Posted on 07/25/2015 6:42:43 AM PDT by SeekAndFind
The common wisdom is wrong; a history lesson is in order.
A cousin of mine has finished his freshman year in college; like most freshmen, he now knows absolutely everything. He took it upon himself, this week, to announce (to my brother, who is a very patient man) that Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,” which manifested itself through “the CIA’s international pro-fascist crimes.”
That’s nonsense, of course, but it’s widely believed nonsense — and not just among college kids who’ve read the first chapter of a Noam Chomsky book. There are serious men who are under the impression that the CIA led a coup to replace an upstanding, democratic reformer named Mohammed Mossadegh with a fascist Shah named Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and that Pahlavi’s crimes were so atrocious that Iran was driven into the arms of the mullahs. None of that is true. And with Congress getting ready to vote on the Iran deal, everyone could use a little historical perspective.
Mossadegh, a popular parliamentarian, was appointed prime minister by the Shah in the spring of 1951. He quickly set about social-reforming: Serfs were freed, paid sick-leave was mandated, landlords’ revenues were tithed to pay for public works — and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalized.
The story of Iranian oil dates back to 1901, when an English businessman named William D’Arcy negotiated an oil-exploration contract with the (then) Shah of Iran, Shah Qajar. In exchange for a large cash payment and shares in the ensuing oil company, along with 16 percent of all oil revenue, D’Arcy acquired exclusive drilling rights in most of Iran for 60 years.
At first, it seemed that Iran had gotten the (much) better end of the deal: After seven years of prospecting, D’Arcy had found nothing. He was almost bankrupt; he had recapitalized with a new partner, the Burmah [sic] Oil Company, which wanted to call it a day. D’Arcy was already in the process of closing up his Iranian shop when — lo and behold — he struck oil, in May 1908.
The British government, hoping to reduce its dependence on coal, invested heavily in in the D’Arcy–Burmah company, which was renamed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The AIOC turned a large profit for the British, and, with 16 percent of the revenue, Iran turned a large profit too. As time went on, though, Iran’s government came to consider the initial 1901 arrangement unfair; after lengthy negotiations, in 1933 — 32 years into a 60-year deal — the British agreed to sign a new contract. In the late Forties, Iran’s government again demanded a new contract, which led to a “supplemental” agreement in 1949, setting higher minimum payments to Iran. Nonetheless, in 1951, Mossadegh had all Anglo-Iranian Oil agreements terminated and the AIOC nationalized. He described the nationalization as a blow against British imperialism.
Extremely valuable property, legally owned by the British government and British private citizens, had been confiscated by a foreign government. Before the war, Britain might have invaded. Instead, it retaliated against Mossadegh by leading an international embargo of Iran’s oil and by withdrawing its technicians from the nationalized holdings. Without British know-how, the company could barely function; after the withdrawal, Iranian oil production dropped 96 percent. And the oil that was produced couldn’t be sold.
Oil money funded the Iranian government; without it, Mossadegh’s reforms were worthless, and his popularity plunged. Mossadegh called a parliamentary election in late 1951. When he realized he was going to lose, he had the election suspended.
(That should put to bed the notion that he was an idealistic democrat.)
Nonetheless, Shah Pahlavi allowed Mossadegh to form a new government, and in the summer of ’52, Mossadegh demanded authority to appoint a new minister of war and a new chief of staff, which would give him control of Iran’s military — thitherto under the authority of (and loyal to) the Shah. The Shah refused; Mossadegh resigned, and began to organize anti-Shah demonstrations. Iran was thrown into chaos, and, fearing collapse of the country, the Shah acquiesced, re-appointed Mossadegh, and gave him full control over the military.
(Quite the fascist was Shah Reza Pahlavi.)
Reinstated, Mossadegh — in the tradition of all great democrats — persuaded the parliament to grant him emergency powers, which he used to confiscate the Shah’s land, ban him from communicating with foreign countries, and exile his sister. Mossadegh also used his emergency powers to institute collective farming. According to Stephen Kinzer’s book All the Shah’s Men, “Iranians were becoming poorer and unhappier by the day. Mossadegh’s political coalition was fraying.”
