Skip to comments.Racists Have No Place in the Conservative Movement (ZO!)
Posted on 03/20/2013 9:57:49 AM PDT by mnehring
Zo has strong words for neo-confederate libertarians, especially those who infiltrated the CPAC conference. He reminds viewers why some libertarians have no place in the conservative movement, and why Republicans should embrace the vision of Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass.
(Video at link)
(Excerpt) Read more at pjtv.com ...
There is nothing as consistent to the south as overestimating their own importance.
Distinctions that exist only in your imagination.
That was one possibility. The other was that the rebels wouldn't fire on the fort. That would prolong the stand-off situation, and perhaps make it likely that cooler heads would prevail and the situation would be resolved. And that would also have suited Lincoln.
The idea that Lincoln wanted or needed to crush the South in all-out war could well be a conclusion reached afterward, after an all-out war that did crush the South. At the time, on taking office, Lincoln still believed that there were abundant reserves of pro-Union feeling in the South that might eventually prevail in the Southern states if the country could weather the immediate crisis. Didn't Davis need a war more than Lincoln did -- so that support for secession and his new government didn't just dry up?
The notion that somehow a differential in tariffs would immediately enrich the CSA and impoverish the USA doesn't work for me. Financial journalists may talk like that, but the tariff's effects would take longer to materialize. If anybody was in a hurry it wasn't for that reason -- not if they were in full possession of their senses, anyway. Moreover, such arguments cut both ways. One might as well argue that Davis needed to strike before his enslaved labor force ran off.
That Providence Daily Post editorial is here. It's a little confused. They believed that secession came because Lincoln didn't support non-interference with slavery in the territories and the rebellion would end if only Lincoln would break his party's platform and cave in to Southern demands. That wasn't going to happen. As I read it they don't come out and directly say that Lincoln had some evil plan, but that he gave into the demands of the abolitionists who did.
If a paper doesn't even seriously consider the idea that the federal government should stand up to the secessionists or that free-soilers could legitimately stand firm on the exclusion of slavery from a territory, that paper would naturally view Lincoln's actions in the worst possible light. They agreed that the federal government had a right to the forts, but they thought a surrender on slavery extension and other concessions would bring the rebels back into the union.
It would take some time to go through the material you cite and untangle what was going on when and what agreements were made with whom and how. I'm also wondering how much of the "this is the beginning of the war" sentiment was a considered judgment on policy and how much was what soldiers and sailors inevitably think when large numbers of troops are massed or mobilized. It's hard to say, for example, how much of Captain Adams's comment relates to the actual situation with the rebels and how much relates to bureaucratic Army-Navy rivalry or to his own private feelings about secession. I'd want to know a little more.
If one believed that the federal government should take some kind of stand -- even a purely symbolic one -- against the rebellion and Buchanan's government had spinelessly renounced even the most theoretical and nominal dissent or resistance to the demands and actions, then obviously there would be a change in policy. Or do you believe that everything the rebels demanded or got was hard and fast and everything the union had held was subject to secessionist demands and assaults? And, as happens when one administration succeeds another, there was confusion and uncertainty. It might not have been clear just what was promised by home and with what degree of authority.
This also applied to the Confederate side as well, though. Davis was in a hurry -- even more than Lincoln. Asking why the Confederates didn't strike earlier when the federals were confused and disoriented ignores the fact that they were confused as well. They had no real army yet, and they -- as much as the Union -- needed a rallying point. Didn't Davis also -- seen from the immediate perspective of the time -- benefit from a war? Didn't he benefit from a rallying point that war would give him?
My point still stands, though: if you think someone is trying to trick or provoke you into war and you give them that war, should you really be complaining or reproaching? Was there another course of action you could pursue that would not result in your firing the first shots and being the one to blame for the war? If you see a massive fleet coming at you, you might fire on the fleet or wait for the other side to fire first, but if you reduce a fort to rubble and it turns out that there were in fact only a few meager ships sent to reinforce the fort, isn't it an evasion to say afterwards that you were tricked? Rather, admit that you tricked yourself into starting the war.
