Posted on 03/20/2013 9:57:49 AM PDT by mnehring
Zo has strong words for neo-confederate libertarians, especially those who infiltrated the CPAC conference. He reminds viewers why some libertarians have no place in the conservative movement, and why Republicans should embrace the vision of Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass.
(Video at link)
(Excerpt) Read more at pjtv.com ...
You, too, are missing the point.
What happened after April, 1861 does not matter to my point.
It was the impending loss of revenue to the Treasury and the severe reduction in imports through US Customs houses that led Lincoln and his people to start war.
You can grouse on about that topic as you wish. I am only concerned with the decision facing Lincoln about the loss of his tariff revenue.
The entire country imported $336 million dollars in goods for that same year.
Grasping the significance and the magnitude of difference between the new Confederate tariff and the recently passed Morrill tariff in March of 1861, and the likelihood that the South would now transfer this demand to European goods and trade directly with Europe, Northern businessmen, politicians, and newspapermen knew that the demand for goods from the South was immense and would have a far reaching impact on their economy.
Practically every New England citizen would be affected by the loss of Southern goods traveling through the North.
Any artisan engaged in building in the shipping trade would be hurt. Any carman engaged in carrying, any agent who sold manufacturers, any merchant who sold to consumers in the South, any shipper, ship builder, lumberman, or laborer would be hurt.
Any brokers, exchange dealers, bankers, insurers, warehousemen, or suppliers of goods to these people would be hurt.
The profits to Northern coffers that were about to be lost were:
Bounties to fisheries, per annum………………………………$1,500,000.
Customs, per annum, disbursed at the North…………………$40,000,000.
Profits of northern manufacturers…………………………….$30,000,000.
Profits of importers…………………………………………...$16,000,000.
Profits of shipping, imports, exports………………………….$40,000,000.
Profits of Travelers……………………………………………$60,000,000.
Profits of agents, brokers, commissions……………………….$10,000,000
Profits from capital drawn from the South…………………….$30,000,000.
Total Annual Revenue Lost………………………………… $226,500,000.
From the census data and the business-press community, it was apparent that the North knew it was approaching permanent injury. Its economy depended on manufacturing and shipping. But it neither raised its own food nor its own raw materials, nor did it furnish freights for its own shipping
Suddenly, in late March and early April, Lincoln's office was filled with governors, businessmen, and politicians calling for war. (From Kettell and Klein, and the Treasury Department, and the 1861 State of the Union report.)
Is there a difference between "recognizing that a state of war exists" and "declaring that a state of war exists"? What is the magical wording that all of the US declarations of war share that make them official, but which makes the confederate act something else entirely?
I figure it has something to to with the Paleo-Confederates...
I figure any white supremacist should try out for the NBA.
The really amusing thing is the 1929 NY Celtics were disbanded because it was unfair for them to compete against white people, their ethnicity was perfectly designed, it was said to be superior at basketball.
They were all Jewish!
American liberals in early 20th century thought a lot Their German socialist(NAZI) counterparts in Europe.
The official act to which BroJoe was referring is listed in the records of the Confederate government as An Act Recognizing The Existence of War Between the United States and the Confederate States, and Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes and Prize Goods.
It was passed by the Congress on May 6, 1861 and approved by President Davis.
The act authorized no act of war but gave instructions for protection. In doing so, the Confederacy noted that war existed and therefore, in order to proceed with protection of Southern shipping, it only authorized the issuance of the letters of Marque, and also established the administrative procedure for dealing with prizes to be followed with approval resting in the Confederate Department of Commerce.
All sorts of writers and historians like to point to this simple act to support their contention that the South was the provocateur and that Lincoln was simply assuming a defensive role.
Of course we here all know that the courts found that the war was begun in Lincoln's office on April 17, 1861.
I have no idea what you are talking about here.
The only raw material the North imported in large quantity for its industry that I'm aware of was cotton.
