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RUSSIA'S GROWING DOMINATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
MEANS POLAND HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ORIENT
ITSELF FULLY TOWARDS THE WEST

Review of article by Andrzej Grajewski, Deputy Editor in Chief
Catholic Weekly "Gosc Niedzielny" in "Rzeczpospolita"
Polish News Bulletin; Warsaw, Poland, Mar 11, 2004

Two important processes will be completed this year that will ultimately
determine Poland's place in Europe, writes Andrzej Grajewski, deputy editor
in chief of the Catholic weekly Gosc Niedzielny, in a recent issue of
Rzeczpospolita.

The first process relates to the key terms of European integration and the
EU's institutional shape. The second one concerns Russia's attempts to
dominate the post-Soviet space in Eastern Europe, notably Belarus and
Ukraine.

Patriotically-oriented Russian politicians, writes Grajewski, accepted the
Soviet Union's collapse because they wanted to rebuild a strong Russian
statehood instead. A crumbling, costly empire was sacrificed to save its
healthy core ? Russia. At the same time, efforts were made to secure control
of areas that would determine the new Russia's geostrategic capacities. That
is why, among other things, Russia intervened militarily in the Dnestr
region, fought two Chechen wars, put in place a military presence on the
border with China and Afghanistan in Tajikistan, and helped install
pro-Moscow regimes in all former Soviet republics in Central Asia.

The integration of economic structures has been less successful. More
important, however, than the Commonwealth of Independent States' dubious
achievements was the way the political Russian elites thought about their
neighbours, a philosophy expressed in the term "Close Abroad." During the
Vladimir Putin presidency, the not too far abroad has become an even closer
one for Russia. In particular, this applies to Poland's eastern neighbours,
Belarus and Ukraine.

Ukraine's and Belarus's Orientation Undecided

Ever since the early 18th century when Peter the Great laid the groundwork
for an empire that would capture Poland's easternmost territories, conflict
between the two countries was inevitable. Poland came out the loser. Russia
opposed any form of Polish statehood, fearing the reborn state would raise
the issue of the captured territories.

The 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia added a socio-ideological dimension
to the civilisational-cultural conflict. The Polish-Russian war of 1920
failed to determine the question of domination in Belarus and south-eastern
Poland, and the dispute was only limited to the areas Soviet propaganda
referred to as Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

For Soviet Russia, the invasion of September 17, 1939, was an act of
historical justice, a unification of lands belonging to Russia's natural
zone of influence in a single state organism. A border agreement made
between Soviet Russia and Poland's provisional government in August 1945
only legitimated a political reality that was also accepted by the western
powers.

The Soviet Union's collapse, writes Grajewski, again put the question of
Russian domination in Central and Eastern Europe on the agenda. While the
Baltic states adopted a clearly pro-western course, Ukraine's and Belarus's
choice has not been clearly defined. Ukraine's foreign policy has been a
constant zigzagging between initiatives towards European and Atlantic
integration and a continuing strong attraction of the powerful Russian
magnet. Moscow has also skilfully exploited pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine
itself.

Belarus represents an even more complicated case. While president Alexander
Lukashenka is rightly cast in Poland as a villain, it should be noted that
he created a model of statehood that gives Belarussians a substitute of
sovereignty in what is probably the only form possible at the current stage
in the development of their national identity.

For many months now, Lukashenka has been a very uncomfortable partner for
the Kremlin in the talks on the new shape of the Union of Belarus and
Russia, trying to secure maximum sovereignty for his own regime. While
personal ambitions and egotism have certainly played a part here, one should
not rule out the possibility that Lukashenka is also motivated by political
realism and concern for Belarussian statehood that is so uncomfortable to so
many.

In Ukraine, and, particularly, Belarus, the West has done little to support
the forces opposing Russian domination. If the pending talks between Minsk
and Moscow on the introduction of a common currency end with Lukashenka
accepting Russia's terms, which include a single central bank in Moscow,
Belarus's sovereignty will be greatly reduced and Lukashenka's own rule will
face decline.

