House drops Confederate Flag ban for veterans cemeteries

DiogenesLamp: "What makes it unclear are these categories "Oil, spermaceti -- Oil, whale and other fish Whalebone".
You aren't going to get that from the Midwest."

That and other examples (i.e., cotton cloth) demonstrate that the author of this report was fudging the numbers to make political points which were not otherwise viable.

DiogenesLamp: "I don't think gold and silver should be counted in the analysis in which I am interested because they did not rely on Southern production and therefore would not have been affected by the South becoming an independent nation."

But specie exports are critical in answering the question: what percent of Federal tariff revenues were paid for by Deep Confederate South exports?
The answer is: roughly half since the US trade deficit was balanced by specie exports.

DiogenesLamp: "Only those economic factors affected by Southern independence should be cited as causing economic damage to the North, and especially economic damage to New York"

We already know exactly what the effect was: when Deep South cotton exports disappeared in 1861 it caused Federal revenues to decline by 26%.
That was far less than "total disaster".

DiogenesLamp: "And this is no small point.
That protectionism by government policy affected domestic purchases too.
It basically resulted in a concentration of wealth and power in the region being 'protected.' "

Wrong again.
First, tariffs protect all manufacturers, east, west, south or north.
Second, what New York imported did not necessarily stay in New York.
Much was re-shipped and sold in other regions.

DiogenesLamp: "Southern independence upset that applecart too.
With the South no longer constrained by the protectionist policies of the North, they would have been eventually able to supply the products which were previously coming from Northern businesses.
Because the prices would have been lower, the shift of business to the South would be virtually guaranteed."

Nonsense since actual Confederate tariffs, from February through June 1861, were virtually the same as Union tariffs they could do nothing except add to the tariff burden of products purchased in Union states.
The new Confederate tariffs, which may have been slightly lower, did not take effect until September 1861, at which point most all Southern trade had ended.

So the only serious consequence of Confederate economics was the eliminate cotton and that reduced Union revenues by 26% in 1861, after which they grew again very rapidly.

DiogenesLamp: "They could have supplied goods and services to the Midwest and territories, and eventually brought them into their orbit."

No possible way, since merchants would then have to pay two tariffs -- first the Confederate, then Union -- so it would be cheaper to import through New York and ship west by rail.

How are the regions defined? I presume "West" meant California, Washington, etc? Or was it referring to the near West?

I assume "East" meant the North Eastern coastal areas.

I was able to turn up some information that might help. I did find a table of cotton manufactures by state, grouped by region in the 1860 edition of the book "Southern Wealth and Northern Profit" by Kettell.

He lists as Southern states all the ones on the map of Southern states that I posted a link to earlier in post 1536. On the map the Southern states included Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware. Kettell includes those four states with sll of the other Southern states. The Southern States had cotton manufactures in 1850 of $9,367,331.

Kettell groups the states New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York and all the New England states into another category. I suspect he would call that group either the North or the East or the Northeast for that matter. Those states had cotton manufactures of $52,062,953 in 1850.

Kettell lumps the rest of the states and territories together in a third group that includes the Western regions Utah, New Mexico and Oregon as well as what we know today as the Midwest (Ohio through Iowa, Minnesota, etc.). Only Indiana and Ohio had any cotton manufactures by 1850. By Kettell's logic, California would fit in his Western group. The Western group totaled $438,900 worth of cotton manufactures in 1850.

Kettell also makes the point, "...If a Massachusetts factory can make a certain style of cotton goods as cheap as the English, it has a duty of 20 per cent., and 10 per cent. charges, or 30 per cent. preference over the English, which insures it the market at a large profit.”

I note that by 1860 there were a number of mills in the South making cloth and other cotton goods. They would have the advantage of much reduced transportation costs to get the cotton to the mills, but perhaps not the possible economy of scale of Northern mills if Northern mills were larger than Southern ones. The South could possibly export any excess cotton goods to Mexico or other places in the Gulf or Caribbean regions and have a transportation cost advantage over English or Northern cotton goods.

He lists as Southern states all the ones on the map of Southern states that I posted a link to earlier in post 1536. On the map the Southern states included Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware. Kettell includes those four states with sll of the other Southern states. The Southern States had cotton manufactures in 1850 of $9,367,331.

Something I wish to point out was the threat analysis which was done by the Financial Elite of the North East. In 1861, they did not know how many states would ultimately join the Confederacy, so they would have regarded the threat that Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland and Delaware joining the Confederacy as a real possibility.