I see Lincoln as pursuing a strategy similar to that of Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis: stand firm, but don't start shooting (assuming that is what Kennedy was doing then: so much of what was said about that crisis turned out not to be true). Such "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation wasn't something his contemporaries would have been familiar with. Whether or not Davis could have trusted Lincoln, he would probably have been better off following a similar strategy and foregoing the first shot (at least in my opinion).
The difference is a vote by the legislative body empowered to declare war, and its announcement.
If I am wrong, then show the minutes of the Confederate House of Representatives as they are voting on a resolution of war.
For the period of three years before the 1860 election, the finances of the Federal Government had been in a very disordered condition due to business downturns resulting from the political disturbances, and which by reducing the imports of overseas goods, had reduced the customs income, the chief source of revenue for the Treasury.
The spending on infrastructure projects had outstripped revenue. In June, 1860, a loan of twenty million dollars had been authorized by Congress to meet its obligations. Of this amount, ten million was offered in October in a five per cent stock, and it had been taken by investors at a small premium.
Before any installments were paid up, the panic that attended the election had severely affected credit, and many bids were withdrawn.
This so seriously affected the Treasury Department, that as the New Year approached, it seemed likely there would be no funds with which to meet the interest on the National debt.
By the Act of December 17th, 1860, an issue of ten million dollars, in treasury notes, was authorized, to bear such a rate of interest as might be offered by the lowest bidders, but so shaken was credit, few bids were made, and some of them at a rate of thirty six per cent interest per annum.
The capitalists interested in the Government credit finally took one million five hundred thousand dollars of one year treasury notes, at twelve per cent per annum (the amount was subsequently raised to five million dollars), on condition that the money should be applied to paying the interest on the national debt.
This was certainly a dark day in the Capitol, when the Federal Government, which had earned the honor of being the only nation that had ever paid its debts in fullprincipal and interestand which in 1856, with an overflowing treasury, had paid twenty-two per cent premium for its own stock, was now reduced to give twelve per cent interest, for a few millions, and to engage to protect its credit with the money.
This, combined with the specter that as soon as the primary cotton and tobacco producing states seceded with the subsequent massive loss in exportable products, meant that the US Treasury was in great jeopardy. (from Thomas Kettell)
This is why Lincoln was so consumed with the tariff issue at the time he issued orders to send the fleets to Charleston and Pensacola.
You also said: “Didn't Davis need a war more than Lincoln did...”
Let's look at what Jefferson Davis had to say for himself just 17 days after Ft. Sumter:
“I cannot close this review of the acts of the Government of the United States without referring to a proclamation issued by their President, under date of the 19th instant, in which, after declaring that an insurrection has broken out in this Confederacy against the Government of the United States, he announces a blockade of all the ports of these States, and threatens to punish as pirates all persons who shall molest any vessel of the United States under letters of marque issued by this Government.
“Notwithstanding the authenticity of this proclamation you will concur with me that it is hard to believe it could have emanated from a President of the United States. Its announcement of a mere paper blockade is so manifestly a violation of the law of nations that it would seem incredible that it could have been issued by authority; but conceding this to be the case so far as the Executive is concerned, it will be difficult to satisfy the people of these States that their late confederates will sanction its declarations - will determine to ignore the usages of civilized nations, and will inaugurate a war of extermination on both sides by treating as pirates open enemies acting under the authority of commissions issued by an organized government.
“If such proclamation was issued, it could only have been published under the sudden influence of passion, and we may rest assured mankind will be spared the horrors of the conflict it seems to invite.”
Lincoln needed war authority to collect the tariffs and suspend Confederate trade with Europe. The US Treasury was in jeopardy as of April of 1861, and needed an immediate remedy.
[you]: That was one possibility. The other was that the rebels wouldn't fire on the fort. That would prolong the stand-off situation, and perhaps make it likely that cooler heads would prevail and the situation would be resolved. And that would also have suited Lincoln.