You may have noticed that, up to this point, the dark and shadowy hand of the CIA has not made an appearance. In fact, the U.S.’s only role in the proceedings thus far was as an intermediary between Iran and Britain in an effort to reach a settlement everyone could live with — something that turned out not to be possible. (The U.S. also played an accidental role in aggravating the situation when an American oil company reached a 50-50 oil-revenue agreement with the Saudis, which made Iran’s 16 percent deal look shabby by comparison.)
After American mediation failed, the U.S. took Iran’s side, accusing the British of being unreasonably immovable. That changed, however, in 1953: According to a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations named Ray Takeyh, as Iran’s economy collapsed, “Mossadeq responded . . . by behaving in an increasingly autocratic manner.” As Mossadegh’s policies drove Iran further and further into poverty, it looked more and more likely that he would turn to the Soviet Union for support. At least, that was the view of Dwight Eisenhower and Winston Churchill, two men who had more than their fair share of experience in the spread of Soviet socialism. It began to appear that the choice in Iran would be a Soviet-backed dictator — a Mao, a Kim, a Kun — or a pro-Western dictator who they hoped would steer the country toward democracy, as in South Korea or Taiwan.
The U.S. had helped turn Persian public opinion against Mossadegh. However: There was no coup. In 1953, Mossadegh was prime minister of Iran; like many heads of state, the Shah had the legal, constitutional authority to remove his prime minister, which he did, at the behest of his ally the United States. Mossadegh, though, refused to be removed, and he arrested the officers who tried to deliver the Shah’s notice of dismissal. The Shah was forced to flee the country.
At that point, it looked at if the U.S.’s anti-Mossadegh efforts had failed: The Shah was gone, and Mossadegh remained in power. After the Shah fled, says Takeyh, “the initiative passed to the Iranians.”
The man who the Americans, the British, and the Shah had agreed should replace Mossadegh was General Fazlollah Zahedi; Zahedi was a powerful man, and well-liked by much of the political establishment, the religious establishment, and the army. With the Shah gone, and the Americans more or less resigned to failure, Zahedi took over the anti-Mossadegh campaign himself, spreading word throughout the country that the Shah — who remained popular — had fired Mossadegh and appointed Zahedi in his place. Says Takeyh: “Pro-shah protesters took to the streets. It is true that the CIA paid a number of toughs from the bazaar and athletic centers to agitate against the government, but the CIA-financed mobs rarely exceeded a few hundred people in a country now rocked by demonstrators numbering in the thousands . . . in the end, the CIA-organized demonstrations were overtaken by a spontaneous cascade of pro-shah protesters.”
Mossadegh ordered the army to restore order; the army took Zahedi’s side, and Mossadegh fled, soon “[turning] himself in to General Zahedi’s headquarters, where he was treated with courtesy and respect. Before the advent of the Islamic Republic, Persian politics were still marked by civility and decorum.”
The CIA was happy to take credit, exaggerating its involvement in what was, at the time, considered a big success — but a private CIA cable credited Mossadegh’s collapse to the fact that “the flight of the Shah . . . galvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force.” (A large portion of those galvanized people, it should be noted, were hard-core Islamists, who feared that Mossadegh’s slide to the left would include Communist atheism.)
So: Mossadegh was no democrat, and the CIA was not responsible for his ouster; the CIA did not install the Shah in his place, and it did not become involved because of oil. In fact, after Mossadegh was gone, Iran’s oil infrastructure remained nationalized, and eventually the British agreed to a 50-50 profit split.
There’s no question, though, that the U.S. was one of the Shah’s major backers. And according to many luminaries — Ron Paul, Ben Affleck, my cousin — the Shah was a real bastard. Ben Affleck’s movie Argo opens with a monologue that says the “Shah was known for opulence and excess . . . [he] has his lunches flown in by Concorde from Paris. . . . The people starved. . . . The Shah kept power though his ruthless internal police: the SAVAK.” It was an “era of torture and fear.”
