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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Posted on 12/16/2002 5:38:35 AM PST by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Dec. 16, 1944 - Jan. 25, 1945 Note: Since all the mentions of this army and that army can become confusing, German units are given in italics, and American units are in normal type.  The Battle of the Bulge began with the German attack (Operation Wacht am Rhein and the Herbstnebel plan) on the morning of December 16, 1944. Two later attacks on New Year's Day 1945 attempted to create second fronts in Holland (Operation Schneeman) and in northern France (Operation Nordwind). The overall German plan is laid out in the map above (from Hugh Cole's official history "The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge", Map IX). In the original plan, three Armies (the Sixth Panzer Army [referred to by Hitler as Sixth SS Panzer Army but not formally designated as SS at the time - Cole, p. 76], Fifth Panzer Army, and Seventh Army) would attack. In a revised plan on November 1, 1944, the Sixth Panzer Army, for political reasons [Cole, p. 34], was given the official role of making the main effort and capturing Antwerp. .gif) The Fifth Panzer Army was not designated as the main force in name, but it actually had the responsibility of hitting the center of the American lines, promptly capturing the highly strategic rail and road center of St. Vith, and driving on to capture Brussels. The Seventh Army in the south was to peel off as it moved west and then turn and form a defensive line, in order to form a buffer area to prevent U.S. reinforcements from hitting the Fifth Panzer Army. In the offical order signed by Hitler on November 10, 1944, the Fifteenth Army was added [Cole, pp. 34-36]: The Fifteenth Army "was not to be employed until the Allies had reacted in force to the German attack, and in any case could not be expected to launch a large-scale attack until the Allied front east of Aachen had been drastically denuded of troops." In fact, on December 13, 1944, the US 2nd Infantry Division began an attack in the Fifteenth Army area that further nullified any effect the Fifteenth Army might have in the attack. With the exception of the critical road and rail center at St. Vith, the main towns were to be bypassed by the attacking panzer (armored) forces, so that the speed of the attack would not be slowed. Rear echelon infantry would clean out the bypassed towns. The military goal was to capture Antwerp and cut off the Allied troops to the north. The political goal was to cause division among the Allies and destroy the Allied coalition. The terrain was the dense Ardennes Forest. The weather was chilly mist and fog, so that Allied air support was nullified until December 23. (In fact, one of the German plans was named Herbstnebel or Autumn Mist.) In addition, ground visibility for the troops was often very low, due to the trees and fog. The dense forest had very few roads, none of which were large. Traffic jams on both sides of the front were a major problem for both Armies.  The only railroad on the entire front to cross from Germany into Belgium came to St. Vith, Belgium, making St. Vith, which was also a major road junction the most vital initial prize the Germans sought, in order to allow supplies to flow to support the remainder of the attack. It was no accident that St. Vith was right in the very center of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies: St. Vith had to be the main line of supply for both Armies. The German plan called for capture of St. Vith by 1800 on December 17 by Fifth Panzer Army, but the defenders held at St. Vith until late on December 21. This led the German Fifth Panzer Army Commander, Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel, to recommend to Hitler's adjutant on December 24 that "the German Army give up the attack and return to the West Wall." Manteuffel's reason for this recommendation was "due to the time lost by his Fifth Panzer Army in the St. Vith area." [Manteuffel press conference of 22 December 1964 in Watertown, NY] Hitler did not accept Manteuffel's recommendation, and the German supplies began to run out. German columns ran low on gas and ammunition well before reaching even their first major goal: the Meuse River. On December 23, the weather cleared, and Allied planes finally filled the skies in support of the besieged American troops. (Some of the GI's had wondered why they saw German planes before that, despite the conditions, but saw no American planes.)  Slowly but surely the Allies -- from the North, the West, and the South -- closed the salient, the Bulge. The First US Army troops from the north met the Third US Army troops from the south at Houffalize, Belgium on January 16, 1945. St. Vith was recaptured on January 23, 1945. The ending date of the Bulge is considered as January 25, 1945, since this was the date on which the lost positions were officially thought to have been completely regained. In fact, as a series of letters in the VBOB "Bulge Bugle" have noted, some positions were not regained until after January 25, 1945. In the largest battle ever fought by the U. S. Army, with 600,000 GI's involved, it is difficult to place one unit or location ahead of another in importance. But the reality is that two crucial stands at the front lines are what really doomed the German attack to certain failure: Holding the Northern Shoulder: The 99th Infantry Divsion and the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion bore the brunt of the Sixth Panzer Army attack on Day 1, and they held most of their ground, creating what would become the northern shoulder. (Keep in mind that the southern shoulder was one that the Germans themselves intended to form with their Seventh Army -- which they pretty much succeeded in doing.) Holding St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division and the 106th Infantry Division, with elements of the 9th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division, held St. Vith four days beyond the German timetable. Even the German Fifth Panzer Army commander recognized that the attack was doomed as a result.  