In other words, they made plans in accordance with what they thought could or would likely happen, because they had no way at the time of knowing for sure what was going to happen. That it ultimately did not happen could not have been known to them at the time.

Meaning, they saw the potential economic loss of those other states joining the Confederacy and responded accordingly.

I think war was a necessary step to prevent future secessions. Once the other states saw the increased profits from free trade in an independent South, the pressure would be on to join them. Of course this leaves the North Eastern trade monopolists in a bad position.

Regardless, the data clearly shows the Union economy and Federal tariff revenues were not as dependent on Deep South cotton as some have claimed.

Still forgetting about the effect of inflation and that those increased dollars of currency of markedly lower worth would buy less imports in those years than in 1860.

From Appleton's Cyclopaedia (paragraph break mine):

The Southern States have produced 400 millions per annum, which they have sold and taken in pay Northern and imported goods. The outbreak of the secession caused that trade at once to cease. The South could no longer sell, and the North lost a customer for $400,000,000 of goods per annum. Such an event could not take place without producing immense changes not only in foreign trade, but in internal industry. Those who no longer sold goods to the South had no longer profits with which to buy foreign goods. At the same time the necessities of Government required the tax on the foreign goods to be increased. The shipping, which had been so largely employed in the transportation of cotton, lost much of its employment. The mills that had been accustomed to work up 700,000 bales of cotton per annum, were obliged to close, and the long list of dye stuffs and other manufacturing materials were no longer in request.

At the West, where in the last four years settlement has progressed with great rapidity, the harvest were very abundant, and at the same time the Southern outlets for it being closed by the events of the war, it was forced upon the lakes, causing a great rise in freights, and at the same time low prices for farmers. Thus the traffic toward the East has been very active, without however a corresponding increase in the return traffic.

As I remember, some of the Northern mills switched to wool when cotton wasn't available.

Some posters on these threads have claimed that reports of business failures in Northern port cities in 1861 were not believable because they were published in Democrat papers. Consider what did happen to business failures in various port cities as reported by Appleton's:

Year----NYC--Philly---Boston--Baltimore---New Orleans--Charleston
1857----915----280-------258--------58-------------58------------31
1858----406----109-------128--------76-------------45------------20
1859----299----105-------122--------50-------------27------------16
1860----528----144-------172--------82-------------24------------25
1861----990----380-------480-------121-------------33------------11

Worse than the Panic of 1857 for cities to which the Morrill Tariff was applied.

DiogenesLamp: "I think war was a necessary step to prevent future secessions."

No, you know perfectly well that Jefferson Davis started war at Fort Sumter to force reluctant Union states like Virginia and Tennessee to switch sides and join the Confederacy's war against the United States.

Of course, once war started then the Union did everything possible to prevent Border South states from joining the Confederacy.

No, you know perfectly well that Jefferson Davis started war at Fort Sumter

I am not going to entertain consideration of your silly rant.

The war started when the North Eastern power blocks realized how much money they would lose if the South became independent. Sumter was just an excuse for starting the war they needed. If they hadn't started it at Sumter, it was guaranteed that it would have started at Pickens when that armed force landed to reinforce it.

I had disguised the ship, so that she deceived those who had known her, and was standing in (unnoticed), when the Wyandotte commenced making signals, which I did not answer, but stood on.
The steamer then put herself in my way and Captain Meigs, who was aboard, hailed me and I stopped.
In twenty minutes more I should have been inside (Pensacola harbor) or sunk.
Signed: D.D. Porter

Lincoln was going to have the war his wealthy masters demanded one way or the other.

Excellent post with glaring data.

This blog string is loaded with quotes, speeches, editorials, and news articles telling of the extreme concern in Northern commercial communities about at first, the loss of shipping service revenue, and almost immediately after, the fear of low customs goods available from Southern ports.

Your data takes all the air out of broCanard’s denials.

rustbucket: "Still forgetting about the effect of inflation and that those increased dollars of currency of markedly lower worth would buy less imports in those years than in 1860."

Not at all, but none of it was the apocalyptic scenario you guys wish us to believe.

rustbucket quoting Appleton: "The Southern States have produced 400 millions per annum, which they have sold and taken in pay Northern and imported goods.
The outbreak of the secession caused that trade at once to cease.
The South could no longer sell, and the North lost a customer for $400,000,000 of goods per annum."