The North produced much more food than the South, and was a major exporter of grain to England and elsewhere in Europe. In some years exporting about as much grain as the South exported cotton.
The Deep South did not even produce enough food to feed itself, with large imports from the North. Not surprising, since so much of the land was devoted to cotton, which isn't particularly edible.
Are you perhaps talking about the Northeast rather than the North? Even the Northeast was at this time still largely agricultural, though less so than the rest of the country.
You really do have some odd ideas of what the country was like in 1860.
Article 1 starts by saying "The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That the President of the Confederate States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the Confederate States to meet the war thus commenced. "
in order to proceed with protection of Southern shipping, it only authorized the issuance of the letters of Marque
Funny sort of protection. Kind of like saying that we're going to protect our bank by commissioning robbers to hit someone else's bank.
With Charleston as full of fanatics as it was, you could send boats out to the fort to see what happens. Would the boats be fired on, ensuring that the US fired the first shot? Would the garrison surrender to a larger force without firing a shot? Would there be a lot of men milling around at the gates of the fort wondering what to do?
Once you get away from the idea of a "forced" war or a war by trickery, you realize that there were other options available at the time, if one had the wisdom and patience not to initiate force.
[you]: That definition leads a lot of room for subjectivity.
That’s true for both sides. I think Lincoln was counting on the South firing on his expedition or on Sumter. With one stroke he was able to get the South to shoot first, get the opportunity to blockade Southern Ports thus negating the difference in tariff rates, and get the backing of the Northern population because of the firing on the flag. He also succeeded or lucked into losing the battle of Fort Sumter, which meant that he didn't have to keep ferrying supplies to Sumter and defending the fort. Remember too that Lincoln had secretly pulled one of the key ships away from the Sumter expedition without alerting Fox and sent it to Fort Pickens. The Sumter expedition was too small to succeed -- far, far smaller than Anderson or Winfield Scott had previously advised would be required.
Years ago I saw this newspaper quote on another web site. I haven’t seen the paper itself, but it does echo my interpretations:
"Mr. Lincoln saw an opportunity to inaugurate civil war without appearing in the character of an aggressor." [Source: Providence Daily Post, April 13 1861].
As I think I alluded to earlier, Lincoln needed to (and did) keep Congress out of the way so he could take actions such as invading the South (Virginia, at least) that committed the country to war. Given the natural patriotic feeling in the North generated by all of this, Congress would have no political will to oppose his actions.
[me]: When he was informed that the Sumter expedition was coming, Anderson wrote that the coming expedition was the start of the war.
[you]: I had heard that about Major Anderson, though I can't find the quote right now. I do find a reference to Adam Goodheart's recent book arguing that the war really "began" on December 26th 1860 when Anderson moved his force to Sumter and raised the flag. Or maybe it "began" when Buchanan sent the Star of the West to resupply the fort. Or maybe it began on January 9th, 1861 when that ship was fired on. I'll stick with the usual answer: the war began on April 12th, 1861 when the fort was attacked.
I believe you and I had a discussion once about what date to use for the start of the war. Here is the Anderson quote [Source, my emphasis below]:
I had the honor to receive by yesterday's mail the letter of the honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4, and confess that what he there states surprises me very greatly, following as it does and contradicting so positively the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was authorized to make. I trust that this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such will be attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout our country.
It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of Captain Fox. I fear that its result cannot fail to be disastrous to all concerned. ...
... I ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon's remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be carried out. We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific measures to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer.
Anderson was not the only one to recognize what Lincoln was doing would start a war. Lincoln on April 5 gave a verbal order to reinforce Fort Pickens without telling the Confederates. He followed this up with a written order. The Confederates and the Union forces in Pensacola were still obeying the truce that had been negotiated between Florida and the Buchanan Administration. The Confederates had promised not to attack Fort Pickens if the Union did not reinforce it. A violation of the truce could result in a shooting war.
