Press release: Iowa Supreme Court Rules in Marriage Case

Iowa Supreme Court ^ | 04/03/2009 | Iowa Supreme Court

[iowamark]

Iowa Supreme Court Rules in Marriage Case

Des Moines, April 3, 2009— In a unanimous decision, the Iowa Supreme Court

today held that the Iowa statute limiting civil marriage to a union between a man

and a woman violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.

The decision strikes the language from Iowa Code section 595.2 limiting civil

marriage to a man and a woman. It further directs that the remaining statutory

language be interpreted and applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian

people full access to the institution of civil marriage.

Today’s ruling resolves an action brought by six same-sex couples who were

refused marriage licenses by the Polk County Recorder. Except for the statutory

restriction that defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman, the

twelve plaintiffs met the legal requirements to marry in Iowa.

On August 30, 2007, the Polk County District Court issued a ruling determining

the statute was unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection

clauses of the Iowa Constitution. The district court initially ordered the county

recorder to begin processing marriage licenses for same-sex couples, but stayed

the order during the pendency of an appeal by the County.

Upon appeal to the supreme court, the parties and numerous amici curiae filed

extensive briefs. The supreme court heard oral argument on December 9, 2008,

and today issued its decision affirming the district court ruling. The court’s

decision becomes effective upon issuance of procedendo, which normally occurs

twenty-one days after the opinion is filed, unless a petition for rehearing is filed.

The entire opinion is available online at www.iowacourts.gov/supreme_court

Opinion Summary

The Iowa Supreme Court has the responsibility to determine if a law enacted by

the legislative branch and enforced by the executive branch violates the Iowa

Constitution. The court reaffirmed that a statute inconsistent with the Iowa

Constitution must be declared void, even though it may be supported by strong

and deep-seated traditional beliefs and popular opinion.

In addressing the case before it, the court found one constitutional principle was

at the heart of the case—the doctrine of equal protection. Equal protection under

the Iowa Constitution “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” Since territorial times, Iowa has given meaning to this

constitutional provision, striking blows to slavery and segregation, and

recognizing women’s rights. The court found the issue of same-sex marriage

comes to it with the same importance as the landmark cases of the past.

Equal Protection Principles. Under Iowa’s tripartite system of government,

courts give respect to the legislative process and presume its enactments are

constitutional. The deference afforded to legislative policy-making is manifested

in the level of scrutiny applied to review legislative action. In most equal

protection cases, the court applies a very deferential standard known as the

“rational basis test.” Under this test, “[t]he plaintiff has the heavy burden of

showing the statute unconstitutional and must negate every reasonable basis

upon which the classification may be sustained.” Classifications based on race,

alienage, or national origin and those affecting fundamental rights are, however,

evaluated under a “strict scrutiny” standard. Classifications subject to strict

scrutiny are presumptively invalid and must be narrowly tailored to serve a

compelling governmental interest. The court also recognized that an

intermediate tier has been applied to statutes classifying persons on the basis of

gender or illegitimacy. Under this level of scrutiny, a party seeking to uphold the

statute must demonstrate the challenged classification is substantially related to

the achievement of an important governmental objective.

Similarly Situated People. Prior to proceeding to an application of the equal

protection analysis, the court addressed the County’s request that it apply a

threshold test. Under this threshold test, if the plaintiffs cannot show as a

preliminary matter that they are similarly situated, courts do not further consider

whether their different treatment under a statute is permitted under the equal

protection clause. The County asserts that plaintiffs are not similarly situated to

civilly married heterosexuals because they cannot procreate naturally.

The court rejected the County’s analysis, finding the threshold analysis

advocated by the County results in the avoidance of a full equal protection

analysis. Equal protection demands that laws treat alike all people who are

“similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of the law.” “ ‘[S]imilarly

situated’ cannot mean simply ‘similar in the possession of the classifying trait.’

All members of any class are similarly situated in this respect, and consequently,

any classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test.” Likewise,

“similarly situated” cannot be interpreted to require plaintiffs be identical in every

way to people treated more favorably by the law. “No two people or groups of

people are the same in every way, and nearly every equal protection claim could

be run aground [under] a threshold analysis” that requires the two groups “be a

mirror image of one another.” Rather, equal protection demands that the law

itself must be equal. It requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated

with respect to the purposes of the law alike. Thus, the purposes of the law must

be referenced for a meaningful evaluation.

The purpose of Iowa’s marriage law is to provide an institutional basis for

defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in

committed relationships. It also serves to recognize the status of the parties’

committed relationship. In this case, the court concluded, plaintiffs are similarly

situated compared to heterosexual persons; they are in committed relationships

and official recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining

their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities.

