Posted on 12/06/2003 4:21:49 PM PST by Happy2BMe
The truth, at last
(Filed: 07/12/2003)
"The West should thank God that the Iraqi army decided not to fight," Lt Col Dabbagh tells the Telegraph's intrepid Con Coughlin in today's newspaper. "If the army had used these weapons there would have been terrible consequences." The weapons Col Dabbagh was referring to are Saddam Hussein's stocks of chemical and biological warheads. A senior officer at the heart of Saddam's armed forces, the colonel was the conduit of the now-infamous claim in the intelligence dossier which Tony Blair presented to Parliament and to the country: the claim that Saddam had the capacity to unleash weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, within 45 minutes of ordering their use.
Col Dabbagh told Mr Coughlin that the 45-minute claim was "100 per cent correct". He added that Saddam had hidden huge stocks of arms, including his chemical and biological munitions, at secret sites across Iraq. The colonel's claims must be taken very seriously. He has no reason at all to make them up, or to lie to Mr Coughlin, by whom he was reluctant to be interviewed. Yet it is important to be clear about what Col Dabbagh's testimony does - and what it does not - establish. There can now be little doubt that Saddam possessed chemical and biological weapons. Col Dabbagh saw those weapons for himself when they were delivered to his unit, and indeed received instructions on how they were to be used.
The means of delivery for those weapons were, however, extremely primitive: they could only be used on the battlefield, where range was very restricted and their accuracy minimal. That seems to have been one reason why they were not used during the war. The American advance was so rapid that the Iraqis could only deploy chemical weapons around Baghdad: that would have killed the Iraqi civilian population - who did not have masks - but not the US soldiers, who did. Even Iraqi officers loyal to Saddam Hussein balked at that.
It is clear that Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to launch missiles which could carry chemical or biological weapons reliably to most sites in Iraq - never mind to places as far away as Cyprus or London. Yet when the Prime Minister presented the intelligence dossier setting out the case for war to Parliament, he described the threat to Britain from Saddam as "current and serious". He allowed the impression to be given that Saddam's ability to launch chemical and biological weapons "which could be activated in 45 minutes" meant that British troops in Cyprus, or even civilians in Britain itself, could be targeted. This was not true, and many of those in the intelligence services knew it was not true. When, however, the newspapers published stories wrongly claiming that British bases in Cyprus were at risk from Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, no one in the Government did anything whatever to correct them.
Mr Blair's determination to confront Saddam Hussein was admirable and right, but New Labour's addiction to spin, and an inability to tell the truth without embellishing it, meant that, in making the case for war, he misrepresented to the public the intelligence that he had been given. Dr David Kelly conveyed, albeit in a somewhat mangled and self-serving form, the concern of some members of the intelligence world about that misrepresentation to the BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan. The Prime Minister then insisted to Parliament that the BBC had been completely wrong to suggest that there was any unhappiness within the intelligence community about the Government's interpretation of the information given to them about Iraq's WMD capability: but as was revealed during the Hutton Inquiry, there was in fact considerable unhappiness on precisely that point.
Mr Blair's exaggerations and misrepresentations were unnecessary, because there is no doubt that, in the context of the global war on terror, and of al-Qaeda's determination to obtain weapons of mass destruction with which to terrorise the West, Saddam posed a clear threat. Contrary to the claims of those who said it was "inconceivable" that religious fanatics from al-Qaeda could ever make common cause with Saddam and his supporters, precisely that has happened since the Americans liberated Iraq from his grip. There were good reasons for going to war with Iraq. But protecting British bases or cities from missiles launched by Saddam Hussein was not one of them.
"For the preparation of the dossier we had a real concern not to exaggerate the intelligence that we had received," the Prime Minister told Parliament on September 24. Yet he did exaggerate that intelligence. If Lord Hutton cuts to the heart of the matter, Mr Blair will pay a heavy political price for it.
Within a day or two of 911 I heard on NPR (NPR!) that calculations were being run at the Penatgon with the intention of being able to claim the jets used in the attacks, with their fuel and velocity, as WMD in a world court, if it ever came to that.
As I recall, they did give a number on the program, expressed in tons of TNT.
True. It could be in an office building on the 39th floor of the empire state building or a cave in the grand canyon.
Good point, thanks.
He said the weapons were hidden by the Fedayeen. He did not know where they were. His men were to wear masks when deploying the weapons, but he did not know if that was because they had chemical or biological agents.
He said the Fedayeen had hidden them. He was told that his men were to use masks if/when they deployed the weapons, but he was not in charge of hiding the weapons.
This too...Discovery of Chemical Suits Reinforces Concerns,Wednesday, March 26, 2003
CAMP AS SAYLIYAH, Qatar — A U.S. general said Wednesday the discovery of 3,000 chemical suits in a central Iraqi hospital that had been used as an Iraqi base raised concern that Saddam Hussein's regime was prepared to use chemical weapons."What we found at the hospital reinforces our concern," said Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks. "We are well-prepared to deal with the potential use of chemical weapons."
In addition to the chemical suits, the Central Command reported earlier that Marines found and confiscated gas masks and nerve gas antidote injectors in the hospital near An Nasiriyah.
1. Manufacture date may have nothing to do with the usefulness of an item. Nations hold onto useful defense items. We had the same missles and rockets around for years. Did that necessarily make them any less useful? Should nations waste money by manufacturing identical new items, if the old ones are just fine?
2. If weapons and defenses are already in a useful place, they don't get moved. A hospital sounds like a fairly secure and easily reached location. And Saddam's enemies, if they were decent people like us, would probably try to avoid direct hits on hospitals. Were the items at the hospital for years, or moved there around the time the weapons inspectors were in Iraq, or moved there shortly after hostilities began?
3. The condition of the boxes may, or may not, be pertinent. It depends on how they got that way. Boxes don't break themselves.
I'm not curious enough to spend the time to find out if the boxes got broken and dusty shortly before they were found, or if they had been that way for years. Maybe you can help.
Were the boxes broken by fearful Iraqis who thought Saddam would use chemical or biological weapons this year or some time in the past? Were they broken because someone was moving things around? Was the damage and dust from recent hurried activity? Was the cleaning staff on strike?
Were the containers holding antidote broken, too?
I guess only time will tell if Saddam (the invader of Kuwait and murderer of his own people) was holding on to "unconventional" weapons after he lost the first gulf War and was supposed to get rid of them.
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