|
Posted on 07/02/2003 12:11:35 AM PDT by SAMWolf
|
|
 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
|
| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans.
Where the Freeper Foxhole introduces a different veteran each Wednesday. The "ordinary" Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine who participated in the events in our Country's history. We hope to present events as seen through their eyes. To give you a glimpse into the life of those who sacrificed for all of us - Our Veterans.
|
|
The pilot. A. W. "Hap" Reese was a young roughneck from Kingston, PA. His credentials in flight training were among the top cadets in his class of 44C. He was a sober, friendly, likeable, chap who was master of the B-17. (How's that for self praise)  Standing from left to right: James McCloskey (BT), Percy Mack (TG), Charles Kenny, (RO) Clair Hetrick (WG), Albert Knox (WG), and Edward Peters (E) Kneeling from left to right: Joel Lester (B), Don Scheuch (N), Jim Stoner (CP), Willard Reese (P) Our copilot, Jim Stoner, was from a small town near Pittsburg. Like the rest of the crew, he was about 20 years old at the time. A smiling, happy faced, swaggering, "Hot Shot Charlie" type. He was just perfect as a contrast to my rather conservative, reserved nature. Our bombardier was Joel Lester who hailed from Patterson, NJ. Joel was trained as a bombardier/navigator - we did not know it then but this capability would serve us well in the future. Joel was the friendly type who never hesitated to take on any task. Don Scheuch, from Rochester, NY was our navigator. He looked about as young as I did and was very close to my age. His credentials told me that we were lucky to have him. He took very seriously his responsibilities and navigated with pin-point accuracy. We lost Don on his second mission when he flew with another crew and was shot down. Our radioman, Charles Kenney, was a tall handsome fellow from Dayton, Ohio. He never had any trouble making friends with anyone. He was a dedicated to his radio. A solid member of our crew. He held several records for Morse Code speed at the training school he attended. Edward Peters, from Gloucester, MA, was our engineer and there was no better flight engineer in the 8th. He looked older than the rest of us because of his heavy growth of beard that always looked like it needed to be shaved. He knew the B-17 inside and out and could "fix" anything. It takes a very special person to serve in a ball turret and Jim McCloskey was that person on our crew. He never complained . Jim was a fun-loving, blond, energetic lad from Baltimore, MD. We could always count on Jim to handle the toughest job with a smile. Clair Hetrick, our waist gunner, was from a town outside Pittsburg, Pa and was the youngest member of the crew - in fact, he was one of the youngest men to fly in the 8th Air Force. A true military type, he was friendly and diligent and all the crew respected him as I did. Percy Mack was our tail gunner and came from a farming background in Vermont. He was a very sober person who seldom seemed to smile. He was always quick with a witty saying and had a great sense of humor that we all loved. He was a perfect compliment to the makeup of our crew. Officially, Albert Knox was called an armourer (actually a second waist gunner). He was from Colorado and the only one of the crew from west of the Mississippi. He was always congenial and friendly. Paul A. Brook was a Navigator who replaced Don Scheuch. Don was lost on the Nov. 2nd Merseberg raid. Paul was a fun loving adventurer who shared the compartment with Joel Lester and soon made his presence felt as a member of the crew. We never got to know much about his past but he performed his duties well.  Berlin, or Big "B", as we called it, was a target that no one wanted to go to and a target that everyone wanted to go to. It seemed that everyone wanted to participate in a raid on Berlin because bombing big "B" was really striking at the heart of Nazi power and it was, in a way, retribution for the bombing of London, Rotterdam and other major cities. By the same token nobody really wanted to go to Berlin because it was a very long mission over heavily fortified German territory and was very heavily defended by both fighters and antiaircraft. The thought of being in sub-zero temperatures and having an oxygen mask on for eight hours or more was not particularly appealing. The 457th Bomb Group had bombed Berlin several times in the past but the mission of February 3rd, 1945 was to be the biggest in terms of aircraft involved and tons of bombs dropped.  At this point in time the German offense in the Ardennes (Bulge) had been stopped and the Whermacht was now in retreat. The allies were advancing on German soil and the end of the war seemed within grasp. I believe that this raid was a political statement more so than a raid on a strategic target. I'm sure it was felt that this strike at the heart of Nazi power would demoralize the enemy military and civilian forces and put extreme pressure on Hitler to seek an armistice and a quick end to the fighting. Toward this end the allies put up 2000 bombers and over 1000 fighters from the 8th Air Force alone and the British, who bombed exclusively at night, put up many hundreds of Lancasters that preceded the 8th to the target. The RAF went in ahead of the 8th Air Force in darkness and we followed in a bomber stream that is recorded as being 500 miles long. The bombing of Berlin was sustained from near midnight through the following day till near 2:00 PM that afternoon. I recall that before we were within 300 miles of Berlin we could clearly see the RAF Lancaster bombers to the North of us over the Baltic Sea on their return to England having already dropped their bombs on Berlin. The 457th put up 36 planes for this mission and led the 94th Wing with Col. Rogner as commander. We flew as deputy lead in the high box. We had been briefed that the weather over the continent would be CAVU (Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited), a condition that we seldom experienced in the winter of '44/'45. This made the adrenaline flow a little faster because we knew that with clear weather like this the antiaircraft fire would be more devastating than usual. We were not disappointed.  