With a brutal, American-puppet dictator in power, who can blame the Iranians for turning to the ayatollahs? Well, it’s possible that Argo overstated its case. According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, “Whereas less than 100 political prisoners had been executed between 1971 and 1979, more than 7,900 were executed between 1981 and 1985. . . . Prison life was drastically worse under the Islamic Republic than under the Pahlavis. One who survived both writes that four months under [the ayatollahs’ warden] took the toll of four years under SAVAK. In the prison literature of the Pahlavi era, the recurring words have been ‘boredom’ and ‘monotony.’ In that of the Islamic Republic, they are ‘fear,’ ‘death,’ ‘terror,’ ‘horror,’ and most frequent of all ‘nightmare.’”
Abrahamian also reports that the Shah’s political prisoners had access to “a radio, television set, reading room, Ping-Pong table, and indoor gym equipped with exercise machines.”
Even Mossadegh was a beneficiary of the Shah’s liberal attitude toward retribution: According to a contemporary New York Times piece, the court that tried Mossadegh “refused to accede to the prosecutor’s demand that Dr. Mossadegh be sentenced to death or at least imprisonment for life as a result of the Shah’s intervention. . . . Most persons had expected the defendant would be exiled or imprisoned for life.” Instead, thanks to the Shah, Mossadegh was sentenced to three years’ house arrest.
Reza Pahlavi was a dictator, but not one of the worst — he was Chiang Kai-shek to the Islamists’ Mao. Reza Pahlavi was a dictator, but not one of the worst — he was Chiang Kai-shek to the Islamists’ Mao. The Shah curbed the power of the aristocracy, promoted rights for women, built new infrastructure and schools, spread literacy to peasants, and maintained a strong pro-democracy foreign policy — the Shah’s Iran was even a friend and ally of that noirest of bêtes noires, Israel. To boot, under the Shah, Iran prospered at Asian Tiger levels: During the last 14 years of his reign, Iran saw annual economic growth of over 13 percent.
Iran did not fall to the mullahs because of “the hated Shah,” as Ron Paul has said — it fell because the United States refused to defend progress from Islamism, in the same way we refused to protect our successes in Iraq from the rise of ISIS. The Shah’s government could have been saved, but we refused to save it.
So why do so many people believe the imperialist-calamity version of modern Persian history? Because the world is filled with freshmen and sophomoric adults.
— Josh Gelernter writes weekly for NRO and is a regular contributor to The Weekly Standard.
Thanks for bringing that to the thread — good info. By that account the CIA actually didn’t mastermind the ouster of Mossadegh. If that is correct, then 1) I still give the CIA points for trying, and 2) it’s good because it undercuts the leftist meme that we engineered the coup and that Iran is therefore justified in having some huge grievance against us.
Oh, I see.
From reading this thread, my impression is that the U.S. Left, perhaps as far back as Truman, but at least under Carter, Clinton and now Obama, has made Iran an ideological issue. In the process they have missed the geopolitical realities and done great damage to U.S. interests. Islamic theocracies appeal to carriers of the totalitarian gene.
The only other really interesting source that could contradict Wilber/Taheri is the CIA report from 1998 (Document #4). However, it is unfortunately so heavily censored that is almost impossible to know what to make of it. Nevertheless, from this quote the author (Scott A. Koch) seems at least not to be completely at odds with Taheri's conclusions:
At the start of 1953, according to Iranian specialist Kuross A. Samii, "Iran resembled an old ship swept away by storm with no one aboard capapble of dealing with the attendant frenzy." By August, Mossadeq "was barely holding on to the broken sails of his sinking ship. Everything onsdidered, whatever might be said of the morality or the leagality of American action, it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a stable regime in Iran."
Interestingly Document #5 in link from post #7 actually gives credence to Taheri's statement that most of the documentation for this epsiode has disappeared:
"Wisner recommends a special commendation for the work performed by the communications specialists who kept CIA headquarters in contact with operatives in Iran throughout the coup period. "I am sure that you are aware of the exceptionally heavy volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated," Wisner writes — an unintentionally poignant remark given how little of that documentation has survived."
PS: Apparently the CIA report from 1998 is under revision so maybe sometime in the future more data will be released.