It appeared from his inaugural speech that that Lincoln would have been satisfied and wouldn't send obnoxious strangers down South if he could have all the tariff revenue from imports to the South, hold the forts the Union still held, and possibly reoccupy those taken by the South. His inaugural speech words were somewhat ambiguous and unclear about forts already taken by the South. Perhaps he simply wanted Union troops in those forts throughout the South which would basically make the South a military-occupied province. This was perhaps a step down from the colony status the South had held for years with respect to the extraction of Southern wealth via the tariff.
If Lincoln thought the South wouldn't fire, then he badly misjudged the attitude of the South and South Carolina. However, I dont think he misjudged the South at all he wasn't stupid he expected the South to fight. Didn't Lamon and Hurlbut impart to Lincoln after their trip to Charleston that the South would fight?
Here is an April 6 article reporting the situation as seen from Charleston: [Richmond (VA) Daily Dispatch, April 9, 1861]:
I do not believe he [Anderson] will surrender unless his Government orders it, and, as I have all along said, I do not believe they will order it.--The truth is, the old (I was about to say Washington, but I will never again associate that dear name with the rotten and treacherous party now in power,) Government the Black Republican Government --has become a stench in our nostrils. We put no confidence on earth in what they say. They declare they have no intention of reinforcing. Everything goes to prove that false; and I will predict that Pickens will be reinforced in a week, and that an attempt will be made here, too. I also predict, and you mark it, that Anderson will not come out of Sumter until he is shelled out. Mark another thing: that he will be shelled out in less than a week. We cannot bear it longer. Our sons, brothers, clerks and mechanics are all away from business, and we do not intend to bear with it longer.--Three fire-engines were sent to Morris' Island yesterday. Should the soldiers' quarters be fired by ball or shell, we will put it out. (signed) Virginius
The author of that piece, Virginius, whoever he or she was, was spot on in those predictions.
One could perhaps judge what the South would do based on what they had already done. South Carolina had fired on the Star of the West that was trying to sneak 200 troops into Sumter in January. In late March Governor Pickens had told Lincolns messenger Lamon that any warship that entered the harbor would be fired at. On April 3, the Confederates fired on the Rhoda Shannon, an ice schooner from Boston, when it headed into the harbor and hoisted the Union flag after a shot across the bow [New York Times, April 8; Richmond Daily Dispatch, April 6].
With the permission of General Beauregard, Anderson sent Lieutenant Talbot to the Rhoda Shannon to find out what it was doing attempting to come into the harbor. Later, on April 7, Talbot met with the US Secretary of War, Lincoln, and General Scott in Washington [Brooklyn Eagle, April 8]. I imagine he mentioned the Shannon incident to them. The Richmond article above also mentioned the firing on the schooner.
The notion that somehow a differential in tariffs would immediately enrich the CSA and impoverish the USA doesn't work for me. Financial journalists may talk like that, but the tariff's effects would take longer to materialize.
Here is an April 2 article about how rapidly the negative effects began to materialize in New York City. This was a day after the Morrill Tariffs higher rates started applying on April 1. Remember that at this point in April the nation thought Fort Sumter would be evacuated. The fort had not yet been attacked. [Source: The Memphis Daily Appeal, April 6, 1861]:
Effect of the Morrill Tariff
Washington, April 2. The disastrous effects of the Morrill Tariff, which went into effect yesterday, are already becoming visible.
The news from New York is appalling to the Republican politicians here, and the Administration sympathizes with the dismay.
A letter just received from the collector of New York city (sic, no caps) says that that port is virtually in a state of blockade in consequence of the tariff, fully as much as if a hostile fleet were at the entrance of the harbor.
All importations are suspended, and the foreign trade is at a stand still.
I quoted a newspaper article in Post 313 about the effect of the Morrill Tariff on New York by May 1861. I have posted on these threads before about the decreased value of imports to New York in 1861 compared to 1860, but perhaps not to you. Here from one of my old posts are the month-by-month comparisons in the value of the Port of New York imports between 1861 and 1860 [Source: the 1865 Appletons Cyclopedia]. There was a significant decline in imports to New York in 1861 compare to 1860, partially no doubt due to the war and the uncertainty that brings and partially to the higher Morrill Tariff.