As we formed up over the Glatton buncher it was apparent that the weatherman was correct. I had never seen the sky so clear and the visibility so good. Forming up a bomber stream of 2000 planes is extremely difficult when clouds or fog interfere. Because of the inability to see distant planes in the sky, precautions had to be taken to avoid mid-air collisions involving dozens of planes. There were times when one group would actually fly through another (called shuffling-the- deck) leading to multiple collisions and the loss of many lives. This usually happened over England and was especially heart wrenching because a mid-air collision was usually fatal to the whole crew and sometimes to other crews in the same formation. So, to avoid this, the bomber stream got either strung out or bunched up in bad weather and the crowding sometimes followed you all the way to the target area. That was not the case on February 2nd. We had no trouble forming up and the bomber stream was orderly and well formed. The sky was filled with planes. I often wonder how it looked to those on the ground to see 2000 planes in the air on a clear winter day. We proceeded to the continent without incident, following our prescribed route. Once we crossed the Dutch coast we started to get some antiaircraft fire, which, with this visibility, would continue sporadically for the rest of our 9 hour flight.. Other than the antiaircraft fire that we encountered on the way to Berlin there were several other events that remain fresh in my memory.  First I remember the tail gunner calling "Bandit at 12 o'clock high". I never saw him nor did any of the guns in our plane fire at him. It was a single plane that made one pass at us and disappeared below - being chased by our fighter escort. No one fired at this intruder because he appeared so suddenly, made one pass through the formation at very high speed, and was not identified by any of the crew as a German aircraft. It turned out from information gathered later that we had seen a rocket powered miniature Luftwaffe fighter designated as an ME-163 Komet. This was the only time that we saw this fighter and was one of only a few that got into combat before the end of the war. This was an advanced swept wing rocket powered fighter that could outrun and out climb any Allied fighter but had the shortcoming of being able to make only one pass at a formation because of it's limited fuel. The Komet could climb to extremely high altitude, almost vertically, and then could dive onto a bomber formation at perhaps over 600 mph but would have insufficient fuel to climb again. It had no landing gear so it had to belly land when it returned to it's field. The P-51's did not attempt to catch the Komet only to follow it to it's base and then attack after it had landed or when it was on it's final approach. The other two events occurred about the same time as we passed near Potsdam. Our radio man had almost no duties when we were on the bomb run except to monitor the radio. The radio room had only two small windows, one of them on the port side next to where the radioman sat but above the level of the wing. From this window the radioman could see nothing of the ground, only the top surface of the port wing and the two engines on that side.  Sgt. Kenny called on the intercom just as we crossed our initial point and said that we had been hit by flak in the port wing. None of the others in the crew could see any damage and my instruments showed normal for engines #1 and #2. After returning to Glatton, Sgt. Kenny took me by the hand and led me around the plane to the area of the wing between engine #2 and the fuselage and pointed up. There in the wing was a perfectly round hole about 10 inches in diameter that passed directly through the wing without touching anything vital. A few inches to the port side and it would have punctured one of our fuel tanks. The damage was not at all like holes created by shrapnel. We concluded that an 80 millimeter shell had passed cleanly through our wing without exploding. "I almost never look out that window and especially on the bomb run but this day I did" Kenny said. "While I was looking out, this hole opened up right before my eyes" he said with a look of dismay. I believe we were all pretty lucky that day. Shortly after we passed the initial point (IP - start of the bomb run), the intercom was active with voices from the waist gun position. Sgt. Knox sounded off on the intercom that he had been hit by flak and was asking Sgt. Hetrick to check his leg around the knee. Hetrick, coming to his aid, said that he did not see any blood or any sign of injury. It was not until we returned to our home field that we found what had happened to Knox. Below the waist gun window is a section of armor plate, about 3 ft by 4 ft, intended to protect the gunner from flak or gunfire - not a lot of protection but some. It seems that Knox was kneeling on this plate (which most waist gunners did when flack was bursting nearby) when a piece of shrapnel hit the armor plate very close to the spot where his knee touched the plate. We later examined the hole through the fuselage and could see a major dent in the armor plate made by the flak. Knox carried a bruised knee for several week after but was able to continue flying.  