Economic Development Corporation, Sutter-Yuba Realtors Association, American Whitewater, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, and Citizens for Fair and Equitable Recreation.
http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/BOC%20Memo%208.pdf
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #8
|
Released July 13, 2017
Lake Oroville Spillways Emergency Recovery Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 8 – June 23, 2017
Prepared by the California Department of Water Resources
Update on investigation of existing FCO spillway chute foundation condition.
The BOC was provided an update to findings on the investigation of the interface between the concrete and rock material. Four concrete cutouts were excavated and exposures described. Subsequently, and as part of the concrete removal, the Contractor created a 200-foot-long centerline
exposure of the interface from Stations 25+00 to 27+00. Where present, the soil material that did exist appeared to be semi-consolidated fines and angular rock debris that was not removed as part of the initial (1960’s era)foundation surface cleanup. The interpretation of the investigators was that the localized occurrence of the soil and its angular nature did not appear to be fill that was purposefully placed as bearing material. A photo of this material is shown as Figure 8.
Nice find - thanks.
Is DWR seeking to preemptively address a serious design issue of constructing the spillway upon a pre-applied layer of "compacted fines or soils"?
A "slight of hand" wording maneuver surely seems to have occurred in the latest DWR "BOC summary" report released yesterday, July 13, 2017. The metadata "author" of this new report summary and combined BOC file creation is David Gutierrez (see Fig 1). This is the same Dave Gutierrez discussed in prior post 3903 where questionable information in testimony and statements have been documented. POST 3903 clip: "Dave Gutierrez has been hired back by DWR as an advisory consultant role during this crisis. He has spoken at town hall meetings and given Testimony at the State Legislative Hearings on the Spillway Failure.
Dave Gutierrez has been a central figure to questionable testimony and statements in light of considering his credentials in engineering expertise (see link to post below: "DWR Organizational Ethics? - Severe Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception? - On the Record Examples from DWR officials in Press Releases, Town Halls, to the Press, and Testimony in State Legislative Hearings 2017")
DWR may be seeking to preemptively strike against a very damaging revelation of the spillway being constructed upon a layer of "compacted clayey fines or clayey soils". If the spillway was indeed "authorized" and "constructed" to be built upon with a "layer" of compacted soil-like material above the underlying foundation, then this has implications to the Upper Spillway's integrity in the decision to not fully replace in 2017.
A Question arises as to WHY this BOC memo, with DWR's preceding summary comments was just released yesterday, July 13, 2017, & with no redactions. The main BOC memorandum #8 report has been available and complete since June 23, 2017. DWR has filed this BOC Memorandum #8 as CEII with FERC, keeping it secret (see Fig 2). So why now? with no redactions if it was CEII secret?
Further examination of this new release shows that the July 13, 2017 document was created with DWR's summary statements as "new" via footer noting "BOC MEMO SUMMARY #8 / Released July 13, 2017" in the DWR summary section. (See Fig 3.)
There is evidence that "questionable statements" have been written in the DWR summary section from this report, authored by David Gutierrez (file metadata identifies as "author"). These DWR summary "statements" are highly misleading when compared to what was written in the original BOC Memorandum (Fig 3 vs Fig 4).
The Independent Board of Consultants never "concluded" that fill material was "not placed as part of the original construction". In fact, DWR was tasked by the BOC with investigating the foundation of the existing concrete chute. Thus, DWR is the "source" of the information provided to the BOC. The BOC clearly states "The interpretation of the investigators..". The "investigators" and the "interpretation" in this case is NOT the BOC. This leaves DWR or an independent consultant/contractor working for DWR as the "investigators" and the "interpreters". Since DWR was "tasked" by the BOC to do the investigation, the results and contents, passed on to the BOC, is the responsibility of DWR.
The end result is that this "DWR responsible" original "interpretations of the investigators" in which said that it "did not appear" to be "purposefully placed fill material" ended up "re-translated" by DWR saying "The BOC notes that material was not placed as part of the original construction". DWR is essentially placing words in the mouths of the BOC. Why?
A DWR provided photograph, of part of the fill material investigation, was noted with comments of "Base of leveling concrete under the slab", and "Soil debris with angular rock fragments left in place", and "Rock foundation" (Fig 5). However, this photograph has a much different "interpretation" to the known conditions of the highly pressurized subslab water flow. Any prior soil like material (as proven "existing" in their photograph) would be part of a greater volume of this soil material to remain under the years of pressurized erosive "washing". Thus "voids" would form in the areas washed and eroded and the known repairs of "void filling" under the slabs would leave the identical impressional results as shown in that photograph. In fact, the concave round rock "indentations" are classic as a "evidential mold" footprints of downward protruding round rock that would have been retained into the slab from the round drain rock used near drain pipes. If this was "leveling concrete", why is the top surface so irregular? This irregularity is a better fit to "void filling" and the effects of the irregular underslab surface prior to the void fill.
