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RUSSIA'S GROWING DOMINATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
MEANS POLAND HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ORIENT
ITSELF FULLY TOWARDS THE WEST

Review of article by Andrzej Grajewski, Deputy Editor in Chief
Catholic Weekly "Gosc Niedzielny" in "Rzeczpospolita"
Polish News Bulletin; Warsaw, Poland, Mar 11, 2004

Two important processes will be completed this year that will ultimately
determine Poland's place in Europe, writes Andrzej Grajewski, deputy editor
in chief of the Catholic weekly Gosc Niedzielny, in a recent issue of
Rzeczpospolita.

The first process relates to the key terms of European integration and the
EU's institutional shape. The second one concerns Russia's attempts to
dominate the post-Soviet space in Eastern Europe, notably Belarus and
Ukraine.

Patriotically-oriented Russian politicians, writes Grajewski, accepted the
Soviet Union's collapse because they wanted to rebuild a strong Russian
statehood instead. A crumbling, costly empire was sacrificed to save its
healthy core ? Russia. At the same time, efforts were made to secure control
of areas that would determine the new Russia's geostrategic capacities. That
is why, among other things, Russia intervened militarily in the Dnestr
region, fought two Chechen wars, put in place a military presence on the
border with China and Afghanistan in Tajikistan, and helped install
pro-Moscow regimes in all former Soviet republics in Central Asia.

The integration of economic structures has been less successful. More
important, however, than the Commonwealth of Independent States' dubious
achievements was the way the political Russian elites thought about their
neighbours, a philosophy expressed in the term "Close Abroad." During the
Vladimir Putin presidency, the not too far abroad has become an even closer
one for Russia. In particular, this applies to Poland's eastern neighbours,
Belarus and Ukraine.

Ukraine's and Belarus's Orientation Undecided

Ever since the early 18th century when Peter the Great laid the groundwork
for an empire that would capture Poland's easternmost territories, conflict
between the two countries was inevitable. Poland came out the loser. Russia
opposed any form of Polish statehood, fearing the reborn state would raise
the issue of the captured territories.

The 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia added a socio-ideological dimension
to the civilisational-cultural conflict. The Polish-Russian war of 1920
failed to determine the question of domination in Belarus and south-eastern
Poland, and the dispute was only limited to the areas Soviet propaganda
referred to as Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

For Soviet Russia, the invasion of September 17, 1939, was an act of
historical justice, a unification of lands belonging to Russia's natural
zone of influence in a single state organism. A border agreement made
between Soviet Russia and Poland's provisional government in August 1945
only legitimated a political reality that was also accepted by the western
powers.

The Soviet Union's collapse, writes Grajewski, again put the question of
Russian domination in Central and Eastern Europe on the agenda. While the
Baltic states adopted a clearly pro-western course, Ukraine's and Belarus's
choice has not been clearly defined. Ukraine's foreign policy has been a
constant zigzagging between initiatives towards European and Atlantic
integration and a continuing strong attraction of the powerful Russian
magnet. Moscow has also skilfully exploited pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine
itself.

Belarus represents an even more complicated case. While president Alexander
Lukashenka is rightly cast in Poland as a villain, it should be noted that
he created a model of statehood that gives Belarussians a substitute of
sovereignty in what is probably the only form possible at the current stage
in the development of their national identity.

For many months now, Lukashenka has been a very uncomfortable partner for
the Kremlin in the talks on the new shape of the Union of Belarus and
Russia, trying to secure maximum sovereignty for his own regime. While
personal ambitions and egotism have certainly played a part here, one should
not rule out the possibility that Lukashenka is also motivated by political
realism and concern for Belarussian statehood that is so uncomfortable to so
many.

In Ukraine, and, particularly, Belarus, the West has done little to support
the forces opposing Russian domination. If the pending talks between Minsk
and Moscow on the introduction of a common currency end with Lukashenka
accepting Russia's terms, which include a single central bank in Moscow,
Belarus's sovereignty will be greatly reduced and Lukashenka's own rule will
face decline.