As we approached Berlin at about 25,000 feet (and still a hundred miles from the city) we could see that it was taking a terrible pounding. Smoke billowed from all areas of the city. The smoke made it difficult for our navigator and bombardier to see the check points and our target. This did not seem to have any affect on the antiaircraft gunners however. The flak was intense and a number of planes from the earlier groups were seen over the city trying to maintain flight with one or more engines feathered or on fire. Our target on this day was the bridge across the River Spree. With the visibility so good each squadron dropped it's bombs on it's squadron leader instead of on the group lead. To do this we had to space out each squadron of our group before we started the bomb run. It was a procedure we had followed many times and presented only minor problems. We dropped on our squadron leader and the bombing results were excellent. We were the seventh group in the Division formation that was led by the 379th Bomb Group with Col. Lewis Lyle as Air Commander. Col. Lyle's comments about the mission were as follows: "There was a bomber stream three to five hundred miles long. Turning off the target and heading back to England, there were bombers heading for Berlin, practically all the way back to England. It was a very successful mission". After dropping our bombs we turned north and then west and headed back to England over the Baltic Sea. The group lost no planes on this mission. Eight other planes besides ours were damaged by flak. The mission was long and it was eventful. We all slept well that night.
|
Many stories have been written about the gallant defenses and the huge losses that were sustained by the Eighth Air Force as a result of Luftwaffe attacks on our bomber formations. And, to be sure, they were especially devastating and very often resulted in major losses of bombers and crews. Aircrew gunners have written time and again of the exchanges between their 50 caliber guns and the 20 millimeter cannons of the enemy and how bomber crews had fought off enemy planes and persisted in spite of the attacks. The "Memphis Belle" and "Twelve O'clock High" films are testaments to the tenacity of aerial combat.
I'm sure, however, that when the records are finalized and one looks closely at the losses, it will be determined that more B-17's were lost to antiaircraft fire than to FW190's or ME109's. One could not shoot back at "Flak" so it tended to be less glorious -- but nonetheless deadly.
On a clear day, when the antiaircraft gunners could see our formation, they were cleared to fire at any plane which they might pick out and adjust the direction and altitude of their shell bursts as they fired and as might be necessary. The quality of the German antiaircraft guns and the skill of their gunners made life miserable for those of us who had to fly straight and level through a sea of bursting flak and flying shrapnel. If "practice makes perfect", then the German gun crews were the best. Here is a typical German battery of four 88 milimeter antiaircraft guns and their crews firing in unison (barrage).
The following is about one of our many encounters with flak. It's about a German gun crew firing at a plane almost five miles above them. A gun crew whose accuracy and persistence almost brought to an end the tour of one crew of ten men in a B17.
Weeks later we learned that six of the crewmen did not survive.
It was not unusual, after a visual bomb run with heavy flak, for the formation to break after dropping its bombs. Each plane would take it's own evasive action to try to avoid the flak and then later reassemble with the squadron after leaving the target area. We felt safe from Luftwaffe fighters at this time since any attack while we were in the target area would also expose them to their own friendly flak fire.
Then, suddenly we were hit.
The explosion was in the nose compartment of the plane where the navigator and bombardier were located. Even with our helmets and headphones on, the sound was deafening. A fierce, cold wind suddenly blew through the pilots compartment. A quick glance at the instrument panel told me that engine number three had been hit. The oil pressure was dropping rapidly. Flying bits of aluminum gave me a clue that there was damage overhead in the pilots compartment and our instrument panel now had a major dent from the force of shrapnel hitting the forward side of the panel.
A quick look upward told me that some flak had penetrated the fuselage above my head and there were several nicks in the bullet resistant glass of the windshield that had not been there before. Our bombardier and navigator crawled out of the nose and retreated through the pilots compartment to the radio room. From the rush of cold air we new there was a major opening in the nose of the plane and the acrid smell of gunpowder lingered in the air. The air temperatures at this altitude in the winter frequently exceeded 40 degrees below zero.