By all the numbers I've seen that's a huge exaggeration.
Half would be realistic, especially since Border South states remained in the Union and continued to ship their products for export, by rail & Great Lakes shipping after secession.
Sure, it was harder on them, but the net result was Federal tariff revenues down only 26% in 1861, after which they grew rapidly.

rustbucket: "As I remember, some of the Northern mills switched to wool when cotton wasn't available. "

Like I said, they adjusted, they adapted and continued to prosper.
It was far from the end of the world.

rustbucket: "Worse than the Panic of 1857 for cities to which the Morrill Tariff was applied."

Ah, the Panic of 1857, I remember it well... not. ;-)

According to this source the Panic of 1857 lasted 1-1/2 years and took the economy down 23%.
It followed the roughly equivalent Recession of 1854 (-18%) and was followed by the Recession of 1860-61, which took the economy down about 15%.

The next recessions came in 1865-67 (-24%) followed by another in 1869-70 (-10%), then the Panic of 1873 (-28%), etc., etc.

So financial panics & recessions in those days were not in the least unusual and certainly not catastrophic.
Indeed, the Recession of 1861 was mildest by far except for 1869-70.
More important: none of those panics & recessions caused the Federal government to "start a war" just to end it.
Economics by themselves do not drive Americans to war.

That's why I say it's just not legitimate to claim Marxist economics and class warfare as the great driving force for Lincoln and Union.
The real reasons, just as we were all taught in grade school were: 1) to preserve the Union and 2) to free the slaves.

For a real picture of economics in those times, consider the following graphs:

GDP growth from 1800 to 1890:

US Industrial Index 1800 to 1914:

US Bonds rates since 1800:

DiogenesLamp: "I am not going to entertain consideration of ~~your silly rant~~ any facts which contradict my insane fantasies."

I know, those pesky typos pop up from time to time. No problem.

DiogenesLamp: "If ~~they~~ Confederates hadn't started it at Sumter, it was guaranteed that it would have started at Pickens when that armed force landed to reinforce it."

In fact, Confederates had already planned to attack Fort Pickens, despite Union ships maintaining the "truce agreement" reached.
But when Davis ordered war to begin on April 12, Union forces were no longer bound by such "agreements" and landed reinforcements at Fort Pickens.

So Confederates never seriously attacked it until October 9.
That attack failed and in May, 1862 Confederates withdrew the 10,000 troops they used to surround Fort Pickens, for other duties.

So, yes, it's conceivable that Jefferson Davis would have started Civil War at Fort Pickens, but if so, it would have been a far less successful beginning than was the bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter.

Point is: when Davis decided to start war, Sumter was the place to do it.
Fort Pickens would have been a poor second choice.

DiogenesLamp: "~~Lincoln~~ Jefferson Davis was going to have the war his wealthy ~~masters~~ slavocrats demanded one way or the other."

No problem, you're welcome, FRiend.

PeaBrain referring to rusty's post #1,564: "Your data takes all the air out of broCanard’s denials."

No, not at all, note my response in post #1,568 above.

You brought up the Panic of 1857 and the Recession in the North

The panic of 1857 was caused by shifts in the world market as a result of the conclusion of the Crimean war and by corruption-induced business troubles at home in America.

Specifically, as the war concluded, the wheat demands it had created bottomed out. With the end of the war, the Russians were able to send their grain crops to market. Needing to raise quick cash, they under priced their crops, and depressed American grain product prices. Demand for US grain dropped, and soon Northern exports dwindled.

With overproduction in the mid-west, the wheat market collapsed, causing an economic depression in the West.

At the exact same time the continental European banks were being adversely affected by the war’s conclusion. The British were withdrawing specie from US banks, further compounding the problems.

Simultaneously, several major railroad embezzlement scandals were exposed, shaking up their creditors on Wall Street, all of them already uneasy due to the wheat problem and shaky banking state in France.

The banks then panicked and a recession set in.

Northern politicians at the time fraudulently used the panic as an excuse to promote their tariff policies that would be detrimental to the recovery.

8/24/1857 The New York Branch of the Ohio Life and Insurance Company failed. This was important because it was the largest bank in Ohio, and purveyor of Eastern credit and hard currency to the West. It failure jarred the national banking system.

As a result, 4,932 U. S. firms eventually failed.

The next month, one of the largest banks in Philadelphia, alarmed by the drains on its coin reserves, suspended specie payments. Most Northern banks reacted by hoarding reserves, and tightening credit. Soon, many banks in the North began to close.