In Ukraine, if president Leonid Kuchma decides to violate the constitution
to prolong his rule, he will find himself in Russia's embrace, and dependent
on Kremlin's support.

Poland Set to Remain a Challenge for Russian Ambitions

Putin's Russia, writes Grajewski, will certainly remain oriented towards the
West. At the same time, it will do everything to dominate the post-Soviet
space of Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. It has sufficiently strong
assets to influence the course of events in that area. This means that
Poland is losing its eastern buffer and becoming a border state again. It is
not yet clear how the EU's eastern policy is going to look like.

It is in Poland's interest for its eastern border not to become a line of
new division in Central and Eastern Europe. But irrespective of how much
effort Poland puts into developing good relations with the area of eastern
European integration, i.e. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, the situation there

will be determined by the course of events in Russia following Putin's
victory in the this month's presidential elections.

As the EU's easternmost outpost, Poland will always remain a challenge to
Russia's ambitions of domination in eastern Europe. For Belarus, Ukraine,
and the Kaliningrad enclave, Poland will serve as an alternative model of
civilisational and social development, weakening their ties with Russia.
This is why Poland poorly integrated with the European and Atlantic
structures is in Russia's interest.

Russia's interests in Poland are clearly defined today: security of all
kinds of communication and transport routes with the West, security of
commodity transmission lines, particularly natural gas pipelines, and the
securing of a monopoly on the markets for those commodities. The failure of
the Norwegian gas pipeline project, the illegal installation of a
high-capacity fibre-optic connection along the Polish stretch of the Yamal
gas pipeline, or the perturbations around the Odessa-Brody-Plock oil
pipeline project all show that the Russians know how to protect their
interests in Poland.

Tomorrow, perhaps, they will raise again the issue of creating a corridor
that would link Russia proper with the Kaliningrad enclave. Poland's western
partners will look at those postulates with understanding, especially that
they have long co-operated with Russia on various strategic projects.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia stands a chance to become a
global power again. Its immense natural resources and the professionalism of
its political leaders, most of whom are former members of the security
services, or siloviki, open up the prospect of rapid economic growth and
civilisational development.

For the first time in its history, Russia is building its statehood almost
solely on the basis of Russian population. For many Russians, the choice of
Orthodox Christianity as an unofficial state religion strengthens the
specificity of Russian identity. Thanks to Putin's efforts, this year will
probably see the historical unification of the Moscow patriarchate with the
Russian expatriate church, which is going to further strengthen the Russian
Orthodoxy's role in the world of eastern Christianity.

As a result, Russian nationalism will receive a boost from Orthodox
messianism.

Poland Torn Between East and West Would Be Worst Scenario

Western Europe, writes Grajewski, has been watching the recent developments
in Russia calmly. While the Polish press reacted to the results of the
autumn parliamentary elections, which saw the democratic forces
marginalised, with fear, the west's perception has been wholly different.
For western Europe, and France and Germany in particular, the election
results only confirmed Russia's specific line of development, always
different than the European model.

The most important thing, it has been stressed, is that Russia is now more
stable, more predictable, and thus a better business partner. Russia would
have to experience a catastrophe, something that fortunately seems unlikely,
for the West to change its good opinion about Putin's state.

If the EU splits into two areas of integration, Poland should be aware that
the member states favouring closer co-operation perceive Russia as one of
their main strategic allies. If they started passing Poland over in their
dealings with Russia, Poland would be marginalised and its peripheral
situation would only be exacerbated. The consequences would be so dire that
today's problems with Nice and the EU constitution would shrink in
comparison.

Poland's integration with the EU, says Grajewski, is not taking place in a
geopolitical vacuum. Going west, Poland should not be forgetting what is
going on in the east, and the processing occurring there should cause it to
integrate as quickly and as fully as possible with the European structures.
One should not fear a strong Russia. It clearly something that the modern
world needs. What one fears is a weak Poland, torn between the East and
West, a hybrid unable to make a consistent choice. (END)(ARTUIS)

CHILD TRAFFICKING IN MOLDOVA
An estimated 1.2 million children worldwide are victims of child
trafficking. One of them is Ioana, who was trafficked from Moldova
to Ukraine. Natalia Cojocaru, a Moldavian journalist for the
newspaper "Timpul" reports.