You look at the U.S. today, and we have all the characteristics of a colonial power. We haven't fought a war to defend ourselves in more than 150 years. We have a larger military infrastructure than the rest of the world combined, and we project military force all over the planet to promote our interests far beyond our national borders. We'll prop up corrupt dictators and radical Islamic regimes if we see fit, and then con our own citizens to support a stupid "War on Terror" to "promote freedom and democracy" in Third World sh!t-holes all over the place.
P.S. We haven't "left" Saudi Arabia. That's why the country is on the list.
Now there's a term that really has a place in a free nation. LOL.
Rather than the details of how involved the CIA was or wasn’t, the premise of the piece is ignorant & naive:
“Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,”
I think what should be understood is that the islamists were always there. Mossadeq himself felt pressure from them, before and after the Shah left. The Shah’s father upset the mullahs & clergy during his reign starting back in the 1920’s.
So, the ‘coup’ itself had nothing directly to do with the islamist revolution in Iran - Except that they used it (and continue to do so) as an excuse, a tool, a recruiting & brainwashing apparatus. They never cared about Mossadeq - they would have overthrown him themselves if they could.
The involvement of the U.S. to try to stabilize Iran by allowing the Shah to return was a good thing for Iran & us. Unfortunately, the Shah made some critical mistakes (a big one, I believe, was not killing Khomeini & instead exiling him). But it’s possible another mullah/ayatollah would have eventually risen in popularity and strength and caused an uprising and takeover. The clergy never liked the monarchy, period, because it reduced their power, wealth & significance.
You’re still wrong. You still can’t name a single colony. You can keep embarrassing yourself by confusing allies with colonies but in the end you’re just not getting any where.
That the Islamists never liked Mossadeq (to put it mildly) is part of Taheri's story as well. Let me quote the pertinent paragraph:
Clinton’s claim that the United States changed the course of Iranian history on a whim would be seen by most Iranians, a proud people, as an insult by an arrogant politician who exaggerates the powers of his nation more than half a century ago. Moreover, in the Islamic Republic that Clinton was trying to court, Mossadeq, far from being regarded as national hero, is an object of intense vilification. One of the first acts of the mullahs after seizing power ni 1979 was to take the name of Mossadeq off a street in Teheran. They then sealed off the village where Mossadeq is buried to prevent his supporters from gathering at his tomb. History textbooks written by the mullahs present Mossadeq as ”the son af a feudal family of exploiters who worked for the cursed shah, and betrayed Islam.” Clinton’s apology to the mullahs for a wrong supposedly done to Mossadeq was like begging Josef Stalin’s pardon for a discourtesy towards Alexander Kerensky.
However, in a more general perspective this story shows how pernicious the Cold War propaganda was, and the fact that the West very seldom was able to properly refute the lies and misinformation coming from the Soviets and their fellow travelers. The latter have now, completely unashamed, changed horses and instead of materialist Marxism they are now supporting "Third Worldism" and Islamism.
It was the college freshman who said, ““Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,” which prompted the article and that’s what prompted my original & subsequent response.
OK!
Freep regards/
Another good source to read to cross check some facts about Mossadegh, Islamists and Communists in Iran, is the memoirs of the late Shah’s wife, Empress Farah.
In her book, she writes that whilst there was an active effort to rein in the communists in Iran & SAVAK actually had a mandate to arrest communists, the mullahs & islamists in Iran were LARGELY left untouched to give anti-monarchy sermons in mosques and other gatherings, particularly in smaller towns and among lower-class groups in Iran.
>>”a big one, I believe, was not killing Khomeini & instead exiling him).”<<
In a way, the Shah was between a rock and a hard place. I understand he was advised not to deal ‘harshly’ with Khomeini because, most probably, it might have caused further trouble & unrest inside Iran. So, the Shah chose to exile him, to cut off his direct influence in Iran. Though I think he wasn’t expecting support for Khomeini from other countries and their media, such as the BBC.
