Posted on 06/03/2016 8:35:30 PM PDT by sukhoi-30mki
One wonders if the Chinese picked up that important difference in the basic carrier operations philosophy
“They just seem obsolescent to me, in an age of hypersonic guided missiles.”
Hypersonic means that the missile’s position in two minutes is highly calculable. The faster the missile, the less it can maneuver.
With the computerized guidance and threat detection currently used the hypersonic missile may be just a waste of money, good only for marketing.
Thanks—great additional info on the CVEs.
The two missions were complementary not contradictory. The logistical/tactical problem was that the Japanese fleet could not fight them both simultaneously, i.e., on the same day (well they could but it was certainly not optimal to have Midway in the mix while fighting the US carriers). They WANTED the US carrier fleet to sortie to defend Midway, and then to be destroyed. But they did not want or need to fight both the US carriers and Midway’s (mostly obsolete) aircraft on the same day. They did not want to be busy doing bombing missions against Midway when the US carriers might appear on the scene.
Problems included wrongly ASSUMING that the US carriers could not appear until days after Midway was devastated by Japanese carrier aircraft, i.e., Yamamoto and Nagumo rigidly assumed that the US carriers COULD NOT appear until Midway’s aircraft had all been destroyed in previous days. Y. did not conceive of the US code breaking or any other way of anticipating the Japanese move on Midway.
Had the Japanese admirals conceived that the US carriers MIGHT appear so soon, the battle would have been fought very differently and then US would have been hard-pressed to win more than a rough draw at best (ala Coral Sea, which was a tactical victory for Japan but a “strategic” victory for the USA since it halted the Japanese movement toward Australia).
Does the insignia on this plane mean its a crash test fighter?
It's important to remember that for every known threat there is a countermeasure, whether it's antimissles, directed energy, or just moving further away from the threat.
If the threat is known, it can be adapted for or defeated.
Unknown threats are what kill us.
So how do we know if we know all the threats?
Ahhhh, that's the rub, isn't it?
You hope for 1.
Possibility 2. is not likely as Cv's are almost impossible to sink outright.
Possibility 3 is the same as 2 but crew can survive and at least can hang on until captured or rescued.
Possibility 4 is a likely scenario if all the damage is above the waterline i.e. multiple missile hits. Fire is a problem and must be contained or put out before towing can begin. Huge target for enemy subs. A sub magnet which can actually be good thing if done right. ASW trap can be set up.
Scenario 5 is the most likely scenario in a missile attack. Although out of service that CV will make it back and fight another day.
Scenario 6 would be if only one missile made it through and hit the CV. She will be back in a short period of time depending on the motivation and stamina of the ships crew.
So there are a lot of scenarios in a hot war so it isn't that simple.
I think you've GOT it.
Thanks, I agree not only with your words, but also your spirit.
And I love, love Psalm 144, especially verses 7 & 8 as particularly apropos this discussion!
Thanks for that. I did not know that modern carriers were so tough to kill. I think I was subconsciously and wrongly conflating Battle of Midway fragility with modern weaponry.
Interesting! I think what is obsolete here is my knowledge of modern battlefield conditions.
Actually WWII carriers were very tough. We did not sink one IJN carrier at midway. All four were scuttled by torpedos fired by IJN destroyers.
CV-4 survived World War 2 and was decommissioned in 1946.
1942 was a brutal year for the US Navy and out carriers. We lost Langley in January. A few days later USS Saratoga was torpedoed but survived the aborted mission to save Wake Island. Her sister USS Lexington was sunk at the Battle of the Coral Sea. USS Yorktown was patched up in a few days after damage at the Coarl Sea, but lost at Midway. USS Hornet didn't even survive one year of service and was sunk protecting Guadalcanal. USS Wasp was torpedoed by submarine and lost in the Guadalcanal campaign.
CVE-1 was transfered to the Pacific in early 1942. But in the fall of 1942, all we had was USS Enterprise and USS Long Island. Fortunately, the Japanese Navy and their air service were spent.
People claim that it was our production that defeated Japan. They forget the sacrifices of 1942, which crippled both navies.
Totally agree.
Thanks for the info on CVE-1 Long Island -- somehow I was under the impression it remained in the Atlantic, now see it was critical to the Guadalcanal campaign.
BTW, Saratoga was damaged by a Japanese torpedo on August 31, 1942, but survived and limped back to dry-dock repairs at Pearl Harbor, where she remained until November 12.
Thus when Hornet was sunk on October 26, 1942 only Enterprise and Long Island were still in service.
After Saratoga return to service (Nov. 12), that remained the situation until the brand new Essex arrived in May 1943, followed slowly by a mounting flood of other new carriers.
Plus I see where USS Copahee (CVE-12) arrived at Guadalcanal around October 11, 1942, suggesting there may have been more escort carriers available from the end of '42 until mid '43.
USS Copahee (CVE-12)
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