Month ... % change from 1860 to 1861
Jan ..... 23.5
Feb ..... -15.6
Mar ..... -22.8
Apr ..... -12.3
May ..... -11.5
Jun ..... -34.0
Jul ..... -40.0
Aug ..... -65.7
Sep ..... -55.1
Oct ..... -49.2
Nov ..... -37.5
Dec ..... -54.8
I didnt post that the effect of the two tariffs on the South would have been large immediately (so we agree) although I think there should have been some fairly quick increase in imports. For the two tariffs to have a huge effect on the South, the South would have to develop a warehouse system like that in New York and Brooklyn where importers could store goods for up to three years without paying tariff duties. From a Brooklyn Daily Eagle article of February 5, 1861 about the Morrill Tariff bill and the warehouse system:
This bill especially affects New York. Under the provisions of the warehouse law, with its facilities for trade, shipping and monied interest has centered here. New York has become to the New World what London is to Europe a great commercial centre, where vessels bring the produce of foreign nations and from whence they may be re-laden without payment of duties, in assorted cargoes and sail for any part of the world. Under the provisions of the present law a very large export trade is done with Mexico, South American provinces and the Canadas. There is also a very large transport trade from New York to the interior and sea board ports of our own country. This new law will alike affect the interests of the ship-owners, the bankers, the merchants and the capitalists.
It materially interferes with the interests of this city of Brooklyn, Upon our water front there are now built large and commodious warehouses for the storage of the heavier classes of merchandise; they were erected by our capitalists for bonded stores upon the supposition that the warehouse system would be a permanency. In New York there are in use 60 stores for bonded goods generally, and 52 cellars for bonded liquor. In this city 48 stores are used as bonded warehouses for general merchandise. These give employment to a large amount of capital and to hundreds of men. Each proprietor of a bonded store pays to the collector one hundred dollars per month for the salary of the officer of the revenue who is appointed by the government as storekeeper. The rent and all other expenses are held in bond at no expense to the government.
The Morrill Tariff as passed by the House in 1860 reduced the tariff-free period of the warehouses from three years to one month which would have been a heavy blow to the warehouse system; it was later lengthened by the Senate in the final bill.
Southern ports would have been closer to the Mexican and South American markets that New York had been supplying through the New York warehouse system. I think the South could have taken a large chuck of that business from New York if they had not been blockaded and had developed a warehouse system of their own.
I dont know a whole lot about the actual impact of the two tariffs on the South. Obviously, Lincolns blockade had an effect after the blockade began. I did find a couple of mentions in the Richmond Daily Dispatch of early April, 1861 about business in Charleston Harbor:
- [Probably about April 1 or 2 as reported on April 5]: Charleston harbor is well stocked with shipping, and it is odd to see the Confederate flag flying from the Northern masts.
- [April 6 as reported on April 9]: Business is good; more buyers than goods by many.
This is an act of the Confederate Congress.
It does "recognize" war with the United States.
It authorizes acts of war against the United States.
This and several other acts of the Confederate Congress authorized war and war-powers to the Confederate government.
So there is no practical, legal or logical distinction to be drawn between Confederate actions and any other formal Declaration of War.
And here's the important point: the United States made no invasions, assaults or attacks on the Confederacy -- no Confederate soldiers were killed in battle with any United States military force -- until after the Confederacy first started, then formally declaration of war on the United States, on May 6, 1861.
Read them again.
They are official documents of secessionists' conventions.
So why do you continue to deny obvious facts of history?
False in every sense.
First, as rusty points out in post #407, as of April 1861, there was no great loss of imports, just normal fluctuations of business -- up one month, down the next, etc.
Second, Republican policy was to reduce imports and encourage domestic production through use of higher protective Morrill Tariff rates.
So Lincoln could not "start war" just because Republican policy succeeded!
Third, Lincoln did not "start war", period.
In March 1861, only the Confederacy threatened war, if its demands (i.e., surrender of US Fort Sumter) were not met.
In April 1861, only the Confederacy started war by assaulting and seizing US Fort Sumter.