Actually, Khomeini was under tight control during the first part of his exile in Iraq when Saddam was there. But Khomeini started trouble in Iraq too, and consequently Saddam didn’t want him in Iraq either. Later, with the Shah’s permission Khomeini was exiled to France; that’s where he had a carte blanche to preach rather openly.
>>”But it’s possible another mullah/ayatollah would have eventually risen in popularity and strength and caused an uprising and takeover.”<<
Right. The mullahs should have been reined in all-around in Iran, see #74. Not that the Shah didn’t understand the mullahs mentality & history in Iran; give a mullah an inch and he’ll take a yard - traditionally they’re MOSTLY despicable hoarders; and I’m being kind.
The U.S. has never been a ‘colonial power’, unlike the UK, France, Russia, Spain or the Netherlands (Holland), as examples.
Even during WW2, mainly Britain and Russia for a very short period of time occupied an officially neutral Iran (Russians in the north & Brits in the south).
It was Britain who accused the late Shah’s father during WW2 of being a ‘nazi sympathizer’, and forced his subsequent abdication in favour of his son, exiling him to South Africa.
Iran throughout WW2 was neutral; the allies went along with Britain because of strategic reasons, and to prevent Nazis from potentially expanding territory; not because the Shah was a ‘nazi sympthasizer’.
And, in hindsight it was absurd to accuse the late Shah’s father of being a ‘nazi sympathizer’, when it’s clearly documented that Britain had many prominent figures itself, who were clearly associated with Hilter and his Nazi party.
Post-WW2, and during the Cold War, the U.S. had military and other presence in Iran, based on mutual agreement, for the fear of Iran’s BIG, socialist, and very much colonial neighbour up north violating the sovereignty of Iran; USSR shared a border spanning some 2000+ kilometers with Iran, constantly looking to expand further south of the border.
While I looked at the book at Amazon I found an interesting review that has some bearing on our discussion:
Also, because this book has been written by a woman and because I am a Iranian woman myself, I cannot complete this review without drawing a comparative reference between the status of the Iranian women during the Qajar times, during the Pahlavi Era and where we are today some 25 years after the departure of the Pahlavi dynasty. Women were essentially no more than common slaves or baby factories during the Qajar period. The Qajar Kings, apart from being grossly incompetent in terms of running the country, never demonstrated any tendency towards progressing the women's rights or status within their kingdom. On the contrary, they all had their vast Harems where much like today's Saudi Arabia, they had literally hundreds of wives, concubines and several hundred children (some of which were their own and others were the courtesy of their kind, supportive and thoughtful court employees). In those days, nepotism was rife of course and every one of these Qajar children (whether rightful or mostly of the courtesy variety) use to be given government posts which anywhere else in the world would have been reserved for experienced and highly qualified civil servants. Mohamed Mossadegh was one of these children who much like his other siblings was give put in charge of the finances of the Khorassan province (15% of Iranian land mass) at the age of 8 (Eight). Against this background, one of the first acts of Reza Pahlavi, the hungry army Soldier who saw no option but to wrap up the Qajar's crooked show was women's emancipation. He started with the women in his own family and then immediately extended this right to every other Iranian woman. He also began the process of changing the country's laws allowing women to have a greater say in the society. This process was continued by his son who also secured voting rights for Iranian women and actively encouraged their education. All of this progress simply came to a halt and was then dramatically reversed after the 1979 revolution.
Oh wow! I never saw that review. But like the reviewer I’ve read Farah’s book a few times.
I also think it is an extremely valid point the reviewer raises about the Qajar dynasty. Everything the Pahlavis did including their achievements must also be put in the context of where Iran was at as the late Shah’s father took over from the Qajars. Yes, the Qajar dynasty was shameful. Thanks for highlighting it!
I might add something in defense of Farah not writing much about the Qajars. Obviously it was “her memoirs” therefore the objective of the book was mostly to focus on those aspects that she, personally, was familiar with. She does write a few paragraphs here and there about the Qajars, but, true, perhaps there could’ve been a more detailed analysis and reference to the Qajars. Although the late Shah’s mother (Queen mother) was in fact a Qajar princess; so, a bit of sensitivity there too for Farah to point the finger at the Qajars.
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