When the instruction to reinforce Fort Pickens finally arrived after much delay, the commander of the Union force off Pensacola, Captain Adams, refused to obey the order. Here is what he said at the time [Official Records of the Navies, Series 1, Vol. 4, pages 109-110, my emphasis below]:
… it [reinforcing Fort Pickens] would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war. … While I can not take on myself under such insufficient authority as General Scott's order the fearful responsibility of an act which seems to render civil war inevitable, I am ready at all times to carry out whatever orders I may receive from the honorable Secretary of the Navy.Because of the extensive delay, Lincoln asked Montgomery Meigs to help prepare a secret expedition to reinforce Fort Pickens. The expedition got underway on April 6. Here is what Meigs wrote on board the ship heading to Pensacola with orders to reinforce Fort Pickens in violation of the negotiated truce at that fort [Source, my emphasis below]
This is the beginning of the war which every statesman and soldier has foreseen since the passage of the South Carolina ordinance of secession.
These three key guys recognized at the time that Lincoln was taking actions that could provoke war. Obviously they hadn't gotten the message about who started the war.
The Official Records show that Union forces started reinforcing Fort Pickens on April 11. That was before the South fired on Fort Sumter. So, if Captain Adams was right, the North had already declared war on the South before the attack on Fort Sumter.
Sorry, that should have read March 5, the day after Lincoln's inauguration.
It might be useful to consider what the Confederates might have been concerned about when informed that the Sumter expedition was coming. Could they trust Lincoln's word that there would be no attempt to reinforce the fort if the South allowed the Union to resupply it? Would Lincoln use the occasion to inject 200 men and supplies for a year into the fort even if the South had allowed Lincoln to supply the fort with food?
The South Carolina governor had previously been told by Lincoln's agent Lamon that the fort would be evacuated. Seward had told the Confederate Commissioners in Washington much the same thing. Then suddenly here is this fleet of warships coming South.
The Confederate Commissioners said the following as they were leaving Washington [Source: New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 13, 1861]:
Washington, April 11. -- The Southern Commissioners charge the Administration with gross perfidy in attempting to reinforce Fort Sumter under pretext of evacuation.
They say the Montgomery Government earnestly desires peace. They return convinced that war is inevitable, saying the responsibility rests on the Administration.
I can imagine what would happen if I ignored a rattlesnake's warning rattle and came to close to it. It might bite me, but I couldn't really claim that I was just going to pet it while holding a pistol behind my back and it was the rattlesnake who initiated the hostilities.
Now for a quote from the (Republican press) New York Times in their April 12th edition:
Sumpter [sic] on the one side and the Fleet off the North Channel on the other, will effectively cover any relieving expedition, whether of open boats, tugs, or small vessels, from any maritime attack, and confine all resisting operations to the land batteries. Experience has shown -- as in the case of Gen. WILKINSON’S passage down the St. Lawrence during the last war [the Mexican War doesn’t count as a war in the Times view?], with five hundred boats, suffering but a trifling loss, in the face of strong shore batteries – that batteries cannot effectually prevent the passage of an armament. Still less can be done when the batteries themselves will be exposed to such a terrific fire as Major ANDERSON can for some hours at least, pour with his whole force on Moultrie and the battery near Cummings' Point, the only two places from which boats or light draft vessels can be fired upon to any purpose.
But ANDERSON’S fire will not be the only one to which Moultrie may be exposed, as the smaller vessels can take with impunity positions from which shell may be thrown with great effect. No matter how brave or skillful the Southern troops may be, they will be under a fire which will render the entire stoppage of relief to Fort Sumpter [sic] nearly impossible.
A storm prevented Northern ships from crossing over the Charleston bar and dispersed the Northern tugs that were to take in supplies.