In May 1861, only the Confederacy formally declared war on the United States.
What Lincoln did in early April 1861 was decide to resupply but not reinforce Sumter, and so officially notified South Carolina Governor Pickens.
The Confederacy chose to use Lincoln's lawful actions as excuse to start war on the United States.
You might want to review those numbers, since they make no sense.
Logically, the South could not import more than the entire country.
Indeed, basic economic facts are that while the average slave-holding Confederate citizen was better off than their Northern cousins, for every white Confederate, there were four Northerners, and Union-states' manufacturing and trade economy accounted for 80% to 90% of the country's totals.
So any suggestions which exaggerate the importance of Confederate-state trade are necessarily misleading.
PeaRidge: "...Northern businessmen, politicians, and newspapermen knew that the demand for goods from the South was immense and would have a far reaching impact on their economy."
Yes but as it turned out, unlike the South: the North's manufacturing and trade economy was not destroyed by embargos, blockade or war.
PeaRidge: "The profits to Northern coffers that were about to be lost were:
Bounties to fisheries, per annum $1,500,000...
Total Annual Revenue Lost $226,500,000."
You cite no source for these numbers, and they appear very dubious.
What exactly do they represent?
Regardless, in overall terms Civil War cost the Union around $6 billion, the Confederacy another $2 billion.
So your figures here add up to less than 4% of the Union total.
What is the significance of that?
PeaRidge: "North knew it was approaching permanent injury.
Its economy depended on manufacturing and shipping.
But it neither raised its own food nor its own raw materials, nor did it furnish freights for its own shipping"
You are obviously very confused.
Those words apply to the South, not the North.
The North was self-sufficient in virtually every respect, except its need for Southern cotton, and even that, as it happened, could be done without.
PeaRidge: "Suddenly, in late March and early April, Lincoln's office was filled with governors, businessmen, and politicians calling for war."
A misleading exaggeration, at best.
The truth is that Lincoln listened to many voices, from all sides, especially those of Border States like Kentucky.
That's because Lincoln figured, if he lost Kentucky that was the same as losing the whole thing.
So he payed close attention to opinions from Kentucky, all of which said Lincoln should go as easy as possible on secessionists.
So Lincoln was not eager for war, but he was determined as much as possible to uphold his oath of office.
Combined with various other war-making acts of the Confederate Congress, there is no practical, legal or logical distinction to be drawn between Confederate actions and any other formal Declaration of War.
And here's the important point to remember: the United States made no invasions, assaults or attacks on the Confederacy -- no Confederate soldiers were killed in battle with any United States military force -- until after the Confederacy first started, then formally declaration of war on the United States, on May 6, 1861.
PeaRidge: "All sorts of writers and historians like to point to this simple act to support their contention that the South was the provocateur and that Lincoln was simply assuming a defensive role."
In fact, as you say: "...the South was the provocateur and that Lincoln was simply assuming a defensive role."
The simple fact is: in every step along the path from peace in 1860 to war in 1861, secessionists provoked and lead the way, while the Union slowly, reluctantly followed.
PeaRidge: "Of course we here all know that the courts found that the war was begun in Lincoln's office on April 17, 1861"
Regardless of later court interpretation, Lincoln committed no physical act of war on April 17, or on any other date before the Confederacy began war on April 11, and officially declared war on May 6, 1861.
So there was no war until the Confederacy made it happen.
In fact, Lincoln did not know for certain what the Confederacy would do in response to his resupply mission to Fort Sumter.
What Lincoln did know was that he had to do something soon to prevent starvation and surrender of Sumter.
If Confederates allowed Lincoln's resupply mission, then status quo was maintained, and all Upper South and Border States remained in the Union.
And that was absolutely the preferred outcome, because it meant that over time the Deep South might be slowly persuaded to return to the Union fold.
Or, Congress might eventually decide to authorize secession, at which point Lincoln's responsibility in the matter was over.