We were now down to about 16000 feet and far from our squadron which was reassembling several thousand feet above us. With only three engines we were never able to catch up with our group but we were able to keep them in sight till we reached the English coast. Again we were fortunate that no fighters were in the area as the physical condition of our plane and our isolated location was a 'made-to-order' type kill for them.
After crossing the Dutch coast we dropped down to about 2000 feet over the North Sea where the air temperature was considerably warmer. It had become unbearably cold in the pilot's compartment and, although it was February the blast of air now flowing through our compartment felt comfortably warm.
We continued to Glatton on our three engines and landed without incident.
As I loosened my parachute to leave my seat and review the damage first hand, I observed that the flak fragment that had pierced the fuselage almost directly above my head had indeed come close. It was lodged in my parachute directly behind my left shoulder. I later dug out the fragment and still have it today. A souvenir of a close call -- both to the plane, the crew, and to me. A slow walk around the plane made me aware of how fortunate we had been. The front end of the plane suffered major damage. The plexiglas nose was almost completely gone. There was a hole just above and to the starboard side of the navigator's compartment about a foot in diameter (where our exploding 50's had exited) and the chin turret was inoperable. One of the two 50 caliber guns veered off at a sharp angle from the other. Several other fragments had punctured the fuselage in the navigator compartment, the leading edge of the right wing, and the cowling of the number three engine.
Addenda:
The following is an excerpt from official War Dept. document about "Flak" and the results of flak on the air war over Europe.
Fliegerabwehrkanonen ( FLAK ) Ack-Ack
The accuracy and effectiveness of FLAK or anti-aircraft artillery fire was derided at the start of the war but it gained a healthy respect as the war dragged on. By 1942 15,000 88mm ( 3.46 in ) guns formed the bulk of heavy flak defenses for Germany. Large numbers of 37mm ( 1.47 in ) and 20mm ( 0.79 in ) guns filled the skies with shells during every air raid. Often arrayed in "belts" around a city or target 88s could fire 22 lb ( 10 kg ) shells up to 35,000 ft ( 10,600 m ) at a rate of 15 - 20 rounds per minute. The excellent 88mm ( 3.46 in ) gun proved very effective especially when radar was used to help with aiming. The shells exploding at a preset altitude sending metal splinters flying in all directions. Later groups of up to 40 heavy flak guns Grossbatterien fired rectangular patterns of shellbursts known as box barrages that proved very deadly to enemy bombers.
In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,501 American planes destroyed, enemy fighters shot down about 600 less in the same time period. More flak guns gradually appeared, mainly the 128mm ( 5 in ) German Flak accounted for 50 of the 72 RAF bombers lost over Berlin on the night of March 24th, 1944. An incredible 56 bombers were destroyed or crippled by flak during a B-17 raid on Merseburg in November of 1944.
www.wpafb.af.mil
sbl.salk.edu
www.brooksart.com
www.flightjournal.com
www.collectorslanehobbies.com
World War II Magazine
| 'The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a dozen other places, they put their rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind' -- Arthur 'Bomber' Harris (RAF)
The Eighth Air Force's frustrations had many architects. Allied intelligence had underestimated the resilience and capacity of German industry. In 1943, German manufacturing had yet to reach its peak wartime productivity. The dispersion and fortification of German factories--some even went underground--made them less vulnerable. And as the Allies would eventually learn, high-explosive bombs might destroy German structures but not necessarily the machine tools and assembly lines that were vital to production. Moreover, the Luftwaffe proved an experienced and determined foe. The Luftwaffe had prepared for the coming air assault with sophisticated ground defenses and fighter support, and it incrementally matched the Allies' air offensive for much of the war. By January 1943, the Luftwaffe had begun to build a modern, organized strategic defense, which would enjoy increasing success against the Allied strategic bombing campaign. The growth of the American daylight campaign combined with British missions to give the Luftwaffe fighter divisions and anti-aircraft forces an increasing amount of on-the-job training. By the fall of 1943, the Germans possessed the most sophisticated strategic air defenses the world had yet seen. With radar warning systems and centralized control of interceptor forces, the Luftwaffe massed its fighters along the bombers' routes. Increased fighter output more than doubled the Luftwaffe's single-engine interceptor strength. By mid-1943, there were almost 800 German fighters operational, a number that would continue to rise. These additional aircraft made it possible to deepen the air defense zone. By the summer of 1943, the Germans would have a fighter network 450 miles deep, supplemented by dozens of auxiliary airfields that were well-stocked with fuel and ammunition. With this support, it was possible for Luftwaffe pilots to fly up to four sorties against a single Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress mission. Once engaged, the German interceptors had a variety of techniques to blow holes in the B-17s' formations of interlocking machine-gun fire. Head-on and underneath attacks exploited gaps in the Flying Fortresses' firepower as daring German pilots, flying the agile Messerschmitt Me-109 and Focke Wulf Fw-190, whirled through the American formations. The standard tactic against American heavy bomber formations was a phased attack. German twin-engine fighters like the Me-110s, Me-210s and Me-410s fired rockets into the formations in an attempt to break them up. Meanwhile, Fw-190s, equipped with a 30mm long-range cannon, lobbed shells into the formations from head-on or underneath, their shells exploding with a lethal radius of 100 yards. As the American formations broke up, the Me-109s fell on bombers that had been damaged or isolated. The result was catastrophic. Unable to gain air superiority over the Reich, the self-protecting Flying Fortresses and Liberators were forbidden to strike deep into Germany until long-range fighters could escort them there and back. General Ira Eaker's unwavering belief in his heavy bombers' ability to reach the German heartland unescorted was shattered. -- Brian Todd Carey |
.......FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole! That deserves repeating!