Then the Times said the following:
… Why the Southern Commander, be he JEFFERSON DAVIS or Gen. BEAUREGARD, has delayed pouring on Sumpter [sic] his full force, and crushing it beneath an iron hail, if he could; why he has waited until, instead of concentrating his fire in security on one small point, he now has to defend a long straggling line [ten miles of shoreline], from a powerful fleet, it is impossible to tell. The reason may have been political; it may have been that there was not the vaunted readiness; it may have been incompetency; and it is not impossible that when the yawning abyss opened before them with all its horror, they may have lacked the insane courage required for the final leap.
The Times question shows a lack of understanding of Southern intentions. IMO, if the South had wanted war, they would have struck long before the North was ready just as the Times said and not waited until the Northern fleet was already on the way. The South had Commissioners in Washington trying to negotiate peace until the last moment. They were lied to by the Lincoln administration about the evacuation of Sumter and not officially received by Lincoln.
You said: "I have no idea what you are talking about here."
Again that was a reference to the Northeastern states.
You said: "The only raw material the North imported in large quantity for its industry that I'm aware of was cotton."
Wrong.
Cotton was not the largest import or the only one.
In 1860, the value of cotton imported into the Northeast was $110,000. (U.S. Treasury). The value of food imported the year before to the Northeastern states from the South was $200,000.
That should clear up the issue.
Here from the Annual Report of the US Treasury, 1859. It was a part of President Buchanan's State of the Union report of that year. That data was also developed in part from the US Census of 1860, and reported on by Thomas P. Kettell, "Southern Wealth and Northern Profits", pgs 73, 74, and 75.
Data from Reports:
1859 Value of Southern Produce sold to the North...$200,000,000.
1859 Value of produce and grains exported from the North to Europe...$40,047,700.
Quote: "The exports of bread stuffs and provisions are also due to the South, since but for the quantities of these which are sent North to feed the Eastern States, little or no Western produce could be spared for Europe, even at high prices. (pg. 72, Kettell).
Quote: "The barren hills of New England...they have hitherto had their food and materials brought to them." (pg. 72, Kettell).
Quote: (1859 food exports from the North)"...The quantity of these articles which went direct from the Northern States did not exceed the quantities which that section received from the South and from Canada." (pg. 73, Kettell).
So, if you believe the Treasury report you will see that your comment about Northern imports that you mentioned that "I'm aware of..." must now include food as being a large percentage of Northeastern imports.
You will also notice that your comment: "The Deep South did not even produce enough food to feed itself, with large imports from the North"... is also incorrect.
If you will consult Kettell's section III, you will find that the first table shows you that the Southern states produced in 1858 54 million slaughtered animals to the productions of 22 million in the west and 34 million in the Northeast.
With regard to grain, the South produced 307 million pounds while the West harvested 173 million and the Northeast produced 132 million.
T think your understanding of the productions of the late 1850s is entirely wrong.
Still no vote by the Confederate Congress to declare war.
Early in April the attention of the whole country, as well as that of our commissioners, was attracted to extraordinary preparations for an extensive military and naval expedition in New York and other Northern ports. These preparations commenced in secrecy, for an expedition whose destination was concealed, only became known when nearly completed, and on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April transports and vessels of war with troops, munitions, and military supplies sailed from-Northern ports bound southward.
Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication of the 12th of March; and thereupon received on the 8th of April a reply, dated on the 15th of the previous month, from which it appears that during the whole interval, whilst the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever; to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations.
That these assurances were given has been virtually confessed by the Government of the United States by its sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use force if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter. No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the conduct of the Government of the United States toward this Confederacy can be required than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this notice.
According to the usual course of navigation the vessels composing the expedition designed for the relief of Fort Sumter might be expected to reach Charleston Harbor on the 8th of April. Yet, with our commissioners actually in Washington, detained under assurances that notice should be given of any military movement, the notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to Charleston to give the notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was so given at a late hour on the 8th of April, the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to arrive.
That this maneuver failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who contrived it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition and gave time to the commander of our forces at Charleston to ask and receive the instructions of this Government. Even then, under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our commissioners, and the tortuous course of the Government of the United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from directing our fire on Fort Sumter if he would promise not to open fire on our forces unless first attacked.
