The only other really interesting source that could contradict Wilber/Taheri is the CIA report from 1998 (Document #4). However, it is unfortunately so heavily censored that is almost impossible to know what to make of it. Nevertheless, from this quote the author (Scott A. Koch) seems at least not to be completely at odds with Taheri's conclusions:
At the start of 1953, according to Iranian specialist Kuross A. Samii, "Iran resembled an old ship swept away by storm with no one aboard capapble of dealing with the attendant frenzy." By August, Mossadeq "was barely holding on to the broken sails of his sinking ship. Everything onsdidered, whatever might be said of the morality or the leagality of American action, it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a stable regime in Iran."
Interestingly Document #5 in link from post #7 actually gives credence to Taheri's statement that most of the documentation for this epsiode has disappeared:
"Wisner recommends a special commendation for the work performed by the communications specialists who kept CIA headquarters in contact with operatives in Iran throughout the coup period. "I am sure that you are aware of the exceptionally heavy volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated," Wisner writes — an unintentionally poignant remark given how little of that documentation has survived."
PS: Apparently the CIA report from 1998 is under revision so maybe sometime in the future more data will be released.
Rather than the details of how involved the CIA was or wasn’t, the premise of the piece is ignorant & naive:
“Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,”
I think what should be understood is that the islamists were always there. Mossadeq himself felt pressure from them, before and after the Shah left. The Shah’s father upset the mullahs & clergy during his reign starting back in the 1920’s.
So, the ‘coup’ itself had nothing directly to do with the islamist revolution in Iran - Except that they used it (and continue to do so) as an excuse, a tool, a recruiting & brainwashing apparatus. They never cared about Mossadeq - they would have overthrown him themselves if they could.
The involvement of the U.S. to try to stabilize Iran by allowing the Shah to return was a good thing for Iran & us. Unfortunately, the Shah made some critical mistakes (a big one, I believe, was not killing Khomeini & instead exiling him). But it’s possible another mullah/ayatollah would have eventually risen in popularity and strength and caused an uprising and takeover. The clergy never liked the monarchy, period, because it reduced their power, wealth & significance.