Classification Undertaken in Iowa Code Section 595.2. Having determined

that the plaintiffs were similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis,

the court next addressed the classification undertaken in Iowa’s marriage statute.

The plaintiffs contended the statute classifies and discriminates on the bases of

gender and sexual orientation while the County argued the same-sex marriage

ban does not discriminate on either basis. The court concluded that “[t]he benefit

denied by the marriage statute—the status of civil marriage for same-sex

couples—is so ‘closely correlated with being homosexual’ as to make it apparent

the law is targeted at gay and lesbian people as a class.” Therefore, the court

proceeded to analyze the statute’s constitutionality based on sexual-orientation

discrimination.

Appropriate Level of Judicial Scrutiny. The next issue addressed by the court

was whether sexual orientation is a suspect class entitled to a heightened level of

scrutiny beyond rational basis. Four factors utilized in determining whether

certain legislative classifications warrant a more demanding constitutional

analysis were considered: (1) the history of invidious discrimination against the

class burdened by the legislation; (2) whether the characteristics that distinguish

the class indicate a typical class member’s ability to contribute to society; (3)

whether the distinguishing characteristic is “immutable,” or beyond the class

members’ control; and (4) the political power of the subject class.

In its analysis, the court found each factor supported a finding that classification

by sexual orientation warranted a heightened scrutiny. The court, citing historical

as well as present-day examples, concluded that gay and lesbian people as a

group have long been the victim of purposeful and invidious discrimination

because of their sexual orientation. There was no evidence that the

characteristic that defines the members of this group—sexual orientation—bears

any logical relationship to their ability to perform productively in society, either in

familial relations or otherwise. Addressing the issue of immutability, the court

found sexual orientation to be central to personal identity and that its alteration, if

at all, could only be accomplished at the expense of significant damage to the

individual’s sense of self. This, the court concluded, would be wholly

unacceptable for the government to require anyone to do. Finally, the court

found that, despite their securing of significant legal protections against

discrimination in recent years, gay and lesbian people have not become so

politically powerful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that produces

discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Intermediate Scrutiny Standard: Governmental Objectives. Based upon the

above analysis, the court proceeded to examine Iowa’s same-sex marriage ban

under an intermediate scrutiny standard. “To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a

statutory classification must be substantially related to an important

governmental objective.” In determining whether exclusion of gay and lesbian

people from civil marriage is substantially related to any important governmental

objective, the court considered each of the County’s proffered objectives in

support of the marriage statute. The objectives asserted by the County were (1)

tradition, (2) promoting the optimal environment for children, (3) promoting

procreation, (4) promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships, and (5)

preservation of state resources. In considering these objectives, the court

examined whether the objective purportedly advanced by the classification is

important and, if so, whether the governmental objective can fairly be said to be

advanced by the legislative classification.

Maintaining Traditional Marriage. Initially, the court considered the County’s

argument the same-sex marriage ban promotes the “integrity of traditional

marriage” by “maintaining the historical and traditional marriage norm ([as] one

between a man and a woman).” The court noted that, when tradition is offered

as a justification for preserving a statutory scheme challenged on equal

protection grounds, the court must determine whether the reasons underlying the

tradition are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. These reasons, the

court found, must be something other than the preservation of tradition by itself.

“When a certain tradition is used as both the governmental objective and the

classification to further that objective, the equal protection analysis is transformed

into the circular question of whether the classification accomplishes the

governmental objective, which objective is to maintain the classification.” Here,

the County offered no governmental reason underlying the tradition of limiting

marriage to heterosexual couples, so the court proceeded to consider the other

reasons advanced by the County for the legislative classification.

Promotion of Optimal Environment to Raise Children. The second of the

County’s proffered governmental objectives involves promoting child rearing by a

father and a mother in a marital relationship, the optimal milieu according to

some social scientists. Although the court found support for the proposition that

the interests of children are served equally by same-sex parents and oppositesex

parents, it acknowledged the existence of reasoned opinions that dualgender

parenting is the optimal environment for children. Nonetheless, the court

concluded the classification employed to further that goal—sexual orientation—

did not pass intermediate scrutiny because it is significantly under-inclusive and

over-inclusive.

The statute, the court found, is under-inclusive because it does not exclude from

marriage other groups of parents—such as child abusers, sexual predators,

parents neglecting to provide child support, and violent felons—that are

undeniably less than optimal parents. If the marriage statute was truly focused

on optimal parenting, many classifications of people would be excluded, not

merely gay and lesbian people. The statute is also under-inclusive because it

does not prohibit same-sex couples from raising children in Iowa. The statute is

over-inclusive because not all same-sex couples choose to raise children. The

court further noted that the County failed to show how the best interests of

children of gay and lesbian parents, who are denied an environment supported

by the benefits of marriage under the statute, are served by the ban, or how the

ban benefits the interests of children of heterosexual parents. Thus, the court

concluded a classification that limits civil marriage to opposite-sex couples is

simply not substantially related to the objective of promoting the optimal

environment to raise children.