This proposal was refused and the conclusion was reached that the design of the United States was to place the besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet and the fort. There remained, therefore, no alternative but to direct that the fort should at once be reduced.
************************************************
With this passage, you can see that the men of the Confederacy were astounded at the disingenuous people in the Oval office, and their unprecedented unwillingness to employ honesty and forthrightness in dealing with the entire situation. Trusted with the oaths of their office, the spirit of the Constitution, and the stature of their positions, they withheld, misrepresented, misdirected, and cloaked their actions in secrecy. This was not the government that the people deserved.
Not only did the Confederacy not know the limits of Lincoln's actions, for all they knew, a massive invasion was about to occur. Thus, firing on Ft. Sumter was a preemptive strike to abort invasion.
The Confederacy knew it was being pushed into firing on Union troops, but knew that falling back at Charleston would require the same tactic at Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, Richmond, and Birmingham.
The only honest political leaders in the situation were Jefferson Davis, who asked for Union cooperation both at the Presidential level as well as at Major Anderson's level, and Anderson himself.
The phrasing of the confederate declaration of war is entirely consistent with other US declarations of war, particularly of the 19th Century, documents that no rational person disputes are, indeed, declarations of war. And it was recognized as such by the confederates.
"I think, if you have no custom-house between Louisiana and the Upper Mississippi, merchants up there will come down and buy their goods at New Orleans. If they learn that at New York they can buy goods under a tariff of fifty percent., and that they can buy them at New Orleans under a tariff of only one third that, they will go down to New Orleans; and the result will be that we shall get very little revenue under the existing system. We may bandy witticisms; we may show our adroitness in debate; but this is a question which we have to look at practically. One of two things must be done: either you must prevent imports into those States, which I do not think you can do; and I do not suppose there is a Senator on this floor who believes that, under the existing laws, the President has authority to do it; or you must call Congress together, and invest him with some authority. If you do not do that, you must establish a line of custom houses on the border."
In other words, Clingman said the southern tariff undermined the Union tariff, therefore the Lincoln government would go to war.
How does this work? The importer who pays the duties may not be able to sell his imported goods at all (or may be forced to discount them) if Southern domestic goods are available at a lower price
If that becomes the case, the recipient of the imported goods will cease acquiring them due to the losses they cause him to incur by their uncompetitiveness with protected domestic prices. When that happens, trade stops.
The Morrill or protectionist tariff was by definition a barrier to trade.
The Morrill Tariff was not a relatively small burden by any reasonable standard. Some predicted average rates would reach about 45%, which they did.
Speeches such as Clingman's above indicate that the tariff would devastate the Union treasury.The fact is the tariff issue was there. They made speeches about it, drafted resolutions about it, and denounced it in their newspapers.
You have made several comments about the timing of Morrill and secession, as well as one about the fact that the South could have defeated it had the Congressmen stayed in Washington.
It passed the House in May 1860 and gained a supportive voice as the heir to the White House that November, all before a single one of them seceded. The only thing left was the Senate, and, by their own calculations of December 12th, 1860, the southerners knew they did not have the votes to stop it there.
Understand this:
Confederate States of America - Proclamation of April 17, 1861
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES.
A PROCLAMATION. Whereas, Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States has, by proclamation, announced the intention of invading this Confederacy with an armed force for the purpose of capturing its fortresses, and thereby subverting its independence and subjecting the free people thereof to the dominion of a foreign power; and, whereas, it has thus become the duty of this government to repel the threatened invasion, and to defend the rights and liberties of the people by all the means which the laws of nations and the usages of civilized warfare place at its disposal;
Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, do issue this my proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for commissions or letters of marque and reprisal to be issued under the seal of these Confederate States.
Clear?
The difference is a vote by the legislative body empowered to declare war, and its announcement. NO such thing in your references.
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