A photograph NOT provided by DWR to the BOC to be included in the Memorandum #8 report reveals a LARGE amount of Soil beneath the slabs (Fig 6). This photograph was taken in the same upper spillway inspection in cutting holes to look at the foundation. It is a DWR photograph. Why didn't DWR submit this to the BOC? This photograph completely changes the narrative of the other photograph. Isn't forensic accuracy important to investigations, including providing critical information to the BOC? Was the original photograph "cherry picked" by DWR to give to the BOC?
Original construction photographs evidence that the spillway was covered with a layer of compacted aggregate/soils before the slabs were poured. (see Fig below). The massive "blowout failure" region also evidences that NO leveling concrete was emplaced as this leveling concrete would have been anchored to competent bedrock and there would have been evidence remaining of these sections. None have been found. (note: Fig 7).
Fig 1. New DWR released DWR Summary + BOC report #8 identifies David Gutierrez as the author in the file's metadata. This file created July 12, 2017.
Fig 2. FERC document reveals DWR filed the BOC Memorandum No. 8 as secret (CEII status) back in July 6 from the original June 23 BOC report. Yet, DWR decides to release July 13 with no redactions now? Why?
Fig 3. DWR "re-translates" the BOC's report notes into a form of a "conclusion" position of the BOC. Yet DWR was the source (tasked with & responsible for) of the investigation information. DWR's own investigation "interpretation" is simply repeated by the BOC in their report. Highly Misleading Conduct?/Actions? by DWR?
Fig 4. BOC report's original comments as provided by DWR (DWR = "interpretations of the investigators"). The wording in this section is noted as "interpretive" and does not contain any statement of "conclusions". The "leap" to an inferred BOC "conclusion" is written solely by DWR in the DWR summary section of the document.
Fig 5. Photograph submitted to the BOC by DWR's investigation with "notes" in white blocks. This photograph has a much different "interpretation" to the known conditions of the highly pressurized subslab water flow. Any prior soil like material (as proven "existing" in their photograph) would be part of a greater volume of this soil material to remain under the pressurized erosive "washing". Thus "voids" would form in the areas washed and eroded and the known repairs of "void filling" under the slabs would leave the identical impressional results as shown in the photograph. In fact, the concave round rock "indentations" are classic as a "evidential mold" footprint of downward protruding round rock that would have been retained into the slab from the round drain rock used near drain pipes. If this was "leveling concrete", why is the top surface so irregular? This irregularity is a better fit to "void filling" and the effects of the irregular underslab surface prior to the void fill.
Fig 6. A photograph NOT provided by DWR to the BOC to be included in the Memorandum #8 report reveals a LARGE amount of Soil beneath the slabs. This photograph was taken in the same upper spillway inspection in cutting holes to look at the foundation. It is a DWR photograph. Why didn't DWR submit this to the BOC? This photograph completely changes the narrative of the other photograph. Isn't forensic accuracy important to investigations, including providing critical information to the BOC? Was the original photograph "cherry picked" by DWR to give to the BOC?
Fig 7. Photograph was taken prior to the pour of the spillway concrete slabs, the image reveals the "grade" aggregate soils compaction construction layer of which the slabs were to be emplaced upon. NO areas in the steep section of the spillway show "leveling concrete" colorations.
This is so serious. The eventual collapse of the dam will kill more people than in 9/11. Frightens me they didn't even get around to cutting trees away so the roots wouldn't undermine the spillway. Just the smallest of mistakes, evasions and sloppy maintenance work thus far noted.
But, if the "real picture" of devastating forensic information - i.e. “failed to properly construct, inspect, repair, operate, and manage the facilities.” - is established to the level of Legal Liability and Legal lack of Standard of Care, then the "water contractors" have a strong position of rejecting the 25% in spillway repair costs. (besides the huge risk of losing FEMA funds).
So DWR's best option, is if "information" were presented that gave a different perspective on any potential devastating forensic analysis reports. That is why I "jumped" on the latest photograph "interpretation" meme as I had seen the large amount of soils in one of the slab cuts (was amazed at the amount of soil). To "see it" you have to change the exposure setting in the photo as the material is in a shaded area, but the soil and small aggregate rock is very clear and completely fills the saw cut area when viewed with a good hi-res 32 bit color display.
= = Article clip: (emphasis mine)
"Sacramento >> In its eighth memorandum released Thursday, the independent board analyzing the redesign of the Oroville Dam spillways commends the construction contractor’s work and makes slight tweaks to former recommendations."
"This is the second memorandum issued without any redactions which the state Department of Water Resources previously requested, citing national security concerns."
. .
"Cleaning and preparation of the rock foundation of the spillway has been done much better this time around, compared to when the dam was originally constructed, the board said."