Chisinau, Moldova, ILO Line, March, 2004

CHISINAU, Moldova (ILO Online) - Last year, life for 15 year-old
Ioana had become unbearable. Though she was one of the best pupils in
her class, she had abandoned school and decided to leave her home and
her alcoholic parents, moving in with her grandparents.

One day, while at the market here in the Moldavian capital, she met a
woman from a neighbouring village who listened attentively to her
woes and proposed that she accompany her to Ukraine where she could
find a job.

Customs was no problem. Despite her young age, Ioana was able to
cross the border in the company of a stranger, identified only by a
birth certificate of a trafficker's (neighbor lady's) daughter.

>From September to April 2003, Ioana was forced to sell goods on a
market in Ukraine. As compensation, she received a pair of winter
clothes and food. Eventually, Ukrainian police who had been searching
for her at the request of her mother, found the girl and returned her
to her home. Paradoxically, Ioana reportedly told the police she
preferred life with the trafficker to her own home, believing life
was better on the run than among her alcoholic parents.

Though not entirely typical, Ioana's story is sadly common in this
impoverished nation and elsewhere throughout the region. Though the
precise number of children trafficked from Moldova and other
countries in the area is unknown and data are unavailable from local
authorities, the Temporary Centre for Minors in Moscow, Russia,
estimates that more than 50 per cent of the children begging on
Moscow streets are from Moldova. In 2001, the Russian Ministry of
Internal Affairs registered 500 minors trafficked from Moldova to
Russia for begging, of which some had been sexually abused.

The First Annual Report of the Counter-Trafficking Clearing Point 1/
reveals that the majority of victims trafficked for sexual
exploitation from Moldova to mainly Balkan countries are between 18
and 24 years of age. Other sources say younger children are
trafficked to Russia and Ukraine for economic exploitation. The lack
of visa requirements for CIS member states facilitates illegal
transportation of children within this region.

The International Organization for Migration and the NGO "La Strada"
report that 40 per cent of children trafficked to CIS, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo and
Albania come from abusive, single-parent families or have been in
boarding institutions. More than a half are orphans, or lost the
contact with their parents.

In either case, they are easy prey for traffickers. Minors are often
recruited from rural areas where about 60 per cent face a higher risk
of sinking into poverty because of the low productivity and incomes
in the agricultural sector affecting the overwhelming majority of
rural workers.

Moldova, Romania and Ukraine are reported as most significant sending
countries in terms of scale and Albania as a major source and transit
country for the trafficking of women and children from the Balkans to
Western Europe. To support the Government of Moldova fulfill its
commitments under relevant international labour standards governing
child labour 2/, the ILO included Moldova in the recently launched
sub-regional project called "Combating Trafficking of Children for
Labour and Sexual Exploitation in the Balkans, Ukraine and Republic
of Moldova".

This three-year project will be funded by the Governments of the
Unites States and Germany and implemented by the ILO International
Program on Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), a leader in
accomplishing of action programs against child Labour.

The project mainly aims at improving capacity of governments, workers
and employers' organizations, NGOs and others in civil society
concerned about child trafficking to effectively prevent and
eliminate child labour, giving priority to its worst forms; to
reinforce the existing mechanisms; and to provide for knowledge and
experience sharing on child labour and replication of best practices
interventions at national and at the sub-regional level.

In line with the provisions of the recently signed Memorandum of
Understanding for cooperation in the area of eliminating of child
labour, and being committed to ensure in-country "ownership" and
sustainability of the IPEC's interventions, the Government of Moldova
will create a National Steering Committee (NSC) to observe the
achievement by the Government and responsible agencies of the
objectives and targets set by the ILO programmes. Participation of
various governmental, social and non-governmental partners in the NSC
will contribute to the mainstreaming of the issues of working
children into all relevant national policies.