Promotion of Procreation. Next, the court addressed the County’s argument

that endorsement of traditional civil marriage will result in more procreation. The

court concluded the County’s argument is flawed because it fails to address the

required analysis of the objective: whether exclusion of gay and lesbian

individuals from the institution of civil marriage will result in more procreation.

The court found no argument to support the conclusion that a goal of additional

procreation would be substantially furthered by the exclusion of gays and

lesbians from civil marriage.

Promoting Stability in Opposite-Sex Relationships. The County also

asserted that the statute promoted stability in opposite-sex relationships. The

court acknowledged that, while the institution of civil marriage likely encourages

stability in opposite-sex relationships, there was no evidence to support that

excluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage makes opposite-sex

marriage more stable.

Conservation of Resources. Finally, the court rejected the County’s argument

that banning same-sex marriages in a constitutional fashion conserves state

resources. The argument in support of the same-sex marriage ban is based on a

simple premise: civilly married couples enjoy numerous governmental benefits,

so the state’s fiscal burden associated with civil marriage is reduced if less

people are allowed to marry. While the ban on same-sex marriage may

conserve some state resources, so would excluding any number of identifiable

groups. However, under intermediate scrutiny the sexual-orientation-based

classification must substantially further the conservation-of-resources objective.

Here again, the court found it was over- and under-inclusive and did not

substantially further the suggested governmental interest.

Religious Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage. Having addressed and rejected

each specific interest articulated by the County, the court addressed one final

ground believed to underlie the same-sex marriage debate—religious opposition.

Recognizing the sincere religious belief held by some that the “sanctity of

marriage” would be undermined by the inclusion of gay and lesbian couples, the

court nevertheless noted that such views are not the only religious views of

marriage. Other, equally sincere groups have espoused strong religious views

yielding the opposite conclusion. These contrasting opinions, the court finds,

explain the absence of any religious-based rationale to test the constitutionality of

Iowa’s same-sex marriage statute. “Our constitution does not permit any branch

of government to resolve these types of religious debates and entrusts to courts

the task of ensuring government avoids them . . . . The statute at issue in this

case does not prescribe a definition of marriage for religious institutions. Instead,

the statute, declares, ‘Marriage is a civil contract’ and then regulates that civil

contract . . . . Thus, in pursuing our task in this case, we proceed as civil judges,

far removed from the theological debate of religious clerics, and focus only on the

concept of civil marriage and the state licensing system that identifies a limited

class of persons entitled to secular rights and benefits associated with marriage.”

Constitutional Infirmity. In concluding the marriage statute is constitutionally

infirm, the court stated:

We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and lesbian

people from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially

further any important governmental objective. The legislature has

excluded a historically disfavored class of persons from a

supremely important civil institution without a constitutionally

sufficient justification. There is no material fact, genuinely in

dispute, that can affect this determination.

We have a constitutional duty to ensure equal protection of

the law. Faithfulness to that duty requires us to hold Iowa’s

marriage statute, Iowa Code section 595.2, violates the Iowa

Constitution. To decide otherwise would be an abdication of our

constitutional duty. If gay and lesbian people must submit to

different treatment without an exceedingly persuasive justification,

they are deprived of the benefits of the principle of equal protection

upon which the rule of law is founded. Iowa Code section 595.2

denies gay and lesbian people the equal protection of the law

promised by the Iowa Constitution.

# # #

2009

Iowa Supreme Court

1111 East Court Avenue

Des Moines, IA 50319

515-281-3952

[manc]

agreed is there a movement to get their state constitution changed there?

Is there any chance of appeal and if so then the homo’s cannot marry legally , am I correct?

[Lou Budvis]

“What date did the U.S. die on?”

November 4, 2008.

[ramjet50]

To all good Iowans, you are welcome to come south to Missouri. Make sure you have a job, or can relocate your business here. Our tax BASE will then lower our overall taxes, and those who are left in Iowa will have what they want & Missouri’s economy will burgeon. I also share this info with residents of Neb. & Ks.

[SlothDC]

Well, animals and children are not consenting adults capable of entering into a contract, so that’s a null argument.

[manc]

so they say the ban is unconstitutional
are these people in this world at all.