you've got freepmail
Bomber boxes of B-17's or B-24's attacking alone gave the Germans a tactical problem they solved fairly easily. When you add the long range fighters to the mix, the Germans were not able to cope. To kill the bombers they needed heavy cannon and thick armor on thir planes. And the twin engine planes like the ME-110 and ME-210 had great utilty.
Throw even a few Mustangs, Thunderbolts or Lightnings into that mix, and the Germans had a serious problem. They never did solve that.
There would have been no 1944 invasion of Europe without the work the bombers and their escorts did in destroying the German day fighter force.
It should also be remembered that there were only four and then later 8 B-17 groups active in England. They might put up @ 100 aircraft for a given mission early in 1943. And yet this tiny force scared the Germans very badly, prompting them to bring back the bulk of their day fighters from the Mediteranean and the Russian Front. Eighty percent of the German day fighters were opposing the USAAF. When you realize of course that the Germans were losing in Russia, this is amazing.
"On March 18th at Vegesack, the 305th managed to place 76% of its bombs within 1,000 feet of the MPI [mean point of impact] in the most precise piece of bombing so far turned out by the B-17's. After two further missions to other French railyards without loss, the Force revisited to Germany. In perfect visibilty 73 B-17s and 24 B-24's dropped 268 tons of high explosive squarely on Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau, the submarine yards at Vegesack that had also been the briefed target for the first raid on the Reich back in January. From the evidence of reconnaisance photographs, seven submarines were assessed as severely damaged and two thirds of the shipyard buildings and much of the plant appeared to have been demolished....this mission was later said to have proved the case for high-altitude precision bombing, and its success doubtless influenced those US war leaders who sought evidence to justify the direction of a goodly part of the US war effort to creating a strategic bombing force."
"The first mission of April brought more evidence of the value of the bombardment campaign when Fortresess left the Renault works at Paris a smoking ruin; It took six months to resume full production, denying the enemy 3,075 lorries...the target was picked out inspite of industrial haze that shrouded much of the city...bombs of the 305th Fortresses struck at least 19 factory buildings..."
"The first mission fulfilled under the new directive was the disruption of the synthetic rubber plant at Huls...Although the Eighth's first large scale penetration of the Ruhr, the most heavily defended area of the Third Reich at that time, the mission resulted in the most effective bombardment of a strategic target yet achieved...just under one quarter of the bomb tonnage dropped, exploded within the factory area rendering the plant inoperative for a month. Full production was not resumed for six months."
--The Mighty Eighth, by Roger Freeman
"The raiders managed to inflict heavy damage on the Focke-Wulf Factory at Oscherleben, where half their bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, and on one of the three targets near Brunswick, where three quarters of the bombs found their mark."
"Despite the punishment they took, both the Regensburg and Schweinfurt raiders managed to inflict substantial damage on their targets. At Regensburg every important building was hit by incendiary or high explosive bombs."
--The Airwar in Europe, Time Life books
Erhard Milch, reich minister for production:
"The two great achievements of the Allied strategic air offensive must be conceded to the Americans: the defeat of the Luftwaffe by the Mustang escort-fighter, and the inception of the deadly oil offensive. 'The British inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said Milch after the war, 'but the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'
--"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings
B-17's rule.
Walt
I think that the quote by Milch is one of the best tributes to the crews of the 8th Air Forces.
'The British inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us, but the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