But if the Confederacy chose an act of war to seize Fort Sumter, then war would begin because that's what the Confederacy wanted.
rustbucket: "He also succeeded or lucked into losing the battle of Fort Sumter, which meant that he didn't have to keep ferrying supplies to Sumter and defending the fort. "
There's no way to "succeed" in losing a battle, that's just ridiculous.
General Winfield Scott and others advised Lincoln it would take 20,000 US troops (an understatement) to hold Fort Sumter, at a time when the entire US Army was only 16,000 and most of them scattered in small units out west.
At the same time, the Confederacy had already called up 100,000 troops, so there was no possibility -- zero, zip nada -- that Lincoln could even fight, much less win, a battle for Fort Sumter.
What Lincoln could do, and did, was attempt to resupply Sumter, and in the process learn if the Confederacy intended to start war.
As it turned out, they did.
rustbucket: "Remember too that Lincoln had secretly pulled one of the key ships [Powhattan] from the Sumter expedition without alerting Fox and sent it to Fort Pickens.
The Sumter expedition was too small to succeed..."
Neither one extra ship, nor ten more, would have made any difference at Sumter -- Lincoln's ships were sent to resupply not invade.
They could not, and would not, fight their way in or out.
rustbucket quoting: "Mr. Lincoln saw an opportunity to inaugurate civil war without appearing in the character of an aggressor." [Source: Providence Daily Post, April 13 1861].
Since Lincoln's actions were lawful and the Confederacy's a premeditated act of war, Lincoln did not "inaugurate" anything.
rustbucket: "Lincoln needed to (and did) keep Congress out of the way so he could take actions such as invading the South (Virginia, at least) that committed the country to war."
On April 15 Lincoln set the date for Congress' return as July 4.
Then, after Lincoln's action:
None of the subsequent Confederate actions -- after Lincoln's call on April 15 -- were known by Lincoln at the time.
rustbucket: "Given the natural patriotic feeling in the North generated by all of this, Congress would have no political will to oppose his actions."
Most Northerners, even Democrats, believed the Union should be preserved and its laws enforced -- yes, certainly, peacefully if possible, but if not, then by such means as proved necessary.
They did not need Lincoln to tell them that.
rustbucket after quoting Anderson: "Anderson was not the only one to recognize what Lincoln was doing would start a war.
Lincoln on April 5 gave a verbal order to reinforce Fort Pickens without telling the Confederates."
Lincoln ordered the Powhattan to Sumter, not Pickens.
Lincoln notified South Carolina Governor Pickens of the Sumter mission on April 6.
Jefferson Davis immediately ordered war to begin, a move endorsed by the Confederate cabinet on April 9.
rustbucket: "The Confederates had promised not to attack Fort Pickens if the Union did not reinforce it.
A violation of the truce could result in a shooting war."
All such demands by Confederates were acts of rebellion and/or war against the United States, period.
rustbucket after quoting various officials: "These three key guys recognized at the time that Lincoln was taking actions that could provoke war.
Obviously they hadn't gotten the message about who started the war."
There is no lawful way to demand the US government not protect, supply or reinforce its property and personnel.
Any such demands are illegal acts of rebellion and/or war.
The perpetrator was not the Union, but the Confederacy.
rustbucket: "The Official Records show that Union forces started reinforcing Fort Pickens on April 11.
That was before the South fired on Fort Sumter.
So, if Captain Adams was right, the North had already declared war on the South before the attack on Fort Sumter."
First, see my comment above.
Second, by April 9 Davis ordered and his cabinet confirmed war to begin at Fort Sumter.
Third, as it happened, the Powhattan's voyage to Fort Pickens was a mistake in communications, which Lincoln attempted unsuccessfully to correct.
So, if that was the Confederacy's excuse for war, it yet again demonstrates they were eager, itching and cruisin' for a bruisin'.
Nonsense, and you know it.
South Carolina's Governor Pickens had been demanding Fort Sumter's surrender since December 1860, and Jefferson Davis first ordered preparations to assault Sumter on March 3 the day before Lincoln's inauguration.
So there's no "concern" to "consider".
Confederates unlawfully demanded Sumter's surrender, and after careful evaluations, both Presidents, Buchanan and Lincoln, refused.