This now says that any kind of marriage can be legal, man and his sister, mother and her daughter, man with his dag, two or ten wives to a man.

what on earth is going on and why haven’;t they got this in their constitution like many of us down here

[manc]

so what you are saying is that now the homo’s can marry legally?

If so why doesn’;t all sorts of weirdo’s go there and get their kind of marriage legal, after all the court has said that to ban this kind of marriage is unconstitutional

[seatrout]

—It doesn’t matter what they think, we changed our constitution. —

Thank God for that.

[manc]

this is why the next election is more important and we have to take seats to stop this.

We have to go on the attack and we have to let the people know that the Dem party is for illegal,s homo’s handouts, high taxes

this is the problem wit the GOP they never get their message out

[manc]

right now I feel that the south the midwest and AK should go it alone as this is pathetic.

we cannot have a small handful of people forcing their perverted sick lifestyles on to us and then saying they are normal anymore

[Bokababe]

You're going to hate this, and I know I am going to get bashed for saying it, but the only way to prevent the legality of "gay marriage" is to take the concept of "marriage" out of the purview of politicians and the courts and put it back in the hands of priest, ministers and rabbis.

Secular law is there to provide equal protection of its citizenry, and as long as the law has the ability to support "marriage as only between a man and a woman", it also has the ability to destroy that concept.

"Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's" -- all the the law should be concerned with is the legal aspect of a partnership -- ie domestic partnership (for all of us).

Let "marriage" stay where it belongs -- in the hands of the clergy who have a higher concept and purpose for it -- not in the hands of politicians and judges who have no such higher concept or purpose.

Frankly, unless all our States move toward "domestic partnerships" only for straights and gays, I think that we are going to see States fall prey to recognizing gay marraige, one by one, whether we like it or not.

I'm in California and I don't think Prop 8 (defining "marriage as only between a man and a woman") is going to hold up in the courts.

[Beagle8U]

In Michigan, any ballot initiative voted in by the majority is automatically part of our constitution.

We banned affirmative action the same way.

[Ghengis]

This also increases the likelihood that the US will be a target of Muslim terrorism. The Muslims (correctly) see homosexuality as an abomination. They won’t take kindly to rulings like this.

Yes. Except for their rampant practice of homosexuality on the "down low" in many Islamic cultures.

[magellan]

The flaw is the court assumes marriage is a right, and therefore subject to equal protection. But marriage has never been a right. If it was, there would be no restrictions on bloodlines (i.e., cousins marrying), no requirement for blood tests, no requirements for waiting periods, no restrictions on marriage with one or two parties being mentally handicapped, etc.

Current Iowa law does not allow cousins to marry. I assume two cousins can enter into any other legal contract. The restriction of cousins marrying in Iowa assumes genetic reproduction, and therefore could not apply to same sex couples. So how could two gay cousins be prevented from marrying? I can't wait for those lawsuits to start.

Some states allow cousin marriage if both parties are past childbearing years, or if one party is sterile. If that is not a violation of equal protection, I do not know what is. But, if marriage is not a right, no violation of equal protection should exist.

If marriage is a right, and just like any other contract, there is no reason siblings cannot marry, or parents marry their own children.

In fact, if marriage is a right, why can't a widower marry his single daughter, therefore avoiding probate and estate issues?

[BlueStateBlues]

Does Michigan have a movement to recognize these out-of-state gay marriages, or any lawsuits on the issue? I think the lefties want to avoid this type of lawsuit, maybe a conservative think tank should file one just to get the issue into the court system and up to the Supremes just as the 2010 election cycle unfolds.

[TheRobb7]

The full 69 page opinion is at:”

Sometimes the jokes write themselves..............

[seatrout]

—Yes. Except for their rampant practice of homosexuality on the “down low” in many Islamic cultures—

Yes, young boys especially are notoriously “popular” in that subculture. Does seem that hypocrisy (something that Islam supposedly considers abominable) is at play here.

[boxlunch]

I agree! States have got to start taking a stand against the Federal judicial tyranny going on!

[seatrout]

True enough. But in this case (as with Mass.) it was state judicial tyranny.

[SomeCallMeTim]

In fact, if marriage is a right, why can't a widower marry his single daughter, therefore avoiding probate and estate issues?

It's a shame you weren't on the legal team in Iowa trying to defend Marriage. Your point make more sense than they way they tried to argue.

If, as a society, we don't have the right to define "marriage" as between a man and a woman, then by what right can we define it at all?

It's open season now... I'm rather fond of my neighbor's spotted sheep. :-)

[Liberty1970]

Yeah, how about marriage to animals and to siblings and children? People who want that have rights. Why should the state intervene on someones “love.”

Why limit it there? I want to marry my furniture so I can claim additional tax deductions. Who says I can't? It's not fair!