In Ukraine, if president Leonid Kuchma decides to violate the constitution
to prolong his rule, he will find himself in Russia's embrace, and dependent
on Kremlin's support.

Poland Set to Remain a Challenge for Russian Ambitions

Putin's Russia, writes Grajewski, will certainly remain oriented towards the
West. At the same time, it will do everything to dominate the post-Soviet
space of Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. It has sufficiently strong
assets to influence the course of events in that area. This means that
Poland is losing its eastern buffer and becoming a border state again. It is
not yet clear how the EU's eastern policy is going to look like.

It is in Poland's interest for its eastern border not to become a line of
new division in Central and Eastern Europe. But irrespective of how much
effort Poland puts into developing good relations with the area of eastern
European integration, i.e. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, the situation there

will be determined by the course of events in Russia following Putin's
victory in the this month's presidential elections.

As the EU's easternmost outpost, Poland will always remain a challenge to
Russia's ambitions of domination in eastern Europe. For Belarus, Ukraine,
and the Kaliningrad enclave, Poland will serve as an alternative model of
civilisational and social development, weakening their ties with Russia.
This is why Poland poorly integrated with the European and Atlantic
structures is in Russia's interest.

Russia's interests in Poland are clearly defined today: security of all
kinds of communication and transport routes with the West, security of
commodity transmission lines, particularly natural gas pipelines, and the
securing of a monopoly on the markets for those commodities. The failure of
the Norwegian gas pipeline project, the illegal installation of a
high-capacity fibre-optic connection along the Polish stretch of the Yamal
gas pipeline, or the perturbations around the Odessa-Brody-Plock oil
pipeline project all show that the Russians know how to protect their
interests in Poland.

Tomorrow, perhaps, they will raise again the issue of creating a corridor
that would link Russia proper with the Kaliningrad enclave. Poland's western
partners will look at those postulates with understanding, especially that
they have long co-operated with Russia on various strategic projects.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia stands a chance to become a
global power again. Its immense natural resources and the professionalism of
its political leaders, most of whom are former members of the security
services, or siloviki, open up the prospect of rapid economic growth and
civilisational development.

For the first time in its history, Russia is building its statehood almost
solely on the basis of Russian population. For many Russians, the choice of
Orthodox Christianity as an unofficial state religion strengthens the
specificity of Russian identity. Thanks to Putin's efforts, this year will
probably see the historical unification of the Moscow patriarchate with the
Russian expatriate church, which is going to further strengthen the Russian
Orthodoxy's role in the world of eastern Christianity.

As a result, Russian nationalism will receive a boost from Orthodox
messianism.

Poland Torn Between East and West Would Be Worst Scenario

Western Europe, writes Grajewski, has been watching the recent developments
in Russia calmly. While the Polish press reacted to the results of the
autumn parliamentary elections, which saw the democratic forces
marginalised, with fear, the west's perception has been wholly different.
For western Europe, and France and Germany in particular, the election
results only confirmed Russia's specific line of development, always
different than the European model.

The most important thing, it has been stressed, is that Russia is now more
stable, more predictable, and thus a better business partner. Russia would
have to experience a catastrophe, something that fortunately seems unlikely,
for the West to change its good opinion about Putin's state.

If the EU splits into two areas of integration, Poland should be aware that
the member states favouring closer co-operation perceive Russia as one of
their main strategic allies. If they started passing Poland over in their
dealings with Russia, Poland would be marginalised and its peripheral
situation would only be exacerbated. The consequences would be so dire that
today's problems with Nice and the EU constitution would shrink in
comparison.

Poland's integration with the EU, says Grajewski, is not taking place in a
geopolitical vacuum. Going west, Poland should not be forgetting what is
going on in the east, and the processing occurring there should cause it to
integrate as quickly and as fully as possible with the European structures.
One should not fear a strong Russia. It clearly something that the modern
world needs. What one fears is a weak Poland, torn between the East and
West, a hybrid unable to make a consistent choice. (END)(ARTUIS)