9/11/1857 Northern banks relied heavily on newly mined gold sources from California.
On this date the Steamship SS Central America sailed directly into the path of a severe hurricane. The ship carried $1,000,000 in commercial gold and a secret cargo of 15 tons of California gold valued at $20 per ounce ($9,600,000). New York banks were waiting for the gold to meet depositor withdrawal demands.

9/12/1857 The SS Central America sank with the loss of 400 passengers. The loss of the ship and its important cargo, devastated the banking and financial system of the country.

Fall/1857 Tens of thousands of Americans were thrown out of work. Over 800 banks collapsed. The sale of public lands nearly stopped altogether. Numerous wealthy manufacturers and investors went bankrupt. The panic turned into national depression that lasted for several years.

The banking failures were due to several reasons, primarily insolvency due to overextended credit to land speculators and railroad construction.

Cotton and tobacco production was not affected by the economic downturn. The South survived the 1857 panic, in large part, because of Europe’s continued demand for cotton.

Due to the fact that Southern cotton and tobacco producers took European manufactured goods in trade and were thus not dependent upon specie for payment, they were further removed from the financial crisis. Production increased, and the South prospered.

In the North, there was a flood of people to the industrial cities because of the failure of the farms as a employment option. Many believed that the great jobs and money were to be made in the factories.

Industrialization was having an impact on the northern and western farms - no longer were large crews needed.

By 1858 the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company was the largest farm equipment manufacturer in the United States, with assets totaling over one million dollars.

The family farm was beginning to disappear because of the economics of the time. Railroads were charging more for transporting their grain and a farm had to be large and mechanized to survive.

Vagrancy laws were enacted to keep the newly relocated workers, not on the farm but in the factories. Laws were enacted that forbid people to leave a town if they owed any debt.

With rising personal debt, these former farm hands either worked or went to prison. The father worked, the mother worked and the kids worked. Most often it still was not enough wage earning to survive without debt to the Company Store. (Some content from Kettell and Pollard)

PeaRidge: "...several major railroad embezzlement scandals were exposed, shaking up their creditors..."

That's impossible since, according to our DiogenesLamp it was Civil War Republicans who first brought corruption to America.
Before that everybody was as pure as the driven snow, says DiogenesLamp.

PeaRidge: "With overproduction in the mid-west, the wheat market collapsed, causing an economic depression in the West."

From peak (1855) to trough (1858), grain prices did fall 60% causing some serious problems.
However, overall result of the Panic of 1857 was a 23% reduction in business activities.
That is hardly a "collapse".

For comparisons: the recession of 1854 reduced the economy 18%, the Panic of 1857 23% and the recession of 1861 15%.
Of the three, 1857 was slightly more severe, but none were relatively long-lived or deep.

PeaRidge: "Northern politicians at the time fraudulently used the panic as an excuse to promote their tariff policies that would be detrimental to the recovery."

The much reduced Tariff of 1857 was set before the Panic and indeed was (wrongly) blamed for the panic.
That 1857 tariff was described as:

"...possible because it did not represent a victory of one section over the other; nor did it produce a clear division between parties.
Its supporters included Democrats, Republicans, and Americans; representatives of northern merchants, manufacturers, and railroad interests; and spokesmen for southern farmers and planters.
Opposition came largely from two economic groups: the iron manufacturers of Pennsylvania and the wool growers of New England and the West"

However, after the Panic protectionism became more popular than ever, finding expression in the Morrill Tariff adopted in 1861, only after its strongest opponents departed Congress.

PeaRidge: "As a result, 4,932 U. S. firms eventually failed."

You don't say what kind of firms those were, but here's what we know about them:

By 1857 about 8 million Americans were non-farmers.
Of those, about 1.5 million worked in 140,000 factories, an average of 10 workers per factory.
Even if we assume (wrongly) that all 4,932 business failures in 1857 were "factories", that's still only 3.5% causing unemployment among about 50,000 workers.
Hardly a "great depression".
However, a large percentage of these factory workers were women & children, so their unemployment would not necessarily cause family crises.

PeaRidge: "...SS Central America sailed directly into the path of a severe hurricane.
The ship carried $1,000,000 in commercial gold and a secret cargo of 15 tons of California gold valued at $20 per ounce ($9,600,000).
New York banks were waiting for the gold to meet depositor withdrawal demands."

Not quite.
According to this source, SS Central America carried 10 tons of gold valued as $2 million at the time.
The loss did contribute to the Panic of 1857, however it was partly covered by insurance.

Btw, the wreck was found in 1988 and has not been fully recovered.
The gold is estimated at over $100 million in today's values.