It is significant to note that the 7th Armored Division was near Aachen, Germany when the German attack began. The 7th Armored Division had to move 60-70 miles to the south on Day 2. If the 99th Infantry Division and 291st Engineer Combat Battalion had not held on the northern shoulder, the 7th Armored Division never would have reached St. Vith. Even when the 7th Armored Division had reached St. Vith, it was the troops on the northern shoulder and the newly arrived 82nd Airborne Division that kept a very narrow escape route open for the virtually surrounded defenders of St. Vith. But once the defense of St. Vith was set up, that defense also bolstered the defense of the northern shoulder, as both defenses forced the German columns off of their planned routes and led to considerable congestion as the Gemran columns were then funneled in between the northern shoulder and the St. Vith salient. But what about Bastogne? In popular thinking, the Battle of the Bulge is synonymous with the Battle of Bastogne. This is very unfortunate, since it ignores the real military keys (holding the northern shoulder and holding St. Vith) to the defeat of the Germans. Journalists hungry for some sign of American success at stopping the German onslaught played up the defense of Bastogne, where Gen. Anthony McAuliffe (101st Airborne Division) said "Nuts" to a German surrender demand and where the Third US Army (10th Armored Division) broke through the German Seventh Army's buffer to reach the surrounded town on Day 3 of the Battle of the Bulge. This was truly heroic stuff. But from a military strategy point of view (and this can easily be seen on the map above), while Bastogne was a strategically important major road junction for sustaining the attack, it was on the periphery of the attack and well behind the initial front lines. The German plan was to have the panzers bypass Bastogne and let the later echelons of infantry and artillery units clean it out. And the panzers did succeed in bypassing Bastogne, so that their plan in that sector was on schedule. As a source for rallying U. S. spirits, the defense of Bastogne and McAuliffe's "Nuts" were a success. But from a strategic perspective, the German fate had already been sealed at St. Vith, when they could not take that critical supply center on Day 2 - nor on Days 3, 4, 5, and most of 6. Bastogne did not become surrounded by forces intent on taking it until the night of December 21, Day 6 of the Battle of the Bulge. And the famous "Nuts" did not come until December 22, Day 7. Heroic as the deeds of the defenders of Bastogne were, the defense of Bastogne is a very important secondary element but not one of the true strategic keys to the German failure. 
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On Dec.16,1944 all Hell broke loose in the Ardennes. Enemy artillery and mortars ripped into the division's 25 mile line. Fanatic Wehrmacht elements threw themselves at the 28th immediately after barrages. Nazis attempted to throw back the Allies in a tremendous counter-thrust. In the path of the German fury was the 28th Inf. Div. 28th Division Held Ardennes.
Five crack enemy divisions - Panzer, Infantry, Volksgrenadier - hurled across the Our River the first day of the assault. Second Bn.,109th; 1st and 3rd Bns.,11Oth; 1st Bn.,112th, rocked most severely under the first blows, lashed back to ward off attacks, caused many enemy casualties. But Germans struck again and again. Enemy reserves from the east threw their weight behind the steamrolling push. Germans pounded American lines continuously. Enemy tanks rolled up in support of Nazi infantry.
The day wore on. Division lines snapped under excessive pressure. Units were isolated, surrounded. Co. B, 110th, was encircled, lost contact with battalion. Men fought and died in their places. Co.I, 110th, pinned down at Weiler, hacked its way out of encirclement at night, joined its battalion in Clervaux.
Clervaux had been the division rest area for a month. Now it was a roaring battlefield as resting men scrambled to form hasty defenses.
Nine enemy divisions were identified in the striking force that kept hammering 28th troopers. Keystone men were outnumbered, overrun, cut off. But they refused to panic. The 28th fought, delayed, and fought.
The 112th plugged the line for two days before pulling north to join the 106th Inf. Div. as a combat team. Route of the regiment from the time it lost contact with the 28th was a path from Luxembourg to Belgium: Weiswampach, Huldange, Beiler, Rogery, Veilsam, Mormont.
For three days the 109th held fast, then set up positions on a hill northeast of Diekirch. Next day, it moved to screen the left flank of the 9th Armored Div. to which it later was attached. Christmas Eve brought not good cheer to Nazis but another attack. The regiment shifted its lines to the high ground between Ettelbruck and Mostroff. Two days later, it rejoined the 28th at Naufchateau.
