[aruanan]

The scientist, by the criteria of his craft, must ignore non-scientific input when explaining a process, even one that is hypothetical, as this one is. Thus he must not consider scripture, creedal or faith-based affirmations, or the possibilities of miracles.

This is somewhat of a misstatement of what science is all about. It's not surprising, though, since naturalists have worked hard to conflate the practice of science with the philosophy of naturalism.

It's scientific to say that one should make sure that one's instruments should provide accurate measurements. But it's not scientific to say that nothing exists except that which is, at least in principle and via instrumentation, open to observation by our senses. It's scientific to say that effects have causes. It's not scientific to say that effects can have only materialist causes.

Thus, if it is true that there exists a reality that is ontologically discontinuous from our reality but which is able, at will, to interact with it and to effect changes in it, the naturalist has put himself into a position of being unable to make an accurate assessment of cause and effect. He has done this because he has, from the beginning, simply declared certain possibilities not to exist. He doesn't do this upon a scientific basis, but upon a philosophical one.

So, presented with the claim that Jesus was killed, was buried, and rose from the dead, he responds that this is impossible and that the appearance to the contrary is only that, an appearance, and must, therefore, be accounted for by an appeal to ignorance (those people back then didn't understand natural law), deceit (either he never died or the followers are lying about his resurrection), or wishful thinking (it was a myth that developed centuries after the purported incident). They make none of these arguments on a scientific basis. But if it is, indeed, true that Jesus was killed and rose from the dead, then, by their previous decision as to what they'll accept as reality, they cut themselves off from this by believing, for one reason or another, something about the event that is, in fact, not true.

[grey_whiskers]

It's scientific to say that one should make sure that one's instruments should provide accurate measurements. But it's not scientific to say that nothing exists except that which is, at least in principle and via instrumentation, open to observation by our senses. It's scientific to say that effects have causes. It's not scientific to say that effects can have only materialist causes.

Sorry for the late reply, I have been cruising Shroud of Turin posts and just ran across this!

I agree in large measure with what you say, but there is another reason the scientist excludes miracles from consideration: by definition, they are not regular (they are, by definition, exceptions), and neither can they be controlled for.

Allowing for them in one's models is therefore well-nigh maddening.

This is not to imply that miracles are impossible--but trying to allow for them (assuming God would be kind enough to inform you of upcoming miracles in advance) is outside the realm of "controllable"--and, on the whole, they are rare enough that neglecting them still allows one to make generally useful, generally testable models and predictions about the natural world one studies.

Freepmail me back if you want a couple of scientist jokes and a quote from a C.S. Lewis novel which further illustrate these points.

Cheers!