PeaRidge: "Due to the fact that Southern cotton and tobacco producers took European manufactured goods in trade and were thus not dependent upon specie for payment, they were further removed from the financial crisis.
Production increased, and the South prospered."

Thank you for confirming elements of my argument:

First, the Deep South prospered greatly during the 1850s.
Cotton & tobacco producers did indeed deal directly with their European customers and were not forced to go through Northeastern businessmen.
Those same producers also took European goods in trade, presumably paying tariffs at the same ports they shipped from.

PeaRidge: "In the North, there was a flood of people to the industrial cities because of the failure of the farms as a employment option.
Many believed that the great jobs and money were to be made in the factories."

Statistics for the period show US farmers still outnumbered non-farmers nearly two to one.
In total the US had about 2 million farms, average size of 200 acres on which 15 million people lived.
Yes, the importance of non-farm employment was growing, but still nothing like today.

PeaRidge: "The father worked, the mother worked and the kids worked.
Most often it still was not enough wage earning to survive without debt to the Company Store."

What seems unnatural to us today (children working in factories) was then considered less unnatural since farm children also worked to help their family farms.
Indeed, many non-farm families worked just long enough to save up money to buy their own farms.
So "working class" was not necessarily a permanent status.

SS Central America:

I am going to interrupt the tariff discussion for a second, to tell everyone that the effort to remove the statue of Nathan Bedford Forrest has failed.

One of my prized possessions is the “Gray Ghost of the Confederacy” by G. Harvey. My 10th wedding anniversary present.

[BroJoeK]: rustbucket: "Still forgetting about the effect of inflation and that those increased dollars of currency of markedly lower worth would buy less imports in those years than in 1860."

BroJoeK then responds: Not at all, but none of it was the apocalyptic scenario you guys wish us to believe.

You keep saying that tariff revenue went up during the war without mentioning that it went up in inflated dollars that were worth less than 1860 dollars. You did it again in the post I'm responding to. The consequence of that inflation you forgot to mention was that the North was able to import less during the war than it had in 1860. Apocalypse is in the eye of the beholder. A dock worker who lost his job because of reduced imports might think it was apocalyptic. The business owners whose businesses failed for the same reason might agree with that dock worker.

As I've pointed out, the South suffered far more inflation during the war than the North. As a whole, things were far easier for the North during the war than they were for the South, but the North did have problems like those that Appleton’s mentioned.

[BroJoeK]: "rustbucket quoting Appleton: "The Southern States have produced 400 millions per annum, which they have sold and taken in pay Northern and imported goods.
The outbreak of the secession caused that trade at once to cease. The South could no longer sell, and the North lost a customer for $400,000,000 of goods per annum."

BroJoeK then responds: By all the numbers I've seen that's a huge exaggeration.

Kettell puts the approximate amount of value of all kinds (raw materials, other produce, bills) going from the South to the North annually at ~463 million. If Kettell was correct, Appleton's (written and published in the North after the war) was conservative.

You have a valid point that all of the transport of Southern produce and cash, however much they totaled, wasn't entirely lost to the North as a result of the war because not all Southern states seceded for whatever reason (Northern force, voter preference, etc.). However much the financial loss to the North amounted to after the South seceded, it still had a big impact on various sectors of Northern economy.

Do you have problems with the economic disruptions that Appleton's says happened in the North as a result of their loss of a significant cross border exchange of goods and services?

Let’s look at cotton mills in the North, The city of Lowell, Massachusetts had many cotton mills. From Wikipedia:

"The American Civil War shut down many of the mills temporarily when they sold off their cotton stockpiles, which had become more valuable than the finished cloth after imports from the South had stopped. Many jobs were lost, but the effect was somewhat mitigated by the number of men serving in the military. Lowell had a small historical place in the war: Many wool Union uniforms were made in Lowell"

Richmond Daily Dispatch of Aug 22, 1861:

The New York World says:

The Merrimac company in Lowell will shut down their entire works in about two weeks. The News says that nearly every corporation in that city has been partially or entirely closed. How long they will remain so, is a matter of uncertainly.

The New York Herald, January 13, 1862

The Cotton Question

The great difficulty with the manufacturer remains to be told. Whatever his late gains, yet the grim fact strikes him that his stock of cotton is almost exhausted, while he knows not when the supply may be reopened. The result of this is that manufacturing operations are reduced to about one-fourth of their usual extent. How long they may be able to continue at that rate is scarcely problematical, should not our troops speedily liberate a considerable amount of cotton.