So Confederates started war, and reaped the immediate benefit of four new states (Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas & Tennessee), doubling their population.
rustbucket quoting: "Washington, April 11. -- The Southern Commissioners charge the Administration with gross perfidy in attempting to reinforce Fort Sumter under pretext of evacuation."
Those Confederate commissioners deserved all the same respect and consideration that police provide bank robbers in a hostage situation.
rustbucket: "The South had Commissioners in Washington trying to negotiate peace until the last moment.
They were lied to by the Lincoln administration about the evacuation of Sumter and not officially received by Lincoln."
First, see my comment above.
Second, on March 3 Davis ordered preparations to assault Fort Sumter, and on March 6 to raise a Confederate army of 100,000 troops.
It's not surprising that these took time, during which Confederates doubtless welcomed the illusion that Lincoln intended to surrender Sumter.
But Lincoln was not going to trade something (Sumter) for nothing (nothing).
What Lincoln wanted in return was a promise by Virginians not to secede -- Lincoln said: a fort for a state is a good trade.
But Virginians would make no such promise, and so Lincoln did what little he could (resupply) to hold his fort.
Once their illusions were lifted, and their preparations completed, Confederates did what they intended to do from the beginning: start Civil War.
Hardly, since you are restricting "the North" to Northeastern states, while expanding "the South" to include all of Deep South, Upper South and Border States.
In fact, when push came to shove, "the North" included the Northeast, Middle-Atlantic, Midwest-Northwest, Far West and Southern Border States all of which accounted for 80% of US free-white population and 90% of US manufacturing.
Sure the Deep South and Upper South were important economically, but they were not in 1860 dominant.
The Union could and did get along just fine without them.
PeaRidge: "If you will consult Kettell's section III, you will find that the first table shows you that the Southern states produced in 1858 54 million slaughtered animals to the productions of 22 million in the west and 34 million in the Northeast."
At least 1/3 of those 54 million came from Border States which remained loyal to the Union, meaning we are looking at most at 36 million produced in Confederate states, versus 74 million in Union states.
But doubtless, even that overstates the Southern case -- since such edible agricultural products were produced inversely proportional to the amount of land devoted to slave-based cash crops like cotton, tobacco and sugar.
In other words, high-slave areas like the Deep South produced few if any surplus animals for slaughter, while low-slave Union states like Kentucky and Missouri producd correspondingly more.
PeaRidge: "With regard to grain, the South produced 307 million pounds while the West harvested 173 million and the Northeast produced 132 million."
Again, break it down by state and you'll find that Deep South states most devoted to export cash crops produced relatively few grains, while more northern Border States produced far more.
And since Border States remained loyal to Union, your analysis is deeply flawed.
Davis was not honest enough to publically admit that he himself ordered preparations to assault Fort Sumter, and then to start Civil War by carrying out the long-planned assault.
In March 1860, what Lincoln lawfully, constitutionally owed to Davis was the same careful respect and considerations that police owe to bank robbers in a hostage situation.
It's what Davis deserved, and got.
The original Morrill Tariff proposed in 1860 raised rates from then historically low 15% back to more average rates around 22%.
There was nothing unusually high about those levels.
During the Civil War Union tariff rates reached 35%, or roughly the same as the 1830s, when Southerner Democrat President Andrew Jackson and South Carolinian Vice President John C. Calhoun were in charge.
The highest rates of 45% did not come until 1870, to help pay for the war, and also to protect US industry and workers against foreign competitors.
The result was the longest, greatest period of economic growth in world history, from 1865 until passage of the 16th Amendment in 1913.
PeaRidge: "You have made several comments about the timing of Morrill and secession, as well as one about the fact that the South could have defeated it had the Congressmen stayed in Washington."
No, why insist on misunderstanding?
The Morrill Tariff could have been defeated in the House in 1860 if the South and/or Democrats had firmly opposed it.
But there were more than enough Southerners and Democrats who voted for Morrill to allow its passage in the House, in 1860.
In the Senate, Southerners opposed to Morrill held positions of power until they began walking out after the November 1860 election.