The 229th F.A. part of the 112th combat team, during the Ardennes breakthrough often had to leave their big guns, pick up rifles, and work alongside the infantrymen in close-in fighting. When the batteries were forced to withdraw, it was noted the crews would pull them a little farther. They did not want the Nazis to know that they were displacing the howitizers, They moved at night by the truck drivers following a white handkerchief and the roar of the enemy tanks drowning out the sound of the trucks.
Meantiine, the 110th was weathering staggering blows. Wiltz was the division CP location since mid-November. The town was a vital transportation hub. It was also one of the first objectives of the German breakthrough.
The 110th, near Wiltz, suffered severe attacks all along its front. But the battered regiment was not alone in its defense. Division troops pitched in; MPs, postal and finance clerks, QM and Division Hq. personnel, band men formed a provisional defense battalion to block the German blow.
The 28th held Ardennes From Dec. 16 to Christmas Day. It was everybody's fight. Outstanding acts of bravery became routine. Morley Cassidy, war correspondent in a nation-wide broadcast to America, said: "The 28th Division has performed one of the greatest fetes in the history of the American Army. Against nine divisions it has held so firmly that the German timetable has been thrown off completely."
According to Nazi plan, Bastogne was to have been gained on the second day, not reached until the third, and not by-passed until the sixth day.
The German breakthrough had struck at the 28th in all its violence. The division had reeled under its impact, suffered the crush but warded off disastrous defeat. Keystone men pulled back to an area where they could recover from the shock, where they could prepare to avenge and slash back at the enemy.
Early 1945 was spent near Charleville where the 28th - less the 112th Combat Team - defended the Meuse River from Givet to Verdun. Troops manned outposts at road junctions and bridges in key cities: Sedan, Verdun, Rocroi, Charleville, Stenay, and Buzancy.
The 112th Combat Team returned to the division Jan. 13 after almost four weeks of continuous contact with the enemy in the Ardennes area "somewhere in Belgium." Four days later, the division moved southeast to Sixth Army Group's sector.
The same Keystone Division that the German radio had declared "wiped out" now was ready again. In September, 1944, a Division slogan contest netted the following motto-. "28th Roll On." Hard hit in the Hurtgen Forest, harder hit In the Ardennes breakthrough, Keystone men still personified their division slogan. The 28th was to smash through the enemy once more, was to continue to live up to its slogan and Roll On!
Success of the division is the result of every man in every unit, organic or attached.
The 107th F.A.,108th F.A.,109th F.A.,and the 229th F.A.all contributed to the terror of the Germans. The 103rd Combat Engineers, kept the division rollin . Engineers built bridges and roads, handled mines, destroyed pillboxes and fought as infantry. Their missions: all accomplished.
Forward or rear, the 103rd Medics - medical aid men on the line, technicians at aid stations - conquered in another kind of battle. Keystone men never suffered from lack of proper medical attention.
The 28th Recon Troop, cannon companies, anti-tankers, Headquarters Special Troops, clerical personnel, 28th Signal Go., 28th QM Co., 28th MP Platoon, 728th Ord. Co., the band - they are all Keystone men, every man a soldier.
The 630th TD Bn. fought continuously with front line Joes. The 447th AAA Bn., one of the first ack-ack units to hit France, D plus 1, the 707th Tank Bn., contributed many pages to the 28th division story.
In World War 1, General Pershing referred to the 28th as the "Iron Division;' in World War 2, the Germans called the 28th.the "Bloody Bucket Division."
A sad but common story. I was lucky enough to inherit a bag of V-mail letters my father wrote home during his service, spanning the period from April 1942 through April 1946, when he was finally discharged from the Army hospitals. (He died in 1958 from the cumulative trauma of wounds and disease suffered during 2+ years of jungle warfare.) Otherwise his story would have died with him, too.
Yes they do. But the NEA makes sure the kids feel good about themselves -- even if they are ignorant -- and indoctrinates kids to be 'tolerant' of every religion except Christianity and every culture other than our own.
That's good that you have those. It's important for those stories to not die with the veterans.
My hubby kept every single letter I wrote him when I was deployed for the Gulf War, and I kept every one he wrote me. Someday my kids or future grandkids may want to have them.
No My unit was not attached to him for that long. However one of my friends was a tank commander in Africa and Patton was doing an inspection and asked him how he was. My friend told Patton that his feet were killing him. He needed a size 14 and was issued something smaller. Patton had a note made of his problem and shortly he had two pairs of shoes. One pair he lost in combat but retained the other. Patton maybe cared more for the troops than being remembered just from the slapping incident.
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