The Lessons from D-Day

Real Clear Politics ^ | June 07, 2007 | Victor Davis Hanson

[gpapa]

Sixty-three years ago this week, we landed on the Normandy beaches. As on each anniversary of June 6, 1944, much has been written to commemorate the bravery and competence of the victorious Anglo-American forces.

All true. But as we ponder this achievement of the Greatest Generation that helped lead to the surrender of Nazi Germany less than a year later, we should remember that the entire campaign was, as Wellington said of Waterloo, a near-run thing.

Our forefathers made several mistakes. They attacked nonexistent artillery emplacements. Planes dropped paratroopers far from intended targets. Critical landing assignments on Omaha Beach were missed.

[LouAvul]

It is a wonder we won that war with the way we started. German tanks took out three of our Shermans for every one of theirs lost. The MG 42 was the best machine gun on earth. And Hitler had jet airplanes.

But God was listening to the children dying in the concentration camps and was on our side.

[InMemoriam]

A German armored officer complained, “We were able to destroy ten tanks for every one of ours lost. Unfortunately, the Americans always had eleven.”

Can’t find the source with Google - quote is best of my recollection.

[Bush2004]

At dawn, on the morning of the 6th of June, 1944, 225 Rangers jumped off the British landing craft and ran to the bottom of these cliffs. Their mission was one of the most difficult and daring of the invasion: to climb these sheer and desolate cliffs and take out the enemy guns. The Allies had been told that some of the mightiest of these guns were here and they would be trained on the beaches to stop the Allied advance.

The Rangers looked up and saw the enemy soldiers--the edge of the cliffs shooting down at them with machine guns and throwing grenades. And the American Rangers began to climb. They shot rope ladders over the face of these cliffs and began to pull themselves up. When one Ranger fell, another would take his place. When one rope was cut, a Ranger would grab another and begin his climb again. They climbed, shot back, and held their footing. Soon, one by one, the Rangers pulled themselves over the top, and in seizing the firm land at the top of these cliffs, they began to seize back the continent of Europe. Two hundred and twenty-five came here. After two days of fighting, only 90 could still bear arms.

Behind me is a memorial that symbolizes the Ranger daggers that were thrust into the top of these cliffs. And before me are the men who put them there.

These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc.

Ronald Reagan's D-Day Speech

[neverdem]

bump & a ping

[glorgau]

Say what you want about Sherman tanks, American infantry had the best battle rifle of any army - the M-1.

[LouAvul]

Stephen Ambrose (”Citizen Soldiers”, “Band of Brothers”) said that our tanks were so inferior to Hitler’s that our guys became expert at “hide and seek.”

[Tolik]

besides Real Clear Politics, this article is posted:

Lessons from Normandy: National Review: In the face of an utterly savage enemy, American never gave up.

War is by nature horrific, fraught with foolish error — and only won by the side that commits the least number of mistakes.

The Other D-Day: JewishWorldReview and TownHall  

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[andy58-in-nh]

"The American lesson of D-Day and its aftermath was how to overcome occasional abject stupidity while never giving up in the face of an utterly savage enemy. We need to remember that now more than ever."

Great quote from VDH.

[The Pack Knight]

The Sherman was inferior in armor and firepower, but they were far more reliable mechanically. They suffered breakdowns anywhere from a fourth down to an eighth as often as German tanks. The Russian T34 suffered half the breakdowns of German tanks. This was immensely important in the realm where wars are really won and lost, logistics.

[metesky]

Hanson at his best, clear, logical, concise and tuned into historic realities.

[Madame Dufarge]

Of course, World War II was an all-out fight for our very existence in a way many believe the war against terror that began on 9/11 is not

Political correctness and the death of clarity.

What an awful tragedy.

[dfwgator]

“War is a series of calamaties that result in victory.” - Clemenceau

[garjog]

Just be glad that Harry Ried wasn’t the commander in chief on that day.

[exit82]

Lesson of D-Day: Tactical nukes are best.

[Valin]

The problem is too many people when comparing WWII with the GWOT is they are two different kinds of war. WWII was a conventional war the GWOT is a guerilla war, you do not fight them the same way.

Fighting the War on Terror
A counterinsurgency strategy
James S. Corum

page 26
Counterinsurgency Theories
(snip)
The American and British counterinsurgency experts outlined the following basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare
1 The civilian population is understood as the center of gravity in an insurgency. One cannot fight insurgents effectively without winning the support of the population. Ideally the counterinsurgency strategy should be geared to driving a wedge between the population and the rebels.

2 Successful counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and economic action. Since insurgencies grow out of large scale dissatisfaction with the government, the means must be found to address the social, political, and economic problems that provide the fuel for insurgency.

3 There needs to be a unity of effort by government forces, that is close coordination between the military and civilian agencies at every level.

4 Effectively fighting the insurgents, who usually live among and draw support from the civilian population, requires good intelligence. Military and police action without good intelligence is largely a wasted effort. To fight the insurgent one has to find him.

5 Military and civic action campaigns need to proceed simultaneously and be coordinated with each other.

6 The government needs to wage an effective media campaign to reassure the population and undermine support for the insurgent.

7 Military and police powers needs to be applied carefully and with discrimination. A heavy handed approach is wasteful and can cause discontent among the population.

______________________________________________________________________

In addition to the British/American theory of counterinsurgency some officers in the French army developed their own theory
(snip)
The French view, expressed by French army Colonel Roger Trinquier and published as Modern Warfare in 1961 was widely read in both French and English editions. The French model differed considerably from the British/American model. Trinquier, who had long experience in counterinsurgency, outlined some very useful tactics in dealing with urban rebellion, including discussions of how to seal off a city district, collect comprehensive data on the population and register the whole population as a means to identify the insurgents from outside the area, and limit the ability of the insurgents to move within the country.
Trinquier’s theory differed enormously from the Anglo-Saxon model on several key points.
First he saw counterinsurgency primarily in military terms. For Trinquier, establishing military presence and crushing the insurgents by force was the first priority. In contrast with the British and America view that military action had to be carried out simultaneously with civic action programs, Trinquier argued first for military action to crush the insurgents. While civic action programs were important, they would be carried out only after the insurgency had been crushed by force.
Whereas British and American theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s believed that building up a legitimate government and supporting indigenous institutions were the key elements of counterinsurgency strategy, there is little of this in Trinquier’s work. Essentially, Trinquier believed in strong arming the population into compliance with French rule.

Trinquier’s approach could bring short team success. The most notable example was Algeria, where the French army essentially broke the back of the insurgent movement by 1960. However in the long run, by ignoring the need to build public support for the government, the French approach led to strategic failure. One illustration of the French approach’s lack of political considerations was to policy of torturing and abusing insurgent prisoners in Algeria. Trinquier advocated the widespread use of such means’s of obtaining intelligence information, although he did not advocate the widespread use of such means. He failed to understand the breakdown in army discipline that occurs when moral and legal boundaries are crossed.
(snip)

[Brimack34]

Thanks for the post. I hope Newt reads this next time he rips how this war was run. He ignores his own books.