What? What? Northern troops were going to liberate cotton? Cotton, not slaves? In other words, capture Southern cotton to supply Northern mills. That’s one way of overcoming the financial loss to the North resulting from the Southern secession — invade and capture the cotton. That behavior eventually led the Confederates to burn cotton and tobacco if there was a chance the Feds might capture it. Some plantation owners did, however, sell cotton to the Union Army for Union greenbacks.

Back to the New York Herald of January 13, 1862:

The following statement, compiled chiefly from the weekly returns of the Shipping List, shows the amount of cotton taken for United States consumption during each quarter of the year, compared with the same periods of 1860: ==

-----------------------------------------------1861---------------1860
First quarter, bales----------------------265,160------------237,540
Second quarter--------------------------- 54,891------------252,946
Third quarter----------------------------- 19,100------------116,845
Fourth quarter (say)--------------------- 25,000----------- 248,030

Total--------------------------------------394,451------------855,361

The quantity here given for the fourth quarter of 1861 is only an estimate, based on the reported sales in the New York market. …

WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE OPERATIVES?

From extended inquiry we find that the contraction of manufacturing has released about seventy thousand operatives from the mills. About one-third of these are males who have mostly walked out of the factory and into the camp, and are doing good service in endeavoring to wrest cotton from the grasp of the rebels.

Sounds like Gollum in Lord of the Rings, "We wants it, we needs it. Must have the precious. They stole it from us. Sneaky little ~~hobbitses~~ rebelses. Wicked, tricksy, false!" (/gollum voice)

Sorry, I should have cc’d you all on Post 1575.

I am going to interrupt the tariff discussion for a second, to tell everyone that the effort to remove the statue of Nathan Bedford Forrest has failed.

Sanity prevailed. That doesn't happen a lot these days.

You have a valid point that all of the transport of Southern produce and cash, however much they totaled, wasn't entirely lost to the North as a result of the war because not all Southern states seceded for whatever reason (Northern force, voter preference, etc.). However much the financial loss to the North amounted to after the South seceded, it still had a big impact on various sectors of Northern economy.

But in the run-up to war, it didn't really matter how many eventually seceded, what mattered is how many the "shadow government" thought would secede. People make plans based on what they think will happen, and they generally plan for the worst.

Take it as a given that the war demands were based on worries of the maximum possible losses for the businessmen of New York.

And here you quote Wikipedia, and a specific of which I highlight:

Many jobs were lost, but the effect was somewhat mitigated by the number of men serving in the military.

A point I was eventually going to get around to mentioning is the economics of war. When you have a massive host of unemployed young men lying around, one of the things you can do with them is send them off to fight. This employs the men, and the losses of manpower result in a fixed quantity of assets going to a lesser number of people. The wealth and opportunities of the survivors increase. This financial oddity is mentioned in that classical series of essays called "Nuclear Warfare 101" where it is pointed out that the Financial condition of Londoners would be improved by dropping a Nuke on London. :)

War is funny economically. It can create boom conditions under certain circumstances, but represent a loss in the long run. Killing off your excess idle population is sometimes in the best financial interests of the power elite. I sometimes think that is what they have planned to deal with the Social security crises. I used to think they were stupid (for not recognizing the math involved) I now think they are just plain evil.

Sounds like Gollum in Lord of the Rings, "We wants it, we needs it. Must have the precious. They stole it from us. Sneaky little hobbitses rebelses. Wicked, tricksy, false!" (/gollum voice)

Now that was pretty good. :)

I am going to interrupt the tariff discussion for a second, to tell everyone that the effort to remove the statue of Nathan Bedford Forrest has failed.

Mr Chairman! Point of order. The "tariff" as the primary focus is misleading. The "tariff" is merely the means by which massive amounts of wealth were channeled to the North. The actual fight was over the disposition of the trade wealth, which was actually being steered by the tariff or the lack thereof.

Focusing on the word "tariff" makes it seem as if only a relatively small amount of money was involved. No, the amount of money involved was the nearly entirety of European Trade, plus potential losses from future competition from newly capitalized Southern industries, both shipping and manufacturing as well as insurance and banking.

New York would have acquired devastating losses and competition in the subsequent decades, and New York had the President's ear. New York was having none of it. Thus, War.

I am going to interrupt the tariff discussion for a second, to tell everyone that the effort to remove the statue of Nathan Bedford Forrest has failed.

Oh, and to speak to your point, it's good to see that sanity occasionally prevails.