= = end clip more at link:
This article did not touch upon the forensic "fill material" "interpretations" from the original construction (other than "cleaning" of the foundation). But I suspect this "fill material" + "leveling concrete" assertion subject may be brought up in an interview to where this point may be "emphasized". The media wouldn't know the significance of the issue in a conflicting forensic situation when compared to the other photographic evidence that was not put into the BOC & DWR summary report.
http://www.timesheraldonline.com/article/NH/20170714/NEWS/170719883
They can talk that smack all they want, it still doesn’t explain the fact that the design performed up to spec until the sidewall drains quit working (for whatever reason) in the exact same area that the slab failed.
I don't know that I agree with that. Not trying to be needlessly argumentative, but I will add my impressions.
First of all, the under-slab drains never appeared to me to work properly. They were constantly charged with water and when the spillway was in use, they jetted water, something that an under-slab drainage system is never designed to do at the pressures displayed by prior photos.
The drains were the primary cause of failure in my opinion, due to their shallow placement thinning the slab. They built in the failure at an early point in the service life of a slab that might have lasted 300 years instead of 50.
To me, the causes of this were (1) Design of both spillways, (2) Detailing Errors and lack of Supervision, (3) Unauthorized Field Adaptation of Construction Details, and (4) Poor Owner Supervision, QC and Follow-up Maintenance of the Construction and Subsequent Operation.
I don’t totally disagree with your causes, but I might reverse the order of precedence. Had the drains been properly maintained, this failure wouldn’t have happened. The water from the non-working drains was going SOMEWHERE, it didn’t just evaporate. When they quit working, that should have been a huge red flag to the operators.
I think that water was busy washing out the soil and rocks from beneath the slab, finally to such a point that it failed, either from uplift, or lack of support from the subgrade.
Sure, the additional cracks contributed, as that was just another place for water to infiltrate into the subgrade. At some point there would be more infiltration than the drains could handle, especially if some weren’t working. Also, the cracks contributed to an overall weakening of the slab.
I will posit another theory. The operators (DWR) and the investigators already know this. They knew within an hour of the failure why it happened.
What’s now transpiring is some sort of smoke and mirror exercise that will try and convince everyone that it happened because of ‘normal wear and tear’ or some such.
Baloney, I say. They should have fixed those drains immediately after they quit working, and should have inspected carefully for evidence of washout beneath the slab.
The operators were, and are, negligent.
Remind me what that soil in the photo means. I believe I understand, but for those in Rio Linda who might not, explain it in layman terms.
Thanks so much for your swift responses,
T.W.
Q: "Remind me what that soil in the photo means."
A: There should be zero soil (if built to the original design specifications). You should see only consolidated rock (not loose) that the spillway concrete slab was poured upon. OR, you should see concrete (called "leveling concrete") which the spillway concrete slab was poured upon.
A good deal of soil underneath the slabs means that (1) the slabs were not poured on a solid consolidated rock surface nor on a leveling concrete surface (violation of the original design specifications).
This means that during original construction, a layer of aggregate (small sharp rock) and soils (clay or clayey fines) were placed over the foundation material (albeit various forms of weathered rock, highly weathered (soil-like), or competent (fresh) rock). Thus, there would be large pockets of soil/aggregate compacted into and on top of the irregular surface of the base rock, leaving a "leveled grade" of compacted soil/aggregate for the spillway drains and spillway slabs to be placed upon.
A Giant form of a Soil-like Problem is if another violation of the original design specifications occurred. All of the evidence is near air-tight on this one. Evidence points to-> original construction did NOT excavate the clay seams and highly weathered rock (BOC calls this clay soils) down to strong base rock. They simply built the spillway on virtual soil foundation (highly weathered rock - clay soils) in major sections from the blowout failure area to near the electrical towers.
Specifications required that excavation was to be performed on these soil-like materials to get to sound rock. Then the excavated area was to be rebuilt to the spillway "grade level" by pouring concrete (called "leveling concrete" as it brings the grade back to "grade level").
There should be giant blocks of this "leveling concrete" in the remains of the spillway (where all of the brown highly weathered rock exists - and was eroded swiftly away into a "canyon"). There are none.
This evidence would then point to a major "time elapse" failure. The spillway would essentially self-destruct as it was used (underslab erosion from every spill) - until it reached the point of the weakest item failing. Take your pick.
DWR - DSOD - FERC Inspectors blew it. Major alarm sign of this self-destruction was non-functional drains. There were two side drains that were broken for years (all of the rest of the entire spillway side drains worked). So these inspectors never looked at the lack of "stain" or "watermarks" on these side drains? This was the case, evidenced in photographs, going back to 2007. So how could all of these agencies say they did inspections and over thirty thousand square feet of service drains (coming out of two outlets) were never detected as a problem? No way. DWR-DSOD-FERC are on the hook for this one. They could have detected a major spillway self-destruction mode nearly a decade ago (plenty of time to enact remedial measures).
Not only re-imbursement money is one the line, there are major implications to personal reputations and organizational reputations on the line. No escaping a "too big to fail" moment.
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