So Morrill passed first because House Southerners were only halfhearted in opposition, and second because Senate Southerners walked out of the Senate.
PeaRidge: "The only thing left was the Senate, and, by their own calculations of December 12th, 1860, the southerners knew they did not have the votes to stop it there."
Because not all Southerners and Democrats opposed Morrill.
Lincoln ordered the Powhattan to Sumter, not Pickens.
First of all it was spelled Powhatan. Second of all, Lincoln did sign orders that ended up sending the Powhatan to Fort Pickens. When Navy Secretary Welles discovered that the ship wasn't going to Fort Sumter as he thought, he went to see Lincoln. From "Days of Defiance" by Maury Klein:
Welles marched to the White House, where he found Lincoln alone at a table. The president looked up from his writing, saw the dark cloud on Welles's heavily beared face, and sighed, "What have I done wrong?" Welles showed him the papers [signed by Lincoln] and pressed for an explanation.
Lincoln had signed orders without reading them. From "Days of Defiance" again: "Lincoln looked mystified and took the whole blame for the mixup on himself." Even after this, Lincoln still kept the Pickens mission secret from Welles. The Pickens mission had been planned without Welles knowledge even though it involved Navy ships and officers.
Lincoln then gave orders to Seward to return the Powhatan to Captain Mercer (i.e., to the Sumter expedition). Seward sent an order to do just that. Seward signed the instruction, "Seward," and did not say this latest instruction was at the order of Lincoln. By the time the order reached the Powhatan, it had already sailed on its Lincoln-authorized mission to Fort Pickens. The note from Seward was carried on a fast ship that managed to catch the Powhatan, but Porter, the man in charge of the Powhatan, ignored it saying that he had received his orders directly from the president, who had not rescinded them. He proceeded to Fort Pickens where he tried to enter Pensacola Harbor flying English colors, a false flag act. In July, Lincoln stonewalled Congress about his orders that violated the armistice/truce at Fort Pickens. No copy of the secret orders survived.
Hell of a way to run the government.
... the local elections that week [rb note: late March or early April, I think] went badly, as Republican candidates lost in Connecticut, Ohio, Brooklyn, Rhode Island, and St. Louis. "Thirty days more of 'Peace Policy' at Washington," one Ohioan warned Lincoln, "and not only the Republican Party, but the Government itself will be gone to destruction." ...
The mounting pressure to act dismayed Lincoln. He had struggled to keep the door open for Seward's policy of delay as long as possible. The Pickens expedition was part of that effort, its secrecy designed to prevent the Confederates from getting wind of the mission and attacking the fort before the relief force arrived. To that end, the president had dissembled with Welles, feigning ignorance of orders in that simple, straightforward manner he had perfected to an art form.
I’ve been browsing Kettel. Interesting book, though his intent is obviously to argue a case, not describe reality, so I suspect a lot of his conclusions need to be taken with considerable sodium chloride.
Thanks, PR, for providing this resource.
For instance, as BJK notes, he separates the West from the North but combines the entire South, as a way of making the South’s contribution to the economy loom larger.
More importantly, a lot of what he has to say is extremely interesting for what it says about the attitude of southern apologists in 1858. I found it fascinating that he essentially agrees with today’s leftists who demand reparations for slavery. Kettel was essentially a vulgar reverse Marxist, believing that all capital and all wealth is generated by enslaving others and stealing most of the value of the work they do. Except of course he believes this to be a good thing and the basis of all civilization.
So far from believing that slavery was on its last legs and shortly to disappear, he was boundlessly optimistic about its survival and expansion. He thought the only result of a conflict between North and South would be the utter destruction of the Northern economy. (May have been a little over-optimistic there.)
It is also interesting where he draws the line between North (and West) and South. The only criterion he apparently considers for “South” is the presence of slavery. And his complaints about the North are largely, though not exclusively, focused on its opposition to the Peculiar Institution.
He constantly harps on the basic theme of the inequality of men and the positive good of slavery, much like Stephens in his Cornerstone speech a couple of years later.
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